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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the work of British and American Quakers in the Spanish Civil 
War and its immediate aftermath. The focus is on the relief effort and the relief 
workers who operated in the field, but it also looks at the development of the 
Friends' Peace Testimony as it emerged into the modern world of civil wars and 
humanitarian aspirations. After examining the general history of Quaker attitudes 
to peace and at the early history of the two relief bodies-the American Friends 
Service Committee and the Friends' Service Council-the thesis takes a largely 
chronological approach to the history of Quaker relief in Spain. In addition to 
examining the work done the thesis considers the individual and corporate 
motivations of the relief workers and the practical consequences of their 
developing perceptions of the situation in which they operated. 
This research is intended both as a contribution to Quaker history-moving 
beyond hagiography to explore the motivations behind individual and corporate 
Quaker action-and as a contribution to current historiography of the Spanish Civil 
War, which tend to focus on the military and political events. In addition this thesis 
should be seen as a contribution to the currently rather sparse research on the 
history of the modern refugee crisis and accompanying relief work. 
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Introduction 
The relief work for Spanish refugees is one of the longest continuous pieces of work 
the Society of Friends (Quakers) has attempted, lasting from 1936-1942 in Europe 
and continuing in Mexico throughout the Second World War. The Friends' work 
in Spain and in France was framed by a situation which has become commonplace 
in the twentieth century, operating first in a country rent by civil war, and later 
with permanently displaced persons. The methods by which they tried to deal with 
these circumstances were often improvised and based on theories of resettlement 
which had been practised in contexts other than a civil war but some of the 
concerns they expressed have since become embedded in modern approaches to 
aid. 
This thesis is an examination of the Quaker witness to peace in the Spanish 
Civil War and its aftermath and is intended as a contribution both to Quaker 
history and to the more general history of relief work in the twentieth century. The 
thesis explores the public declaration of faith through action made by the two 
Quaker organisations which sent these individuals to Spain: the Friends Service 
Council of London Yearly Meeting (FSC) and the American Friends Service 
Committee (AFSC), an independent charity. Its focus is on one active manifestation 
of the Friends' peace testimony: the relief work carried out in Spain and France, 
1936-1942. The relief work in Spain took place on both sides of the political and 
military divide: the work, therefore, helped to define the nature of the Friends' 
much-vaunted neutrality as a neutrality of intervention and not of non- 
involvement, but it was in itself a relatively new test for the Peace Testimony. In 
part, I hope to be able to assess to what degree the work in Spain answered that 
test. 
Friends' relief work in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was 
almost always framed as work for peace and not work for social justice. However, 
the statement termed the Peace Testimony is fundamentally a quietist testimony 
of non-involvement. The conversion of this testimony to a more activist mode is a 
consequence of the political currents of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The increasing prominence of the Peace Testimony in the public eye has 
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served to obscure the degree to which the incorporation of the lesser known 
testimony to social justice is essential to any activist manifestation of this testimony. 
Without the testimony to social justice "peace" may be defined in ways which are 
inherently at variance with Quaker understandings of justice and equality. It is this 
interface which is central to this thesis which is otherwise simply about some very 
admirable people who went to work in famine relief. 
A second line of argument in this thesis will focus on the role of both 
individual and group witness in the practicalities of relief. Workers' individual 
witness, and that of their agency, influenced the choices they made and the 
paradigm within which they operated. I intend to demonstrate how, whilst 
missionary work rapidly disappeared from the relief workers' short term 
objectives, it continued as a desired long term aim and helped to structure the 
mode in which the work was managed. However, I do not intend, in this thesis, to 
explore the reaction of American and British Friends as a whole to the Spanish 
Relief Mission. This decision has been taken because of the very different natures 
of the American and British Society of Friends. Whilst the British membership is 
easy to delineate as those people holding membership in Meetings affiliated to 
London Yearly Meeting, the multi-denominational nature of American Quakers 
and the ideological disparity between the denominations make it difficult to give 
any sense of a Society as a whole. In addition, many of the publications of the 
United States Friends largely ignored the Spanish crisis, focussing instead on the 
conflict in China where a number of evangelical missionaries were stationed. 
Although there is a comparative element to this thesis, particularly when 
modes of organisation and ideology are discussed, this is not intended as a 
comparative history. Instead, the thesis is a history of one project carried out jointly 
by diverse groups. The insuperable obstacle in the way of writing a comparative 
history is Alfred Jacob himself, the central figure of the British relief effort. Jacob 
was born and brought up in America, but went to England to take a degree in 
History and Spanish at Oxford. He later took British citizenship, married an 
English woman, Norma Jacob, and went to Spain in 1936 as a representative of the 
(British) FSC, but in 1940 returned to the USA with his wife and children. Because 
of his pacifism and therefore his conviction that he could not defend the United 
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States by force of arms, he has never applied to restore his American citizenship. 
The Friends' involvement in the Spanish Civil War has gone relatively 
unremarked. A brief account of Spanish relief is to be found in John 
Ormerod 
Greenwood's book, Quaker Encounters: Volume I, Friends and Relief,, ' and there 
is an account of the British Friends' fund-raising campaign in Jim Fyrth's The 
Signal 
Was Spain: the Aid Spain Movement in Britain 1936-1939.2 Both suffer from an 
over-reliance on public sources: records of Yearly Meeting (the governing 
body of 
British Friends) and letters to The Friend and other newspapers, and on the 
pamphlet Quaker Service in Spain, 1936-1940, which was published by the Friends 
Service Council (FSC) in 1940. For both authors this was inevitable as the files of the 
Friends Service Committee for the Relief of Spain were not available to the public 
until 1989. Quaker Encounters spares only seven pages for the work in Spain and 
draws its evidence from Minutes of Meeting for Sufferings, Yearly Meeting 
Minutes and a number of biographies. Other publications include a report 
produced by the International Commission (a Quaker sponsored umbrella 
organisation) in 1940, when the work was as yet unfinished; and two occasional 
papers published by the Russell Sage Foundation? All are essentially institutional 
narratives of the work done, and none attempts to explore the personalities, 
motivations or ideologies behind the work. The only publications which do attempt 
any sort of analysis are a number of autobiographies, mainly by non-Quakers who 
served with the Friends. Most of these amount to little more than personal 
reminiscence and anecdote, but where appropriate these books have been used to 
explore workers' responses to their surroundings. More significant to this thesis is 
Howard Kershner's Quaker Service in Modem War. 4 Howard Kershner, a New 
York Quaker, was appointed Director of the International Commission and 
'William Sessions Ltd., York, 1975. 
2Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1986. 
3 "In Spain, 1937-39", by John Van Gelder Forbes, and "In France, 1941-42", by the American 
Friends Service Committee, 1943, Administration of Relief Abroad: A Series of Occasional 
Papers: Recent Relief Programs of the American Friends in Spain and France, Russell Sage 
Foundation, London, 1944. 
'Prentice Hall, Inc., New York, 1950. 
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Director of Friends' relief in Spain and France in late 1938. His personality was such 
as profoundly to influence the nature of Friends' activities and this will be 
discussed in depth in Chapter Six. His autobiography shows a powerful personality 
embodying strong views which coloured and distorted his recollections. For 
reasons best known to himself, Howard Kershner provided very few dates in the 
book and moved quickly from event to event with little reference to chronology, 
moving back in time as often as forwards. In addition, Kershner felt that as he 
could not mention all names he would mention almost none. The book is therefore 
interesting but misleading. Kershner's strong opinions and overwhelming 
conviction of the righteousness of his own actions further undermines confidence 
in this book. 
The neglect by Quaker historians of Quaker relief work in the Spanish Civil 
War is part of a wider context of neglect: there has been little social history of the 
war written in English. English-language historians working on the Spanish Civil 
War have overwhelmingly concentrated on political and military events. English- 
language works on the Spanish Civil War usually focus on the political or military 
situation in Spain, or on the political ramifications of Non-Intervention. An 
additional distortion, to which this thesis will unfortunately contribute, has been 
the tendency to shape the war in terms of its impact upon those foreigners 
involved, for example the biographies of International Brigaders and Jim Fyrth's 
book The Signal Was Spain. 
Amongst Quakers the neglect of this period is due in part to events both 
prior to and after the Spanish Civil War. Both the American and British Friends 
were involved in the very successful and very well publicised child feeding in 
Austria and Germany, and in famine relief in Russia in the 1920s. 5 Most of the 
major figures in Quaker relief whose memoirs are frequently cited, such as Dr. 
Hilda Clark, Edith Pye, Ruth Fry, Clarence Pickett and others, were involved in this 
earlier work but only marginally in the work in Spain. Dr. Hilda Clark spent the 
late 1930s in Vienna and most Quaker attention in the period 1933-39 was focussed 
'Ralph Fox, who served with Quaker famine relief in Russia, was one of three Quakers I know 
to have fought in Spain. He died, aged thirty-six, in 1937. 
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on the needs of German-Jewish refugees .3 
Consequently Spain is at best only 
peripheral to their narratives. The effect is reinforced because, of all the 
Quaker 
workers in Spain and France, only Norma Jacob went on to work with the 
American Friends Service Committee in the post-war period although others did 
continue in regional Quaker relief groups. Although some of the Spanish workers 
were active in war relief on the home front, none of the British workers continued 
in overseas work with the Friends Service Council after the war. 
Finally, the Spanish Civil War has generally been overwhelmed in the 
public memory by the impact of the Second World War, and this is no less true for 
Friends. Quakers were active in civilian relief on both sides of the Atlantic 
throughout the war. The American Friends, as we shall see, remained in France 
until 1942, and both the Friends Service Council and the American Friends Service 
Committee returned to contintental Europe in 1945 to assist with the reconstruction 
and to promote a message of reconciliation. In 1947 the American Friends Service 
Committee and the Friends Service Council were jointly awarded the Nobel Prize 
for Peace for their work in Germany, ensuring that it would be for this work that 
the Friends would best remember their relief agencies. 
The sources for this thesis were drawn primarily from the Archives of the 
American Friends Service Committee in Philadelphia and the Friends Service 
Committee in London; from interviews with a small number of the relief workers 
themselves; and from a number of autobiographies. Evidence for the internal 
context in which the Friends worked is drawn from The Friend, The Wayfarer, The 
Evangelical Friend and The American Friend, the principal news journals of the 
Society. 
The American Friends Service Committee archive recently undertook a 
series of interviews with past relief workers, a number of which are employed in 
this thesis. These interviews, by Karin Lee, focussed on constructing a coherent 
narrative and proved extremely useful, but they made little attempt to go deeply 
into motivation, much of which, in the context of the AFSC, appears to have been 
taken for granted. In an attempt to investigate motivation I conducted a small 
6John Ormerod Greenwood, Quaker Encounters: vol. 1, Friends and Relief, William Sessions, 
York, England, 1975, p. 234. 
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number of personal interviews with those relief workers still alive and who were 
members of the AFSC or FSC units in Europe; of these, only Alfred Jacob, Alfred 
Cope and Lucy Ingram' worked in Spain in the correct period. These interviews, 
as with all such oral histories, told the protagonists' own stories and did not always 
provide the information or serve the agenda which I, the researcher, brought to 
their histories. Both Alfred Cope and Alfred Jacob also provided additional 
personal material such as newspaper clippings and journals which whilst not 
always directly relevant contributed to a sense of them as individuals. 
Furthermore, all the interviews need to be examined carefully for the difficulties 
presented by fifty-year old memories, the change of focus over fifty years and the 
occasional misconstruction of memory. 
Materials from the archives include the minutes of the Spain Committee 
(FSC), the Committee on Spain (AFSC) and of the Peace and Refugee committees 
of each organisation. The nature and form of the minutes for the two organisations 
differ markedly, altering their relative value. The Friends Service Council and its 
Spain Committee were an extension of London Yearly Meeting. As such, they 
follow the pattern of Meeting for Worship and Business, that is, they begin with a 
period of silence, and silence is expected between each contribution. All may speak 
but each person is expected to wait until moved by the spirit of God and to avoid 
phraseology which might cause contention. The aim of such a Meeting is to reach 
a consensus, not to gain a majority for an opinion. If such a consensus is reached 
it is recorded as the Minute. If it is not reached, the Clerk will simply record the 
absence of unanimity. No discussion is recorded and neither a majority nor a 
minority opinion is indicated. Although slow, this has the effect of producing a 
curious forcefulness and unity behind British Friends' decisions, but does obscure 
dissension and also motive. At the same time, it successfully recognises the validity 
of minority opinion. Diversity of thought in the active expression of faith is the 
perhaps the underlying subject of this dissertation. 
The American Friends Service Committee operates under a quite different 
'L ucy Palser (nee Ingram) worked as a nutritionist in Barcelona and later became a relief 
worker for the International Commission in France. However, not enough material exists for 
an extensive analysiss to have been made of her experiences. 
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system. It is not governed by any other body but it is responsible to a number of 
different Quaker denominations and organisations, not all of which share the same 
interests and whose Meeting and Worship traditions departed somewhat from 
those of the British Friends in the nineteenth century! In addition, its position as 
a charity with whom the United States government was willing to do business 
required a level of openness and accountability normally associated with public 
companies. Consequently, minutes of meetings accord far more with the 
conventions of the business world. Discussion and dissension are both recorded, 
providing a far greater sense of both the personalities and the motivations behind 
the decisions, and this is one reason why American sources have been favoured. 
Useful though the minutes are, the majority of the material used in this 
thesis was drawn from the letter files of both societies, which contain the personal 
views of both relief workers and administrators. The archive of the American 
Friends Service Committee is intended, in part, as a resource for relief workers, and 
as such stores all files without selection. In contrast, the archive of the Friends 
Service Council is stored in Friends Library in Friends House in London where 
limited space has led to a winnowing of material. This was somewhat compensated 
for by the habit of sending copies of many documents to the AFSC; hence a number 
of British letters and reports are cited as from the AFSC archives. A second problem 
with the British files is that almost all the letters sent from Spain were written by 
Alfred Jacob. Whilst he was clearly the major figure in the British operation, this 
does lead to a dominance of his views which is difficult to correct. The contents of 
the American files are far more varied and more people's experiences are 
represented than it is possible or useful to incorporate, but the number of 
individuals whose letters are contained in the files is still smaller than the total 
number who served with the AFSC. In this thesis I have chosen to focus on those 
individuals who left most material, often an indication of their importance within 
their units, and who most dearly expressed their witnesses. These are a very small 
proportion of the total relief workers, and in their committment to a Quaker 
witness perhaps not totally representative, but they were clearly the individuals 
'For further detail see Thomas Hamm, The Transformation of American Quakerism: Orthodox 
Friends, 1800-1907(University of Indiana Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1992). 
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who shaped relief practices in their field. 
The principal concern of this thesis is with the witness which the Friends' 
made in the expression of their Testimonies. What has been sacrificed is any 
attempt at a sustained analysis of the amount of relief given. Summaries of relief 
may be found in the FSC pamphlet Quaker Service in Spain (1940) and in the 
International Commission Report (1940), extracts from which are included in 
Appendix A, but whilst financial records were kept meticulously, the Quaker field 
workers paid less attention to the methods by which they recorded distribution. 
Perhaps because of his lack of business experience, Alfred Jacob never clarifies 
whether his figures are per week or are cumulative, and the figures themselves are 
not revealing: Alfred Cope was sent to Murcia in 1938 in the hope that he would 
regularise Esther Farquhar's rather careless book-keeping. The tendency was to 
report how many meals were served, rather than to elaborate and record how 
many children were fed and how many times, which satisfied the field workers but 
was often frustrating to the Philadelphia office. However, the Friends' own 
understanding and valuation of their work rested on spiritual quality and not 
material quantity. Louisa Jacob, aunt of Alfred Jacob and an employee of the AFSC 
wrote, 
I am frequently asked how many people are being fed daily. I 
always reply that the number varies and that we are attempting a 
qualitative rather than a quantitative job; however, I would be glad 
to get statistics wherever they are available. ' 
Financial estimates are also difficult to make. There appear to have been few 
annual reports and many of the sums are stated in pesetas. The FSC's pamphlet 
tells us they raised and spent a total of MAO' but there is no equivalent 
document for the AFSC and the matter is complicated by their relationship with the 
International Commission. AFSC expenditure appears to have been at least twice 
that of the FSC at any time (their fund-raising was often affected by similar political 
'Louisa Jacob to Esther Farquhar, 7 December 1937, Committee on Spain, 1937: 
Correspondence, to Esther Farquhar. Also mentions here that she is allowing ten cents a day 
per child in her calculations. 
10 Quaker Service in Spain, 1936-1940, Friends Service Council, London, 1940, p. 19. 
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pressures) but to assess it accurately would require another thesis. Consequently, 
because the emphasis of this thesis is on faith in practice, I have chosen to accept 
Louisa Jacob's concept of a "qualitative" job and to judge the relief work in terms 
of this notion of quality: to what extent it proved an adequate manifestation of the 
Peace Testimony, a work or gift of love from the Friends to the people of Spain. 
To my regret this thesis refused to conform to the thematic structure which 
I had planned. I had originally intended to structure the thesis around the Friends' 
expressions of the Peace Testimony and the Testimony of Social Justice; the issues 
of autonomy and leadership; and the ethics and ideology which shaped Friends' 
relief work. Of the above plan, only the section on ethics and ideology survived as 
a discrete chapter although these issues also permeate the thesis. Instead, what 
emerged was a story which wanted to be told, and individuals whose work shone 
out. Consequently the thesis is essentially narrative, beginning with an outline of 
the historical development of the Friends Service Council (FSC) and the American 
Friends Service Committee (AFSC), their position within their countries' respective 
peace movements and the domestic politics which shaped their reactions to the 
Spanish Civil War. Chapters Two to Five examine the development and practice 
of relief work in Republican and Nationalist Spain, explore the paradigms which 
shaped Quaker decisions, and examine the personal witnesses of the relief workers. 
This thesis could have stopped in 1939 when the war ended, or in 1940 when the 
last Quaker left Spain, but this would have been to leave the story incomplete. The 
Friends believed that having taken on the relief of the Spanish people they had a 
duty to see the work through. When the Spanish refugees moved into France, the 
Quakers went with them: Chapter Six details the aftermath of the war and the 
involvement of the Quakers in refugee resettlement. Concluding the thesis, Chapter 
Seven attempts to bring together many of the issues which arose, such as the 
decisions about who to feed and how, and the beliefs which the Friends brought 
to working with their Spanish colleagues, and examines the difficulties which arose 
when the ideological basis of the mission began to change. 
In any thesis there is always material that it was not possible to include and 
areas it was not possible to explore. Within the word limit of this thesis it did not 
prove possible to examine in any detail the origin of Friends' funds. It is clear that 
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funds for food were raised outside of the American and British Societies, the FSC 
and the AFSC relying on Friends to provide the finance for administration. A larger 
work would benefit from a closer analysis of the dealings which the organisations 
had with other bodies in the United States and Britain, particularly with attention 
paid to the negotiations and compromises which had to be made with overtly 
political bodies. The relationships between the Friends and non-Quaker 
organisations would contribute greatly to an understanding of the Friends' witness 
in this period. Finally, this thesis was always intended as a study of British and 
American Quakerism. However, inevitably, this has led to half of the story being 
omitted. Any expansion of this work would need to consider seriously the Spanish 
reaction to Quaker intervention in Spain. 
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Chapter One: 
Quaker Attitudes to Peace, 1660-1940 
1.1 The Peace Testimony 
The Society of Friends is a church without creed or dogma in the conventional 
sense. Although a certain standard of behaviour is required and certain 
assumptions are made about religious beliefs, the written creed of the Friends 
consists of Faith and Practice, a book containing inspiring extracts from Quaker 
experience, and Counsels and Questions/Advice and Queries. The latter used to 
be a method by which the Societies took a formal census of the spiritual well-being 
of its members, but it is now usually a handbook consisting of questions designed 
to make the reader examine her own spiritual well-being in private; each Yearly 
Meeting produces its own text. Detailed exploration of Friends' theology is made 
particularly difficult by the fragmentation of the American Society of Friends 
during the course of the nineteenth century. 
The Friends' witness to peace has developed from the statement issued by 
the Society in 1660 to the government of Charles II: 
We utterly deny all outward wars and strife and fighting with 
outward weapons for any end or under any pretence whatever. ' 
However, the manifestation of this testimony has differed greatly over the course 
of the past three centuries as the Friends have responded to changes in their own 
political circumstances and the demands of the wider world. 
After the Restoration of 1660 the Quakers moved to divorce themselves 
from those elements which continued to seek the possibility of a restructured 
Commonwealth. The declaration on peace and war was both a compromise with 
those members of the society who did not wish to declare loyalty to the King and 
a declaration of quietism to a suspicious King Charles II2 It was in essence a 
'Declarations of the Society ofFiiends (Quakers) on Peace and War 1600-1938. Published by the 
Northern Friends Peace Board, Leeds, June 1938. 
2Peter Brock, The Quaker Peace Testimony, 1600-1914, Sessions Book Trust, York, England, 
1990, pp. 24-31. Horace G. Alexander, The Growth of the Peace Testimony of the Society of 
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negative witness, a refusal to be involved, rather than an act of protest, although 
Friends felt their refusal to be an example which the world should follow. 
Furthermore, the testimony was also a rejection of the notion of humanity's 
"natural depravity"; it embraced a belief in the presence of God in all, a belief in 
the presence of the Divine Light of God in each individual and therefore the 
sanctity of the individual life, but it was not a witness against the concept of an 
ongoing conflict between good and evil. Quakers rejected outward strife, not 
inward struggle. 
In the eighteenth century, as the majority of British and American Friends 
became respectable merchants and traders, the Peace Testimony embraced a belief 
in the benefits to trade of a peace-time economy and also the benefits of trade in 
securing peace, a belief that was to survive into the twentieth century 3 British 
Friends remained outsiders in political society, but by the eighteenth century 
American Friends were established as part of a Colonial political elite due to their 
dominance of the political process in Pennsylvania. During the Revolutionary war 
most American Friends kept the witness of the Peace Testimony (those who did 
not were disowned), in part because they believed it wrong to overthrow the 
government, even though many had been active in protesting the manner of British 
rule. " After the Revolution the Friends withdrew their corporate presence from 
active politics feeling that there was something incompatible with Quakerism in the 
requirements of government, although individuals continued to sit in the state 
Friends, Quaker Peace and Service, London, 1982 ((D 1939), p. 4. 
A typical example in a Quaker publication in the 1930s was penned by R. Ernest Lamb: 
A recent slogan adopted by our business leaders is World Peace through 
World Trade. Realistic industrial executives recognize that war is a poor 
business partner, and therefore seek to preserve for commercial transactions 
the trade routes and markets of the world. They know that war provides 
profits for the few at the expense of the many, and leaves the land exhausted 
and impoverished when peace is again restored. Trade is a matter of 
reciprocity, with both parties gaining by the transaction; we do not press for 
it at the point of a bayonet, or force our goods on an unwilling purchaser. 
Given fair play in commercial transactions, the cause of world peace is 
inevitably advanced... 
R. Ernest Lamb, "Good Will-Our Good Neighbour Policy", The Messenger of Peace 
Supplement to the American Friend, 6 August 1936, pp. 329-40. 
'Peter Brock, The Quaker Peace Testimony..., op. cit., pp. 142-165. 
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legislatures. On being questioned about Quaker loyalty to the new regime Warner 
Mifflin, a Southern Friend, assured Washington that Quaker objection to revolution 
had not changed: "All that ever was gained by revolutions, are not adequate 
compensation to the poor mangled soldier, for the loss of life and limb. "' 
In contrast, the American Civil War marked the increasing distance between 
the British and American Friends, in both practice and belief. American Friends 
had, during the nineteenth century, been caught up in the renewal and revivalist 
movements which had been sweeping the United States. Although John Joseph 
Gurney, the leader of Quaker renewal, was an English Friend, the renewal had a 
far more devastating impact on American Friends. By 1860 the American Friends 
had already split into three parts, the Hicksites, the Wilburites and the Orthodox. 
These three denominations each regarded the others as non-Quakers: increasingly 
the Orthodox, who had adopted the creed of renewal, saw themselves as being of 
the world, not apart from it. They abandoned plain dress, plain speech and the 
tradition of separatism and began to consider themselves part of the Protestant 
mainstream. Ironically, the Friends' sense of justice and their assimilation into this 
mainstream led many young Friends to take up arms for the Union. According to 
Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, the Friends provided more enlistments in 
proportion to membership than any other denomination in the State. However, 
few members of the Philadelphia Meeting or of the very traditional Wilburite 
branch enlisted. The majority of Quaker soldiers came from western states such as 
Ohio and Indiana where Friends had most fervently espoused renewal, and these 
soldiers came home not to disownment, but to a hero's welcome. The Friends who 
joined the Union army argued forcefully for the theory of just war; most felt they 
were part of an anti-slavery crusade. ' In contrast, those few Quakers who joined the 
Southern army could expect immediate disavowal .8 
Although the majority of Friends abided by the Peace Testimony and were 
'Howard H. Brinton, Quaker Journals: Varieties of Religious Experience Among Friends, 
Wallingford, PA, 1972, p. 65. 
6Hamm, op cit., p. 68. 
7Hamm, op. cit., pp. 68-69. 
8Brock, The Quaker Peace Testimony..., op. cit., p. 178. 
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active in providing relief to civilians of both sides (and, controversially, to soldiers 
of both sides), the potential for large scale rejection of the Testimony amongst 
certain groups of Friends was established. After the war the society began to show 
signs of division over pacifism: some Friends began to argue the morality of a 
defensive war; others, including some prominent renewal Friends, began to assert 
that under some circumstances governments could, morally, take life 9 
Thus, when by the 1870s the revival and "holiness" movement came to 
Orthodox American Quakerism, some Friends were ripe for a radical departure 
from traditional Quaker practices and beliefs. The new "holiness" movement 
stressed the direct experience of sanctification over the continuous presence of the 
Divine, or Inner Light and a gradual growth into grace. Premillennialism turned 
some holiness Friends against the traditional Quaker devotion to social reform and 
towards an ideal of saving individual souls: conversion would remove the evil and 
resolve the problems of the world 10 Holiness Quakers withdrew from movements 
for peace and international arbitration, believing that universal peace could come 
only after Christ returned to Earth. One holiness Quaker of the 1890s declared: "We 
do not believe that the world is going to be saved as a whole. Our duty is to get 
people to the lifeboats and be rescued. ""' Thomas Hamm argues that holiness 
Friends, if forced to choose between Quaker pacifism on the one hand, and loyalty 
to their fellow holiness believers in other denominations on the other, chose the 
latter. '2 
In the late nineteenth century the British Friends had also experienced an 
evangelical revival, but they managed to avoid major secessions 13 Throughout this 
period they had sought to convince others of the value of the Peace Testimony 
through letters, petitions and embassies, but it was their concern for social justice 
9Hamm, op. cit., p. 69. 
'°Hamm, op. cit., p. 107. 
"Seth C. Rees, Fire From Heaven, God's Revivalist, Cincinnati, 1899, pp. 157-8, cited in Hamm, 
op. cit., p. 163. 
"Hamm, op. cit., p. 108. 
"Alastair Heron, Quakers in Britain: A Century of Change, 1895-1995, Curlew Graphics, Kelso, 
Scotland, 1995,18-29. 
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and reform during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which came 
to dominate their public image. The British Quakers were best known for their 
work in prison and factory reform, in the anti-slavery movement and for the 
building and running of model industrial communities. The extension of relief out 
into the political world, to famine victims in Ireland or to the victims of the Franco- 
Prussian War, was a reflection of an increasingly outward looking Society, one 
which acknowledged a responsibility to the world, " and was prompted by 
concerns for social justice as much as for peace. Furthermore, British Friends were 
involved in peace groups, unlike the American Friends who often held themselves 
aloof, and like their American counterparts evangelical British Friends were 
actively involved in mission work at home and abroad 15 
At the end of the nineteenth century both the British Friends and the 
American Orthodox Friends underwent another doctrinal conflict. This time the 
leading lights, all young men in their twenties-the Americans were historians and 
theologians with teaching posts in Quaker Colleges-were reacting against 
Evangelicalism and the holiness movement and pressing for a return to a tradition 
based on an understanding of the Inner Light: a religion of works not words. The 
rise of Rufus Jones and his colleagues Elbert Russell and Thomas Newlin in 
America was parallelled by the emergence of John W. Graham, Edward Grubb and 
John Wilhelm Rowntree in Britain. In Britain modernism revived the Society as a 
whole, but in America it heralded the eventual secession of the holiness Quakers 
into the Friends Church. The modernists "saw the Peace testimony primarily as a 
reflection of the Quaker doctrine of the Inner Light rather than as a biblically based 
injunction, and they urged Friends to join with non-Christians in the fight against 
war". " However, it is easy to over-emphasise the extent to which the theology of 
the modernists disagreed with that of the evangelicals. In his 1915 pamphlet for the 
Peace Association of Friends in America, Rufus Jones wrote: 
To become a person, in the real sense of the word, is to awake to the 
"John Ormerod Greenwood, Quaker Encounters: Vol. 1, Friends and Relief, William Sessions, 
York, 1975. 
15Heron, op. cit., p. 14. 
16Brock, The Quaker Peace Testimony..., op. cit., pp. 291-2. 
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consciousness of the divine relationship, to feel the inherent 
possibilities of sonship with God, to draw upon the inexhaustible 
supplies of grace, to enter into the actual inheritance of this divine- 
human privilege and to live in it and practice it 17 
This statement does not differ markedly from the concept of sanctification, but 
where Jones departed from the holiness movement was in his conception of where 
one should go from there. For Jones and his colleagues the awakening of 
consciousness to the divine should be followed by a gradual growing into grace 
proceeding from the exertions of the individual. 
Great as is the influence of the divine operation in the realization of 
this higher life of man, it is forever conjoined with human assistance 
and with human elements 18 
To save the individual was not enough and, to save the world and the individual, 
human as well as divine interference was needed. 
In the aftermath of the First World War and Quaker service in France, whilst 
relief work continued in Germany and Austria, the Conference of All Friends (later 
known as the First Friends World Conference) met in London in 1920 to debate the 
Testimonies of the Society. It was the modernist approach to the business of peace 
and to the world which dominated. The epistle which emerged, Friends and War. " 
A New Statement of the Quaker Position, adopted both the modernists' action 
oriented approach and opposition to the holiness movement; 
There can be no question that this substitution of theology for 
real Christianity is one of the great tragedies of history. It turned the 
gaze to another world. It made men acquiesce in the evils of this one. 
It cut the nerve of practical effort to transform the world here.... It 
made a compromise Church, with artificial functions and tasks, 
instead of an apostolic dynamic Church bent on overcoming the 
"Rufus Jones, The Quaker Peace Position, Peace Association of Friends in America, Richmond, 
Indiana, 1915, p. 2. 
"Rufus Jones, op. cit., p. 2. 
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world 19 
Although not all Friends, particularly in America, accepted this new 
theology and its demands, the renewed Peace Testimony meant a stronger 
emphasis on action and by the end of the 1920s modernist Friends were taking an 
ever larger part in international peace groups and in the growing peace movement. 
The establishment of formal Quaker relief bodies in the twentieth century-the 
Friends Service Council and the American Friends Service Committee-assisted 
this process. By 1930, in common with many others reacting against the horrors of 
the World War, the British Friends and their American counterparts were 
demonstrating a pronounced and vocal concern for peace. However, this concern 
was hampered by self-imposed strictures and contexts as the following sections 
will explore. UNIVERSITY OF YORK 
LLBRARY 
1.2 History of the AFSC and the FSC 
In order to understand the differences in the policy and practice of the American 
Friends Service Committee and the Friends Service Council in Spain it is useful to 
understand the differences in their origins, the different internal pressures to which 
they had to adapt, and the wider culture from which they came. The American 
Friends Service Committee (AFSC) was established in 1917, the Friends Service 
Council (FSC) in 1927, but it was the latter organisation which had the older 
history. 
Both American and British Friends were involved in relief work at various 
times in the nineteenth century. The American Friends, however, focussed their 
efforts on the relief and assistance of free and enslaved Blacks, at least until 1860 
when they became involved in war relief. American involvement in European aid 
was limited by distance and they often channelled their financial aid through the 
British Friends. Until 1870, the British Friends' involvement in overseas aid was 
relatively informal and chiefly concentrated on aiding such groups as Mennonites 
and members of the Church of Brethren whom the Friends recognised as co- 
19Friends and War. " A New Statement of the Quaker Position, adopted by the Conference of All 
Friends, 1920, issued by the Continuation Committee of the Conference of All Friends, London 
and Philadelphia, 1920. 
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religionists. The principal exception to this generalisation was the extensive aid 
which Friends organised in Ireland to which both British and US Friends, in 
addition to Irish Quakers, contributed extensively. This relief, organised by 
concerned individuals, was not officially recognised by London Meeting for 
Sufferings. Like much of Quaker relief work before and since it was organised by 
only a small proportion of the society and Helen Hatton argues that it was 
consequently outside the corporate witness 2° However, Friends' use of the title 
Minister recognised the value of individual action and it is a mistake to assume that 
because the Society did not make a formal effort that it refused acknowledgment 
of the work. A better way of approaching the issue-which affects all of the relief 
efforts, formal and informal, of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries-is to 
recognise that the Society of Friends was established along a cell structure in the 
seventeenth century. Such a structure allowed individual and minority group effort 
as long as it remained within certain paradigms. As will be seen later in this 
chapter, it allowed for the formation of controversial bodies such as the Friends' 
Ambulance Unit, outside but very much a part of the corporate image of the 
Society of Friends. 
The first official Friends War Victims Relief Committee of London Yearly 
Meeting was established in response to the unexpected defeat of France in the 
Franco-Prussian war. The devastation caused by the war and the consequences of 
the German occupation had mobilised a number of charitable efforts but it was 
clear that some form of organised and sustained activity was necessary. In 
particular, the Friends were aware that whilst some regions received ample 
attention, others were unjustly neglected. In 1870 the British Friends sent out forty- 
one Commissioners to investigate and begin distribution of aid and followed this 
up with a small group of more long-term workers who provided first food, and 
later seed corn and cattle. After one year both funds and fund-raising abilities were 
nearing exhaustion, but the Friends found it impossible to lay down the work 
immediately as individual field workers found ways and reasons to carry on. The 
Quaker presence in France eventually concluded five years later with assistance 
20See Helen E. Hatton, The Largest Amount of Good. " Quaker Relief in Ireland, 1654-1921, 
McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston and Montreal, London and Buffalo, 1993, pp. 6,11. 
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during the harsh winter of 1875 21 
Quaker relief in the Franco-Prussian war left a number of lasting legacies. 
To ensure that money subscribed by the public went to relief, the Friends set up an 
internal fund to raise money from the membership for expenses and 
administration. Most Quaker workers were unpaid, with a few receiving an 
allowance from the administration funds and only a very few of the French 
assistants receiving remuneration. This became standard practice on Quaker 
projects. Non-Quakers in sympathy with Quaker aims were welcomed as relief 
workers, and the age range of the workers spanned thirty to sixty years of age. 
Deviation from this practice would be rare and as the Americans later found, 
presented problems. Quaker relief would be distributed irrespective of race, class 
or creed and where possible it would be done through the encouragement of local 
committees whom they would aid. Although the Quakers had some success with 
development projects in Ireland, James Long's failed attempts to introduce 
communal ploughing had taught that it was often advisable to accept local 
attitudes rather than to enforce change from above ' It was also established that 
Quaker workers would not themselves distribute food but would use local agents: 
recruitment of local volunteers both encouraged self-help and allowed the number 
of overseas workers to be kept to a minimum. A long term lesson, which was not 
discovered until later, was that relief work should not be expected to produce 
gratitude. When, in the 1890s, the Friends sought money for relief in the Russian 
famine, the Friends failed to raise any money from those areas of France which they 
had assisted in the 1870s 
The time spent in France also drew attention to the importance of the 
individual and the potential tensions between the relief workers and their home 
committee in the matter of when to extend and when to lay down a mission 24 It 
was assumed that when the work in France was over, the War Victims Relief 
21Greenwood, op. cit., pp. 73-80. 
22Hatton, op. cit., pp. 200-222. 
'Greenwood, op. cit., p. 117. 
24Ibid.., pp. 49-61. 
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Committee would be disbanded. Its life was extended, however, after Meeting for 
Sufferings, the oldest committee of London Yearly Meeting, failed to respond to the 
need for relief in the Balkans in 1876. Four members of the Friends War Victims 
Relief Committee joined together to revive it and James Long eventually took a 
mixed party of Alsatian carpenters, Belgians and Germans to Bulgaria to help 
rebuild villages devastated by Turkish troops. The work was expanded further in 
1896 when John and Elizabeth Bellows set out to assist the Armenians. For two 
years popular support brought substantial donations, after which funds dropped 
off. Rumours that conditions in the Balkans had been exaggerated undermined 
fund raising, and emphasised the need for full continual and detailed reports'' 
Despite the difficulties, the British Quakers were involved continuously in Eastern 
Europe until 1914, following a pattern of initial well-funded enthusiasm followed 
by public ennui and the dismantling of the project. In addition they served in a 
number of Russian famines from the 1870s and, in a more peripheral position, in 
the Boer War'' Most of the involvement of this period was triggered by the interest 
of one or more individuals operating "under Concern", that is, under a God- 
inspired impulse. 
The First World War changed the nature of British Quaker relief work. The 
Friends were not totally unprepared, but they still had no single body responsible 
for coordinating relief work, nor were they in a strong position to rely on their 
young men to hold an absolutist position on the Peace Testimony. Although the 
modernists had made an impact on the Society, this had the tendency to encourage 
young people to action rather than steadfastness. As J. William Frost has said of the 
Americans in this period, "Peace meant passivity and the times called for activity", 
and this activity needed to be channelled if the testimony was to be maintained? ' 
The most popular organisation to emerge was the Friends Ambulance Unit, a 
rather typical British Quaker group in that it was the product of individual concern. 
The initiative was taken by those most interested, and Society support sought in the 
25Ibid., pp. 80-87. 
26Brock, The Quaker Peace Testimony, p. 292. 
27J. William Frost, "'Our Deeds Carry Our Message': The Early History of the American Friends 
Service Committee", Quaker History, Spring 1992, p. 4. 
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aftermath, but because the unit served with the military it was never permitted 
recognition as an official branch of the Yearly Meeting. By 1916, when the unit was 
brought under army command, the majority of its senior officers were non-Quakers 
and many Friends had left 28 Official bodies to emerge from Yearly Meeting 
included the new War Victims Committee (France), the Emergency Committee for 
Aliens, and the National Relief Auxiliary 29 All were important elements of what 
was to become, in the inter-war period, the Friends Service Council, but it was the 
War Victims Committee (France) which had most to do with the emerging 
cooperation with the Americans. 
For five years the War Victims Committee (France), with permission from 
the British government, operated behind the lines, assisting with ploughing when 
war drew manpower from the fields, distributing seeds, cabbage plants, manure, 
and repair services for farm machinery. Twenty-four thousand fruit trees were 
distributed by the British Friends. In addition, the FSC operated a maternity unit 
at Chalons-sur-Marne, assisted in hospitals and in convalescent homes and 
initiated a building scheme to provide prefabricated houses. In 1917 the FSC 
workers were joined by Americans, sent by the newly formed American Friends 
Service Council (AFSC) 30 
American Friends' approach to provision for conscientious objectors and to 
relief was, from the start, professionalised. Whilst individual concern did sponsor 
the initial operation, it was not permitted to emerge unguided in the manner 
familiar to British Friends. Many American Quakers relief workers had come from 
experience in the settlement houses established in a number of American cities in 
the late-nineteenth century whilst others were products of an increasingly 
professionalised social work, or from the new business schools. This did not, of 
course, prevent many mistakes being made but it did indicate the direction in 
The writer Olaf Stapledon, a non-Quaker, was accepted into the FAU in part because he could 
bring with him an ambulance. His pacifism was ambivalent and rested more on his belief that 
this was a gentleman's war which he as an ally of the working man felt he could not support. 
Robert Crossley, O1afStapledon: Speaking for the Future, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 
1994, pp. 129-132. 
"Greenwood, op. cit., p. 181. 
30Ibid., pp. 199-205. 
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which the AFSC would develop. 
American entry into the war was declared on 2 April 1917. On 18 May the 
Selective Service Act was passed and the first draft occurred on 5 June. Yearly 
Meeting Peace Committees had been debating throughout February and March the 
need for coordinating policies and for an organisation which would support 
Friends' work in war time. In April the Young Friends organised a joint meeting 
for members of the Five Years Meeting, Friends General Conference and 
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting31 to create a central clearing house for peace policies, 
to be called the Friends National Service Committee. Within six weeks the 
Committee had sent two Friends to France to investigate conditions-thus 
beginning a tradition of preferring their own investigations to any information 
British Friends in the field could send. They had also asked Henry Cadbury and 
Rufus Jones, two leading modernists, to join the Committee. The latter soon became 
chairman, consulted with the Red Cross, invited the Mennonites and Brethren to 
participate and changed the name to the American Friends Service Committee. An 
independent board was formed, composed of members from the three branches of 
Friends, and money raised. The British Friends War Victims Relief Committee 
welcomed the offer of American help, requesting particularly medical personnel, 
mechanics, carpenters and builders. The Red Cross, too, having appreciated British 
Quaker success, were keen to encourage American Friends and willing to transport 
their personnel and supplies to France, a necessity under the military agreements 
in place 32 
The American Friends, like the British, insisted that all male workers be 
conscientious objectors, and although the Friends recruited many Mennonites and 
Brethren there were no religious tests. Unlike the British Friends who were clear 
in their opposition to the war, the AFSC trod very carefully where patriotism and 
neutrality were concerned, as many Friends supported the war. Frost suggests that 
"There were two Meetings in Philadelphia, one Hicksite (an early-nineteenth century schism) 
and one Orthodox. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting was Orthodox but for much of the nineteenth 
century had stood aloof from the internal dissension among American Quakers. At one point 
it communicated only with London Yearly Meeting. 
32Frost, op. cit., pp. 9-11. 
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perhaps even a majority were at least supporters of Wilson and his policies? ' One 
effect of this was a decision to say nothing about the war publicly and in the 
minutes there is no mention of the possibility of civilian relief behind the German 
lines. ' 
The American workers were very different to the British Friends' recruits. 
The British relief workers were older, often in their late twenties and early thirties. 
Many were not Friends and many were politically on the left, motivated as much 
by socialist internationalism as by religious pacifism. In addition, many of the non- 
conformist strongholds in Britain were in urban areas. The American workers were 
a mixture of Quakers, Mennonites and Brethren-three churches with strong 
historical connections to each other-young men mostly between twenty-two and 
twenty-six years old, and 26% were twenty or younger. Many were from the small 
farming communities of the mid-west, although there was a general spread across 
the areas of Quaker settlement in the USA. The largest single group was 126 men 
and women from Pennsylvania ' Greenwood argues that in many cases their 
pacifism had become nominal and that they were politically naive but Frost, 
examining it from an American stand-point, feels otherwise, and one argument 
against Greenwood's assertion is that of the first ninety-two men to be sent, 
seventy-two (78%) had a college or professional education, at a time when less than 
15% of seventeen-year-olds graduated high school. However, it was true that 64% 
listed farming or agriculture as work which they had undertaken at some time. 
Frost argues that these young men, many from isolated communities, may have 
been more committed to pacifism than their urban counterparts, but reports from 
the field indicated otherwise ' 
The new American Friends Service Committee, eager to have the support 
of a much older organisation, had decided to cooperate with the War Victims 
Committee and to operate a joint relief effort. In practice the result was a culture 
33Ibid., p. 4. 
"Ibid., p. 11. 
35Ibid., p. 15. 
'Ibid., pp. 15-16,24. 
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clash which, whilst possibly at its worst during the First World War, would repeat 
itself later. The British relief units in 1917 were manned largely by veterans who in 
many ways resembled the troops among whom they served: they were cynical and 
war weary, some used tobacco and alcohol and many were socialists who 
welcomed the Russian revolution and its challenge to the capitalist "merchants of 
death". " In contrast, mid-western Quakers had been taught to regard alcohol and 
tobacco as "of the devil", and "the faintest tinge of pink damned a man in mid- 
Western eyes. The cheery irresponsibility of the American college boy was met and 
chilled by the dogged reserve of the Britishman... "" Frost concurs with this 
assessment but adds an assertion that the British Friends were "tired, set in their 
ways, and inefficient". " The Americans were younger, enthusiastic, politically 
conservative and imbued with the new American business ethic with its premium 
on efficiency. Clashes were inevitable, sometimes over simple matters of 
perspective. Conditions which looked good to workers who had been in the war 
for three years was shocking to newcomers. Frequently the Americans repeated 
experiments, such as communal mechanised farming, which the British had already 
seen fail 40 Based on very similar evidence, Greenwood and Frost simply exhibit 
prejudice, Greenwood in favour of the British, Frost in favour of the Americans, but 
both do agree that a consensus emerged in the field about the relative spiritual 
immaturity of the American workers. Letters from Lewis Gannet, a journalist who 
went to write publicity for the AFSC and the Red Cross, complained about the low 
standard of morals amongst the American men and the poor commitment to 
pacifism (one claimed adamantly that he was not a pacifist). In response the AFSC 
decided to change their recruitment policy to emulate the British Friends. Instead 
of eighteen-to-twenty year old men who had been classified as conscientious 
objectors but had no strong beliefs, the aim would be to send older men, committed 
"Greenwood, op. cit., p. 207. 
38Ibid. 
39Frost, op. cit., p. 20. 
'Ibid., pp. 21-24. 
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to their pacifism, with suitable skills for the job in hand 41 
In the aftermath of the war Friends continued reconstruction work in 
Verdun although disgusted with the allied policy of continued blockade. They 
made a number of innovations, the most important of which was paying the 
families of the German prisoners-of-war who worked for the Friends. By 1920 the 
Anglo-American mission was completed but not all of the workers went home. 
Many went on to serve in the large-scale food relief efforts in Poland, Russia, 
Serbia, Austria and Germany where they were joined by female workers such as 
Edith M. Pye and Ruth Fry, two of the best known of the inter-war relief agents. 
The obvious and continuing need in Europe ensured that the AFSC would 
not be disbanded and that the British Emergency Committee would continue to 
evolve. Within a week of the signing of the Versailles Treaty a delegation of British 
and American Friends visited Germany, the first civilians to be admitted after the 
war. The initial plan was for small-scale feeding but widespread need led to the 
decision to obtain governmental support. In America, this rested in the hands of 
Herbert Hoover, a Quaker, who had been placed in charge of rationing during the 
war. 
Hoover felt that the Germans needed to be punished, and did not agree to 
support food relief until January 1920, but even this was conditional 42 Hoover 
refused to support a joint American and British Friends' relief effort forcing the 
Americans to concentrate in Germany and the British in Austria. When he tried to 
enforce the same division in Russia the AFSC refused to cooperate and he was 
forced to back down but the idea that Anglo-American cooperation and joint 
projects would be the norm was broken very quickly. Most importantly, it was 
Hoover who enforced the notion that adults had a lesser political, as well as moral, 
claim to relief, a point which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two. 
In 1919, the Emergency Committee for the Assistance of Germans, Austrians 
and Hungarians in Distress joined with the Friends Emergency and War Victims 
Relief Committee. From 1924 this became the Council for International Service 
41Ibid., p. 27. 
'Ibid., p. 36. 
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which in 1927 was amalgamated with the Friends domestic relief 
bodies to become 
the Friends Service Council'' In 1924 the American Friends Service Committee was 
placed on a more permanent footing; work in the inter-war period included 
feeding 
in Europe and in Africa. The main new development in the permanent structure of 
the Friends peace witness was the development of Friends Centres in a number of 
European capitals. Envisaged as embassies these were to become centres of small- 
scale relief during the 1930s, but, as much of the correspondence both American 
and British indicates, they were most concerned with the religious face of the 
Society, often manifested in a forceful stance on the Peace Witness, a concern that 
was passed on to the Spanish mission. 44 
1.3 The FSC and the AFSC in Context 
Whilst there are superficial similarities between the two organisations, the contexts 
from which they emerged and in which they operated were very different. In this 
section I intend to outline these contexts and suggest ways in which they affected 
the methods the committees adopted both generally and in Spain. 
The internal context in which the Friends Service Council (FSC) emerged 
was stable and orderly. Although the drive to minister to the world's temporal 
needs came first from the evangelicals with their rejection of quietism in the early 
part of the nineteenth century, and later from the modernists, the British Friends 
succeeded in maintaining unity of purpose. The FSC was formed as part of London 
Yearly Meeting, independent of, but taking guidance from, Meeting for Sufferings, 
whose role it was to identify and minister to distress either within the society or, 
more usually in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in the outside world. 
Whilst the FSC took its moral responsibility to its donors very seriously, its only 
institutional responsibility was to London Yearly Meeting. As the Yearly Meeting 
followed the traditional practice of conducting business meetings as prayer 
"The information cited is from Greenwood. J. W. Frost states that "In 1928 London Yearly 
meeting merged its relief and missionary activities into a Council for International Service", p. 
41. However, his own footnote contradicts this statement and confirms Greenwood's 
chronology. 
"Greenwood, op. cit., p. 231; Carl Heath, cited in Roger J. Carter, "The Quaker International 
Centre in Berlin, 1920-40", The journal of the Friends Historical Society, vol. 56, no. 1,1990, p. 
27. 
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meetings, waiting for unanimity rather than majority feeling, the FSC could at least 
be sure of some consistency in its guidance. In addition, the FSC was expected to 
react quickly and with the minimum of consultation. It had its own small staff, and 
was empowered to establish sub-committees when it deemed them appropriate, 
but had a long tradition of dependence on volunteers and individual Concern, both 
at home and in the field. The authority of the FSC lay entirely in its ability to 
mobilise people and funding and in its confidence that it was respected both inside 
and outside the Society of Friends. 
At its formation the AFSC occupied an uncomfortable place between the 
Quaker denominations. Although Young Friends saw the AFSC as a way to draw 
together the different wings of American Quakerism the AFSC had to deal with 
much suspicion. The largest number of Quakers in America belonged to the 
evangelical Five Years Meeting, but their contributions to the AFSC in its first years 
were substantially less than either of the two Philadelphia Yearly Meetings. In part 
this was due to a concentration of Quaker wealth on the East coast but it also 
reflected the suspicion that mid-Western evangelicals felt towards Eastern Quakers. 
Furthermore, different denominations saw the AFSC with different purposes in 
mind: many evangelical and Conservative Friends saw the Quakers as a "people 
made distinct by pacifism", '5 whilst in the East, Hicksite and Orthodox Friends 
were reticent about the importance of pacifism: their emphasis was on good works. 
Liberals and moderate evangelicals saw the AFSC as confirming their belief in a 
"blend of mystical religious experience and social activism" 46 The very existence 
of a number of different authoritative Meetings, one at the head of each 
denomination, meant that whilst unanimity might come from any one of them, it 
could not be expected from all of these Meetings combined. 
During the war the divisions amongst American Quakers were set aside. 
After the war many Meetings reconsidered their commitment to the AFSC, 
preferring to support instead the American Friends Board of Missions. 
Consequently, the AFSC emerged as an independent and officially autonomous 
45Frost, op. cit., p. 33. 
'Ibid. 
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corporate entity, responsible only to its Board of Directors and its General 
Committee. At the same time, its ability to function was dependent on the goodwill 
of Quakers of a wide variety of theological views and it needed to retain support 
from the Five Years Meeting, the more liberal Friends General Council and from 
the Wilburite and Hicksite Friends, as well as the two Philadelphia Yearly 
Meetings. Those Quakers who did continue to support the AFSC did not always do 
so unconditionally. 
The theological diversity amongst Friends meant that if the American 
Friends Service Committee was to attempt to represent all Friends it could not 
formally merge faith and relief in the manner of the Friends Service Counci147 
Overseas work could bring the AFSC into conflict with the missionary wing of the 
Church: in Mexico, for example, the AFSC was seen as infringing on the territory 
of missionaries sent out by the American Friends Board of Missions. Domestic 
work could also be controversial. Although the AFSC could draw on over two 
centuries of Quaker tradition confronting racism and black poverty, the decision 
taken in 1922 to alleviate native white working class poverty and assist the children 
of striking miners in West Virginia and Pennsylvania was unpopular. The feeding 
and resettlement programmes which the AFSC initiated brought little public or 
Quaker support. Quakers were generally conservative and midwestern, and 
holiness-evangelical Friends came to feel the AFSC overly dominated by 
Philadelphia, by radical ideas and by a creeping secularism, a problem which 
affected how the AFSC approached its fund-raising. One solution to these tensions 
was to form a Message Committee within the AFSC, funded and managed 
separately, with a responsibility for printing leaflets, sending out speakers and 
providing funds for the Quaker Centres in Europe. However, their very lack of 
missionary intent made them objects of suspicion to the holiness Friends who saw 
in them vehicles for promoting liberal Quakerism. 8 The Message Committee 
became a part of the Peace division and the AFSC's emphasis settled on "silent 
47Ibid., p. 40. 
48Ibid. 
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witnessing for Christ and public emphasis on good deeds" 49 As we shall see, their 
activities in Spain clearly operated within this paradigm. 
The AFSC's need to walk carefully between the different denominations, 
and the background of the original Board Members shaped its internal structure. 
From the first there was a stress on professionalism. Whilst it was important that 
all workers had the proper motivations and sympathies, early on it became the 
practice to employ non-Quaker professionals in non-executive posts. 
Professionalism also required the collating of statistics and the keeping of reports, 
invaluable to the researcher but leading to a flood of material. Whilst this habit was 
also consistent with previous Quaker relief practices, with their emphasis on moral 
probity, 'O professionalism also functioned as a defence against accusations from 
within the society that the AFSC might be too liberal. By consistently couching 
relief work in the vocabulary of social science it was possible to evade some of the 
theological debates. The drawback to the AFSC's desire for professionalism was the 
loss of spontaneity and a place for the individual with a strong Concern. Wolf 
Mendl, in his Swarthmore lecture of 1974, asserted: 
a feature of Friends and their Peace Testimony is the persistence of 
individual witness and involvement in the world. Quakers may have 
been limited by their historical experience and cultural background, 
but that did not prevent individuals in each generation from 
standing out as pioneers in the attack on the scourge of war. 51 
However, it is questionable to what extent the AFSC extended this tradition of the 
individual pioneer. As will be discussed more fully in Chapters Two and Three, 
Alfred Jacob and Francesca Wilson, operating within the British tradition, each 
began with a personal Concern and persuaded the FSC to be led by their spirit and 
witness. Both stand out as rather forceful characters. In contrast when the 
Californian Lydia Morris attempted to interest the AFSC in her Concern for Spain 
49[bid. 
"Hatton, op. cit., p. 12. 
"Wolf Mendl, Prophets and Reconcilers: Reflections on the Quaker Peace Testimony, 
Swarthmore Lecture 1974, Friends Home Service Committee, London, 1974, p. 44. 
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she met with little response 52 The Board preferred to wait for advice from the FSC 
and, in the event, refused to act upon FSC requests for assistance until news was 
received from its own observer Sylvester Jones who was, perhaps not 
coincidentally, from Chicago, a city whose Quakers split between liberal and 
evangelical Quakerism. The use of Jones as an investigating witness may have been 
partially calculated to appeal to those otherwise hostile to the predominantly 
eastern AFSC. For the workers in the field this desire on the part of the committee 
to monitor all events and changes may have led to less autonomy and a restricted 
ability to respond to changes in circumstance. 
The religious context for the British Quakers was straightforward. The 
British Friends were part of the nonconformist tradition and, although respected, 
were religious outsiders. In the nineteenth century, their rapprochement with the 
world and their position at the forefront of many nineteenth-century reform 
movements brought them into close contact both with other nonconformist 
groups-particularly the Methodists-and with paternalist and liberal wings of the 
Church of England; this contact was strengthened with the growth of Anglican 
pacifism in the inter-war period. However, there were no other pacifist churches 
with whom the British Friends might be automatically associated; the nearest 
organisation was the Save the Children Fund whose relationship with the Friends, 
through its founder Eglantyne Jebb whose sister-in-law was a Quaker, was 
extremely close. During the inter-war period, the Save the Children Fund was the 
body with which the Quakers cooperated most readily. 
Although Quakers had not been welcome everywhere in colonial America, 
the American Friends were, by the American Revolution, a part of the emerging 
religious mainstream. By the twentieth century they were a part of the Protestant 
establishment, had contacts with most of the churches and were regarded as allies 
by the Conservative and Reform Jewish community. However, the American 
Quakers' closest relationship was with the Mennonites and with the Church of the 
Brethren, two European sects whose settlement in the United States had been 
"See letter to Clarence E. Pickett, 10 October 1936, Committee on Spain, Individuals: Morris, 
Lydia, 1936 (Box 1) and letter from Clarence E. Pickett to May Jones, 10 November 1936, 
Committee on Spain, Individuals: Jones, May & Sylvester, 1936 (Box 1). 
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assisted by the British and American Friends. The three churches held in common 
a witness to peace, although their reasoning and practice differed. Known as the 
historic peace churches of America, in the First World War their young men were 
granted status as conscientious objectors with relative ease and it was the coming 
together of these three groups to provide alternative service for their young men 
which sponsored and funded the American Friends Service Council in its first few 
years. By 1924, when the AFSC was placed on a permanent basis, the Mennonites 
and the Brethren had organised their own relief bodies but cooperation between 
the three churches was common and requests for assistance almost automatic. In 
Spain the Mennonites and Brethren supplied both money and personnel. 
Consequently they had considerable influence on the direction and nature of the 
mission. 
The existence of these two natural allies meant that the American Friends 
had far less incentive to seek for additional collaborators or associates. In particular 
it meant that they could be rather more selective over their associates' political 
allegiances. In Britain, the shortage of natural allies and the desire to reach as wide 
a public as possible encouraged the Friends Service Council to take part in the 
National Joint Committee for the Relief of Spain's (NJC) public meetings. The FSC 
was a small body with restricted resources and the NJC could offer a far wider 
platform. However, involvement with the committee placed strains on the Friends' 
public neutrality. Although the NJC was an attempt at an impartial organisation 
its committee was made up of political figures, including the Liberal MP Wilfred 
Roberts, and it was viewed with suspicion by the parliamentary Labour party 
which was wary of Communist party involvement 53 Invitations to speak at NJC 
functions frequently required representatives of the FSC Spain Committee to share 
a platform with representatives of other, less impartial organisations, such as the 
labour and trade union Aid Spain Campaign. In mid-1937 the Friends became 
aware of the increasingly partisan nature of the appeals made at NJC gatherings, 
and in conjunction with the Save the Children Fund, the only other impartial 
organisation, resolved to send a joint deputation to the officers of the NJC. The 
53Tom Buchanan, "The Role of the British Labour Movement in the Origins and Work of the 
Basque Children's Committee, 1937-9", European History Quarterly, volume 18,1988, p. 59. 
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point was discussed and eventually an assurance given that all 
future public 
meetings would be prefaced with the reading of a statement emphasising the 
strictly neutral, non-political basis of the NJC 
ý' However, the FSC appears to have 
never refused a donation on political grounds, and was willing to allow, although 
it did not encourage, earmarking for one side or another 55 
The AFSC was in a position to be rather more selective in terms of its 
alliances and associations, and was also constrained by its internal circumstances 
to be circumspect. The existence of a number of natural allies, including both the 
Peace Churches and such neutral organisations as the Red Cross, gave the AFSC 
an automatic constituency for fund-raising. As the American Red Cross declined 
to become involved in fund-raising for Spain, having already experienced 
difficulties in raising revenue for relief in China, any donations received by the 
American Red Cross were channelled to the AFSC and in 1938 the International 
Red Cross designated the Quakers as its agents in America, in Murcia and in 
Barcelona 56 The AFSC was also requested by a number of other organisations to 
handle the finances they raised and to endorse their campaigns. As the AFSC did 
not conduct street level fund raising, preferring to approach wealthy individuals 
for large donations, this theoretically provided the AFSC with a greater reach. 
However, the organisation was extremely cautious about the political bias of those 
with whom they associated and were extremely reluctant to lend their name. In 
particular, the AFSC was alert to any association with communism 57 This caution 
had two origins: although by 1936 the AFSC was relatively well established, many 
mid-western Quakers still eyed its "radicalism" with suspicion. In addition, the 
Red Scare of 1924 had left its mark on the Friends as much as on any group, and 
anti-communism was common within the peace movement generally which tended 
54FSC: Spain Committee Minutes, #177,11 May, #194,26 May, #206,15 June 1937. 
"It was made clear from 1938 onwards that all subscriptions specifically ear-marked for use in 
Nationalist Spain would be sent to the American Friends Service Committee. Spain Committee 
Minutes, #36,20 January 1938, 
56Foster Rhea Dulles, The American Red Cross: A History, Harper and Brothers, New York, 
1950, pp. 343-345. 
57When the left-wing Spanish relief organisations began to fragment in 1939 this became a 
particular concern for the AFSC. 
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to emerge from the liberal Christian tradition, without the socialist overtones 
evident in its British counterpart 5S Although the AFSC never joined in Red-baiting, 
it did regard communism and socialism as inconsistent with Quaker testimonies 
and was suspicious of trade unionism which many American Friends regarded as 
a disturbing and potentially revolutionary force: the AFSC itself was not unionised 
until the 1960s, and its statement on worker employer relations (1923) resembled 
the Fascist model of the organic state. All this was in contrast to the British Friends, 
a large minority of whom in the 1930s would have described themselves as 
socialists, and who on the whole were sympathetic to British trade unionism with 
its emphasis on welfarism and its direct association with the parliamentary process 
through trade union sponsorship of the Labour Party. As the AFSC did not 
generally take part in large scale meetings, preferring to stage its own events or 
send individual speakers to church and college groups, the issue of platform 
sharing was less urgent. As non-party organisations, both the FSC and the AFSC 
regarded themselves as non-political and continually stressed their political 
neutrality. However, both organisations were engaged in activities-pacifism and 
peace campaigning-and embraced an ideology which to the modem mind seems 
extremely partisan. Furthermore, as has been discussed above, many western 
American Friends did perceive the activities of the AFSC as too "political" 59 
Although both organisations were essentially relief bodies, both regarded 
their relief work not as a humanitarian effort but as a central part of their peace 
witness, an issue to which I will return repeatedly in this thesis. As a consequence, 
both maintained Peace Committees and were active in the peace movements of 
their respective countries. The international peace movement had been swelling 
since the late nineteenth century. Whilst the First World War interrupted its 
growth, it also provided impetus for a mass expansion in the 1920s. The growth of 
this movement provided the Friends on both sides of the Atlantic with a wider 
audience. In the United States it ensured the survival of the Peace Testimony by 
"Charles Chatfield, For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941, University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 1971, p. 158-9. 
59In the 1930s these fears were fuelled by the AFSC's good relations with the Democratic Party, 
and in particular with Eleanor Roosevelt. 
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allowing the modernists to sponsor a return to the traditions of Quakerism whilst 
continuing to emphasise the place of Friends in the world, rather than as apart from 
it. In Britain the Peace Testimony was also strengthened, elevating it to the best 
known of the Friends' testimonies 60 
In Britain, whilst the absolutist nature of the Quaker Peace Testimony may 
have alienated many peaceable individuals who continued to envisage an imperial, 
if anti-militaristic role for Great Britain, it struck a chord among others still war- 
weary and fearful of the possibilities of a second "great" war. Obviously the 
Friends were not the only group working for peace in the 1930s: a wide range of 
organisations were active from the absolutist through to the merely anti- 
imperialist. To the peace campaigns of the inter-war years the British Friends, along 
with other religious groupings, offered an additional, spiritual element. 
The Fellowship of Reconciliation was part of a wider international 
organisation, a loose coalition of Christian pacifists from a number of 
denominations seeking to act as "leavening" for society rather than providing for 
a new social order. The No More War Movement, in contrast, was a predominantly 
secular off-shoot of the defunct No Conscription Fellowship of the Great War. After 
the election of 1923 it had sixteen MPs in Parliament. Its connection with the labour 
movement, however, proved to be its weakness as the events of the late thirties, in 
particular the Spanish Civil War, led much of organised labour to abandon its 
pacifist sympathies. 
The War Resisters International formed one of the more radical groups. 
Although not strictly associated with any particular political organisation, it was 
obviously secular and associated with the politics of class struggle. In contrast the 
Peace Pledge Union, led by Canon Dick Sheppard, although also an essentially 
secular organisation, had little fixed ideology other than vocal opposition to the 
war; its main appeal was to youth 61 The largest of the organisations was the 
'The Yearly Meeting of 1912 issued an epistle entitled "Our Testimony for Peace" which declared that the Peace Testimony formed "an organic outgrowth of our faith as Christians and Friends, which cannot be abandoned without mutilating our message for the world. " Peter 
Brock, The Quaker Peace Testimony, 1660 to 1914, Sessions Book Trust, York, 1990, p. 294. 
"Peter Brock, Twentieth-CenturyPacifism, Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, New York, 1970, 
pp. 104-153. 
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League of Nations Union, organised in the 1920s as a support and educational body 
for the League's activities. Its very clear and direct aims enabled it initially to raise 
a level of support never seen before or since. By 1931 it had registered 406,868 
annual subscriptions 62 However, its very specificity of purpose led it to move away 
from the main body of the peace movement as the direction of the League altered. 
Of all the groups it was probably the least pacifistic but perhaps the most 
concerned with peace education. 
The American peace movement divided rather differently. Although the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation was an international organisation with a strong 
presence in America other lines of division were distinctively American and there 
were many areas of overlap; people tended to belong to more than one group and 
a number of organisations shared officers. There were numerous organisations to 
choose from: in 1938 the Peace Year Book listed one hundred and nine international 
organisations, not including those groups who promoted peace between only two 
nations 63 The most important division in terms of long term developments was 
that between isolationists and internationalists. Although it was not uncommon for 
isolationists and internationalists to band together on such matters as the 
Neutrality Act (1935) they were very different movements. Isolationists were 
concerned with keeping America out of any European conflict: they were not 
interested in efforts to prevent such a conflict. The internationalists saw America's 
peace as tied inextricably to world peace; as such, they generally strove to involve 
America as closely as possible with such organisations as the World Court and the 
League of Nations. Internationalists tended to come from fields such as law, 
education, banking, business and politics. Consequently, this section of the peace 
movement was more oriented to meeting with Congressmen than labour leaders 
and more accustomed to writing to individuals than producing leaflets. They 
tended to be north-eastern and college educated and viewed themselves as a 
minority voice within rather than outside the establishment. They also tended to 
"Martin Caedel, "The Peace Movement Between the Wars: Problems of Definition", p. 50, in 
Richard Taylor and Nigel Young (eds. ). Campaigns for Peace: British Peace Movements in the 
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see little conflict between American interests and a new world order: 
free trade 
policies would relieve economic pressure, reduce the need for conquest and enable 
poorer countries to develop, an approach which many friends shared 
`41n 1937 a 
number of these groups banded together as the Emergency Peace Campaign, with 
the aim of influencing Congressional elections. After its conclusion, a coalition of 
the Socialist Party, the Peace Section of the AFSC, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, 
the World Peace Commission of the Methodist Church, the US section of the 
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the National Council for the 
Prevention of War and the War Resisters's League, combined to form the Keep 
American out of the War Congress in March 1938. The Congress' platform called 
for withdrawal from such "imperialist" activities as the stationing of American 
ships and marines in China's war zones, the scrapping of plans for industrial 
mobilisation, conscription and foreign alliances, the termination of the arms trade 
and the staging of a national war referendum prior to any declaration 65 
Although a part of this movement, the AFSC tended to focus on the 
behaviour of the individual rather than the reform of institutions which interested 
most internationalists. The success of the AFSC in securing audiences with 
congressmen and with the President stemmed from their similar status as 
members of the establishment, and the ideologies which they took with them 
abroad were firmly grounded in their understanding of the benefits of American 
culture. In particular, the AFSC shared with the internationalists their belief in 
collective responsibility for the maintenance of world peace. However, many 
internationalists rejected pacifism in favour of "collective security", the notion of 
the League of Nations being in a position to police with force-a concept that the 
British Friends at least could not accept, and over which American Friends were 
divided. 
The internationalists themselves divided into a number of different groups, 
64Harold Josephson, "The Search for Lasting Peace: Internationalism and American Foreign 
Policy", in Charles Chatfield and Peter Van Den Dungen (eds. ), Peace Movements and Political 
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usually congruent with an individual's social class, religion and broad political 
allegiance. Many of these groups were associated with the churches, although 
Chatfield argues that in many cases it was the clergy rather than the laity that 
turned to pacifism in the inter-war years P However, the main trend to cut across 
these allegiances was the great success in America of women-only peace 
organisations. Societies with an exclusive focus on peace included the Women's 
Council for Education in International Relations, the Women's Peace Union and the 
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), in addition to a 
number of international organisations such as the World Young Women's Christian 
Association and the World Women's Christian Temperance Union whose concern 
for peace was peripheral but active. The best known and most important of these 
organisations, for the simple reason that it contained most of the leaders of the 
American feminist movement, was WILPF. By 1930 it had 9,514 members and in 
the mid-1930s its membership fluctuated between 13,000 and 16,000. Only in 1940 
did the membership begin a sharp decline. WILPF had strong connections, through 
a number of its officers, with the American Quakers, and unlike other many of the 
mixed and predominantly male internationalist groups the American branch 
tended towards an emphasis on moral education rather than international 
organisational change, although it was active in making international connections 
and agitating for the support of the League of Nations. However, as an 
international body it began to divide in the 1930s as women in the European 
branches began to weigh up the attractions of pacifism against the growing fascist 
threat 67 
Behind the activity of these groups lay public opinion, insubstantial but 
ever-present, and it wag this public opinion which the peace groups sought to 
channel. The notion of orienting the public to peace through formal education was 
a relatively modern concept, although its roots were clear in the nature of 
Christianity itself. However by 1936 it was one to which the AFSC (though not the 
'Chatfield, op. cit., p. 128. 
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FSC with its more limited resources) was committed. Through its Peace Caravans, 
by which young college students were sent out to proselytise, through its work 
camps in ghettos and its speakers in schools and colleges, the AFSC hoped to 
educate America for peace and peace keeping. The move to "peace education" was 
framed by the AFSC as non-political and in theory was intended to be 
uncontroversial amongst the diversity of American Quakerism. Rufus Jones 
declared: 
There must be no withdrawal from the complicated life of the world 
into any of the subtle forms of cloistered piety... every opportunity 
must be seized for directing and perfecting methods of public 
education, and for raising the moral tone and quality of the press; 
and a full share of responsibility for the character of local and 
national government must be taken up and borne with the same 
fidelity that the Quaker has always shown to the inner voice in 
matters of intimate, personal duty 68 
By the early twentieth century the focus of the peace education movement 
had settled on the revision of the curriculum in the interest of international 
understanding. In the aftermath of the World War this plan gained a measure of 
public support assisted by the moral though not financial reinforcement of the 
League of Nations. Although many Americans did not wish to be a part of the 
League, it was still regarded as a good thing for European peace 69 Peace education 
became one of the main fronts of the international peace movement. However, this 
was not a cohesive movement: Elly Hermon points out that the aim of peace 
education towards "moral disarmament" could be interpreted in two ways, either 
as an exercise in the transformation of human behaviour, or as an attempt to reform 
international organisation. 70 The Friends, both in Britain and the United States, 
were firmly committed to presenting an example of the transformed behaviour of 
68Rufus M. Jones, The Quaker Peace Position, Peace Association of Friends in America, 
Richmond, Indiana, 1915, p. 4. 
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people who worked for peace, but were more ambivalent when it came to issues 
of international politics. Unease with such coercive measures as sanctions and 
blockades-the child-feeding in Austria and Germany had begun as a protest 
against allied blockades after the war-meant that the Friends were uncomfortable 
with governmental mechanisms to secure peace, at the same time as they felt no 
compunction about soliciting the government in the cause of neutrality. 
Consequently, the Friends supported non-intervention but rejected Government 
arguments that neutral shipping should stay away from Spain to avoid running the 
Nationalist blockade, an action which would prevent food and clothing getting 
through to the people of Spain. 71 
1.4 Friends and Sanctions 
The matter of coercion, its legitimacy or otherwise, was central to the peace debates 
taking place in the British Society of Friends in the 1930s. This manifested itself in 
endless, and by Quaker standards ferocious, debates in the Society's journals, The 
Friend and The Wayfarer, on the morality of economic and military sanctions as a 
means of coercing and controlling an aggressor. In contrast, the American Friends, 
placed at some distance from the debate, appear to have been less concerned. 
To the British Friends sanctions could be both an act of war and a step in 
that path to war known ironically as collective security. Nancy Bell, a 
correspondent in The Wayfarer, stated her view unequivocally: "... supporters of 
Collective Security are really at bottom the advocates of World Law, with the 
weapon of war retained to enforce respect for this. "72 Sanctions were a warning 
shot, a step short of the last resort but in effect an admission that war remained an 
option if deemed politically necessary. This debate on the inevitability or otherwise 
of war in a system of Collective Security was considered extensively in the pages 
of The Wayfarerin a series of articles in 1936. This was initiated as a consequence 
of the publication, in January, of a document on Collective Security from the 
Friends' Centre in Geneva. The document contained the following paragraph: 
"Jill Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, Macmillan Press, 
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In principle, they [sanctions] differ from war in that they constitute 
police action by the community for social order, as against 
anarchical action by the individual state for selfish aggression. They 
constitute public war for defence of the community against private 
war for the advantage of one state at another's expense. Even if, at 
the very worst; this involved some form of military or naval action, 
that would be preferable in a world where armed force rules, to 
allowing the aggressor to work his will freely. 73 
There are several points here that are contentious for a Quaker audience. First, it 
is essentially a defence of the concept of just war, as Carl Heath, a respected British 
Friend, did not hesitate to point out: 74 a move away from the belief that war in itself 
is evil, to a belief that the purpose for which it is fought may be evil. In addition, 
sanctions are presented not as an independent tool, but instead stand in place of a 
formal threat of war; in effect they become that threat. In reply Heath declared, "... 
once you have established the power of the League to enforce its will (even to the 
point of public war), in future 'the effect would be obtained by the threat of 
sanctions. "'75 Whether this would be successful Heath questioned. 
Even where sanctions were referred to only as the final option prior to a 
declaration of war this enshrined the assumption that sanctions are in themselves 
legitimate, a peaceful tool of diplomacy, hence their popularity amongst anti-war 
groups. The nature of the Friends' absolutism caused many to challenge this notion 
and it is unusual to find it appearing in a document of an official nature. For Carl 
Heath, and many other Quakers, sanctions were an act of war. War "is destroying 
innocent people... and destroying them by a combination of methods from attrition, 
starvation and mechanized force. "76 There was no useful distinction to be made 
'Cited in Carl Heath, "Sanctions and the More Excellent Way", The Wayfarer, March 1936, pp. 
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between the methods of death. " In part, however, the Geneva document, produced 
by American Friends, marked the difference between the two societies: an editorial 
in the American publication The Messenger of Peace expressed the view that: 
... while we may question some of the motives 
behind the League 
action, and while we may disagree with the policy of sanctions as 
applied, let us remember that for the first time in history some fifty 
nations of the world are actually banded together in common 
program to bring an aggressor to time and call a halt to international 
banditry. " 
The British and Orthodox Quaker antipathy to coercion in any form is based 
in a belief of "that of God in every man" and the consequent respect of the sanctity 
of the individual and of the ability of the faithful to speak to his or her heart. This 
imposes upon the Quaker the duty not to impose his or her beliefs upon others, but 
rather to convince through the power of the spirit. As Nancy Bell wrote, "all 
improvement comes from encouraging the little seed of good in every human 
being. o79 
The above quotation is representative of the sentiments expressed in The 
Friend and The Wayfarer during the 1930s, but what then of those who felt this to 
be either impracticable or contrary in action to the urgings of the spirit? Bertram 
Pickard, an American Friend and one of the architects of the Geneva document, 
deplored the tendency of Quakers-as he saw it-not to recognise their own very 
small place in the world and to tailor the manifestation of their peace testimony to 
a practical programme which might be a step in the direction of a more absolute 
peace. 
... whilst as Quaker pacifists we are trying to 
live and propagate by 
"Although more modem Friends support sanctions as a political tool than did in the 1930s they 
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513. 
"Nancy Bell, op. cit., pp. 210-211 
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word and example an active peaceableness which is able to 
minimize fear, hatred and anger in ourselves and others, as Quaker 
citizens we are also co-operating in the complex political task of 
eliminating outward violence (notably the institution of war) by 
changing human behaviour in the direction of international co- 
operation, and towards the establishment of a framework of law and 
order, without which setting mass human passions are beyond 
control 8° 
British and American Quaker action during the Spanish Civil War, therefore, can 
be seen in two ways. For the British Friends their action was both an expression of 
love for the Spanish and a protest against the politics of collective security which 
came into play. For the American Quakers, it was equally an expression of love, but 
the American Friends also perceived relief as a way of preserving world neutrality 
and taking part in the international politics which the British Friends abhorred. 
1.5 The Spanish Civil War 
The Spanish Civil War did not in itself lead to the crumbling of the peace 
movement in Britain and America. The process had already begun with the Sino- 
Japanese War and the Abyssinian crisis: the outcome of both damaged confidence 
in the effectiveness of the League of Nations. However, feelings in the United States 
and Great Britain ran in different directions. During the 1930s, the failures of the 
League of Nations dampened the recruiting power of the internationally oriented 
peace groups. Those who rejected international cooperation as tainting Americans 
with European deceit and corruption were more successful in keeping and 
attracting members, and American security was seen as a product of the actions of 
Congress, rather than of International conferences 81 As the constituent elements of 
the Keep America Out of the War Congress illustrates, internationalist feeling 
tended to be liberal rather than left-wing and placed a heavy emphasis on the 
diplomatic method rather than on the justice of the outcome. The AFSC, whilst 
80Bertram Pickard, "Sanctions-A Political Way", p. 87, The Wayfarer, April 1936, pp. 86-87. 
81Richard P. Traina, American Diplomacy and The Spanish Civil War, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1968, pp. 13-14. 
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resolutely opposed to war anywhere, adopted the immediate goal of keeping the 
US uninvolved. Thus, in electoral politics fear of the Catholic clergy's ability to 
mobilise the Catholic electorate and the reinforcement lent by generally Protestant 
peace campaigns led Roosevelt to acquiesce to the British and French governments' 
policies 82 In Britain, in contrast, much of the peace movement found its support 
amongst the Left and in the trade-union and working class rhetoric of international 
brotherhood. In this context, peace without social justice was unappealing, and a 
popular front or war against fascism appealed as a greater indication of 
international brotherhood than the rhetoric of appeasement and compromise. Thus 
in Britain the Spanish conflict undermined the peace movement, but in the United 
States it appears to have reinforced it. 
American and British Quaker reactions to the Spanish Civil War and to the 
Republican Government were mixed. Assessing the concern of Orthodox American 
Friends is difficult. The distance of the conflict diffused interest and although The 
Messenger of Peace... devoted one editorial to the matter-sympathetic to the 
claims of the Republican Government for sole legitimacy-this does not appear to 
have aroused the passion of American Quakerism The East Coast American 
Friends, wary of the aggressive nature of fascism, were also sympathetic, although 
members of the western Friends Church, to judge from the complete absence of 
discussion in The Evangelical Friend, were simply uninterested, their energies 
channelled towards the missionary and relief needs in China " 
Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to analyse this matter in any 
detail, it seems fairly clear that the British Friends, generally aligned with the left, 
were far more sympathetic to the Republic and generally deployed a greater 
82It is not clear to what extent the American Catholic Church influenced the Roosevelt 
administration's decision to maintain an embargo, but there is some agreement that the 
influence of the Catholic clergy was exaggerated. A December 1938 poll indicated that 39% of 
Catholics were pro-Franco whilst 30% were pro-Loyalist. In 1939, a Gallup poll put the figures 
at 38% pro-Franco and 29% pro-Loyalist. J. David Valaik, "Catholics, Neutrality and the 
Spanish Embargo, 1937-39", Journal ofAmerican History, 1967, p. 83. 
"It Happens Again in Spain", The Messenger of peace, Supplement to the American Friend, 
15 October 1936. 
"Jaime Mendez, "Spain is Saved From Fascism", The Messenger of Peace, Supplement to the 
American Friend, 2 April 1936, pp. 134-5. 
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passion. In August 1936, an extremely partisan article was published by Alfred 
Jacob in both the British journal, The Friend, and its American counterpart, The 
American Friend. 85 This provoked little debate on the issue of Spain and what 
Friends could do, but it did trigger a debate in Britain about the place of the Peace 
Testimony in a civil war, asking pointedly how British Friends would feel if in a 
similar position or subject to invasion. One correspondent, P. Mabel Unwin, asked, 
Could we take the complete pacifist position if an armed rising took 
place in our own country, a conflict of ideas which neither sanctions 
nor a system of collective security could affect? Must we not 
consider the possibility of such a situation, and take the same 
attitude to it in another country as we should in our own? ' 
The letter aroused passionate response. The following week, Charles Edward 
Gresham wrote in to declare, "The Christian Pacifist position is not conditioned by 
circumstances; it regards the method of war as an infraction of the Divine Law. "87 
However, the following week, P. L. Dobrashian contributed a rare example of a 
Quaker suggesting the possible inadequacy of the Peace Testimony. 
To those Friends who still entertain illusions as to the innate 
goodness of civilised man... 
Once we recognise that Christian humility is no deterrent to 
the worshippers of brute force, we have no option, if we are 
concerned for the propagation of our faith, but to condone the use 
of coercion for the specific purpose of preserving those liberties 
which are indispensable to our very survival. Aldous Huxley's 
warning that Means determines Ends is a splendid tonic in our 
contemporary world, but it must not deceive us into believing that 
the defence of the Spanish democracy is in any way comparable to 
the crime of voluntarily waging the Great War to prove to our 
'Alfred B. Jacob, "The Roots of Spanish Unrest", The Friend, 7 August 1936, pp. 735-6 and The American Friend, 20 August 1936, pp. 348-9. 
16P. Mabel Unwin,, "Letters to the Editor", The Friend, 14 August 1936, p. 767. 
"Charles Edward Gresham, "Letters to the Editor", The Friend, 21 August 1936, p. 786. 
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Imperial rivals that "Might is Right". " 
The most extensive and thoughtful exposition of the usual British Quaker stance 
was written by Mabel King Beer: "... the Christian realises that the tyrant is 
powerless in the spiritual world-which is no merely verbal or nebulous 
conception... "" Although marginal to this dissertation the reply from H. E. 
Edwards must be noted for the virulence with which it challenged Jacob and 
offered a defence of Accion Popular, the Right and "the Fascist organic state". " It 
is easy to forget that not all British Friends, however great their generosity in 
matters of relief, supported the Republican cause. However, what is most 
important is to recognise that the British Friends did not actually oppose non- 
intervention, rather they opposed the refusal to acknowledge a legitimate and 
democratic government, the motives which lay behind non-intervention, and the 
obvious lack of will to enforce it. 
Reactions to the Spanish conflict amongst the constituencies the Quakers 
hoped to appeal to also differed and this affected fund-raising strategies. The 
British Quakers could be relatively certain of financial support from the Left which, 
whilst sometimes of suspicious of communism, did not regard the government of 
Spain as necessarily the tool of either communism or the Soviet Union. Partially 
because it was the usual British Quaker mode of fund-raising, and in part because 
of this visible public support, the British Friends were able to campaign for funds 
publicly on the streets and at large (and often political) public meetings. They also 
succeeded in mobilising schools and church organisations in the fund-raising 
efforts. However, the FSC relied on Quaker donations to cover administrative costs. 
Paul Sturge, Secretary of the Friends Service Council (FSC) Spain Relief Committee, 
wrote to all Preparative Meeting (PM) Clerks in November 1936 warning that: 
No service in Spain could easily be undertaken by Friends if it were 
not for the existence of the Friends Service Council, and the need for 
maintaining the ordinary work of the Council should therefore 
BBP. L. Dobrashian, "Letters to the Editor", The Friend, 4 September 1936, pp. 822-824. 
"'Mabel King Beer, "Letters to the Editor", The Friend, 11 September 1936, pp. 846-848. 
90H. E. Edwards, "Letters to the Editor", The Friend, 14 August 1936, p. 767. 
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clearly come first 91 
Appeals were thus not sent out to Friends individually, but directed towards 
Meetings, where it was hoped group fundraising would bring in more substantial 
sums from outreach and much of the relief was paid for by donations from non- 
Quaker individuals. 
In America the Red Scares of 1924 had left a trade union movement and 
socialist party which were seriously weakened and terrified of association with 
communism. Although many socialists did rally around the Spanish cause, the 
campaign for relief funds in America was factionalised. Many American liberals 
were suspicious of the Republican government and although Progressive, anti- 
Catholic sentiment may have aroused some American support for the Republicans 
it did not succeed in wholly assuaging fears of both communism and atheism. 
Unlike the situation in Britain and despite apparently heated passions, the majority 
of Americans appear never to have desired active intervention in the Spanish Civil 
War 92 This might have affected the AFSC campaign more had the AFSC been 
accustomed to rely on street collections and private charity as did the British 
Quakers. However, the Philadelphia office rejected street collections on the 
grounds that they were not cost effective, although a number of the local branches 
may have employed this tactic. Instead, and in contrast to the FSC, the AFSC 
operated mainly as an umbrella organisation soliciting substantial donations from 
other charities including the Greater New York Federation of Churches, the 
Unitarians and the Association to Save the Children of Spain, whose names 
appeared on the letter-head of the "Spanish Child Feeding Mission". 3 In addition, 
the AFSC also took substantial donations from the North American Committee for 
Democracy in Spain, another umbrella group consisting of largely left-wing 
organisations, but it is noticeable that this association was not publicised. 
In the international arena, the failure of the League of Nations either to 
enforce sanctions or successfully to mediate in Abyssinia was one justification, had 
91#10,27 October 1936, FSC Minutes of Spain Committee, 3 September 1936-11 July 1940, p. 10. 
92Traina, op. cit., p. 107. 
93See sample letter-head from 1937 of the "Spanish Child Feeding Mission" of the AFSC. 
Committee on Spain 1937: Finance, Fundraising by Wellington Tinker (Box 4). 
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any been needed, behind the decision to move negotiations on the politically 
delicate issue of the Spanish Civil War from the public arena of Geneva and the 
League to the private diplomatic circles of London, Paris and the in camera Non- 
Intervention Committee. Furthermore, neither Italy nor Germany took part in 
League meetings and thus another mechanism was needed to pull them into 
negotiations. In addition, Spain held the Presidency of the League of Nations 
Council, and although in the long-term this did them little good 94 it did mean that 
any debates on Spain in the League were vehicles for the Spanish government, 
something which Britain seems to have been anxious to avoid. The Non- 
Intervention Committee, in contrast, excluded Spain, emphasising the effective 
non-recognition of the Republican government implied by the arms embargo 95 
Throughout the war, with the exception of a greater willingness to provide 
humanitarian aid, the American government followed the lead of Great Britain. 
In order to prevent the Spanish Civil War from escalating into a European 
conflict (the notorious "first criterion" of the Non-Intervention Committee96) it was 
necessary not actually to halt foreign intervention but merely to provide a 
mechanism whereby diplomacy might be employed to slow down potentially 
hostile moves between the European powers. This allowed those who wished to 
intervene actively-Russia, Italy and Germany-to do so, whilst Britain and 
France- concerned to secure their existing interests in both zones and in France's 
case to preserve internal order-could indicate to their electorates that something 
was being done. Simultaneously they endeavoured to avoid internal controversy 
and preserve at least an outward show of neutrality. In Britain this failed to 
appease many sections of public opinion, particularly on the Left. The wide variety 
"Veatch points out that of the total membership of the League (fifty-one states) only twenty had 
liberal democratic systems and that "Conservative governments, of one kind or another... were 
in power in the great majority of the League's member countries". Richard Veatch, "The League 
of Nations and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-9", European History Quarterly, volume 20,1990, 
pp. 188-9. 
95Ibid., pp. 182 and 194. 
% In the House of Commons, December 21,1937, David Grenfell MP asked, "Was not the object 
of Non-Intervention to stop Intervention? ". Chamberlain replied, "The policy was designed 
with the object of confining the policy to Spain. " Hansard, 330 H. C. Deb. 55, p. 1808; Wm. Laird 
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, The Policy ofSimmering: A Study of British Government Policy During the 
Spanish Civil War, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962, p. 105. 
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of political opinion within the British peace movement meant that active peace 
campaigners were as likely to campaign for intervention in Spain as not. 
The 
opposition to Non-Intervention came from those on both the Right and Left of 
British politics, many of whom saw in Spain the seeds of a future threat, either 
fascist or communist. Many in the British peace movement saw in Non-Intervention 
the abdication of responsibility in matters of mediation, conciliation and an 
abandonment of humanitarian ethics 97 In America, however, the less left-wing 
peace movement was content to see some form of neutrality preserved and was 
more concerned that it should be enforced, however poorly, than with protesting 
the partiality of this official neutrality in both theory and practice. 
Between 1936 and 1940 the British Society of Friends participated in calls for 
Government, Church and League-sponsored reconciliation in Spain, but in the face 
of the British and French Governments' unwillingness to explore public channels 
of debate and the deliberate marginalisation of the Spanish conflict from the rest 
of the "international situation", the opportunities for peace campaigning were 
limited: the Spanish Civil War quickly slipped from the minutes of the FSC Peace 
Committee, to be mentioned only once after December 1937. Although the AFSC 
had a Peace Committee, its main concern had been consistently for peace education 
as this was less controversial than political campaigning might have been. In 
addition, whilst the AFSC did make use of its political networks to support 
congressional peace initiatives, it was far less prone to putting out public 
statements and leaflets which might have brought it into conflict with large 
elements of American Quakerism. 
For the Quakers on both sides of the Atlantic the imposition of an economic 
blockade and the hardships this imposed on Republican Spain, cut off from its 
main food supplies now in the Nationalist zone, was an obvious area to be of 
"The League of Nation Refugee Convention (1938) had failed to include Spanish refugees 
within its definition of refugees, both because it did not specifically name the Spanish as a 
special group in the same way as it identified the Russians, but also because refugees were 
defined as people without nationality-White Russians had been stripped of theirs in 
1922-and therefore without government protection. As both the Republic and the Nationalist 
authorities claimed responsibility, the Spanish did not benefit from the few conventions the 
League had put in place by 1938, such as international travel papers. See Claudena Skran, 
Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 
72,76,99 and 86. 
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service. The Friends turned towards vociferous agitation for relief and the right of 
volunteers to serve with relief agencies in Spain, permission for which was slow to 
come from the Foreign Office and the State Department 
98 The consequent stress 
on the humanitarian aspects of the war challenged the ideological dominance of 
"international considerations" over individual needs but Spain was still, partially 
as a consequence of British and American government assessment of the situation, 
to be approached as discrete from other issues. The manner in which the Friends 
approached work in Spain, emphasising their practical neutrality and playing 
down individual workers' attitudes and political beliefs, inevitably reinforced this 
notion at least until 1940 when, for the American Friends, the consequences of the 
Spanish Civil War became inseparable from the other events they dealt with in 
Europe. 
98 The US State Department did not begin to issue passports for relief work until March 1937. 
This might explain the relatively late start of the AFSC relief effort-see, Richard P. Traina, op. 
cit., p. 189-except that Sylvester Jones began his mission of enquiry in December 1936 and that 
there is no mention of any difficulty in securing passports in either the minutes or the letters. 
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Chapter Two: 
The Friends Service Committee in Barcelona 
2.1 Arriving in Spain 
In 1935 an expatriate Quaker, Russell Ecroyd, informed the Society of Friends that 
with the increasing toleration of Protestantism in Spain the opportunity existed for 
a Quaker mission. In 1936 the Friends posted an internal advertisement calling for 
a Spanish-speaking volunteer. The advertisement was answered by Alfred Jacob, 
a Quaker student who had recently taken a history degree at Oxford and spoke 
Spanish. ' 
Alfred Jacob was born in West Chester County, Pennsylvania, and raised in 
the United States. Although educated primarily in the USA, he took his 
undergraduate degree at Oxford, took British nationality and married an English 
Friend and convinced pacifist, Norma Jacob. By 1936 the Jacobs had two small 
children. It was the feeling of Meeting for Sufferings, the responsible body, that the 
pair were both too young and too inexperienced to be sent as missionaries into a 
new field, but the shortage of Spanish-speaking Friends ensured that the Jacobs 
were selected? 
It was originally intended that the Jacobs would travel to Awakening and 
there establish a small hostel which would serve as a Quaker Centre, similar to the 
centres in Geneva, Berlin and Paris which served as Quaker "Embassies" or 
mission houses. The original programme expected Alfred Jacob to raise the bulk 
of his own funds, and £150 was quickly raised to support a trial year. Should the 
' "Outlook and Outreach: Opportunities in Spain", The American Friend, 21 March 1936, p. 102. 
Alfred B. Jacob to Ruth E. Outland, 14 July 1936, AFSC: Committee on Spain (CoS), 1936, Corns. 
& Orgs.: Friends Service Council, General. 
'Alfred Jacob suggested that had he not been a pacifist Norma would not have agreed to see 
him. As it was, it was one of the first things she asked. Interview with Farah Mendlesohn, 
January 1994. 
3Norma Jacob, "The Spanish Civil War", in Bio of an Ogre, by Piers Anthony, Ace Books, New 
York, 1988, p. 229. Personnel in the Field, Report of Committee held at the Priory Rooms, 
November 24 1936, to meet Paul Sturge of the London Committee: Warwickshire Monthly 
Meeting Spain Committee: Letters and Minutes. 
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initial project prove successful, the AFSC planned to provide staff to form a joint 
venture similar to that operating in the other Quaker centres 
4 
The military rebellion in mid-July, and the rapid escalation to civil war by 
mid-September, precluded the idea of the Jacobs, with their two small children, 
travelling to Spain as a family group. It also cast doubt on the wisdom of siting a 
Quaker embassy in Madrid, due to the danger of Madrid coming under attack, and 
engendered further doubt within the FSC that the original idea of a Quaker centre 
remained viable. Instead, Alfred Jacob travelled with John W. Harvey, a member 
of the newly established Spain Committee, to explore opportunities for Quaker 
work outside Madrid. It was assumed that this would be a short war and that 
material aid would be unnecessary. Instead, the Quakers would offer spiritual 
support for those attempting to maintain a pacifist witness. The evangelical and 
Protestant nature of the proposed Quaker presence ensured that the Friends would 
not be welcome in Burgos, the Nationalist capital, although enquiries were made. 
Instead, Jacob and Harvey turned their attention to Catalonia, an area not at the 
fore-front of the fighting and therefore relatively safe, but which as a consequence 
of its relative safety was taking a major role in the housing and maintenance of 
refugees, and thus might offer openings for future Quaker work. Although this 
project had clear missionary intent, the FSC entered upon it with an awareness that 
conditions and needs might change. 
The level of need which Harvey and Jacob found in Catalonia hinted that 
food shortages could not be far away and whilst Jacob remained to establish 
himself, Harvey returned to London. In response to John W. Harvey's report the 
members of the Spain Committee began to visit those individuals in London whom 
they felt might prove of importance in any future work, including both the Spanish 
Embassy and representatives of the Insurgents. ' One traditional contact renewed 
was with the Save the Children International Union, based in Geneva. The Friends 
had strong contacts with the Union-a non-partisan organisation-through 
'FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 3 September 1936. 
SNorma Jacob eventually joined Alfred in 1937, once the work was established, and by late 1937 
had become an integral part of the unit; FSC: Minutes of the Meeting for Sufferings, October 
1936: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 17 September 1936. 
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personal connections to Eglantyne Jebb 6 the founder, and through shared work 
in 
Germany and Austria. The Friends also moved to establish links with other 
organisations including the Council of Action (Women's Section) and, at a 
later 
date, with the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief, a left-wing organisation 
which ensured public neutrality with a cross-bench parliamentary presence on its 
committee! The most important decision taken as a consequence of John W. 
Harvey's report was that FSC activity would not concern itself with the refugees 
who had fled to France and appeared to be adequately cared for by relatively 
sympathetic French authorities! This policy was maintained until 1940. 
In late October 1936, Alfred Jacob was residing in a YMCA centre and 
hosting gatherings of young men anxious to hold to a pacifist witness. Jacob was 
concerned to assist them to alternative service, a mission in which he had some 
success. By October 1936, however, refugees were entering Catalonia at an 
estimated average of 600 per day, with as many as 3,000 refugees entering on some 
days. The vast majority of these refugees were children. Most were evacuees from 
Madrid, but others came from Valencia, where there would be little provision for 
refugees until the arrival of the AFSC in April 1937. Whilst all efforts were being 
made by the local authorities and indigenous charities to settle these children it was 
clear that if the situation extended for more than a month or so, external assistance 
would be needed 9 Although the League of Nations had, by this time, established 
a regime for the treatment of refugees, it did not apply to internal refugees and thus 
could not immediately assist those refugees who remained in Spain 10 The 
6Jebb's sister-in-law, Dorothy, was a Quaker. See Francesca Wilson, Rebel Daughter of a 
Country House: the Life of Eglantyne jebb, Founder of the Save the Children Fund, George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1967, p. 212. 
'FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 28 September 1936. 
8FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 3 October 1936. Skran, op. cit., pp. 57-61. 
'Pro Infancia Obrera, for example, had been established in 1934 to assist refugees from the 
Asturias rebellion. 
"Under the terms of the Franco-Spanish Convention (1932) Spanish aliens were accorded the 
a same status as nationals and extended special benefits to refugees who were old or very 
young, pregnant or nursing, or who had large families. In 1936 Leon Blum's Popular Front 
government recognised the "right to work". This is one reason, apart from its proximity, that 
many refugees fled to France. Skran, op. cit., p. 129-130. 
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Republic's Health Department made it clear that any assistance would be 
appreciated, but that the emphasis should be placed on tinned or dried milk, milk 
foods, cod-liver oil, dried eggs and sugar. The supply of milk had already failed by 
October as most of the dairies and factories were located in insurgent Spain; 
furthermore, the Non-Intervention agreement, with its refusal to recognise the 
Republic as legitimate, discouraged the extension of credit to the Spanish 
government for food purchases, and included food aid within a broad definition 
of intervention. " The British Quaker response was to begin raising funds for a 
supply of milk and dried foods for children in the Barcelona region, in association 
with the Save the Children Fund (SCF), the British section of the Save the Children 
International Union (SCIU). From the start, Jacob held two budgets, one for relief 
purposes designated by the Committee, the second for the management of his 
personal Concern. From this second budget Jacob proposed that he attempt the 
protection and support of those members of the Right trapped in Republican Spain, 
possibly through the maintenance of a Government-controlled hostel. Nothing 
came of this, but Jacob did succeed in establishing a scheme to supply food parcels 
to those of the Right and British expatriates who could be found sponsorship in 
Britain 12 This particular scheme was to prove a useful means of acquiring Spanish 
currency as the war proceeded and the blockade took hold. 
The arrival of donations in kind from a number of sources enabled the SCIU 
and the Friends to begin relief work in Barcelona almost immediately, and in 
December Alfred Jacob was able to distribute enough milk for 200 children. 
Arguably, this was more in the way of moral than nutritional support, but this was 
crucial to the Quaker understanding of aid as an expression of a shared humanity 
in God. In the meantime the Geneva committee of the SCIU despatched 200 cases 
of condensed milk with the intention of distribution to 500 children in Barcelona 
for three months. Mrs. Small, the SCIU investigator, returned to Geneva leaving 
Alfred Jacob with seniority and effective autonomy. 
In December 1937, Alfred Jacob was authorised to obtain a warehouse and 
"FSC: circular letter, 21 October 1936, attached to Minutes of the Spain Committee, 27 October 
1936. 
12Spain Committee Minutes, no. 29, p. 11. 
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office space as rapidly as possible . 
13 The FSC and SCIU agreed that they would 
cooperate on joint projects but were to feel free to raise money independently for 
other work; an agreement which proved open to a number of interpretations 
14 By 
the end of the month Alfred Jacob had carved out a space for Friends' aid in Spain, 
the SCIU had appointed Dr. Miette Pictet, a Swiss with professional experience in 
child protection, as their agent in Spain, and Alfred Jacob, with the help of a 
Catalan Protestant, Domingo Ricart who was to prove crucial to the success of the 
mission, " had established himself in an office in Calle Caspe, Barcelona. 16 Fund- 
raising was under way and it was planned that a number of people would visit 
Spain over the Christmas period to report back to local fund-raisers on needs and 
conditions. In the same cause it was also decided to issue a bulletin to all regular 
donors 17 
2.2 The Spiritual Witness of Alfred Jacob 
The modern Society of Friends tries to manifest a group witness; however, the 
prominence of Alfred Jacob as a correspondent and in the letters and records of the 
Spanish relief mission cannot be ignored. Jacob had a very personal Concern for 
Spain as a place and the Spanish as a people and was very clearly partisan. It is 
difficult to assess the extent of Jacob's missionary zeal because it was so rapidly 
13 FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 8 December 1936. 
"One such project which the FSC agreed to support was to supply Russell and Maria Ecroyd 
with materials and foodstuffs to maintain a hospital at their home in Castellon, a project which 
was supported continuously until Russell Ecroyd's death in 1938. FSC: Minutes of the Spain 
Committee, 8 December 1936. 
"There is not enough primary material on Domingo Ricart to enable adequate consideration 
of either his role or personality-his papers at Haverford College consist of his academic 
writings. A short summary drawn from the available secondary material is included as 
Appendix B. 
76FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 22 December 1936. 
"These visitors included Edith M. Pye, a respected relief worker and member of the 
Birmingham Spain Committee, and Horace A. Alexander, who had served in India, was a 
member of the FSC Spain Committee and served as Chairman of the Birmingham Spain 
Committee, the most active of the regional Quaker campaign groups. The Birmingham 
Committee would send a small but steady stream of observers in the next two years in order 
to provide material for its fund-raising efforts. See the Minutes of Warwickshire Monthly 
Meeting. 
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swamped by events, but there is evidence that Alfred Jacob's initial Concern was 
not for relief-which appeared less urgent in the autumn of 1936-but 
for the 
spiritual enlightenment of the Spanish people. Jacob had been to Spain for the first 
time in 1928 and had five subsequent visits to his credit 18 What made him 
particularly useful to the Friends was far less his "beautiful, formal Spanish", 
" 
which was of limited use in Catalonia, but his expressed concern for the spiritual 
future of the Spanish people. In the talk he gave to the Friends Service Committee 
in March 1936, he declared his belief that there existed in Spain "a keenness, 
alertness, thirst for new institutions, new knowledge, and real progress" 2° His fear 
was "whether a country which is going through half a century of progress in a very 
few years is to leave God behind because it cannot find him in the Church? "" He 
viewed the Spanish Republic and the rise of secularism as an opportunity for the 
Spanish to reject the hegemony of the Catholic Church and turn towards a more 
individualistic form of Christianity and in an early article on the Spanish conflict 
for The Friend in 1936, although he stopped short of justifying Church burning, 
Jacob offered an apology for the actions of people oppressed over centuries, "in 
which the Church has opposed all significant efforts to improve the lot of the 
poor"'' More positively he noted with approval many of the reforms of the new 
government, particularly the efforts to improve literacy, and the move to land 
reform and noted that the Protestant churches had been left unmolested 3 Jacob's 
support for the leftist policies of the Republic may have helped to fuel AFSC fears 
that the mission was not as impartial as it ought to be. 
"Alfred Jacob, "Talk to the Friends Service Council, 5 March 1936", transcript, p. 1, in Alfred 
Jacob's personal journal. Jacob's journal is not a good source for this thesis. Due to both 
pressures of work and to a lack of interest, as well as the need to send constant reports to 
London, personal record-keeping fell into abeyance before the end of 1936. 
"'Domingo Ricart, cited in "Domingo Ricart: A Life of Seeking and Serving", by Nancy Dawson, 
in Friends Journal, February 1988. 
20Alfred Jacob, "Talk to the Friends Service Council, 5 March 1936", transcript, p. 1. 
21Alfred B. Jacob. "The New Spain", The Friend, 8 May 1936, p. 410. 
'Alfred Jacob, "The Roots of Spanish Unrest", The Friend, 7 August 1936, p. 736. 
'Ibid. p. 735. 
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Jacob's suspicion of Catholicism was not unusual amongst either British or 
American Friends 24 but his vehemence was couched in traditional Quaker 
objections to the interference of institutions between the individual and 
his or her 
deity-as applicable to Anglicanism as to Catholicism-rather than anti-papist 
rhetoric. His Quaker paradigm inevitably shaped his understanding of what 
he 
saw. 
In the sphere of real religion, as opposed to church organization, 
there is no doubt that Spaniards as a nation have a very deep sense 
of religion, an almost mystical outlook and an unusually genuine 
sense of consciousness of human brotherhood. Religion is 
fundamental, and is always a personal relationship-with God, and 
with men. 
But as long as Church and religion remained synonymous, Jacob felt that religion 
as practised in Spain was a "hoax": "... you have an alert and promising people 
with an innate though unconscious sense of real religion, who have been obliged 
to reject the church. " With this primitivist and essentially orientalist approach to 
the "Spanish character", Jacob and his one Spanish recruit to the Society of Friends, 
Domingo Ricart, believed that the Quakers had the potential to catalyse this 
rejection into something else: "... if there are any... who would benefit by a religious 
fellowship such as ours; any who are tired of empty forms and want reality in 
worship, it is part of our mission to unite with them. "' However, whilst Jacob's 
language and calling came from the American Quaker missionary tradition, his 
religious practice did not. In rejecting the rituals of the Catholic Church, Jacob also 
implicitly rejected the tradition of programmed meetings, supervised by paid 
ministers, which marked the Western Quakers, those most active in missionary 
endeavour. His description of Quakerism is far more in accordance with that of 
North-East American and British Friends. Alfred Jacob appears to represent the 
"Quaker relief work in Ireland, however, had been notable for its impartiality and its refusal 
to blame the famine on the inhabitants' adherence to Catholicism. 
"Alfred Jacob, "Talk to the Friends Service Council, 5 March 1936", op. cit., p. 2. 
26Ibid. 
27Ibid. 
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convergence of two traditions. What tempered his evangelical fervour was a belief 
in the rightness of the Catalan cause: better education, greater social justice and the 
abolition of poverty. Whilst this did not shake his pacifism, it did temper his 
personal neutrality and brought him perilously close to what a later generation 
would call liberation theology. 
A believer in practical Christianity, in the mode of the twentieth-century 
Quaker reformers Henry Cadbury and Rufus Jones, Alfred Jacob looked quickly 
for a means to begin his work. His first and most fortunate contact in Barcelona 
was Domingo Ricart, a local officer for the YMCA. This contact provided Jacob with 
lodgings in the Ricarts' home, and office space in the YMCA as a base from which 
he could engage those around him on the issues of pacifism. 
Jacob had been relieved to find that the Protestant churches had been left 
relatively untouched by the upheavals, although no churches in Barcelona were 
holding public worship. ' This reinforced his belief that in the religious vacuum left 
by the Catholic church "there might conceivably be in the future the starting point 
of a unified Spanish Protestant Church, "' a confidence supported by the initial 
success of study groups among the young men who attended the YMCA. It was 
vitally important to nurture those who might prove the "nucleus of a new spirit", 30 
and Alfred Jacob asked the FSC to provide financial aid to the YMCA, in order that 
it could keep in touch with its members and encourage them to maintain their 
testimony 31 A number of young men attached to the YMCA and ordered to the 
front had succeeded in securing non-combatant duties, reinforcing Jacob's belief in 
the essential liberality and spirituality of the Republic. For Jacob, Attempts to 
extend the message from alternative service to conscientious objection, however, 
were less successful: "It is hardly ever opportune to go into the question of 
conscientious objection, but I believe that many who now refuse to shoulder a gun 
"Karin Lee interview, "Alfred Jacob: Spain 1936-1940 Friends Service Council", AFSC Oral 
HistoryInterview, Alfred Jacob, Spain. American Friends Service Committee, 1989, pp. 24-25. 
"Reports and Letters, Alfred B. Jacob to Frederick J. Tritton, 3 October 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
'Ibid. 
31Ibid. 
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will in time refuse to participate in war. i32 However, with the exception of 
Domingo Ricart, Jacob does not mention the existence of any absolute pacifists and 
this section of the mission clearly enjoyed the least success. Despite this, by 
securing the financial support of the FSC for the YMCA, Jacob ensured himself a 
respected base from which to begin operations; in securing the support of Domingo 
Ricart, he assured himself of an invaluable adviser, interpreter and friend. 
In the first months of the war Alfred Jacob saw himself as principally as an 
example: a living witness to peace and a peace maker not a relief worker. However, 
within a few months the need for material relief was to dominate the 
correspondence. By February 1937 Jacob was writing to the FSC, concerned that the 
Quaker relief workers should not be stigmatised as "rice Christians" in their desire 
to have their work distinguished from "mere" relief work. Much later he would 
express his concern: 
There are great needs and a great will to meet them ... it is not true 
that assistance of outside bodies would be unacceptable. We have 
found rather the contrary-so long as we do not propagandize, and 
remain under the direction of competent heads, I have met with no 
rebuffs, rather with every assistance 33 
The visit of Sylvester Jones in December 1936 and January 1937, whilst appreciated 
for the AFSC assistance he would bring in his wake, reopened this issue of the 
supposed distinctive and religious nature of Friends' work. An admonitory note 
from Sylvester Jones unleashed passionate irritability from Alfred Jacob: 
I am glad Sylvester Jones recalled the need to remember the 
fundamentals of our work here, and the elements that should 
distinguish it from mere relief work. At the same time I am eager to 
avoid ulterior motives, because for so many centuries Spain has been 
the victim of organisations who give one thing in order to gain 
another, and I am quite content to see the work confined exclusively 
32Ibid. 
"Meeting for Suffering Minutes, no. 9, March 1938. This is in noticeable contrast to the 
missionary work being undertaken at the same time by American Evangelical Friends in China 
(see Appendix C). 
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to relief as long as may be M 
The speed with which the Friends in Spain resigned themselves to the loss 
of an evangelical mission is commendable. The rapidity with which other needs 
and other goals superseded and eventually encompassed the proselytising element 
of their work was integral to the relief workers' response to the challenge which 
was Spain. There were very few further references to missionary work in the letters 
of either Alfred or Norma Jacob, or, after January 1937, in the pages of The Friend. 
This may be the Quaker equivalent of the "depoliticisation" of the Spanish Civil 
War which took place in government circles. In the face of great need, Jacob made 
it clear that he was quite content to see the work confined exclusively to relief as 
long as need be. The name "Cuäquero" would become known by its association 
with the milk canteens, thus fulfilling the notion of a silent witnessing for Christ 
and a public emphasis on good works ' Looking back on his work many years later 
Jacob commented: 
... when we were thinking of going to Spain in the hope of creating 
an international center, we did have a printed statement of the 
nature of Quakerism that could be circulated in Spanish, but it never 
was. So those people who worked with us must have formed their 
own notion of what we stood for by the way we worked, not by 
anything we said. It wouldn't have been right to use the relief 
services. Our mission was to feed the hungry, and that's [... ] out of 
simple justice. Men have no right, even in the midst of war, to create 
lifelong problems that children in no way have brought on 
themselves ' 
Implicit in this was a rare recognition that to influence children in a spiritual path 
other than that of their parents could create lifelong difficulties, but one consistent 
with previous Quaker practice on the continent and in Ireland. The Quakers were 
proud of their reputation of faithful, non-proselytising relief work. However, 
'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 12 February 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 12 February 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
"6Karin Lee interview, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
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Alfred Jacob's public rejection of the missionary label was somewhat disingenuous. 
Although conversion was not part of the outward practice of the Barcelona unit, 
Jacob abandoned neither the practices nor the paradigms of the missionary 
movement of the period. By the 1930s the purpose of missionary work and its 
practice was under scrutiny by many of the mission societies. In particular, some 
missionaries were concerned to distance themselves from the concerns and 
ambitions of the secular world and were particularly concerned not to be identified 
with a spirit of political or cultural colonisation 37 Missionaries were accepting a 
more subtle understanding of their work, one which "opened doors to an 
understanding of the Gospel in many places where preaching was quite 
unavailing" ' Alfred Jacob, for all his disavowal of proselytising, saw Quaker relief 
both as a service valuable in itself, but also, in common with many medical 
missionaries, an "object lesson" in what Christianity should be. 
2.3 Child Feeding as a Spiritual Witness 
Alfred Jacob's principal motive for becoming involved in child-feeding in Spain 
was no more complicated than the desire not to see children go hungry, but, as the 
previous section indicated, this desire was shaped by the paradigm in which he 
operated and thought: the need to do a work for peace; the need to make a stance 
for neutrality; and the desire to do a work peculiarly Quaker. In describing his 
work and ambitions to an enquirer in 1936, Jacob declared; "Our effort is simply 
to do the works of peace in the midst of war, affirming the right of the human 
personality which war denies. 09 This affirmation involved a moral as well as 
physical dimension: war relief as practised by the Society of Friends was meant to 
be more than humanitarian aid. Relief workers were asked to give something 
spiritual, to experience the essential unity of the peace testimony, the testimony to 
social justice and their efforts in the field and to develop in the process an active 
and living spiritual witness. 
37H. Kraemer, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World, Edinburgh House Press, 
London, 1938, p. 37. 
"Max Warren, Social History and Christian Mission, SCM Press, London, 1967, p. 94. 
"Alfred Jacob to Mrs. Judith Corcoran, British Youth Peace Assembly, 8 December 1936. 
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In the political tension which ensued on the outbreak of war it became 
essential that those targeted for relief should be as uncontroversial as possible in 
order to gain as wide as possible a response. For Friends, a further step needed to 
be taken to force people to examine the consequence of warfare. The obvious 
decision was to focus publicity and relief efforts around the needs of children. 
We have begun with the children, because no one regard children as 
reds or anti-reds, and they can be fed and clothed without in the 
least helping the progress of war. However, by mobilizing masses 
of public opinion on behalf the children we cut across barriers of 
party and creed both outside Spain and inside 40 
Traditionally, until the end of the First World War, Quaker relief programmes had 
been impartial and according to need. In the American Civil War, the Franco- 
Prussian War and in France in 1917, the Friends had provided aid to both adults 
and children, with children taking priority, but there had been no conscious 
decision to separate children out for any political reasons. "' The involvement in 
"Hoover relief" at the end of the First World War changed the conventions. Despite 
widespread hardship amongst adults in Austria and Germany, Herbert Hoover 
and the American government were adamant that food relief should be granted 
only to children because they had not been the enemy 42 Adults were to be 
excluded on specifically political grounds. To secure American funding-and it 
was the largest single amount available-the British and American Friends had to 
go along with this decision in order to ensure the widest possible support from the 
American people. But because Hoover was himself a Quaker he effectively set a 
precedent which American Quakers would be less likely to challenge. 
However, Hoover cannot bear the entire responsibility for the decision to 
focus relief on children. The message that children were different, entitled to 
different treatment and a greater portion of compassion had been gathering weight 
throughout the nineteenth century as philosophies of child-rearing had changed. 
'Alfred B. Jacob to Fred Tritton, December 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
"Greenwood, op. cit., pp. 47-80 and 95-149. 
42Francesca M. Wilson, In the Margins of Chaos: Recollections of Relief Work in and Between 
Three Wars, John Murray, London, 1944, p. 119. 
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With the moral emphasis of the British Poor Law on the relief of the incapable and 
the forcing of the able-bodied adult into work, children emerged as a body to be 
protected from the system of laissez-faire. By the turn of the century, the condition 
of children was being considered separately from that of adults, as an area in which 
compassion was appropriate and moral reform a possibility. Eglantyne Jebb's 
contribution was to both internationalise and to codify this growing understanding. 
In a 1906 Booth study of Cambridge she drew attention to the hidden misery of the 
children of the poor, pointing out that the abolition of child labour did not 
automatically resolve all distress. During the First World War her publicising of the 
plight of women and children in Germany and Austria was treated indulgently, 
and welcomed for the favourable propaganda it provided. When, however, Jebb 
continued and extended this campaign against the continued blockade of Germany 
and Austria after the Armistice, she was reviled in the press and eventually 
prosecuted and became a cause celebre 43 Her success at mobilising aid for the 
children of Europe lay in her ability to tap into the growing belief in the sacredness 
of childhood, and the importance of children to a nation's future. In 1923 this was 
embedded in article three of the Save the Children International Union's charter, 
and the following year was incorporated into the Geneva Declaration on the Rights 
of the Child. This was formally accepted as a guiding principle, but not as a binding 
regulation, of all members of the League of Nations. " The declaration set up a 
"principle of first call", which it would be difficult for subsequent agencies to 
ignore. 
The decision to feed children only also catered to the need to harness the 
support of those who advocated neutrality, without forcing British Friends to 
support Non-Intervention which to many implicitly denied the responsibility of 
one individual for another in the sight of God45 Friends were happy to advertise 
work on both sides of the lines, and to cope with the loss of some support as a 
'Francesca Wilson, op. cit., p. 173. 
"Murray Last, "Putting Children First", Disasters, volume 18, no. 3,1994, pp. 192-202. 
"In the absence of any over-riding imperative the Friends also leaned towards supporting a 
recognised and established government, a precedent set at the Restoration and reinforced by 
Quaker actions during the American Revolution. 
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consequence, but it was accepted that for the most part only children could be 
considered as neutral recipients of relief, since to feed adults would be to risk 
accusations of partisanship should those adults prove to members of political or 
religious organisations. 
The method, the mode and the choices made in the Quaker relief effort were 
all integral to the Quaker witness; including the decision not to evangelise, who the 
Friends chose to work with and the types of relief they offered. 
2.4 Distribution and Decision Making 
The need for dairy products emerged early in the war. With Santander, the main 
dairy supplier, cut off from the Republic, it was clear that milk was going to be 
scarce. Inevitably, refugees began to congregate in the best organised areas. By late 
November 1936, and with the removal of the Republican Government to Valencia, 
15,000 children arrived in the city and another 8,000 evacuees were sent to 
Catalonia (most to Barcelona and its villages). By December, however, no SCIU or 
Quaker supplies had arrived and it was still unclear whom the Friends intended 
to assist. Most refugee children were initially placed in fertile country districts, 
billeted in farms and agricultural communities which it was felt were able to bear 
the additional burden, but reports of milk shortages had come in from the colonies 
and from Barcelona, and other foods were reported scarce. 
The welfare of the refugees was the responsibility of local refugee 
committees who were funded by the central government and the authorities of 
Barcelona. Whilst there was little available, this little was directed to the refugee 
colonies which initially took priority and which were guaranteed supplies by the 
government 46 The children who were most at risk were those in the city of 
Barcelona itself, a city with a peace-time population of approximately one million 
inhabitants. By late December there was no dried milk available on the open 
market and the production of tinned milk had declined by at least 40%. Mothers 
with children under eighteen months old were entitled to receive milk from the 
Casa Maternologia, a municipal feeding station, but only 400 mothers could be 
'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 10 October, 15,19,24 and 27 November, and 5 December 1936, 
FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
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supplied and for these, rations had been cut from five tins a week to two 
4' In order 
to supply milk to those assessed with special needs, both tinned and fresh milk was 
withdrawn from the general market, but this left many children without access to 
milk. In response to this Alfred Jacob asked if the remit of the mission might be 
extended to deal with the non-refugee children who were in want 48 
In late November 1936 Alfred Jacob, in association with Mrs. Small of the 
SCIU the provision of a daily milk ration to 200 of the neediest children in the city 
(to be selected by the Government Refugee Committee) and in the government run 
children's colonies 49 If possible, this milk would be given with a doctor in 
attendance, and under the supervision of the Quakers 5° This plan did not, 
however, find favour with the authorities. Senor Alcalä, the representative with 
whom Jacob dealt, reported that, "to select a group of children for special treatment 
is out of keeping with the order of things and amounts to creating a little 
hierarchy": the Syndicates which organised much of the rationing were unlikely to 
approve and might appropriate the milk for those children they personally 
identified as needy 51 Implicit in this fear was the knowledge that it would be easy 
for the Friends to become caught up in political bargaining, should one group or 
another feel that its followers were excluded from relief. This situation reinforced 
Jacob's desire to work with rather than for the Spanish, and where possible to 
reinforce their arrangements. However, Jacob was still concerned that the Friends 
take on a work which could be clearly identified as their charge: 
I called his attention to our desire to do a work which forms a sort 
of unity over a period of time, ... we cannot raise funds if the only 
report we can make is "200 cases of milk turned over to the 
47iWhat is happening is that all the mothers not getting condensed milk must go to special 
stations, eight of them in the city, where a car delivers fresh sterilized milk once a day to them 
according to [doctors'] cards which they present. This is of course increasingly difficult for 
mothers who have anyway to stand in line for bread, coal, meat, sugar and other things... ", 
Alfred Jacob to Mrs. Small, 12 December 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
"Alfred Jacob to Mrs. Small, 10 December 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
"'Alfred Jacob to Edith Pye, 28 November 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
50Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 27 November 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
51Alfred Jacob to Mrs. Small, 12 December 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
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authorities at Barcelona". We wanted to know the children and 
regard them as our special charges. And he reminded me that was 
favouritism or would be interpreted as such by the [Refugee] 
Committee, and that we must not make distinctions of that sort in 
these days 52 
The Friends' relief work in Spain was, like much aid work before and since, 
constrained by its need to use relief work to raise the funds for further assistance: 
balancing publicity-friendly projects with less attractive operations was a necessity. 
Where possible, Quaker funds were used for the routine administrative functions 
which might otherwise impair the emotional appeal of the campaign. Furthermore, 
the Quakers' constituency of donors was sufficiently ambivalent towards the 
Republic that the British Friends could not become involved in direct donations to 
the Republicans-in 1939, direct donations to the Nationalist authorities would 
cause the American Friends to lose a number of their contributing agencies. It was 
equally important to the Friends that they maintain a closeness of care, that the 
relief work not become distant charity but instead it should be marked by an 
association between the giver and the receiver. Direct relief would also allow the 
Friends to ensure impartial distribution. 
The solution was for the Friends to tackle a problem previously neglected 
and for whom no individual or group as yet had responsibility but which as a work 
had publicity potential. Children were arriving almost continuously at the railway 
station. If they arrived at meal times they were fed, otherwise they received 
nothing until they were distributed to refugee colonies and foster homes 53 Whilst 
the discussion between Senor Alcalä and Alfred Jacob was in progress, a message 
was received that 250 children were due to arrive on the midnight train and that 
there was no provision for them. Jacob suggested to Mrs. Small that this was the 
piece of work which they take on until such time as they had the materials to create 
a mass feeding programme. A canteen could be established in the Casa 
Misericordia where the children were usually brought to rest prior to distribution, 
szthid. 
"Alfred Jacob to Mr. MacKenzie, 7 December 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
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and hot drinks could be dispensed from there at any time of the day or night, under 
Quaker aegis and under direct Quaker control. 
This plan has certain advantages: it is a task universally 
regarded as a work of mercy, particularly by those whose task it has 
been to receive children after a long train journey-anywhere up to 
three days-without being able to offer them a warm drink: it 
enables us to conserve the individual character of our work, and 
gives us something to report on, to photograph... ' 
Jacob was clear that publicity was a necessity and did not regard this decision as 
a politicised compromise: the project allowed Jacob to monitor the children, to offer 
medical care if required, and provided a base for expansion from where milk might 
be given to those in the city with medical prescriptions. 
The feeding station began with the provision of twenty-five drinks on 25 
December 19305 Quite quickly the proposed distribution of milk was moved from 
the Casa Misericordia to the railway station, once it was realised that many 
children were sent on to their billets directly from the train 56 The usual provision 
was hot milk, but with donations of cocoa powder from the British Quaker firm 
Cadbury, hot cocoa rapidly became a tradition in the FSC canteens, in part because 
even when it could only be made from water it was felt to be particularly 
nourishing. However, once the distribution began the workers ran rapidly into the 
first of many ethical dilemmas: 
We are prepared to give hot cocoa to all refugee children arriving. 
But they come so tired and dazed that they simply come in and sit 
down by their mothers, never stirring, and wait for something to 
happen. We carry the cocoa to the children, but since the old people 
do not of course understand that it is for the children alone, they 
sometimes stretch out their hands for what they believe is their 
drink, and it is brutal to say no. Those who have not worked with us 
'Alfred Jacob to Mrs. Small, 12 December 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 7 January 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
-'Alfred Jacob to Mrs. Small, 18 December 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
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at the station [... ] believe that we should insist on giving only to the 
children; but all of us who have worked there see it is impossible to 
do oneself, and less so to ask Spanish helpers to do so. The old 
people come sometimes unfed, sleepless, ill... to sort out the children 
alone and put a steaming cup in front of them where all the others 
can see and smell it is not consistent with charity 57 
Politically neutral though child-feeding might be, to the Quaker relief workers it 
quickly demonstrated itself to be potentially cruel, placing an emotional strain on 
both giver and receiver. This was an early recognition of the points which Nancy 
Scheper-Hughes was to make in the 1990s, that children's relief cannot, without 
cruelty to all involved, be separated from that of the family or community unit 58 
However, Alfred Jacob believed that resources donated for children could not be 
diverted to adult relief without undermining the financial probity of the FSC in the 
eyes of the donors. Instead he requested that the Spain Committee secure 
alternative donations for mothers and the elderly, two groups who could also be 
delineated as "neutral": in order to live up to the spirit of the mission, drinks 
should be given to all refugees arriving at the station 59 The potential controversy 
which a public campaign for adult relief might have caused encouraged the Friends 
to solicit private gifts for this endeavour; later, when Kanty Cooper, a British 
sculptor, was added to the unit, part of her work would be assisting the elderly to 
whom would be diverted some of the gifts in kind, including a donation of coffee 
from the Brazilian government 60 This and like incidents does emphasise the point 
that the witness to peace could be most effective only when linked to a sense of 
social justice, but consistency on this point was not always maintained, and was 
often balanced against the need or the desire to accommodate the sensibilities and 
ideology of Catalan co-workers and the authorities. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 30 December 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
"Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Death Without Weeping. - the Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992, p. 551, n. 4, cited in Murray Last, op. cit., p. 198. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 4 January 1937, FSC / R/ SP /1/1. 
60Dorothy Thompson, Assistant Secretary, Spain Committee to Alfred Jacob, 30 December 1938. 
General Files, 1938, Foreign Service: London Letters, copies, 1938. 
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Although Jacob indicated that in the case of the station canteen, the Spanish 
assistants wished to extend beyond child relief, both he and Esther Farquhar 
(leader of the AFSC unit in Murcia) found that, overall, the Spanish were in 
agreement with the principle of children first; however, selection of children when 
left to the local authorities was sometimes biased by cultural and political factors 
such as the need to retain the support of powerful groups or to accede to local 
prejudices. By mid-January 1937 the success of the station canteen, and of the fund- 
raising campaign in Britain, had encouraged Alfred Jacob to consider expansion 
into supplementary feeding in the city 61 As the supply of milk to the poor was in 
government hands, Alfred Jacob decided to consult Martinez Cuenca, the Minister 
in charge of the milk supply, and secure advice as to which area contained the 
greatest levels of need. Cuenca suggested that the unit begin its wider campaign 
of child feeding in the Fifth Quarter of the city, an area notorious for its poverty. 
Domingo Ricart, however, pointed out that it was notorious not only for poverty 
but also for vice. Jacob reported: 
... there were more pressing needs 
in the more honest working class 
districts where we should be more certain of doing maximum good. 
This may sound prudish but I think he is right, and I think any 
Friend who cared to walk through the Fifth Quarter would agree 62 
Reinforced by his desire to accommodate the judgments of his principal Catalan co- 
worker, Jacob allowed his prejudices to overcome other factors, imposing a moral 
judgement on the nature of poverty that was absent from other Quaker relief 
missions and uncharacteristic even within the general trend of the relief work in 
Spain 63 
With little money available at the start of the mission spending decisions 
were crucial. Following the advice of the authorities, and with his own impetus to 
spread spending as widely as possible, Jacob at first concentrated on providing 
milk to newly arriving refugees. Although at this early stage of the relief effort, in 
61Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 14 January 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
62Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 16 January 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
63Helen Hatton observed that "There is not a word in their 1843 relief papers castigating the 
destitute Irish for the unspeakable misery of the industrial slums... ", Hatton, op. cit., p. 7. 
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1937, the milk was being given in amounts below even supplementary feeding, the 
type of milk to use for child feeding was an early concern. Jacob was particularly 
anxious to provide as much nutrition as at low a cost as possible on the basis of 
what was known about the nutritional benefits of skimmed versus full-fat milk, 
condensed versus powdered milk. As there was little money to spend, Jacob turned 
to the Cadbury Analysts who produced a report on the milk contents of preserved 
milk, after the water and sugar had been subtracted. This report was careful to cite 
a League of Nations report which had recently reported on the nutritional qualities 
of skimmed milk. However, Mrs. Small of the SCIU, in charge of the unit, had 
apparently taken no time to read the report and-partially in response to the 
reported sugar shortage and despite the higher cost-despatched in the first 
shipment tinned, sweetened milk. The tinned milk cost £60 per ton, a reasonable 
price compared to fresh milk, but there was also 275 pesetas of freight to pay on top 
of this, "which makes me wish the water and tin content could be reduced so we 
could pay freight on the milk alone". The sugar content was also an issue, although 
on grounds of cost, not nutrition, as sugar was believed to be an important part of 
the diet' If sugar was to be sent it should be sent separately, and of a cheaper 
grade than was used for tinned milk 65 Although the FSC, advised by Jacob, 
eventually settled for powdered skimmed milk (which kept longer than full fat), 
the continuing decision of the SCIU to send in tinned milk annoyed Jacob who saw 
it as an unconscionable waste of money. A related issue in this argument was 
whether to send full fat or skimmed milk and contemporary nutritional beliefs 
were marshalled to support the importing of the cheaper skimmed milk. 
Although many people still believe that the cream is the only 
really good part of the milk, one finds more and more the opinion 
that it is the non-fatty part which contains the proteins and mineral 
salts which cannot so readily be found in other foods, whereas the 
fat can easily be supplied from other sources such as butter, 
margarine, nuts or olive oil. Others think that whole milk must be 
`Farah Mendlesohn, interview with Alfred Jacob, 15 January 1994. 
'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 20 December 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
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used because of the vitamin A in the fatty part; but they forget that 
the vitamin content of preserved milk which passes a sterilisation 
process is far too low to justify the extra cost 
If vitamins were required it was felt better to make sure of them by importing oils 
and supplements with a known vitamin content. The issue was resolved in part by 
the response of the children themselves. Many of the children arrived too 
exhausted to cope with a rich drink and could barely swallow even the skimmed 
milk. After feeding with condensed milk many children were observed to ask for 
water, the mixture having left them thirsty. The doctor in charge of the Casa 
Maternalogia, which gave out milk to mothers of young babies, felt that he would 
prefer to receive both full fat and skimmed milk in order that each child might 
receive the most suitable balance. Jacob's recommendation that the FSC and SCIU 
opt predominantly for dried milk, despite its relatively more complicated 
preparation process, was essentially an ethical one. Pound for pound, it was 
possible to send more milk. Its drawback was that this milk required time to mix, 
special equipment for large quantities and was more likely to turn rancid if stored 
than was tinned milk. The speed of consumption, however, may have rendered this 
last point unimportant. 7 
Alfred Jacob was adamant that the personal convenience of neither himself 
or the volunteer workers should be taken into account. A later decision by Mrs. 
Small of the SCIU to revise the quantities of dried and condensed milk for the 
Barcelona canteen-allocating 125 children to dried milk and 1,575 to condensed, 
the reverse of the usual ration-led to unusually concerted opposition from Jacob, 
and the SCIU agents Dr. Pictet and Mrs. Petter, who pointed out that one English 
pound would buy either 178 litres of milk made from powder, or 85 litres of milk 
from the condensed product. As in the latter case some 12 kilos of sugar was 
included, the condensed came out at around twice as expensive. 8 
Similar concerns were to arise in the AFSC mission in Murcia. As mixing 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 30 December 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
'Louisa M. Jacob to Esther Farquhar, 2 July 1937, Committee on Spain, 1937: Correspondence, 
letters to Esther Farquhar. 
68Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 7 July 1937, FSC/R/SP/1 /3. 
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machines were available from the local Puericultura Institute which was hosting 
the work, the labour of mixing was not a major factor and powdered milk was 
preferred for its longevity once opened 69 However, the condensed milk, which had 
been rejected in Barcelona as too sweet, was in demand. Esther Farquhar reported 
that although children were taking the evaporated milk that formed the bulk of the 
early supplies, they all preferred the sweeter condensed milk. In part this may have 
been simply local tastes, but an alternative explanation for this preference for 
condensed milk may lie in the conditions in which the children were being fed. In 
Barcelona, many of the children were receiving their milk as a drink at the 
conclusion of a long journey and the water content of condensed milk was not high 
enough. In Murcia the condensed milk was a form of supplementary feeding to 
children who had an adequate if not always too clean water supply. Hunger rather 
than thirst was the issue, and as cans could be recycled into bottle caps and cups, 
in shorter supply in Murcia than in industrial Barcelona, the importation of the 
heavier condensed milk could be justified 7° What was a consistent stance in both 
Barcelona and Murcia, however, and which divided them from the SCIU, was that 
feeding should be spread as widely as possible and that some assistance for all was 
better than complete support for only a few. In a hand-written addition to this letter 
Jacob commented: "the Spanish point of view is definitely that it is better give the 
good to many children than the best to some. "71 The only exception to this was a 
later request that full cream condensed milk should be sent for children under two 
years. 72 
The fall of Malaga to the Nationalists in February 1937 put more refugees 
on the road and the Friends unit was forced to restrict aid to refugees arriving at 
the station canteen to clothing distributions and to the gifts of milk and sugar to the 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 21 July 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Boxfile 3). 
70Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 27 July and 10 August 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence from Esther Farquhar (Boxfile 3). 
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institutions already mentioned. 73 As the authorities began to assume responsibility 
for the refugees, the unit began to provide milk for Barcelona children under six 
years old, giving half a litre a day at two centres, Gracia and Sans, each capable of 
feeding 1,000 children a day. Food was limited to occasional biscuits and a quarter 
a kilo of sugar a week believed nutritious and essential to health. The emphasis 
on nutrition and scientific monitoring had crept in early. The canteens doubled as 
children's clinics, with prospective clients receiving health visitors, and with a 
person trained in child welfare (usually Spanish), and authorised to give out the 
limited supply of food supplements, in attendance during the feeding sessions. 74 
As shortages of staples other than milk emerged, the Friends in Britain 
persuaded McFarlanes and McVities to send biscuits as a contribution to the 
canteens. Handed out with the milk, biscuits substituted for breakfast for many of 
the children! ' Later, by judicious liaison with a Mr. Park of the General Relief 
Committee, an organisation of expatriates, it was possible to swap biscuits for rice 
in order to provide some variety. The rice could be cooked into a milk pudding 
which suited American and British notions of suitable children's fare and appeared 
to be well-liked, but milk had become the priority. 76 There was no longer any sort 
of milk to be bought in Barcelona, and the condition of the refugee children, 
hitherto satisfactory, had begun to deteriorate by July 1937: it was still better than 
that of other children in the city, but remained unsatisfactory by any other point of 
view. The only improvement was that the number of new refugees entering the city 
had reached a temporary hiatus. " In August, the Friends' Norwegian canteen, 
supervised by Elise Thomsen, a Danish Friend, finally opened with a total of twelve 
Spanish volunteer workers to mix the milk and with a capacity equal to the 
canteens at Sans and Gracia. In addition, the workers now had "Quaker Star badges 
which firmly identified the origin of the work and contributed to a growing sense 
"Alfred Jacob to Peter Rhodes (FSC representative in France), February 1937, FSC/R/SP/1 / 1. 
"Ibid. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 15 February 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
"Norma Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 12 October 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
77Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, addendum dated 13 July to letter of 7 July 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
80 
of unity". 
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As the war worsened, a number of problems faced the unit in Barcelona. 
Some difficulties were not financial-in late October Alfred Jacob wrote home that 
he wanted to move all canteen feeding to the early mornings to minimise the risk 
of black-outs and bombings"- but the majority were. Keeping the projects in 
Barcelona stocked with provisions was not easy. As the Nationalist blockade on the 
ports deepened in 1937, and France and Britain declined to intervene 80 it became 
difficult for even relief agencies to ensure sufficient deliveries for the many colonies 
and canteens which had been established. By the end of September 1936 the Quaker 
canteens were short of dried milk and had only a month's supply of tinned milk. 
Stocks in Barcelona were so low that children were re-evaluated, and those 
recovered from illness were excluded from the lists; milk was restricted to those 
below the age of two years; what milk the unit had was mixed at a weaker 
concentration; and tins were no longer issued to be used at home (even pierced 
they were finding their way on to the black market). The only improvement in the 
situation was the decline in the number of new refugees, which allowed the Friends 
to close down the station canteen and to open one in Puigcerdä on the French 
border where the colonies were reporting shortages of food 81 Pilfering was also a 
problem and Elise Thomsen requested that goods be secured tightly for transit 82 
Controversial decisions had to be made about further expansion of work, which 
was dependent on fund-raising at home, and the way in which work would 
expand. It was decided, for example, to begin supplying food to the Public 
Assistance Department of Barcelona which no longer had access to internal food 
supplies and which found it difficult to purchase from abroad. The Department 
would sell the food to those with special needs at controlled prices: it would then 
"Alfred Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 27 August 1937; Elise Thomsen to Dorothy Thompson, 
27 August 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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pay to the National Joint Committee-whose particular niche in Barcelona was as 
the transport corps of the various relief agencies, including the Friends-and to the 
FSC approximately 30,000 pesetas to be used for internal expenses such as paying 
the growing cohort of Spanish workers, and purchasing vegetables and other goods 
still available in Spain. In November 1937 the decision was taken to reduce the 
ration to half a litre a day for children between six months and two years of age. In 
this way, the canteens at Sans and Carmen could extend a minimum ration to every 
child between six months and two years of age and thus feed almost double the 
number of children. As conditions in the city deteriorated, the difficulty of selecting 
those children worst off grew and each individual request was heart rending. 
Sometimes, faced with a particular case, the unit felt the necessity of circumventing 
their usual rules. In early November Norma Jacob reported a request from an 
elderly German man-a refugee-to assist a school which he was running for thirty 
children "in an area notorious for desperate poverty and vice". Determined to 
refuse, Norma went to visit the school and found thirty children who, although 
they were coming to school unfed, were learning French, German and Russian, as 
well as arithmetic. These were the only children Norma had met who spoke 
anything of another language: "Alfred's instructions were 'don't promise anything' 
but the man assumed (rightly) that no one could see his children without straining 
every nerve to help them. "' Estimating the cost at 30/- per week, Norma Jacob 
requested that money be found to help this school if Dorothy Thompson had to 
solicit contributions from every person who walked through the office door. "He 
reminded me of the woman in the Bible who worried the judge till she got what she 
wanted. "" Two days later, the school, including the children of the woman 
employed to do the mixing, was receiving its first milk 85 This small example 
demonstrates admirably the nature of the Jacobs' witness in Barcelona. They were 
willing both to create rules to ensure as wide a distribution as possible, and to 
admit the possibility that their rules might not cover all eventualities or secure the 
Norma Jacob to Fred Tritton, 1 November 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
'Ibid. 
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interests of justice. In addition, they operated under a system in which they 
identified need and then attempted to secure funds, using the need as the lever. As 
we shall see in the next chapter the American pattern was rather different, need 
being identified specifically only after funds were available to allow action. This 
incident also illuminates the enormous level of autonomy and decision-making 
authority which the Jacobs acquired. Within the limits of the funds that could be 
raised, the Jacobs had a free hand as to how it might be spent. However, this 
autonomy was hard fought for and was a matter of principle argued out not with 
the home committee, but with their collaborators, the Save the Children Union. The 
British Friends themselves had a long tradition of field-worker driven projects. 
2.5 Working with the Save the Children International Union (SCIU) 
From the beginning of FSC involvement in the Spanish Civil War, the Spain 
Committee's activities were marked by the enthusiasm with which they cooperated 
with other organisations and people. The manner of this cooperation, and its place 
in the Friends' spiritual paradigm influenced the relative success or failure of 
different arrangements. 
When the FSC decided to begin relief in October 1936, they recognised that 
they were a small organisation with limited financial and personnel resources, 
already overstretched in maintaining current commitments in Europe. It was thus 
necessary that the Friends secure co-operation from another large body. The AFSC 
was the most obvious choice, but the Americans refused to commit themselves at 
this point. 
London Yearly Meeting had few obvious allies. Most action on behalf of 
Spain was coming from political and trade union groups, and although the FSC did 
eventually become a part of the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief, it was 
both uneasy with too close an association with manifestly partisan organisations, 
and unwilling to tie itself to groups with little experience of relief. However, one 
obvious partner did exist: the Friends' work in Germany and Austria after the war, 
and in Russia during the famines, had been supported and more than matched by 
the Save the Children International Union. The presence of the Save the Children 
Fund in Britain offered the additional attraction of an experienced fund-raising 
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partner at home. 
It is unclear what the SCIU gained from the partnership in Spain, except 
initially a foothold in Barcelona, but the FSC gained a responsible partner with 
international links which it hoped would be used for the benefit of the Spanish 
mission. The SCIU was to take charge of most of the purchasing and provision of 
supplies from Geneva and undertook to provide expert and experienced workers 
to organise and supervise the feeding stations, to survey the area and to decide on 
policy. The FSC was to provide funds through its campaign and to send suitable 
volunteer workers. Alfred Jacob, who had never been intended to act as a relief 
worker, was to focus on his original mission of fact-finding, making contacts and 
publicising the effort in Spain and abroad. The SCIU appointed Dr. Pictet to take 
charge of the relief work in Barcelona and Alfred Jacob was to serve as the link 
between the Friends and the work they were paying for: he was specifically not to 
have executive capacity. 
The SCIU were involved in operations in other, parts of Spain, and 
concentrated their efforts in Burgos and Madrid, the capitals, respectively, of 
Nationalist and Republican Spain. This required SCIU representatives to travel 
extensively, and in practice Alfred Jacob was frequently left in physical charge of 
the canteens, but Dr. Pictet retained executive authority ' The effect was to draw 
Alfred from the publicity work which was his remit and to involve him directly in 
the distribution process. As petrol shortages deepened, transport became more 
complicated and Dr. Pictet's absences were extended. One consequence of this was 
that the system of seniority was undermined as the local authorities turned to Jacob 
for assistance. Concerned with the effects of this, he wrote to Fred Tritton: "I am 
afraid that it sometimes looks to Dr. Pictet as if I were trying to push myself ahead. 
The fact is that since I am here constantly, the Refugee Committee and others 
naturally expect me to be able to take the necessary decisions. "" Without executive 
authority it was difficult for Jacob to know what course to take: whether to defer 
to Dr. Pictet and delay decision making in her absence, or accede to the requests for 
'Alfred Jacob to Peter Rhodes, February 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
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decisions from the local refugee committees. It was inevitable, in these 
circumstances, that Alfred Jacob would come to feel proprietorial over the work he 
had initiated and supervised. By March 1937 difficulties had emerged with regard 
to both differing management styles and philosophies. 
Although a number of works had been set in process by March-the 
canteens at Sans and at the Station Jacob felt that the large-scale relief work which 
he had hoped to see in place was still missing. Whilst some of this could be put 
down to "numerous small difficulties", he felt that none were insuperable and that 
neither were they a consequence of a lack of local co-operation or of supplies. His 
most forceful complaint was that it was actually during those periods of Dr. Pictet's 
absence that the current projects had got underway: the canteen at Gracia was 
organised in under a week, the one at Sans in less than two weeks in response to 
both demand and an assessment of stocks. The distribution of second-hand clothing 
from Britain had also begun in Dr. Pictet's absence. Such a development of local 
autonomy might not have mattered-it was fully in accordance with FSC traditions 
and appears to have been standard practice for many missionary societies-but 
Jacob felt that Dr. Pictet returned only to find fault with whatever arrangements 
had been made. In March, a month after feeding had begun at Sans, Dr. Pictet 
presented proposals for a drastic re-arrangement of the work. The SCIU wished to 
see a smaller number of children receive a greater amount of food; the clash was 
between amateurs (the Quakers) wishing to spread their assistance as rapidly and 
as far as possible, providing a little for everyone and incidentally-but 
crucially-extending their spiritual impact, and professionals, who increasingly 
wished to monitor the improvement of children and to provide a "proper" diet and 
were less concerned about their relationship with the Spanish. To reach all was a 
failure by SCIU standards if that resulted in all being undernourished. Further 
more, although the Friends had abandoned evangelising, they continued to lay 
emphasis on the spirit of the gift; good science was admirable but rather 
dispassionate. "No one would say that she is not a perfectly conscientious worker" 
Jacob wrote, 
or that she lacks professional qualifications and so on. She is careful, 
cautious, methodical, confident-but meanwhile the children need 
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milk. My single aim all this time, and I believe the aim of Friends in 
general, has been to get food into children speedily and without 
waste. I am naturally impatient where I see any willingness to delay 
or nourish less children than a number we conveniently could. Dr. 
Pictet wants above all to do a work worthy of her profession, and 
prefers to proceed slowly and be sure of her ground! ' 
The growing professionalism of social work over the previous fifty years, 
with its increasing emphasis on the need for careful investigation and long term 
planning and the move away from the voluntaristic, philanthropic model had 
brought with it methodology more reminiscent of business practice. The difficulty 
in Spain was that the model to which Dr. Pictet was working required a careful and 
slow approach with the idea, presumably, of expanding in the long term. It also 
brought with it a disparagement of individual initiative. Alfred Jacob responded 
in part with the impetuosity of the young but also in recognition of the fact that the 
war in Spain promised to be a short-term crisis with no guarantee of any future 
continuation of the work into peace time nor, perhaps, any need for it. His model 
was voluntaristic and fundamentally depended upon the initiative of the 
individual and the ability of that individual to inspire local effort. It reflected past 
FSC experience; offering a speedy and wide response to an immediate crisis, whilst 
searching for openings for long term work. The Friends Service Council, although 
an efficient organisation, was still essentially an amateur one, called to provide 
relief in too few cases, and employing too few individuals to develop the type of 
professional and technocratic ethos which had shaped the SCIU or, as we shall see, 
the American Friends Service Committee, both bodies which had been providing 
domestic and foreign relief continuously since 1917. The FSC's underlying ethos 
rested on its witness not on scientific method. 
The differences between Alfred Jacob and Dr. Pictet extended from issues 
of professionalism and the decisions which emerged from this, to managerial style 
and the philosophy behind it. For Jacob, there was discomfort in what he observed 
of Dr. Pictet's relationship with the Spanish volunteers and his position in this 
arrangement. Whilst Dr. Pictet's travels ensured that she could construct a wide 
'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 3 March 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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picture of Spain's problems, it also prevented her from building up close 
relationships with any of the volunteers. Further, Dr. Pictet chose to reside in 
hotels, rather than in private homes, which Jacob felt shielded her from the worst 
of the privations experienced by the average citizen. In contrast, Alfred Jacob's 
residence with the Ricart family enabled him to acquire an intimate connection 
with the welfare of the Catalans, a connection which he treasured. That Dr. Pictet 
did not, apparently, value this experience caused resentment. The crucial 
difference, however, may have been that whilst Alfred Jacob saw himself as 
working with his volunteers, each of whom brought skills and expertise, Jacob felt 
that Dr. Pictet saw all the workers, himself included, as employees who should 
follow her instructions. Jacob felt deeply that Dr. Pictet was in the habit of issuing 
orders without reference to the previous experiences of the workers, and then 
returning some days later to check that her instructions had been carried out. 
Whilst nothing fundamental was affected, Jacob believed it provoked tension 89 
The expansion of the work and Alfred Jacob's growing sense of isolation 
from Dr. Pictet led him to ask for another Quaker worker; a request consistent with 
the understanding that the FSC would provide volunteers for Barcelona, but 
intended in this instance to bolster the witness which Jacob wished to offer, a rare 
occasion on which missionary intent was expressed. "Friends' motives in taking up 
this work are rather different from those of other bodies, including the SCIU; and 
our testimony would rest better on two pillars than on one. i90 Spreading the spirit 
of Friends' work remained crucial to the mission. However, Dr. Pictet refused the 
offer of a second Quaker and placed a Miss Petter, who did not speak Spanish, in 
charge of the Sans canteen, taking Sans out of Jacob's hands altogether, and altering 
the scheme of distribution without prior consultation with either Jacob, the 
volunteers, or the city authorities. 
I am given the impression, along with Ricart and Rosa Poy, that we 
are no longer needed; and you cannot have reliable helpers who are 
given that impression. They have sacrificed themselves in ways Dr. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 3 March 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
90Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 16 January 1937, FSC/SP/1/1. 
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Pictet does not conceive. Moreover they have never failed us, so long 
as the work was done in a spirit of mutuality, of intrinsic 
togetherness 9' 
The numbers of volunteers began to drop off, and at Sans the unit was forced to ask 
the Urban Guards for assistance, a move which overtly identified the canteen with 
the local authorities and jeopardised its neutrality in the eyes of both the workers 
(some of whom were Nationalists) and observers. 
Crucial to Alfred Jacob's philosophy was a belief that the spirit in which 
things were done was as important as the method. This meant both working with, 
rather than for the Spanish, and entering into negotiations as informally as possible. 
Fundamentally, Jacob saw himself as a facilitator and funder of local initiative; Dr. 
Pictet, on the other hand, saw herself as there to initiate projects. For example, 
according to Alfred Jacob: 
.. given 12,000 pesetas to start up a clothing workshop in Barcelona, 
she threatens to take it to Tortosa when the Refugee Committee 
suggest that her money be employed by a local committee with 
similar plans 92 
Alfred Jacob was not unconscious of the fact that some of the tension between 
himself and Dr. Pictet was personal, but by this stage he felt that much of the 
publicity work he was doing was being undermined by Dr. Pictet's public 
statements to such people as Sr. Figueras of the city council and Sra. Lain of the 
visiting nurses, to whom she reportedly declared, "You must understand that 
things are going pretty badly. " 93 This dismissive attitude was a personal blow to 
the morale of the workers. It was reiterated at the end of October; Norma Jacob 
wrote to complain of a visit which Mrs. Small had made, "in the spirit of fault- 
finding and after just the merest glimpse began giving orders turning everything 
upside down without consulting us. i94 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 5 March 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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Obviously, Dr. Pictet had her reasons for such an approach, and one can 
assume that they related as much to accountability to her funders as many of 
Jacob's decisions did. However, the Quaker practice had been to involve 
established local organisations and to solicit interest from as many local bodies as 
possible, the Quaker workers saw themselves as facilitators. Had the two 
organisations been working independently along side one another these differences 
might not have mattered, but the agreement which they had entered into meant 
that the two names were associated with one another in the public eye. Alfred Jacob 
was increasingly uncomfortable with this, "... in some mysterious way the conduct 
of the work here in Barcelona has slipped off the plane I feel Friends would most 
approve of; yet Friends are just as much identified as ever with it in the eyes of 
those outside... "". That this mattered so much is an indication of the value 
the Friends placed upon their public image. The biggest issue, and the one which 
was to escalate, remained Dr. Pictet's belief that smaller numbers of children 
should receive larger amounts of milk. The first canteen had given out Ih litre of 
milk to each child. In March 1937 Dr. Pictet doubled this amount and fed fewer 
children despite Jacob's feeling that this was inconsistent with the needs of the 
many. The growing pressure of the number of children in need of milk eventually 
resolved the situation and the canteens returned to a wider distribution, 6 but 
smaller matters also got in the way of smooth cooperation, such as whether to use 
powdered or tinned milk 97 Dr. Pictet felt that the tinned milk was most nourishing 
as it contained sugar. Alfred Jacob felt that it was more cost effective to purchase 
powdered milk and sugar separately and mix the two. With most of the supplies 
being sent in from the Geneva headquarters of the SCIU, it became difficult for 
Jacob to feel as if he had much input into the ordering and selection of stock, 
despite being the most senior and experienced field-worker stationed in Barcelona. 
By the middle of March Jacob's letters were becoming increasingly frustrated as he 
became ever more concerned both about the work and the spirit in which it was 
95Ibid. 
"The canteens resumed the / litre per child Alfred Jacob had initiated. Alfred Jacob to Fred 
Tritton, 15 June 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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being undertaken. 
"[Norma] has reminded me too of the mis-step of suggesting what 
foods should be sent, when Dr. P. was the expert, even ifI was right. 
I see that I was mistaken, led perhaps too little by patience and 
expediency and too much by my desire which first led me into this 
relief work, of getting as much nourishment into as many 
undernourished children as possible. Mistaken, I mean, in having 
given expression to what I knew both about milk and Spain in the 
circumstances. It would have been equally mistaken to say nothing, 
and I can't tell whether I chose the lesser evil ... the work... tends to be 
known as Quaker relief when in spirit and in fact it has little relation 
to us. Perhaps when American Friends come it will be possible to 
associate with them.. 98 
Hardly an apologetic or humble letter, its tone clearly illuminates Jacob's state of 
mind. For Jacob, it was impossible to separate the spirit in which the work was 
approached from the outcome. The distant relationship which he felt was 
maintained between SCIU workers and the Spanish volunteers disturbed him. The 
SCIU station in Madrid was being run with an entirely Spanish workforce and 
without any permanent foreign presence, but under the peripatetic authority of Dr. 
Pictet. Whilst Jacob was anxious to point to the competence of the Spanish, he was 
equally anxious to preserve the sense that relief was a cooperative effort, a joint 
endeavour between those who cared for one another, rather than charity from the 
rich to the needy, and he felt strongly that this was best achieved when both foreign 
and Spanish volunteers operated together, although later he was to express doubts 
about the cost-effectiveness of foreign volunteers ' Increasingly, Jacob questioned 
whether it was advisable for the Friends to be connected with the work being done 
in Spain. 10° In one of the rare letters which Norma Jacob wrote from Spain, she 
attempted to clarify the significance of these issues. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 14 March 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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From what Alfred says it seems perfectly clear that his work, 
however effective as relief, is not coming up to what Friends would 
wish on the human side. It does appear as though Dr. P. has not the 
knack of getting willing service from those under her. The question 
of whether she antagonises the voluntary Spanish helpers may be 
trivial from the relief point of view, but from the Friends' point of 
view I feel it is of enormous importance (since in Spanish eyes our 
work and theirs are completely identified). Wouldn't Friends feel 
that the most important aspect was the willing cooperation of 
everyone concerned, from the highest to the lowest, even if this 
meant a certain waste of time and energy? [... If] we are identified 
in people's minds with someone who uses the methods of 
dictatorship and impairs good relations with lack of tact, our 
chances of usefulness here in the future will be very much 
handicapped. Human nature-especially Spanish being what it is, 
people will forget the babies fed and clothed and remember just the 
complaints and the snubs administered to those whose help wasn't 
on quite the right lines.. 10' 
Although Norma Jacob reinforced Alfred's argument that the SCIU and the FSC 
had fundamentally different missions, her focus on style, like that of her husband, 
failed to address some of the deeper issues. The SCIU was both a more professional 
organisation than the FSC and a larger one. As it grew, professionalisation became 
a necessity, as the AFSC had found, and individual autonomy more a hindrance to 
the smooth-running of the agency than an aid. Far from valuing local initiative, to 
Dr. Pictet, responsible for a much larger field, the Barcelona unit may have felt like 
a unit out of control: with each visit new unauthorised changes would be found 
which had then to be brought under the organisation's umbrella. To be morally 
responsible for this would require Dr. Pictet to set reforms in motion. The Jacobs, 
whilst acknowledging the wide scale of the work for which Dr. Pictet was 
responsible, failed to assimilate the relatively small role which their own unit 
played in this picture. 
101Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 14 March 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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In March 1937 the FSC began to find new, smaller allies who would 
eventually facilitate the re-organisation of the relief work in Barcelona and the 
separation from the SCIU. The first of these allies were overseas Friends. Quakers 
in Norway and Denmark decided to sponsor both relief and their own 
representative, Elise Thomsen, a Friend from Denmark102 This appointment 
effectively by-passed Dr. Pictet's earlier refusal of an additional FSC worker. Elise 
Thomsen joined the unit in order to set a canteen sponsored by the Norway relief 
committee and to provide Jacob with spiritual support, but there is a question, 
impossible to answer definitely, as to whether she was also brought in either to 
back Alfred Jacob up, or to control him 103 Jacob hoped he could persuade Dr. Pictet 
to grant some level of autonomy to Elise Thomsen, but by June it was clear that 
relations between the Jacobs and the SCIU representatives had deteriorated beyond 
repair. At the beginning of June, after a short stay in London, Alfred and Norma 
Jacob wrote to Paul Sturge (secretary of the FSC) to say that neither of them wished 
to continue as representatives of the Society in Spain whilst the work there was 
under the direction of the SCIU. 104 Mrs. Small's and Dr. Pictet's decision to 
renegotiate many of the arrangements Jacob had made with the authorities 
undermined much of Jacob's authority 105 
102In an undated general letter sent out some time in June 1937, from Elise Thomsen, Patrick M. 
Malin (FSC) and R. Ogliati (Comite de Suizo), Elise Thomsen is listed as a Danish Friend. 
FSC/R/SP/1 /3. 
"'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 23 March and 17 April 1937, FSC/R/SP(/1/3. 
104Alfred and Norma Jacob to Paul Sturge, 6 June 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
`A practical affect of this was that arrangements already made for the import of goods without 
cost and the transportation of these good free from the docks through Asistencia Social-the 
principal aid agency in Barcelona- was renegotiated by Mrs. Small. The SCIU representatives 
were also keen that arrangements should be made to ship goods through Valencia, an approach 
with Jacob found unnecessarily complicated for the supply of Barcelona, and likely to annoy 
the Catalan authorities with whom he already had arrangements. One ship-load brought in this 
way became held up at customs until duty could be paid. This, Jacob reported, Mrs. Petter 
eventually placed in the hands of the Chief Officer of Health on the principle that since the 
canteens were in the service of the municipality it was the city's business to get the milk in, or 
the canteens would shut down. The ministry did pay enough of the customs to release half of 
the milk, but were forced to wait for a refund from Valencia before they could proceed and 
complained of an approach that bordered on coercion. Goods passing through Asistencia Social 
had previously been exempt from duty. Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 10/11 June 1937, 
FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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The bad feeling between FSC workers and the SCIU, began, in Jacob's 
opinion, to spill over to affect the setting up of the Norwegian canteen. Whilst 
Alfred Jacob clearly did not relate well with Dr. Pictet, her seniority was never in 
doubt, but difficulties were exacerbated when Dr. Pictet began to appoint 
subordinates whose relationship with Alfred Jacob was not clearly defined. The 
Norwegian canteen was supposed to be under Quaker aegis-it was a Norwegian 
Friends' operation in alliance with the FSC-but Jacob reported that, in Dr. Pictet's 
absence, Miss Petter refused to become involved with a non-SCIU project, although 
Domingo Ricart did eventually persuade her to lend necessary advice. This had the 
effect of holding up the establishment of the canteen at San Andres. Once 
established, the SCIU representative, Mrs. Small, appeared to attempt to publicly 
appropriate the Norwegian canteen, and made a number of statements to the 
ministry both guaranteeing the supply and indicating how much milk would be 
distributed daily. As both these matters were in the hands of the Norwegian 
Committee, Alfred Jacob felt these to be superfluous. 
Identification of relief work, an issue previously settled, again became 
grounds for contention. The design of new ration cards for use in the canteens bore 
the insignia of the SCIU but not the Friends. Similarly, at the Sans Canteen the 
name of the Comite de Ayuda-a previously agreed title for the joint operation of 
the SCIU, the FSC and the General Relief Fund for Distressed Women and Children 
in Spain-was removed and replaced by one headed "Union International de 
Socorro a los Ninos". Mrs. Petter, when this was discussed, explained that she had 
not realised that Mr. Park of the General Relief Fund had anything to do with them; 
she also made it clear that she took her orders direct from Dr. Pictet and Mrs. Small 
and did not accept that there was a state of joint responsibility. 
From Alfred Jacob's point of view, there seemed to be little prospect of 
collaboration in the canteens; the tension was such that Elise Thomsen was forced 
to act as an intermediary between Mr. Park, Alfred Jacob and Mrs. Petter. 106 Jacob 
had arranged for the Asistencia Social to pay custom charges, but SCIU shipments 
continued to arrive directed instead to the Ayuntamiento of Barcelona or to the 
Campejo de Menores, neither of which were willing to accept financial 
106Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 10/11 June and 15 June 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3 
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responsibility. This caused problems beyond slowing imports down; when a 
supply of soap was received by the Ayuntamiento in July, they naturally assumed 
that it was intended for their work and in order to retrieve the larger portion Mrs. 
Petter was obliged offer them a share 107 
Feeding policy remained an issue. In the Norwegian canteen, Alfred Jacob 
had argued that Friends' policies should predominate, as he believed that the 
cooperation between the Norwegians and the Friends fell outside the rubric of the 
SCIU agreement (the SCIU disagreed, although they also took on agreements 
elsewhere). Mrs. Small had written to state that the canteens should give milk to 
"well-chosen" children. Alfred Jacob wrote, "Our aim in the Norwegian canteen 
is to make a distribution which is satisfactory to the local authorities, to the women 
and children concerned and to ourselves. " Clearly, Jacob was attempting to 
differentiate Friends' work from that of the SCIU. 108 This extended to the type of 
people Jacob felt were appropriate for the work. Increasingly, Alfred Jacob felt that 
it was like-minded administrators that were required for the feeding stations, and 
not necessarily the medical expertise which the SCIU could offer. l°9 
By June 1937, the AFSC was active in Valencia and in Nationalist Spain. In 
an attempt to diffuse tension it was decided to hold a relief workers' conference 
which would bring together workers from the Swiss, Swedish and Danish 
Committees, with the AFSC, FSC and SCIU workers. The object was to discuss 
relations both with each other and with the Spanish authoritiesllo In the event, the 
conference did not consider the arrangement between the Friends in Barcelona and 
the SCIU, but in private discussion with Patrick Malin (the AFSC representative in 
France), Alfred Jacob accepted Malin's interpretation of the cooperation agreement: 
that it did indeed give the SCIU "very great freedom in the field to make its own 
dispositions with or without the agreement of our representatives". However, he 
felt strongly that the time had come to revise this agreement. Mrs. Petter had 
"Alfred Jacob to Mrs. Small, 17 July 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
108Alfred Jacob to Mrs. Small, 17 July 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 15 June 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"'Undated letter from Elise Thomsen, Patrick M. Malin (AFSC) and R. Ogliati (Comite de 
Suizo). FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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already handed in her resignation suggesting that the SCIU were coming to similar 
conclusions. Dr. Pictet was over extended, spending much of her time travelling to 
other SCIU projects, including a large one in Madrid, and she confessed that 
Barcelona, with all of its tensions, was not a great concern because so many other 
matters had arisen11' As a face-saving compromise it was agreed that the canteens 
should be handed over to Elise Thomsen at the end of August, independent of any 
other change in the bipartite agreement 112 
In August 1937 the unit, anxious to become independent of the YMCA, 
moved from their respective residences to a rented house from Ayuda Infantil 
which they named Hogar Luis Vives u3 The new house became both an office and 
the official residence of the entire unit (consisting of up to twelve people at any 
time, of varying nationalities), including the Ricarts. The acquisition of a central 
base allowed Alfred Jacob to take on responsibilities from a number of different 
agencies. Although not the official representative of the Paris Committee (that was 
Werner Droescher in Puigcerdä) he took on a large amount of administration for 
them. He also represented the NJC over matters concerning the lorry service which 
had been transferred from Valencia, and managed the NJC colonies' budget. In 
return, the NJC lorries transported the Quaker relief supplies. 
A number of smaller agencies also passed their work through Hogar Luis 
Vives, and Alfred Jacob was in a position to keep an eye on most of the work being 
done in Barcelona. The household itself, with most of the principal workers in 
residence, helped to create "the kind of spirit that makes a solution possible". '" 
With Elise Thomsen taking over the canteens from the SCIU, Norma Jacob was able 
to applaud the high level of autonomy which the FSC field workers now enjoyed 
"'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 30 July 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"'Alfred Jacob to Mrs. Small, 14 July 1937, Alfred Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 27 August 1937, 
FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
113The house was rented to the Quakers on condition that some part of it be used for the care 
of children. Until the fall of Barcelona in 1939 this condition was fulfilled by the presence of a day nursery in one section of the building, caring for children in need of special help. FSC: 
Minutes of the Spain Committee, 12 January 1938. 
"'Norma Jacob to Fred Tritton, 27 October 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3 
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in comparison to the workers of many other agencies "' 
Had the supply of the canteens gone smoothly, much of the difficulty with 
the SCIU might have been over-looked, but the canteens, like the children's 
colonies which the Friends later supported outside Barcelona, suffered from a 
shortage and irregularity of supply. Part of the problem was the condition of the 
frontiers. The Port-Bou frontier was more or less continuously bombarded in 
October 1937, whilst the Puigcerdä frontier involved a climb of 2,000 metres to 
fetch the goods. On neither route were shipments of goods normally accepted and 
any attempt to use these routes would require arrangements with the Republican 
Asistencia Social. However, as the Paris Co-ordination Committee (an allied relief 
organisation), using a transport service offered by the Spanish embassy, appeared 
to be able to keep its shipments steady, Alfred Jacob increasingly felt the 
irregularity of deliveries to be unreasonable. Whilst the FSC was partially 
responsible for this in that orders tended to be filled only at the last moment, most 
of the milk was supplied from Geneva and Jacob had the distinct impression that 
they had not acknowledged the problem. The supply received in October had 
arrived in time mainly because the FSC had brought some pressure to bear on the 
SCIU committee in Geneva to speed up ordering and deliveries. The children 
assigned to a programme of individual sponsorship which Ricart had been running 
for the SCIU for a year, had not received food parcels between August and 
November 1937. In response, Alfred Jacob suggested that he and Mr. Park take on 
the colonies as joint FSC and General Relief Fund projects without relating to 
Geneva. This would allow food to be ordered directly from England through 
channels which the FSC could monitor. 116 The delay caused by transport times 
needed to be accommodated by planned deliveries and a strategy of always 
maintaining a month's reserve stock. From October Alfred Jacob and Mr. Park 
requested that new orders were placed immediately one was received, thus giving 
plenty of time for the delivery to arrive 11' 
"'Norma Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 12 October 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 27 October 1937; Norma Jacob to DT, 3 November 1937, 
FSC. /R/SP/1/3. 
"'Alfred Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 5 October 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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In late November, much to the relief of the Barcelona unit, the arrangement 
with the SCIU came to an end and new alliances were brokered "' The canteen at 
Gracia was to be the sole funding responsibility of the General Relief Fund (GRF), 
San Andres was to come under the aegis of the FSC, acting for the Norwegian 
Committee and the canteens at Sans and Calle Carmen were to be financed and 
administered jointly by the GRF and the Society of Friends. The technical 
management of these two canteens was to be in the hands of Elise Thomsen who 
would have the final decision on all matters, but was required to consult the 
committee at all times 119 Both organisations agreed that it was important that they 
maintain personal contact with the canteens, and visiting rights at the canteens 
were to be assured 120 It must be emphasised that throughout all the difficulties 
with the SCIU, relations in Britain between the FSC and the Save the Children Fund 
had remained healthy, but that increasingly these organisations had both entered 
into the fund-raising programmes of the National joint Committee. In the future, 
the unit in Barcelona would select its own allies and establish reciprocal 
arrangements with other relief organisations already in Spain; the FSC in London 
would make agreements only for joint fund-raising. 
The conclusion of the co-operation agreement had a positive affect on the 
workers. In April 1938 after an absence of about two months on leave, Jacob was 
pleased to report that: "The impression is one of endless and complex activity, in 
which everyone knows his part and gets ahead with it, maintaining the most 
cordial relations with the others. i121 The end of the agreement with the SCIU at the 
end of November 1937 left the unit much freer to decide how to distribute what 
milk was available. " After some discussion with local doctors-reinforcing the 
"'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 22 November 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
19Ibid. 
""Barcelona Milk Canteens: Suggested Scheme for Joint Management by General Relief Fund 
and Society of Friends", November 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"'Alfred Jacob to Paul Sturge, 26 April 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence- 
Barcelona (Jacobs) (Box 7). 
"'Barcelona Milk Canteens: Suggested Scheme for Joint Management by General Relief Fund 
and Society of Friends", November 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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Friends' insistence on local input-the unit decided to mix the dried milk at a rate 
of 1: 10 which would use 250 pounds of milk per month rather than the previous 
300 pounds and would therefore feed more children. Additionally, the decision 
was taken to proportion the milk allocation for babies so that a nine month old 
would receive more than a one month old child" Only the very neediest children 
could now be added to the current cohort despite the fact that in the markets only 
vegetables and a limited amount of fish were available 124 
At the end of December 1937 the first of the large scale relief deliveries from 
the AFSC began to filter through. The first donation of $1,000 was sufficient to feed 
3,00 children daily if 10% of the funds were deducted for administrative costs. Each 
child would receive half a litre of milk containing 12% butterfat and milk 
distribution could be extended to the large refugee centres at Sabadell, Terrassa 
and Grabollers. The first two of these three sites were large industrial centres near 
Barcelona with few agricultural resources of their own and unsuited to sustaining 
large refugee populations. Left to make their own decisions, the workers in the 
Barcelona FSC Unit moved quickly to expand their reach. 
Throughout 1937 the FSC was fully engaged supplying milk canteens in 
Barcelona, Tortosa and Alcazar. In addition a distribution centre for food and 
clothing had been set up in Madrid with warehouses in Barcelona, Valencia and 
Madrid. As work progressed it became easier to assess the rapidly expanding needs 
of the Spanish urban population. With the expropriation of many vehicles to 
military purposes, for example, it became clear that the Friends would need to 
provide trucks, both for material distribution and to aid the evacuation. '25 
The main direction of policy throughout 1937 and 1938 was to feed Spanish 
children in Spain itself, whether from canteens or in children's colonies. In May 
1937 Alfred Jacob returned temporarily to England, both to take part in fund- 
raising and to explain his plans for the expansion of relief work. His attention was 
turning to the possibility of Quaker sponsorship of children's refugee colonies in 
"Elise Thomsen to Fred Tritton, 29 November 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
12. Elise Thomsen to Dorothy Thompson, 12 December 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
'IIFSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 13 January 1936. 
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Catalonia. These colonies were intended as safe-havens for refugee children where 
they might receive both food, health care and education away from both the war 
zones and the unhealthily over-crowded refugee hostels. The ability of private 
organisations to continue supporting these establishments was in doubt, but Jacob 
felt that with the help of outside funds they might be maintained. Feeding children 
in colonies rather than at home would concentrate resources-fifty children could 
be installed for a start-up cost of £150-and would enable medical practitioners to 
keep watch on the children's health. "' The colony work expanded as it became 
clear that sponsorship of colonies was an attractive expenditure for potential 
donors. As a consequence of a rearrangement of work with the SCIU, Alfred Jacob 
took over the colony work as an exclusive FSC project, the canteens coming under 
the authority of Elise Thomsen, the Friend from Denmark127 The Friends decided 
not to become involved with the plans of the National Joint Committee-an 
umbrella organisation sponsored by a number of British MPs-to establish colonies 
of children in England, for reasons which will be discussed in detail in chapter 
seven. 128 However, the expansion of the colony work created its own problems. 
The colonies were kept dispersed and isolated in order to provide greater safety, 
but this required improved and expanded transport facilities a need which was 
only ever partially satisfied by the use of National Joint Committee trucks129 The 
changes in the working arrangements of the FSC continued through August, but 
the station canteen in Barcelona was closed at the end of the month, the majority 
of refugees having arrived and been settled. 
By October 1938, with the loss of Republican territory in the north, a new 
exodus of refugees from Santander and the surrounding areas began to head 
towards Barcelona. The FSC sent out a lorry-load of milk to meet the refugees on 
the road but it was evident that the situation had gone beyond the ability of private 
charity to cope. On a visit to Barcelona, an AFSC worker, Emily Parker reported 
'IIFSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, p. 57, "Proposal for Supporting Children's Colonies" 
`2'FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 22 July 1937 and 17 August 1937. 
'ZBFSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 27 April 1937. 
129FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 22 July 1937. 
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that the Catalonian government had started to feed children from four to fourteen 
years of age a noon meal for the price of one peseta. Four canteens were each 
feeding 2,500 children and another was feeding 6,000. Cinemas had been taken 
over, the seats replaced with tables and feeding spread over two hours 130 In late 
1937 the needs of Eastern Spain had become acute, and shortages of petrol and coal 
were making what relief there was available hard to transport 131 However funds 
remained scarce; a particular problem for charities was the generally deteriorating 
international situation which was placing conflicting pressure on a number of 
charitable activities. In the USA, the Federal Council of Churches (a Protestant 
body) suggested a joint Christmas appeal in 1937 to raise funds for German 
refugees and for relief in China and Spain in order to minimise this conflict. 132 The 
FSC and the SCIU, both operating across Europe, sponsored ä similar joint 
campaign 1 Although this project did raise money for all three campaigns it was 
clear that the crisis in China drew American philanthropic attention away from the 
problems in Spain. A call for the League to help with relief led to the appointment 
of an International Commissioner, but no immediate help was forthcoming, whilst 
the British Government offered only to contribute in proportion to the generosity 
of other nations' However, negotiations were in progress between a number of 
charities to organise an international programme of charitable relief which might 
be able to command the attention of governments. In consultation with the Foreign 
Office, Edith Pye drew up a draft scheme for what was to become the International 
Commission on Child Refugees in Spain. In order to get it off the ground, the Spain 
"Emily Parker to "Girls", 21 October 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Individuals, Parker, 
Emily (Box 9). 
13'FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 13 October 1937. 
"'Although the AFSC was active in Berlin and were involved in resettlement projects for 
German refugees in Latin America, they were little involved in China relief, in part because the 
American Friends Board of Missions, the evangelical wing of the American Friends societies, 
already had representatives in China. AFSC: Minutes, Board of Directors, 6 October 1937. 
'IFSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 28 October 1937. 
13''FSC: Minutes of the Committee on Spain, 13 October 1937. 
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Committee agreed to guarantee £100 to finance the planning meetings 135 By 1938, 
the Barcelona unit was feeding approximately 19,000 children financed through 
their own fund-raising, by the Swiss Committee and by the General Relief 
Organisation, but the continued failure of resources to match needs restricted 
possibilities for either expansion or the opening up of new areas of relief by the 
Barcelona Unit. Consequently the unit continued to operate on the outline laid 
down in this chapter until the fall of Barcelona in January 1939136 The expansion 
of Quaker work in Spain, came not through the expansion of the FSC unit, but with 
the arrival of the American Friends Service Committee in Eastern Spain in April 
1937. 
"5FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 18 November 1937. 
'Clarence Pickett to Emily Parker, 18 July 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
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Chapter Three: 
The American Friends Service Committee in Republican Spain 
3.1 Francesca Wilson and the Quaker presence in Murcia 
In February 1937 Nationalist advances set many refugees from Malaga on the road 
to Murcia but there was little assistance waiting for them. Until the American 
Friends Service Committee (AFSC) arrived in south-eastern Spain in April 1937, 
very little in the way of formal relief could be done. The FSC and the SCIU had 
agreed to a regional division of responsibilities, but neither had the personnel for 
extensive expansion outside the major cities. The FSC had installed a representative 
in Valencia, Barbara Wood, a British Friend, whose role was facilitate the 
distribution of supplies from the ports to local organisations in the interior, but she 
was not employed to dispense relief. ' In 1937, Francesca Wilson was appointed as 
an observer. 
A Birmingham school teacher, Francesca Wilson was an experienced relief 
worker. She had begun her involvement with the Friends in 1914. Although she 
was not herself a Friend she served with them in Belgium, France, Corsica, Serbia, 
Austria, Russia, France and Hungary over a period of twenty years. 
In 1914 Francesca Wilson had volunteered to work with Friends' relief for 
French civilians, but, in a rather instructive interview, was turned down. At the 
time, she had been housing two refugee girls and was working as a journalist. 
Ruth Fry, in charge of the Friends' London office, granted me an 
interview, but it was in vain that I stressed my fluent French and 
willingness to do any work. She pricked my bubble when she 
remarked-"You are engaged in a useful task here. What is your 
motive for wanting to leave it? Is it a genuine concern for Friends' 
work and the relief of the unfortunate, or only love of excitement? i2 
'Esther Farquhar to John F. Reich, 1 July 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Box 3); Francesca Wilson, In the Margins of Chaos: Recollections of Relief in 
and Between Three Wars (John Murray, London, 1944), p. 174. 
'Wilson, op. cit., p. 40. 
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With the exception of Emily Parker, of whom more later, we have little information 
as to how relief workers were selected by either the FSC or the AFSC except that 
provided by Francesca Wilson in her memoirs. These memoirs are unusual in that 
they are not suffused by "quakerliness", and are marked by a more worldly 
assessment of motivation and ideology. Francesca Wilson was unusually open 
about her own desire for adventure as a motivation for her present and past relief 
activities. In the above extract from her memoirs, she acknowledged that Ruth Fry 
had seen the truth of the matter; she was indeed attracted by the promise of 
adventure; but Wilson felt strongly that a desire for adventure should not be 
grounds for rejection 
Motives are so complex. How can one explain to Serbs the love of 
excitement and adventure, the itch to meddle in other people's 
affairs, the nostalgia for foreign countries and for increased scope for 
one's powers, which drive the British abroad, to administer either 
their own Empire or a small slice of somebody else's? 3 
Francesca Wilson was clearly an unabashed imperialist with an insouciant 
acceptance of British competence and superiority. This in itself was not unusual 
amongst the Friends in Spain. There was a standard assumption that British and 
American ways were more "progressive" and scientific, particularly with regard 
to child care and nursing. However, Wilson did not disguise this with the language 
of compassion, liking or of evangelism, nor the desire to do a scientific work of the 
professional relief worker. All these were secondary factors: 
[My] motives do not sound very sublime, but once on the job other 
emotions quite often come into play-compassion perhaps, or the 
desire to help, affection for the people helped, or if it is mainly 
ambition to do a piece of work properly, there is still some merit. ' 
Her understanding of the range of motivations suitable for an aid worker clearly 
departed markedly from either the official expectations of religious commitment 
3mid. 
'ibid. 
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or Jacob's oft-reiterated request for people who cared specifically for Spain. 
Despite her enthusiasm for relief work, in 1937 Francesca Wilson's first 
reaction to the need in Spain was hesitant. At the time, she was teaching in a 
Birmingham girls' school and could secure only half a term's leave. Almost fifty, 
she also felt that "her relief-working days were far in the past. "5 However, the FSC 
felt that she could do some useful publicity work, and she herself was attracted by 
the prospect of viewing first hand the consequences of revolution: 
A friend of mine who knew Spain intimately urged me to go. It 
would be interesting to see the experiments in collectivisation and 
in education. Good heavens! I thought. Social experiments, 
educational reform-it was not my idea of a civil war. 
"But what do you think the Government is fighting for? " she 
said. "It has something it values. There is a whole Spanish 
Renaissance at stake. " I often thought of her words when I saw 
Spain. " 
Like Jacob, Francesca Wilson was not the strict neutral the FSC claimed to prefer; 
nor did she travel to Spain with an open mind about what she saw. She went 
looking for social experimentation and "progression" and where she found it she 
was quick to comment, both in bulletins and letters to the FSC and in her memoirs. 
[The children's colonies] were thoroughly modem, both in 
buildings, equipment and methods, and were like our newest and 
most brilliant schools. The difference was that in Spain there was no 
charge-the children of the poor were having the same chance as the 
children of the rich with us! 
Like her American counterparts, she was concerned that relief work and child care 
be undertaken in as modern a fashion as possible and was impressed by the efforts 
she felt the Republicans to be making in this direction. 
What startled me in Spain was to see so much that was 
'Ibid., p. 171. 
6Ibid. 
'Ibid., p. 172. 
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extremely modern and advanced, side by side with dirt, degradation 
and medieval conditions. It was light struggling with darkness. The 
Republic had committed a thousand errors, but it was on the side of 
light! 
Her partiality was as clear as Jacob's, but Wilson, a Quaker worker but not a 
Quaker, may have felt less necessity for prevarication. Although an opponent of 
military intervention, she clearly felt no compunction in identifying herself with the 
fortunes of the Republic. 
When Francesca Wilson arrived in Murcia it was to find a town with a 
peace-time population of approximately 60,000 inhabitants in only barely 
controlled chaos. Approximately 20,000 refugees were packed into the few billets 
left vacant by the evacuation of wounded from the front, and more refugees had 
been sent to the provinces. Aware that an AFSC worker would arrive in April, with 
only a few weeks leave and despite her remit to observe and identify need, she 
determined to initiate work as rapidly as possible, in the tradition of other British 
Quakers. She discovered that whilst four of the refuges were receiving two meals 
a day, the worst of the shelters-Pablo Iglesias-had only suppers, with milk in the 
morning for babies. Half of the refugees had no money with which to supplement 
this ration, and there was little left to buy in the town because the needs of the city 
hospital received priority of supply. ' Whilst the municipalities were willing to try 
to provide milk for the smallest babies, nothing was provided for older children, 
and Francesca Wilson determined to provide milk or chocolate to the smaller 
children and the nursing mothers. 
The first feeding at Pablo Iglesias, however, did not go well. This was not 
Barcelona, where an efficient municipality combined enthusiastically with keen 
volunteers and an educated population. From the beginning, Francesca Wilson was 
warned off attempting a canteen system on the lines of Barcelona or Vienna, on the 
grounds that the Malagans were too wild. The local committee, however, united 
behind her in the belief that the children of Pablo Iglesias needed breakfast, and 
'[bid., p. 200. 
9Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 1 July 1937, Committee on Spain: Correspondence from Esther 
Farquhar (Box 3). 
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with the lorry loads of food-milk, cocoa and biscuits-sent from Valencia by 
Barbara Wood this was possible. In order to assess the number of breakfasts which 
would be needed a local man was sent around to make up a list and give out tickets 
to the children who would need a meal. 
I was astounded at the result. There were only sixty names. "Well, 
you see, companyera, " he said, scratching his head and trying to put 
the matter delicately, "they saw you going up and down the other 
day and they thought you looked a little foreign, so the rumour went 
around that every child on the list will be taken to Mexico or to 
North America or to Russia. "1° 
Many refugee parents preferred to keep their children with them rather than 
risk their loss to a safer place; many families had been broken up in the flight from 
Malaga and few were willing to take further risks. Others, less politicised perhaps 
than their counterparts in Barcelona, distrusted the motives of outside agencies. 
The distrust, however, broke down as soon as the first meal was served: the second 
morning Francesca Wilson arrived at Pablo Iglesias to find the area near the kitchen 
alive with children. When they attempted to feed the children in relays they were 
mobbed. The situation was compounded by the initial difficulty of finding local 
volunteers to assist. In Barcelona, the Jacobs engaged those of strong religious or 
political (both Right and Left) commitments. In Murcia and Valencia Francesca 
Wilson, and later Esther Farquhar, found a society essentially untouched by the 
Republic. Both workers noticed the lack of women willing to engage in voluntary 
work, 
The handful of enterprising women in Murcia were run off their feet 
and my suggestion that others who were doing nothing might come 
and help their countrymen was received with a contemptuous smile. 
Go into a refuge, mix with filthy Malagans, catch their vermins and 
diseases? They knew better 11 
The need for relief in Murcia, although urgent, was initially on a smaller 
"Francesca Wilson, op. cit., p. 174. The authorities did accept a number of offers to take children 
abroad, discussed briefly in Chapter Seven. 
"Ibid., p. 175. 
106 
scale than in Barcelona, and the productivity of the surrounding countryside made 
the initial situation look less daunting. Food was clearly available in Murcia at this 
time, the difficulty was distribution. In addition, Murcia was further from the 
public eye: the Friends could afford to deviate from the neutrality of child relief, to 
assist other needy groups, whilst maintaining a belief in children first. Once a 
supply of milk to the refugee shelters was established, Francesca Wilson moved 
quickly to extend her reach beyond simple child-feeding and into the realm of 
facilitating self-help. Francesca Wilson's previous work in Serbia had been in 
rehabilitation and resettlement and it was this experience she brought to bear on 
the situation in Murcia. Concerned about the destitution of refugees entering 
Murcia, and the idleness of the inhabitants of the refugee shelters, Wilson decided 
to open workshops with the joint aim of meeting a portion of the demand for 
clothing, and providing occupation for some of the refugees. Two sewing machines 
were donated by the Mayor and two modistes were found to teach refugee women 
to cut and sew clothing for themselves and their children 12 The sewing workshops 
proved successful, and Wilson established ten workshops in Alicante and Murcia. 
When she returned to Spain in August 1937 (after a two month break), she 
provided the women with books and games and was surprised to discover that 
most of the women were illiterate. The workshops quickly became educational 
centres, but this discovery fuelled Wilson's hostility to the Catholic church 13 
The workshops did not remain a priority for funding, in part because of 
their success in attracting sponsorship. Popular with an American public who 
believed in self-help and the work ethic, gifts of cloth continued to arrive for the 
workshops throughout 1937. Esther Farquhar, the AFSC worker who took over 
Francesca Wilson's work in April 1937, decided in the light of this that it was better 
to reserve AFSC funds for food, consequently their success appears to have rested 
mainly on Francesca Wilson !s periodic visits in the Easter and Summer vacations la 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 11 June 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, 
London-Spain (Box 3). 
13Wilson, op. cit., p. 191. 
"Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 27 July and 21 August 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence from Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
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In September 1937, for example, she established a number of workshops making 
rope soled shoes, but in the long term these were to be kept supplied by the local 
Asistencia Social. 15 By September 1937, there were three workshops active, one for 
alpargatas, one for plain sewing such as clothing and another for fine embroideries. 
This latter workshop was to produce goods to sell to raise funds for further relief 
work16 
In addition to the formal help from the AFSC once it arrived, Wilson proved 
adept at securing assistance from others. Keen to widen Friends' influence, 
Francesca Wilson contrived to secure the support of the ex-patriate, Sir George 
Young, for the establishment of a children's hospital in Murcia. After some 
discussion with the Mayor-the same Mayor who had provided the sewing 
machines-an appeal was made, a house secured, and donations of crockery, 
cutlery and medicines began to arrive. Wilson was apparently unperturbed by her 
knowledge that many of the donations had been looted from the homes of the 
absent and self-exiled wealthy 17 The International Brigade in Murcia also proved 
particularly co-operative, sending their lorry drivers to search for fresh meat, fish 
and vegetables for the hospital. 18 In June 1937, the AFSC, in the person of Esther 
Farquhar, finally arrived to take over Francesca Wilson's projects, allowing her to 
return to her teaching job from which she had already exceeded her leave of 
absence. 
The other work which Francesca Wilson established in Murcia were 
children's vacation colonies. Returning to Spain in August 1937 she established a 
series of short-stay colonies in the town of Benidorm which proved so popular with 
the mothers that she was forced to find a means to extend their duration-" The one 
intentionally permanent colony she established was at Crevillente, under a young 
"Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 23 September 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence 
from Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
"Esther Farquhar to Barbara Wood, 3 September 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Workers in Spain [internal] (Box 3). 
"Wilson, op. cit., p. 183. 
"Wilson, op. cit., p. 185. 
19Wilson, op. cit., pp. 206-211. 
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engineer called Rubio. The Crevillente colony was unusual. It catered only 
for boys, 
for whom Francesca Wilson felt nothing was being done. At fourteen they were 
considered too old for the children's colonies, and unless they joined the army, 
something which Friends were at pains to discourage if possible, they seemed to 
gravitate into gangs. However, Rubio and Don Pedro, the school master Wilson 
secured, were anxious that the colony be more than simply a holding station. They 
wished to make it the "Eton-Harrow" of farm colonies and requested that Wilson 
select the boys on the basis of their ability to read and write. Wilson stuck to this 
rubric in her selections despite her own doubts and despite her pity for a number 
of illiterate boys without parents or means of support, in order to accommodate the 
ideologies of her Spanish co-workers. However, her intentions were undermined 
when the four boys concerned simply walked to the colony on their own. Given the 
opportunity Wilson insisted that they be admitted, but Crevillente was an 
uncomfortable illustration-as was the issue of the canteen for the Fifth Quarter of 
Barcelona-that the Friends would sometimes allow their own principles of 
egalitarianism to be over-ridden by the desires and principles of their Spanish co- 
workers. 20 
3.2 The Arrival of the AFSC in Spain 
In contrast to all this activity, in September 1936 the AFSC had informed 
Inez Munoz, a Spanish woman recently arrived in the USA that they were not yet 
planning to take action in Spain, although they were monitoring the situation? ' 
They gave a similar reception to Lydia Morris, a Californian who had toured Spain 
and was anxious to see Friends offer a witness. Although Mrs. Morris was keen to 
offer her own services, the AFSC were not inclined to support her individual 
Concern. Mrs. Morris, an enthusiastic amateur, did not fit the apparent requirement 
for a trained observer or relief worker ' For the AFSC, corporate responsibility had 
come to supersede the function of individual initiative both as part of the drive 
'Wilson, op. cit., pp. 202-203; Levi Hartzler to John Reich, 19 January 1938, Committee on Spain 
1938: Correspondence, Murcia, General: January to September (Box 7). 
Z1AFSC: Minutes, Foreign Service Section, 25 September 1936. 
22AFSC Minutes: 2 December 1936. 
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towards professionalisation and away from the more individualistic impetus of 
philanthropy and in its efforts not to encroach upon the remit of the American 
Friends's Board of Missions. Although this approach did not entirely replace the 
personal witness, it did shape the way in which this was framed and understood. 
At times, as the section on Emily Parker will demonstrate, personal enthusiasm was 
felt to deviate substantially from the "proper" motives to the point of rendering 
useless the individual involved. Increasingly, AFSC volunteers were encouraged 
to come through the youth summer Peace Caravans, training first at Pendle Hill, 
or with experience in either missionary or social work. 
In response to Alfred Jacob's presence in Barcelona, the AFSC had agreed 
to be "largely guided by the investigation and counsel of the English Friends' 23 
John W. Harvey returned to London from his fact-finding mission in November 
1936, and the FSC's report, forwarded to the American Friends, prompted the 
AFSC to discuss the prospect of a fund-raising drive. Individual mailings were 
planned, but it is not clear that these mailings were ever issued ' In late November 
and early December 1936, the AFSC also held a series of meetings to assess the 
situation in Spain's However, in marked contrast to their assertion that they would 
be guided by the FSC on all matters, it was decided that the first step would be to 
send a representative to Spain to investigate the need for relief and openings for 
reconciliation work. It was felt strongly that "just" a relief mission would not 
adequately justify AFSC intervention; there had to be space for a distinctive Quaker 
witness, but this distinctive witness was understood, rather than defined on 
paper Z6 
The delegate selected was Sylvester Jones, a member of 52nd Street Meeting 
in Chicago who had previously served as a missionary in Cuba and spoke fluent 
Spanish. His membership of a mid-Western meeting may have been an additional 
factor in his selection since the AFSC continued to remain conscious of the need to 
23AFSC: Minutes, Foreign Service Section, 22 October 1936. 
2'AFSC: Minutes, Foreign Service Section, 15 November 1936. 
IAFSC: Minutes, Foreign Service Section, 24 November, 2 and 17 December 1936. 
26AFSC: Minutes, Board of Directors, December 1936. 
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elicit Western Quaker support. In the meantime, the Foreign Service Section would 
begin collecting food and clothing in order that a material response might follow 
immediately Sylvester Jones' recommendations were received. Until separate lines 
of distribution were established, the committee would utilise those already 
established by the Friends Service Council. The Foreign Service Section, in view of 
the widespread need, and the general inability to supply that need, suggested that 
emphasis should be placed on the relief of nursing and expectant mothers and the 
needs of young children, reiterating again the emphasis of mothers and children 
first which had been established in the relief work in Austria and Germany. A 
separate committee, the Committee on Spain, was to be established with a remit 
specifically directed to the raising of funds and distribution of relief. 
Inevitably, this committee proved to have its own agendas, and one of the 
first decisions was to suspend fundraising until Sylvester Jones' recommendations 
had been received. Although Sylvester Jones' report proved to corroborate the 
evidence submitted by Alfred Jacob, and was preceded by a number of telegrams 
requesting urgent assistance, the AFSC Committee on Spain chose to wait for the 
report to be delivered in person, in February 1937. Preliminary conversations were 
to be held with those groups or individuals who might be interested in supporting 
such an undertaking, but no major effort to raise funds was made until February, 
delaying the despatch of the first of the American relief workers. 
It was initially intended that Esther Farquhar would join Alfred Jacob in 
Barcelona; instead, apparently independently but probably in response to the 
number of refugees moving from Murcia to Barcelona, Farquhar chose to travel to 
Murcia where she took up the work initiated by Francesca Wilson. It was decided 
that the AFSC would take over responsibility for relief in the South-East; the FSC 
would focus its efforts in Barcelona and Catalonia, whilst the SCIU concentrated 
on Madrid, Trespaderne, Corales and Malaga, but with the entry of the AFSC 
cooperation between the SCIU and the FSC would wind up. The joint canteens 
would continue as long as joint funds existed, and representatives would be 
maintained on each other's committees, but the joint project was to cease? ' 
27FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, p. 101, "Friends Service Council and General Relief 
Fund; Proposals for the Future Management of the joint Canteens in Barcelona at Sans and 
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3.3 Esther Farquhar and Relief Work in Murcia, Almeria and Alicante 
The selection of Esther Farquhar as their first representative in Republican Spain 
is illustrative of the AFSC's understanding of the qualifications for a professional 
relief worker. Farquhar was a trained social worker with a background in 
missionary work. Brought up in the Friends Church, the evangelical denomination 
of American Quakerism, Farquhar had been introduced to the unprogrammed 
tradition of East-coast Friends at Westtown School in Pennsylvania. After 
graduating from college in 1916 and training as a teacher, Farquhar had 
volunteered with the Friends Board of Missions and been sent to Cuba for three 
years. In Cuba, in addition to learning Spanish, Farquhar had recognised her 
discomfort with the Friends Church and transferred her commitment to the 
unprogrammed and less evangelical tradition. After three years Farquhar left Cuba 
for Vermont where she taught Spanish, and eventually sociology, at Middlebury 
College. As her interest in sociology deepened, she decided to take up charity work 
and left, first for a post with Cleveland Associated Charities and later for a place 
at the School of Applied Social Sciences at Western Reserve (now Case-Western). 
She volunteered for Spain in 1937 28 However, Esther Farquhar's missionary 
experience in combination with her social work training may have continued to 
influence her style of operation and helped to position the AFSC- 
organisationally-mid-way between the SCIU and the FSC. 
The letters we have from Esther Farquhar, although voluminous, are not as 
helpful as one might suppose. Unlike Francesca Wilson or Emily Parker, Esther 
Farquhar was not inclined to discuss her motives, perhaps because these were 
already clear to those to whom she wrote. Most of the letters are between five and 
ten pages-the intention was that John Reich would reproduce them and circulate 
them to her friends and family in Chicago-but, where not taken up with practical 
matters of food stock and distribution plans, Esther Farquhar's principal interest, 
particularly in the early letters, was to describe the landscape and surroundings to 
her correspondents. From the letters a sense of a warm and high-spirited woman 
Carmen", also Minutes of the Spain Committee, 16 December 1937. 
280ral History Interview #14, Wilbur Kamp, France 1919 and Esther Farquhar Kamp, Spain 
1938, American Friends Service Committee, 27 February and 30 March 1989, pp. 3-5. 
112 
emerges, but unlike the writings of Alfred Jacob, and later, as we shall see, the 
Mennonites, no great spiritual depth is easily evident. This is not to imply that it 
did not exist, but the professional tone of her work-related letters provides little 
personal context, and the more personal elements are rarely related to her 
experience as a relief worker. She does not appear to have interpreted her work, in 
and of itself, as a witness in the way in which Alfred Jacob, Emily Parker and Levi 
Hartzler clearly did. It is possible that her more evangelical experience in Cuba 
served mainly to emphasise the apparently secular nature of the operation in Spain. 
Emulating the Barcelona unit, Esther Farquhar began with the provision of 
milk to the most vulnerable portion of the population, the small children. Her 
approach, however, had more in common with that of the SCIU than with Alfred 
Jacob. A trained social worker and a product of the professionally structured AFSC, 
Esther Farquhar was more sympathetic to the notion of a scientific and structured 
relief programme and less concerned to introduce a sense of religious mission to 
her work, in part because, the AFSC needed to avoid visible evangelism in order 
to secure the support of the evangelical Quakers, suspicious of the AFSC's liberal 
theology. Furthermore, professionalism did not need to be imposed upon the 
Murcianos: the impetus came in part from Spanish co-workers. 
... 
last evening we had our conference. Sr. Montalban, Dr. San 
Miguel, Mrs. Wood, Miss Imbelli and I. We were very much 
delighted when the physicians said that they would like to set up a 
milk station for the babies and do the thing scientifically 29 
This meant establishing a system of triage administered by local doctors and 
nursing staff from the Puericultura. As supply was uncertain the centre would 
begin with 100 babies and focus on feeding those few babies well until a larger 
amount of milk was assured 30 This approach had been rejected by Alfred Jacob, 
ensuring that the Barcelona feeding stations lurched from one shortage to the next. 
It was possible in Murcia, in part because of the larger scale on which the AFSC 
operated, which meant that supplies could be despatched before the results of 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 1 July 1937, Committee on Spain: Correspondence from Esther 
Farquhar (Box 3). 
'Ibid. 
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fund-raising were known. However, like Jacob, Farquhar desired that the canteen 
should meet local perceptions of need as well as the need itself and Esther Farquhar 
was keen that local doctors should be the ones to decide which children were to be 
fed? ' The local authorities, also rationing milk, had arranged for a milk on 
prescription scheme which Esther Farquhar followed, but many other children also 
needed milk and were unable to secure prescriptions. Whilst milk supplies were 
relatively plentiful, the Murcia canteens gave out milk to those assessed as needy- 
but not in receipt of local authority prescriptions-in return for donations. A 
straightforward sale was avoided as it was feared this might encourage a black 
market economy? ' Once milk shortages set in, it still remained important to the 
Murcia Unit to try and provide older children with something, and Eleanor Imbelli 
(who transferred from the SCIU) and Esther Farquhar agreed to try and provide 
raw tomatoes to the children (at a cost of around 90 centimes or 2 American cents 
per pound) in an effort to provide some vitamin content to the diet. There was not 
yet any thought of providing an adequate diet for older children. The children of 
Murcia were not, as yet, starving, but malnutrition-related diseases had begun to 
appear and few children were fat. 
The expansion of the milk canteens in Murcia was far less problematic than 
it had been in Barcelona. To begin with, there was no second international 
organisation such as the SCN with whom the AFSC had to bargain. Also, whilst 
changes in the political balance within Murcia could and did cause problems, it was 
nothing like on the same scale as the disruption which could occur in Barcelona. 
When in June 1937 the government dissolved the Asistencia Social only a few days 
before the first milk canteen was to open, the Mayor of Murcia offered to provide 
funds until the government could be induced to step in. The close relationship 
which Francesca Wilson had established with the Mayor of Murcia continued to 
operate to the unit's advantage long after her departure. The impression from 
31Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 11 June 1937, Committee on Spain: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
"Levi Hartzler to Orrie Miller, Chairman of the Mennonite Relief Committee, Committee on 
Spain 1937: Correspondence- Murcia (Levi Hartzler, from and to) (Box 3). 
13Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 21 July 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
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Esther Farquhar's letters is often of a rather cosy organisation who "met around 
a table in the lobby, in order to discuss the proposed station 
for babies. "' 
Some facilities already existed which could be applied to the relief 
programme. The local Puericultura Institute was able to provide pasteurising and 
mixing machines which in Barcelona had had to be bought in; before the war 
lectures on infant care had been given and the infrastructure existed for some of 
this tobe continued 3' The local Asistencia Social, prior to its dissolution, had been 
impressed by the initial work done by Francesca Wilson and was prepared to pay 
for a doctor and a nurse for the first feeding station, leaving Esther Farquhar to 
request 500 baby bottles from the FSC. The feeding nipples were to be bought by 
the mothers as, despite the inherent difficulties of maintaining standards of hygiene 
under poor living conditions, it was felt that the nipples would be better cared for 
if owned by the users. However, the feeds were given out in prepared bottles to 
ensure that the mixing itself was done in the sterile conditions which could not be 
secured in the overcrowded refuges? ' This was done until September 1937, when 
bottles were in short supply throughout Spain and it was decided to give instead 
packets of powdered Glaxo and trust to the intelligence of the mother to ensure that 
hygiene was maintained in often unpromising conditions. It was, however, 
determined that the milk stations should move back to bottles as soon as they could 
be imported from London by the Joint Committee? ' 
Living conditions varied from refuge to refuge. The condition of Pablo 
Iglesias, for example, made it desirable that it should be completely emptied as it 
was considered too expensive to repair and maintain to an acceptable standard but 
in June 1937 1,800 people were still housed there even though many children had 
been relocated to the surrounding villages. During feeding sessions, Esther 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, Committee in Spain: Correspondence, London-Spain (Box 3). 
"Ibid. 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 4 May 1937 and 1 July 1937, Committee in Spain: 
Correspondence, London-Spain (Box 3). 
37Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 23 September 1937, Committee on Spain, 1937: Correspondence 
from Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
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Farquhar observed the mental as well as the physical health of the children: 
38 
"Some of the children come in creeping along as if they were afraid of the whole 
world. i39 The contrast with those who seemed unaffected was a powerful argument 
for going beyond milk relief and removing these children to some form of remedial 
care. Like Alfred Jacob before her, Esther Farquhar began to look favourably on the 
establishment of separate children s colonies, where previously she had preferred 
to keep families together. Most of the colonies both in Barcelona and in Murcia 
were intended simply for the care and protection of children away from the 
fighting and had taken in children from an organised evacuation. Now the colonies 
were dealing with children who had actually fled war zones with their parents. 
Many were reluctant to be separated from parents for long, and the parents were 
equally reluctant to part with their offspring. One solution which the field workers 
in Murcia came up with was the part-time colony. Eleanor Imbelli, a young 
American woman who had been living in Switzerland and was a member of the 
Swiss unit of the SCIU, had by this time attached herself permanently to Esther 
Farquhar and the Friends and was keen to undertake play-work among the 
children of Murcia 40 Her first action was the creation of a children's camp in which 
parties of children could be entertained. The idea appealed to the mayor and the 
doctors and it was decided to take groups of children up to cabins at Mor Menor 
for a week at a time. The success of this camp quickly led to the adoption of a 
summer hotel nearby which could accommodate between fifty and two hundred 
children. Furnished and ready to live in (presumably abandoned by its pre-war 
owners) it was also ideal for a convalescent home as it contained a swimming pool 
and its own water supply 41 
Space for children was good, but a particular concern for Esther Farquhar 
was the lack of playthings she saw in the nurseries and orphanages. Dolls' houses 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, Committee in Spain: Correspondence, London-Spain (Box 3). 
39Esther Farquhar to John Reich, Committee in Spain: Correspondence, London-Spain (Box 3). 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 1 July 1937, Committee on Spain: Correspondence from Esther 
Farquhar (Box 3). 
91Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 21 July 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
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and dolls were in evidence but out-door toys, such as balls and hoops were not, 
and few of the children seemed to be engaged in what she would have described 
as play 42 The concern for play was not entirely an American one and does not 
appear to have been imposed upon the Spanish: Esther Farquhar was able to report 
that two of the Murcian officials, "agreed that one of the biggest contributions 
America could make to Spain was to teach her children how to play" and asked if 
"well trained group workers who had an understanding of the Spanish people" 
and of Spanish games could not be found. Surprisingly, the evident trauma which 
Esther Farquhar observed in some of the children was not always viewed as an 
explanation for the absence of play 43 Instead, the absence of organised games was 
viewed by the American workers as a lack of cultural play skills, although 
Francesca Wilson observed evidence of play amongst male children and both 
Spanish, American and British workers shared assumptions about the role of 
female games as a socialising process. The Committee for World Fellowship 
responded to this concern with goodwill suitcases containing toys and clothing 
collected by children's groups. In the meantime practical pursuits such as basketry, 
weaving, and reading were taught to the children. 4 It is noticeable from the lists 
that requested toys tended to be of the type associated with boys' activities: balls, 
nets, rackets and bats. Whilst girls are of course not precluded from these activities 
it is interesting that no request appears to have been made for dolls. Description of 
girls' activities frequently refer to domestic duties and the learning of sewing and 
cooking. Equivalent activity for male children was uncommon, only in Rubi did the 
boys appear to have been engaged in market gardening. This pattern suggests 
certain fundamental assumptions about the nature of play for the two groups 
which accord with the American construction of gendered play of the late 
42Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 7 May 1937 and following letter, undated with front page 
missing, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
43 Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 21 July 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich 1 July 1937, Committee on Spain: Correspondence from Esther 
Farquhar (Box 3). 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 45 
A secondary but compelling concern was that play work should be carried 
out by the "right" people. Although the establishment of a nursery would require 
more personnel than the AFSC were accustomed to send-preferring a policy of 
maximum supplies and minimum people-Esther Farquhar felt that this was 
preferable to some of the alternatives: 
The International Brigade has started a playground, and I think she 
[the Inspector of the Refugee Evacuation Office] is afraid they will 
also start a nursery if some one else does not, and naturally she 
would rather it be in the hands of social workers rather than 
soldiers 46 
Whether this was an expression of misgiving about handing child care to military 
personnel, or simply a fear of amateurism on the part of the officer is unclear, but 
it encouraged the Friends' This need was eventually met by the despatch of Emily 
Parker in January 1938. 
As fund-raising in the USA gained momentum and supplies became 
assured, Esther Farquhar could plan for expansion in both the level and the type 
of relief provided. An outgrowth of the Gota de Leche (the milk station) in Murcia 
was the provision of children's dining rooms. In a reversal of the situation in 
Barcelona, where larger children had been fed from the first until supplies became 
too scarce, in Murcia they had only received some help in terms of fresh vegetables, 
and were automatically excluded from the milk supply. Once supplies were 
assured in Murcia Esther Farquhar reconsidered extending supplementary feeding 
to larger children, making available milk for soups and rice puddings. As the 
"Karin Calvert, Children in the House: the Material Culture of Early Childhood, 1600-1900, 
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supplies increased it was expected to expand this side of the feeding 
48 Once the 
Murcianos had schools established for the refugee children it was planned to 
provide dining rooms as an incentive to school attendance49 
The dominance of the AFSC in this area was not without drawbacks. The 
AFSC was committed to sending nothing but milk during the summer of 1937, in 
part because the vacation month saw a hiatus in much fund-raising activity, but 
with the arrival of the AFSC other agencies such as the SCIU proposed to move out 
of Murcia. A visit to Barbara Wood in Valencia confirmed that from July 1937 and 
for the next three months the SCIU had directed all joint SCIU and FSC funds to 
supplying milk to Madrid, as had the National Joint Committee in England 5° A 
problem for Esther Farquhar, and for other AFSC workers, was that initially, as a 
result of the State Department's "neutral" stance, shipping from America proved 
difficult. Until the American government became involved in the International 
Commission for Child Spanish Refugees in 1938 it was easier to purchase supplies 
in Europe through either the British Friends or the SCIU 51 
Not all work was directed at children. Although the AFSC had initially 
accepted that children should be the sole recipients of relief, their location in a 
reception area for refugees where there was little in the way of work for the able- 
bodied led them quickly to explore other possibilities for relief work, without 
compromising their neutrality. The elderly could also be considered neutrals, and 
as the Barcelona Unit had discovered, in war-time they were likely to find 
themselves responsible for the the children. Feeding the children but not their often 
equally vulnerable care-givers led to mental and moral discomfort for the relief 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 21 July 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from 
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workers. Thus, breakfasts for old people were started in Almeria at the beginning 
of April 1938, consisting at first only of cocoa, obtained by exchanging excess milk 
from the children's breakfasts for chocolate from the the refugios. 52 Later two 
biscuits were added, "... and you should have seen the expressions of appreciation 
for the biscuits the first morning they were given, "53 a salutary reminder that for 
all its concerns about nutrition, the work of the Friends and their associates was 
always intended to mean more than the supply of material well-being TM The 
availability of flour from the new International Commission from May 1938 meant 
that bread could be added to the breakfasts? A cable of 22 June put the amount 
being used at six tons monthly 56 
For the able-bodied, the AFSC unit also decided to interfere on moral 
grounds. Whilst older refugees were harder to label as neutrals, strong arguments 
could be made to an American public reared on the work ethic that it was essential 
that something was done to prevent moral lassitude. Francesca Wilson had needed 
no such reasoning for establishing the clothing workshops, she rarely paused to 
justify her work, but for Esther Farquhar, to be able to argue that the workshops 
both aided moral regeneration and assisted the Spanish to supply their own needs 
facilitated the flow of donated material, cotton and needles. However, although 
some clothing could be provided by the workshops, the large numbers of destitute 
refugees created a great need for clothing. The closure of the clothing room at the 
AFSC during the summer months exacerbated the difficulty as there was no one 
available to sort what clothes did come in, too much of which was winter weight 
for it to be possible to simply send it on to be sorted on-site. The vacation period 
meant also that regular suppliers could not easily be reached to be informed of the 
52Levi Hartzler to John Reich, 6 July 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, Murcia, 
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new requirements 57 Another factor was cultural differences: although 
Esther 
Farquhar asserted that for the most part "nobody could be conspicuous in ordinary 
American clothes", the need for black summer dresses was one which could not 
be 
met from abroad? Children's clothes were always needed-although not as much 
babywear as donors appeared to think-print dresses for small girls were 
appreciated as they were suitable for school wear, but there was always a shortage 
of boys clothing 59 
An additional area which Esther Farquhar wished to assist were the 
"preventoriums" established for children in the colonies in the early stages of TWO 
Children placed in the Friends supported hospital at Espuna were seen to gain 
weight and health rapidly 61 In late 1937 she took over the administration of Sir 
George Young's English hospitals in Almeria, Alicante and Murcia. The Alicante 
hospital was concentrating principally on typhus cases and skin infections, 
although TB was a constant problem. In March they had approximately thirty 
children although the number fluctuated. All the children were assessed as 
suffering from malnutrition which was only partially alleviated by the provision 
of fresh vegetables from the vegetable garden of the hospital 62 The hospital work 
was valuable for more than its direct treatment of children. Emily Parker reported 
the remarks of one visitor: 
"It has given the people an entirely new idea of how to treat sick 
children. Before, if they got sick, well, they did what they could but 
''Louisa M. Jacob to Esther Farquhar, 23 June 1937, Committee on Spain, 1937: Letters to Esther 
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now an ambulance comes and gets the child, it is taken to the 
hospital where it receives good care and when it comes home again 
it is well and smiling. And they say we never saw such a thing 
before.. 
The children received more than medical care: they were obvious recipients of the 
small suitcases of clothes and toys from the Committee for World Fellowship, 
which had always had the drawback of being difficult to divide but impossible, 
ethically, to hand out to individual children selected from a large group. These 
children were selected by their status as invalids, and the games and toys which the 
suitcases contained, in addition to the much needed clothing, helped to keep the 
children entertained. Emily Parker, the play specialist sent in by the AFSC in 1938, 
observed that many of the children had to be taught to play with the games, both 
because they were unfamiliar, but also because of the apparent lack of play culture 
observed " Toys came in as donations from a variety of places, and Parker was 
keen to see that all bed-bound children had something and that those who were 
mobile were encouraged to share. Some of the toys and games were kept for the 
use of supervised groups as she was keen to encourage cooperative rather than 
competitive team games. In addition, a school was established for the hospital, for 
which two Spanish teachers were found. Some suitcases included pens, paper, 
crayons and pencils, both unavailable in Spain by 1938, and these were kept back 
for the use of the teachers and group projects ' 
At the end of 1937, the still small Murcia unit had considerably extended its 
geographical and financial authority. The AFSC was rapidly becoming the 
dominant relief group in the area, a channel for other agencies relief supplies and 
a centre for other workers and smaller organisations. Its sector extended 
approximately 200 miles along the coast, from Alicante to Almeria, and inland at 
least forty-five miles 66 As the government allowance was only two pesetas a day 
'Emily Parker to John Reich, 1 March 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, Murcia, 
General: January to September (Box 7). 
'Ibid. 
'Ibid. 
""Dan West's Report", 1 February 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Reports, General (Box 9). 
122 
per person, a sum which would not feed anybody well, and the ill and convalescent 
required better nutrition, the hospital take over required additional money-$500 
a month was approved in late September-and new personnel. In particular a 
Spanish-speaking responsable was needed for the Murcia hospital; in Almeria, 
Margaret Hope, an English nurse was already in charge 67 
One of the problems with the hospitals was in defining their tasks. As relief 
conditions worsened, the notion of the hospitals treating only the seriously ill 
became increasingly restrictive. Levi Hartzler, one of the Mennonite workers, wrote 
that the hospitals, rather than releasing their patients to further hardship and 
perhaps repeated exposure, were keeping many child patients after their cure ' 
This growing reluctance to release patients was at least part of the impetus for the 
convalescent homes and some of the short-term children's colonies which Esther 
Farquhar established, but it also increased the need for soup kitchen style feeding 
for the hospitals who needed more than milk 69 
Although expansion was taking place rapidly, by early 1938, Murcia was, 
like Barcelona, feeling the strain of growing need and restricted supply. In April, 
Emily Parker felt that Murcia was perhaps the last place on the coast towards 
Almeria which still had anything like enough! ' Funds were adequate, with the 
AFSC receiving some $12,000 in December, " but increasingly the situation was 
hampered by poor communications and the difficulties of lorry transportation. 
With very little milk in Spain, the Murcia Unit was forced to import milk, mainly 
from Holland; this system could not guarantee delivery. As the only organisation 
working in Almeria, through the Gota de Leche and the hospital, there was ample 
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incentive to try to process orders with more rapidity. 72 
The great problem was how to get milk into the south of Spain. The railway 
network was used and controlled by the government and the military authorities 
and few other organisations had access. The relief agencies relied heavily on each 
other, borrowing trucks and making deliveries to their neighbours. However, as 
Hartzler pointed out, although it was nice to receive surprise deliveries, this was 
not a dependable system. By the beginning of February 1938 the Murcia unit had 
temporarily exhausted its milk stocks, despite having ordered from London in 
December. 73 One solution was that all European orders be shipped through the 
Paris Coordination Committee with which Esther Farquhar made arrangements, 
but this introduced yet another factor into the equation 74 
By March, and into the second year of the war, the Murcia unit was finding 
it impossible to meet the rapidly escalating demand for relief. Relief workers were 
being stopped in the street by people asking for help which the Friends did not 
have the resources to offer. When it was announced that bread would be given to 
children in schools, enrolment increased from 2,500 to 3,500 children. 75 Resources 
generally were short and it continued to be important to maximise the use made 
of any delivery. Hence, an order for powdered milk in April 1938 requested that 
it be bought in tins rather than cardboard boxes. This kept the milk in better 
condition and reduced pilferage and, although the extra weight had to be paid for, 
the tins could also be used for heating water. 76 In May 1938 the unit requested that 
butter and vitamin tablets be sent out for the children who were being fed mainly 
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on milk, chocolate, white bread and boiled vegetables. 
" Extra money was 
forthcoming in May to make up for earlier shortages, but with the depression biting 
into fund-raising efforts, it was becoming harder to fund anything but milk and 
bread 78 Despite this, in May it was decided to provide breakfasts for an additional 
4,000 school children, a task taken on by Emily Parker. With eleven tons of 
powdered milk ordered and two tons of flour available it would be possible to 
provide milk and cookies to all of the children. With the cooperation of the local 
Mayor and the directors of schools, a mixing station was established in a large 
military hospital and on 23 May the first milk was mixed and sent out to the 
schools. As initially the mixing team was not large enough, many children received 
lunch rather than breakfast. Each child received fifty grams of bread and a glass of 
milk 79 If there was extra bread left the older children were given two pieces, but 
many were observed to take the second piece home for a parent or ineligible elder 
sibling. 80 Once the system was organised, mixing began at 6: 30 in the morning. 
With eight people mixing 1,000 litres of milk, the first delivery went out at 9: 00 in 
the morning and the last at 10: 30.81 
By May 1938 the Murcia unit had coalesced around Esther Farquhar, Emily 
Parker, Levi Hartzler and D. Parke Lantze as the four American workers. 
Cooperation with the Murcianos was good and the relief work, despite the growing 
difficulties with fund-raising, was expanding rapidly. The entry of the International 
Commission into relief during 1938 would ensure that the unit could continue. 
However, in May 1938 Esther Farquhar's increasingly poor health resulted in her 
recall to the United States, effectively ending one phase of the relief work in 
Murcia. 
Esther Farquhar's illness provides rather more insight into her character 
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than we might otherwise get from her rather impersonal letters. Whilst 
her 
symptoms were very real, they almost certainly had their roots in her character and 
the circumstances in which she found herself. One of the more startling aspects of 
Esther Farquhar's letters is how concerned she was for her own comfort, in 
particular her food. The lack of sweets and her desire for sugar is a recurring 
theme. Bemoaning the fact that they are never served sugar-but not mentioning 
that by this time it was rationed in many areas-she writes that in spite of this, 
"you can still buy candies in the shops if you need them" [my italics] 82 The 
condition and comfort of the beds and the condition of the hotels are also areas for 
comment in her early letters, but very little time is spent on the conditions around 
her. Esther Farquhar chose to live in a hotel, protected from the worst of the 
rationing and with little personal contact with the Murcianos, restricting her own 
personal contact with the prevailing conditions. In one letter she described sitting 
down in Valencia to "a lovely dinner with butter and everything" but this 
commentary was the nearest she came to indicating personal involvement with the 
increasing hardship in Spain. "' Of course, none of this necessarily indicates that she 
was an uncaring person. Her commitment to Spain was clear, but she was less 
single-minded than Alfred Jacob and less adept at infusing her letters with a depth 
of emotion. The frequency with which she discusses food may be the first 
indication of her failure to acculturate " 
A further problem for Esther Farquhar may have been the spiritual and 
physical isolation she experienced in her first months. Initially, she was without 
another permanent worker of either her own faith or from her own organisation - 
in a letter to Elise Thomsen in Barcelona, 22 August 1937, she expresses her 
disappointment that she did not see the Jacobs. "I had all kind of things I wanted 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 7 May 1937 and following letter, undated with front page 
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to talk over with Alfred. " As a woman she may have found it more difficult to 
develop personal contacts with the Spanish she met, and unlike Jacob she does not 
seem to have stumbled upon any congenial Spanish Protestants. It may have been 
with this in mind that the AFSC sent over Emily Parker in January 1938. 
By 1938 Esther Farquhar was having problems with her digestion. This was 
not her first bout of illness, as she had left Cuba in part because of ill-health, but 
this second bout of illness she later ascribed to eating contaminated cheese. 6 
Whatever the cause, her aversion to olive oil, whether a matter of taste or digestion, 
was a serious handicap for a relief worker in Spain, where olive oil was by 1938 the 
only form of fat available. In August 1937 she was hospitalised for the first time 
with the "grippe" 87 Taken ill again on a trip to Paris at the end of the year, a 
Parisian doctor recommended that she should eat only grated, raw vegetables. 
Whilst this may have assisted her digestion, it was a diet almost impossible to 
follow under the circumstances! " In addition, the diet almost certainly left her 
feeling weak and drained. By January 1938 she was in the American hospital in 
Paris, having started a sinus infection, hardly fatal but guaranteed to do little for 
her morale 89 The obvious remedy would have been for Esther Farquhar to return 
to the USA, but this was resisted both by herself and, for all their concern for her, 
also by her co-workers. Levi Hartzler reported that her return from Paris prompted 
a lift in the general morale. Like Alfred Jacob, she had become a symbol of the 
work; John Reich, writing to express his concern, declared "we have been 
profoundly moved by the success that has followed your efforts, and we have felt 
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that you are representing the finest spirit we have known in the Committee. "90 
Naturally, the AFSC were reluctant to remove this element 91 However, on her 
return from Paris to Murcia she went straight to bed at the house of a widow where 
private accommodation had been arranged. 2 In May, Hartzler cabled to the AFSC 
that Esther should be recalled for the sake of her health ' 
At times, Esther Farquhar comes over as frankly frivolous, an attitude that 
does not sit well with her responsibilities nor the competence with which she 
carried them out, but she was apparently conscious of this contradiction: 
In the meantime my life is full of thrills and satisfactions that I 
wonder if it is really I. The sadness of the suffering and depravation 
which I see among the refugees often brings tears to my eyes and an 
ache to my heart, but the joy that comes with ability to alleviate it is 
very satisfying 94 
There is something uncomfortable about this statement. It lacks the passionate 
commitment of Alfred Jacob, substituting instead sentimentality. This is not to deny 
the efficacy of Farquhar's work, but although she desired to assist and indeed to 
modernise Spain, she was rather more fascinated with the customs and the ruins 
she saw around her. 
What an accumulation of the past enters the life and breath of these 
people. And now we say they have torn down the monuments 
Church [sic], and have cast off Christianity, but the Spanish people 
can't do that (for it is part of them) any more than they could cast off 
these others [Moorish traditions such as the methods of irrigation in 
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use], or they can stop the bull fight by ordinances.... In the long 
history of Spain a hundred years are but as a day, so we cannot 
expect it all to happen in this generation or tomorrow as some of the 
Spaniards seem to want 95 
Esther Farquhar was both fascinated by the Spanish and yet repelled by the 
Spanish Church. Her determination to separate the two undermined her belief in 
neutrality, but may have assisted her support of a Republic which might otherwise 
have seemed too extremely left-leaning for a liberal American, but it is not clear 
that she had any particular commitment to the Spaniards. However whilst Esther 
Farquhar may have lacked the passion for Spain with which Alfred Jacob inspired 
his workers, the reluctance of both Levi Hartzler and Emily Parker to see her leave 
Spain suggests that she was a capable leader. From the evidence, one suspects that 
Esther Farquhar's passion was for her work in its very concrete sense, and that it 
was here that her spirituality lay. Her desire was to do a very professional, that is, 
American, piece of work, and within this a work worthy of the AFSC, but there is 
no sense that she consciously saw this as a Quaker work within the paradigm in 
which Alfred Jacob framed his task. 
The immediate reaction to the loss of Esther Farquhar was to speed up the 
arrival of three new relief workers, Alfred and Ruth Cope, who would manage the 
business and household accounts respectively, and Martha Rupel, a nurse. Clyde 
Roberts, a Quaker businessman, was also directed to Murcia where he was 
expected to take on the leadership of the unit. However, the AFSC in Philadelphia 
clearly felt that some of the difficulties which Esther Farquhar experienced could 
be attributed to the living arrangements of the workers in Murcia. Clarence Pickett, 
Executive Secretary of the AFSC, drew attention to the need for greater closeness 
within the unit, perhaps on the model of the very successful Barcelona unit. Such 
a familial structure might provide more than support for those it assisted: "there 
could be developed out of this experience an illustration of the power of a group 
which had a strong cohesion as well as being representative of a wide variety of 
95Ibid. 
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talents and programs. "' John Reich persisted with the issue, raising the possibility 
of an "American home life" as well as the economy which this "more pleasant way 
of living" might bring. "Please remember that we want you to be comfortable and 
to take time off for recreation. Do not allow yourselves to get run down from 
overwork or worry. "w He was particularly concerned that no one stayed on the job 
so long that "she cannot recapture her vitality. " From this point on, regular leaves 
of absence were to be programmed into schedule. With the addition of the extra 
workers, this became more feasible 98 
An agreement with the State Department that only those strictly attached 
to relief work would be sent to Spain, limited the number of workers which the 
AFSC could despatch 99 Until May 1938 this edict was interpreted narrowly to 
imply that only relief workers could be sent, in contrast to the FSC's ability to send 
observers and short-term volunteers from Friends' schools "' The evident failure 
of Esther Farquhar's health, however, encouraged the AFSC to consider sending 
another kind of worker, the accountant (Alfred Cope) and the housekeeper (Ruth 
Cope). If few workers could be sent, those who were had to be selected carefully 
for their professional skills, their dedication and their suitability in a number of 
practical capacities. However, finding these attributes in one package was not easy. 
There is little documentary evidence, as the recruitment files do not appear to have 
been archived, but the impression is of a limited number of volunteers for Spain. 
The much vaunted desire of the AFSC to send professionals may have undermined 
the search for skills, as traditionally, it was businessmen who were best in a 
position to take leave from work. Equally, the search for professional social work 
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experience may have lead to the rejection of others with the motivation and 
dedication that previously would have suggested their suitability, a growing trend 
in American social work generally "' The desire to balance these factors may have 
also obscured the need for other considerations to be taken into account, such as 
ability to adapt to a foreign culture and the ease with which workers would interact 
with each other. In practice, however, the AFSC evidently felt constrained to 
despatch those workers who were available and enthusiastic, taking skills where 
they found them. 
3.4 Emily Parker 
Emily Parker arrived as assistant to Esther Farquhar in the spring of 1938. Her 
despatch was both in response to Esther Farquhar's need for an assistant, but also 
a consequence of Emily Parker's importunate requests to be sent. Of all the AFSC 
workers, it is Emily Parker who most demonstrates the traditional motivation of 
Concern. In December 1937 she wrote an article for The Messenger of Peace, 
Supplement to the American Friend in which she argued against the politics of 
convenience, the ease with which people "join the great and ever-increasing ranks 
of those who find it easy to justify any change of attitude or action on the grounds 
of crisis". Instead, she demanded a living witness and that "the ideals we declare 
from the mountain of vision are proved true on the actual test. "102 
Emily Parker came to the relief work in Spain with a strong reference from 
Louisa Jacob, aunt of Alfred Jacob. Florence Conard, an American who later joined 
the AFSC unit in Murcia and was herself the daughter of a Quaker missionary. 
described her as "a tremendously energetic girl about four feet ten and in her late 
twenties". 103 A Young Friend, Emily Parker was also an active member of the 
United Christian Youth Movement, an interdenominational Protestant Movement. 
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Having succeeded in interesting them in Spain, the UYCM designated Parker to 
represent them (and their funds) in Spain under the aegis of the AFSC. However, 
Emily Parker spoke only a little Spanish, which she had acquired in an effort to 
prepare herself for the task; neither was she regarded as very businesslike, and for 
these and other reasons the AFSC was doubtful of the wisdom of sending her 104 
John Reich, the man in charge of the administrative side of the Spanish 
mission, had doubts about both her character and her motives and wrote a 
cautionary epistle to Esther Farquhar: 
You will find her an extremely energetic, dynamic person, capable 
of hard work and abundant cheerfulness. At the same time, you will 
find she is inclined to ramble off on vague intangibles. The thing to 
do is give her a real job with children, and see to it that she settles 
down and delivers the goods. It is not the purpose of the Committee 
for Emily to travel about the country, but to confine herself to the 
work of recreation instruction in some children's colony 105 
In particular, Reich was concerned that Emily Parker would use her position as a 
representative of the UYCM to obtain greater autonomy in the unit. Worried, Reich 
asked that the Committee be given a frank report of Emily's progress. Emily 
Parker, herself, was not unaware of this concern: 
I hope thee does understand how anxious I am to fit in with the 
spirit of Friends in this kind of work. I suppose my insistence on the 
UYCM part has made thee feel that I was over emphatic in my 
personal interests and that perhaps I might not see the whole 
program so dearly. I hope by now that thee understands that it was 
my great concern that American Christian Youth take some practical 
action on the basis of an ideal held only in the abstract that made me 
so insistent 106 
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It could not have been easy for Emily Parker to feel constantly on probation, but 
this attitude appears to have been held only by the workers in Philadelphia. Esther 
Farquhar felt that she provided "a great strength both spiritually and 
practically" 107 As it happened, Emily Parker could not be assigned to a colony, as 
her experience in organising children's activities was too generally valuable to 
Esther Farquhar. Instead, she initiated children's activities in a variety of feeding 
stations, catering to that need for play which Esther Farquhar had earlier 
identified 1°s 
Both the content and the language of Emily Parker's letters suggest a 
traditionally Quakerly Concern. Her use of "thee", already rare amongst Friends 
by 1938, is unique amongst the relief workers. Although its significance as an 
indication of inner spirituality is minimal, it does serve to reinforce Emily Parker's 
personal identification with the more conservative Friends' traditions; it is not 
surprising therefore that Emily Parker was sensitive on the issue that her first 
loyalty might not be to the AFSC and its mission: 
Thee will remember I sent on first of all my concern as a Friend. If 
thee re-reads my application thee will perhaps see my purpose more 
clearly. My only fear is that I might not be able to really translate the 
message of Friends to these people adequately. My joy in the work 
has only been marred by an occasional sense that I was sent more to 
satisfy me than because it was considered useful. This was due of 
course to the conversation with both thee and H. T. Brown. 109 But I 
felt the work to be done and the challenge to Youth groups which it 
might bring was more important than any sense of personal hurt I 
might have felt. I have worked hard here and tried in the work to 
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outgrow this feeling. "' 
Emily Parker had two concerns: the first, to bring the message of Friends to the 
Spanish, and the second to bring the challenge of Spain and the Quakers to the 
Young Christian Movement. The message which she brought to the Spanish might 
be roughly divided into a social ministry and a ministry for peace; she served both 
in the same unselfconscious manner which we saw first in Alfred Jacob, but her 
missionary and evangelical motives were rather more foregrounded than those of 
her Quaker co-workers. 
On arrival, Emily Parker took over the workshops first initiated by 
Francesca Wilson. This type of work, Parker felt, "gives an opening for sharing our 
ideas of friendship and goodwill. ""' In particular, they had the advantage of 
bringing the Friends into contact with established projects and people with tried 
and tested ideas which could be shared. 112 In addition, the workshops appealed to 
her belief in empowerment; the workshops also housed schools, and she was 
concerned that these should continue as they provided perhaps the only 
opportunity for adult women to learn to read and write. 113 
It is the type of thing I am especially interested in as you well know 
for it represents more than mere relief, important as that is. 
Education must go on no matter what the conditions are and in fact 
conditions such as now exist make carrying on still more important. 
It is through such groups as this that the spirit of friendship and 
goodwill can be transmitted 114 
As far as possible, she hoped that teachers could be provided from the local 
students and that these would be willing to start educational centres in the refuges. 
These students came from the FUE (the Federaciön Universitario Escolar), the main 
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Friends in Spain", Emily Parker, May 1938. Committee on Spain: Reports, Murcia (Box 9). 
"'Ibid. 
12Ibid. 
13lbid. 
"'Extract from composite letter from Emily Parker, circulated by Grace Rhoads of the AFSC, 
February-March, 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Individuals, Parker, Emily (Box 9). 
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students' organisation. This approach was made both for utility and because, as 
representative of a youth church organisation, Emily Parker felt strongly that it 
would provide an opportunity for Spanish and American youth to "cooperate in 
a constructive project for Spanish children. "115 Such a project would appeal to the 
young people of the UYCM. 
Emily Parker's work was not free of ideology. She combined a belief in 
"modem" educational procedures with a firm insistence that no new workers be 
sent out; all the teachers were drawn from the local population. Concerned again 
for empowerment and for the maintenance of local independence she wrote of one 
school she established with the aid of the FUE: 
... the work must be planned so that if at any time for any reason I 
have to leave, the school can carry on just the same. I have seen the 
rather tragic result of what happens when a thing is completely run 
by outsiders. The International Brigade had a Campo de Ninos 
which took care of about 300 refugee children.... Well, suddenly and 
with no warning, as all things in war time occur, the I. B. was 
evacuated from Murcia leaving the Campo de Ninos with no 
leadership. It is being carried on at the moment but it remains to be 
seen whether or not it can actually continue. Besides the fact that it 
is very bad to be responsible for something which is helpless 
without one it seems wrong to me to feel that one is doing the best 
for a people by imposing an outsiders idea of education on the 
children. If the desired end is to help develop the Spanish culture 
and life it seems important that Spanish teachers and leaders be 
used 1'6 
This did not prevent Emily Parker expressing the hope that she would be able to 
introduce: "a good bit of expressional work into the classes ... there certainly is not 
much included in Spanish education. Those things which we simply take for 
us1bid. 
116 "Special interests and responsibilities of S. Emily Parker in connection with the work of Friends in Spain", Emily Parker, May 1938. Committee on Spain: Reports, Murcia (Box 9). 
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granted in American education are not included here at all, "117 but it is clear that 
she perceived this as sharing new skills, sponsoring indigenous development and 
not an attempt to impose a colonial mentality on the population. 
Whilst practical work was crucial to Emily Parker's witness, she also 
believed the AFSC to have a role in lifting morale: 
I am sure it is important for us all to help all of those here with 
whom we work daily to remember how to smile and laugh. I feel if 
we can keep up our own morale and that of those who help in our 
work, be they Spanish or the various foreign workers, the work we 
do will have twice the value "' 
The ability to maintain her optimism was in itself a spiritual act-"The constructive 
always has to give place to the necessities of the destructive. The thing is to believe 
that the light does shine on in the darkness and that the darkness has never 
overpowered it and keep on trying to build as permanently and constructively as 
possible.. -`9-and within this context, it was necessary also to consider how one 
performed one's mission. The "joy and strength of fellowship" was not enough for 
Emily Parker if performed in the wrong way 120 On her initial route to Murcia, she 
passed through Barcelona where she was taken to see some of the children's 
colonies: 
It is far more pleasant visiting the colonies than the refuges because 
there you may see something which is more constructive, and less 
of personal misery. I shall never again go to a refuge just to see what 
it is like. If I can go to help in anyway I will go gladly but those 
whose homes have been shattered have quite enough of misery and 
bitterness to bear without the additional embarrassment of having 
people gaze upon you even though it may be with great 
"'Ibid. 
"$Ibid. 
u9Ibid. 
120Ibid. 
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sympathy'21 
Even when assistance could be provided the experience could not be seen as 
wholly beneficial to either party. Presenting a dress to a woman who had lost her 
husband and found her children in a refuge, the woman "cried she was so glad and 
kissed my hand. One feels terrible to be in such a position. i122 Over all this rises 
Emily Parker's continued belief in pacifism. However, this was not a simplistic 
belief. In a late letter of February 1939 Emily Parker wrote of her continuing belief 
in the "futility and waste of war", 
... a waste one can 
hardly comprehend, though looking at these 
babies in our hospitals, or watching them being carried out, 
sometimes two and three a day in little coffins made from powdered 
milk boxes... or seeing children faint as they stand in line waiting for 
the bit we have to give! " 
Yet, whilst for Alfred Jacob the work in Spain was a pacifist witness, a 
practical witness to peace, it is not clear that it fulfilled this role for Emily Parker. 
All of this creates a struggle in one's inner being that will not be 
stilled by any of the stock answers of pacifists, which, by the way, 
are also no answer to death by air raids on civilian villages or 
starvation by blockade. There will be many, many questions that I 
shall have to bring back to UYCM groups. '24 
For her, the project was "no answer to the problem of what a Christian Youth 
should do in such a crisis", but it was "a practical opportunity to discover what the 
real problems of being a Christian in these days are". " Neither did Emily Parker 
feel that democracy had answered the call. Impartiality was difficult for her to 
12' Emily Parker to Mary Elmes, February 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Individuals, Emily 
Parker (Box 9). 
Emily Parker to Mildred (unknown correspondent), 1 March 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: 
Individuals, Emily Parker (Box 9). 
'23Emily Parker to Grace Rhoads, 24 February 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Individuals: 
Parker, Emily (Box 13). 
'24Ibid. 
"Ibid. 
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maintain when she believed in a "brave, courageous people, people who love peace 
as much as we, and who only long to live free of domination of either Church or 
State. i12' But despite a belief in the inadequacy of her witness, when Murcia was 
taken by the Nationalists, Emily Parker chose to honour the neutrality in which she 
had initially believed. 
Well, it has happened! I am now working on the other side or is it 
this side now? For better or worse I shall have become a completely 
rounded out non-partisan relief worker. For the sake of that phase 
of the cause to which I have committed myself and for the sake of 
the UYCM which wanted to make it completely N. P. I shall stay but 
many times over personal preference would drive me off and 
127 quickly .... 
For Emily Parker, her saddest observation was the transience of human loyalties 
as many of the Spaniards she had known as ardent supporters of the Republic 
quickly let go of their cause and began to accommodate themselves to the 
inevitable. " One sees not only how difficult but how nearly impossible it is to help 
to educate people to the idea of a democratic and cooperative society. /428 
After leaving Spain in 1940, Emily Parker went temporarily to live with her 
sister in Richmond and worked with summer youth camps and later as secretary 
at Ohio State University. Throughout 1939 and 1940 she continued to raise funds 
for the work in Spain and France. ' Her offer of service in France was turned down 
by Howard Kershner but during the Second World War she went on to provide 
assistance to displaced Japanese Americans. 
u6Ibid. 
127Ibid. 
128Ibid. 
'John F. Rich to Emily Parker, 25 October 1939. Committee on Spain, 1939, Individuals: Parker, 
Emily (Box 13). 
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3.5 The Mennonites: a Different Witness 
Since 1917, with the establishment of the training camps for conscientious objectors, 
the AFSC had maintained close connections with the Mennonite Central Committee 
(MCC). The MCC had its own projects but it was keen both to assist the AFSC with 
fund-raising and, where appropriate, to send its own workers into fields 
established by the AFSC. 
The arrival of the Mennonites Levi Hartzler and D. Parke Lantz in Murcia 
in early 1938 provided both additional personnel and assured the unit of continued 
help from the Mennonites. In particular, the Mennonite Central Committee was 
keen to send clothing through their agents. Whilst this may have been a low 
priority in Barcelona, the general poverty of the Murcia region ensured that there 
was a need. Writing home to John Reich, Levi Hartzler reported seeing many very 
young children with only enough clothing to cover them to the waist, in the middle 
of January. 130 But although these men, D. Parke Lantz and Levi Hartzler, were sent 
to cooperate with the AFSC, it became clear to both sides that they would have a 
separate agenda and perhaps a different way of doing things. All that was asked 
was that both the spirit and the manifestation of the work be in accordance with 
AFSC expectations. Initially, at least, the Mennonite representatives felt that it 
would be better to work as a part of the organisation than to begin independent 
work which might not prove sustainable. 131 While the Friends could make 
suggestions as to where these relief workers might fit, the final decision lay in the 
hands of the Mennonite Central Committee. As Louisa Jacob underscored, "The 
point is that they represent the Mennonites and thus we do not have great freedom 
in their appointment. i132In the event, both young men were assigned to work with 
Esther Farquhar. 
For the AFSC workers, cooperating with the Mennonites meant accepting 
both their nomination of relief workers and their accompanying agendas. Up to a 
130Levi Hartzler to John Reich, 19 January 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General: January to September (Box 7). 
13'Levi Hartzler to John L. Horst (Scottdale, PA. Mennonite), 27 December 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence - Murcia (Levi Hartzler, from and to) (Box 7). 
132Louisa Jacob to Esther Farquhar, 8 October, Committee on Spain, 1937: Correspondence, to Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
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point, both organisations had similar ideas of what made a good relief worker. Levi 
Hartzler and D. Parke Lantz had both served as missionaries in Latin America and 
spoke Spanish, Levi Hartzler was a young business man and both men had been 
ministers in the formal sense, and wrote letters home containing more obviously 
spiritual language than their Quaker colleagues. However, Esther Farquhar noted 
that the Mennonite Central Committee saw their workers operating separately but 
cooperatively. Many Mennonites had little sympathy with the work because it 
could not be openly missionary work although Levi Hartzler contacted local 
Protestants and engaged in Mennonite evangelism. Working with a religious group 
whose forms of worship were very different from the Mennonites, Hartzler 
believed that the only point of likeness between Friends and the branch of 
Mennonites which he represented was the belief in pacifism. " Consequently, 
whilst Hartzler and Lantz made clear that whilst they wished to cooperate closely 
with the Friends, they also desired to maintain a sense of individuality so that their 
supporters would feel them genuinely representative of the Mennonite church, in 
much the same manner that the FSC in Barcelona had wished to distinguish 
themselves from the SCIU 134 For example, Esther Farquhar reported that Levi 
Hartzler particularly wished to drive the truck because he wanted to use it as a 
symbol to create a spirit around the work 135However, this proved inadequate; in 
late April Esther Farquhar wrote to John Reich to say that Levi Hartzler, after much 
prodding from Emily, had admitted that he was not happy with the wording on the 
truck. The wording had been according to very specific instructions from Patrick 
Malin, the AFSC representative in Paris, whilst he had been in Spain the previous 
year, but Hartzler, in addition to his own discomfort, was under pressure from his 
church. 
... This morning he brought me his last letter from Orrie Miller in 
which he says that you had assured him that the ownership of the 
'33Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 25 April 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, Esther Farquhar (Box 8). 
134Louisa Jacob to Esther Farquhar, 1 November 1937, Committee on Spain, 1937: 
Correspondence, to Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
135Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 15 April 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, Esther Farquhar (Box 8). 
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truck would be indicated on the truck itself. If I had instructions 
which I did not follow I am terribly sorry, but I think you just 
expected me to have enough sense to know that it should be. I seem 
tobe the kind that has to be told. Anyway, this morning we learned 
that the aluminium paint of the lettering can be removed, so we are 
having the "AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE" on one 
side changed to read "MENNONITE RELIEF COMMITTEE", 
leaving the other side as it is. This, Levi thinks, is all their Committee 
would want, but if you find out that it does not satisfy please let me 
know immediately. 136 
A number of points stand out: first, the desire for semi-autonomy and for public 
recognition which had not been clear to the AFSC at the beginning of MCC 
involvement. The position had been assumed to be roughly similar to that of Emily 
Parker, who as a representative of the United Young Christian Movement reported 
to them, but in all other ways was an AFSC worker. Rather it was closer to the 
relationship that the FSC had assumed they had with the SCIU, that of equals, and 
clearly the issue of labels mirrored the difficulties experienced in Barcelona. The 
second point is the clarification of the aims of the Mennonite workers. Although 
both the FSC and the AFSC work in Spain had a missionary element, the stress 
could be said by a non-Quaker to be on the political elements of the Quaker 
profession. Thus Alfred Jacob was anxious to avoid incurring the epithet "rice 
Christian" but remained keen to witness to peace, social justice and to the simple 
message that people should care for each other's welfare. Similarly, Esther 
Farquhar's mission could be framed in a political paradigm as a witness to peace 
and to modernising child-care. Although both were uncomfortable with, if not 
actively hostile to Catholicism, both refrained from attempting to convert the local 
populace, although Alfred Jacob, like Levi Hartzler, seems to have been active in 
recruiting the small number of Catalan Protestants as assistants. Alfred Jacob had 
initially been despatched to Spain as a missionary. That he was allowed to drop 
public proselytising was a comment on the type of sect which British Quakerism 
had become-committed to the efficacy of Quaker witness to the presence of God 
"mid 
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in the world rather than to active winning of souls. Levi Hartzler, however, came 
from a tradition that had retained a strong allegiance to evangelism and the MCC 
expected to receive evidence of this in his reports. However it rapidly became 
unclear how Hartzler could provide evidence of specifically Mennonite work. The 
clothing distributions were relatively easy as much of the clothing had been 
collected by the MCC and was identified as such by the labels on the bales. 
Reporting distinctive food distribution was less easy as food was bought by the 
AFSC with the assistance of Mennonite funds. As there was no Mennonite canteen, 
there did not exist any easy way to distinguish the AFSC and the Mennonite 
distributions. Writing to John Horst, a Mennonite elder, Hartzler suggested that the 
Mennonites simply accept this: "It seems now that the best way is to report on 
various projects that are being carried on by the organization as our own work, 
keeping in mind the Mennonite interestsi137 i 
However, this did not always work. Although Levi Herztier felt that the 
work which Esther Farquhar was to take charge of in the hospitals could be 
subscribed to by "our folks" without difficulty, other projects were not so amenable 
to Mennonite wishes. The lack of religious instruction in either the schools or the 
hospitals was a particular source of sadness for Hartzler, visiting the children in 
hospital he noted sadly, "how I would like to tell them Bible stories and teach them 
choruses, but that would not be wise now, even if I could do it" 138 
In the face of these restrictions, the Mennonites became more concerned to 
contact and assist any Spanish Protestants they might find. One successful contact 
was established with Don Miguel Aguillera, President of the Spanish Branch of the 
World Evangelical Union, who was already involved with the AFSC. This contact 
was particularly helpful to the Mennonites as it provided them with access to 
organised worship. Sunday evening prayer was held each week at Don Aguillera's 
home and also placed them in a position to support coreligionists, perhaps assisting 
them with rent for a hall. But the Mennonites did recognise the constraints which 
existed; 
137Ibid. 
"Ibid. 
142 
I am not sure that it is just the time now to do much public work of 
that kind, but we can always do any amount of work in our closets 
before God, that he might open the way for the preaching of the 
gospel. We find no direct opposition here, although it not doubt 
exists among certain classes, but many folks have the idea that 
anything that has to do with the church is fascistic, and as long as the 
war continues there is no need of aggravating that feeling139 
Although the possibilities for evangelism were limited, the Mennonites can be 
distinguished from the Quaker workers by their continued desire to find an 
opening for a missionary endeavour. Most Friends had by 1937 postponed it as a 
post-war possibility mainly predicated on a Republican victory. Additionally, the 
Mennonites contrast with the Quaker workers in their emphasis on the power of 
prayer. Although we know that Alfred Jacob attempted to organise a Meeting, and 
Emily Parker was clearly maintaining the more traditional forms of Quaker 
address, mention of prayer and its efficacy is remarkable by its absence. This is not 
the case for the Mennonites. Concluding his lengthy epistle, Hartzler wrote: 
We hope that folks at home will be patient with us as we try to meet 
the needs which are peculiar to this time and this particular place. 
The Lord knows we have spent much time in prayer and in trying 
to find that which is nearest and neediest to be done. Most of the 
pioneer work was done before we came, except what new situations 
may arise yet. We appreciate your prayers and continue to need 
them. Word from anyone at home is always appreciated... "' 
In contrast, the Friends sound positively secular, a reflection perhaps, of their more 
mainstream position in both British and American life. 
The Mennonites' relationship with the Murcia unit was a difficult one. The 
Mennonites wished to see themselves as a separate, self-contained unit, apart from 
the AFSC. At the same time, they wished to cooperate very closely with the AFSC 
]39IbId. 
". Levi Hartzler to Orrie Miller, Chairman of the Mennonite Relief Committee, 31 December 
1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence- Murcia (Levi Hartzler, from and to). 
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and receive their shipments through AFSC channels 141 Until this was established 
formally, relatively late in the process in November 1938,142 the presence of the 
Mennonites was a source of some tension. Whilst Esther Farquhar was in residence, 
the chain of authority was fairly clear and apparently acceptable to Levi Hartzler. 
Once she returned to America in May 1938, however, Hartzler seems to have been 
unhappy with Emily Parker as a possible leader, and the issue does not seem to 
have been settled with the arrival of Clyde Roberts in late 1938. In fact, the arrival 
of five new Quaker workers at the same time as Roberts may have exacerbated the 
situation, pushing Hartzler to maintain a separate ministry in order to emphasise 
the distinctiveness of the Mennonites. The motives were relatively simple and have 
been already discussed. The Mennonites' commitment to prepare the ground for 
missionary work remained intact until very late in the process, far longer than that 
of Alfred Jacob, which dissolved in the very first months of the war, and the multi- 
denominational AFSC was not and could not be a missionary body 143 
"'John F. Reich to Clyde E. Roberts, 7 November 1938, Committee on Spain: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, October-December (Box 7). 
"John F. Reich to Levi Hartzler, 10 November 1938, Committee on Spain: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, October-December (Box 7). 
"This role was taken by the American Friends Board of Missions, a mid-western organisation dominated by the programmed meetings. 
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Chapter Four: 
The American Friends Service Committee in Nationalist Spain 
In April 1937, when Esther Farquhar entered Republican Spain, she was 
accompanied by Wilfred Jones, son of that Sylvester Jones who had made the AFSC 
investigation in the winter of 1936/37. Wilfred Jones made his way quickly to the 
Nationalist sector and established an agreement with the Nationalists that would 
enable the AFSC to operate in a culturally hostile environment. However, Wilfred 
Jones stayed only six months, setting a pattern which was to plague the AFSC unit 
in Burgos. In part because of this rapid turnover of staff, there are no 
overwhelming personalities or individuals who conspicuously shape the mission. 
By 1938, the Friends Service Council had failed to secure visas for 
Nationalist Spain and had decided that the best way to ensure their own 
impartiality was to support the Nationalist Zone through AFSC workers. ' The 
principal purpose of the AFSC presence in Nationalist Spain was to preserve an 
image of neutrality. The Nationalist zone did not initially require additional food 
supplies, and would not until such time as the Nationalists took over large tracts 
of the Republican zone. Furthermore, in order to ensure a steady supply, Franco 
moved in 1938 to create a National Wheat Service to manage the marketing of 
grain. Farmers sold at fixed retail prices to the services which fixed prices and 
administered distribution. When rationing became necessary, a mechanism was 
already in place. However, manufactured goods were in short supply and the 
AFSC decided to divert some of the clothing collected in Philadelphia to the 
children of Nationalist Spain. 
'John Reich to Dan West, 5 January 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain, Workers from/ to (Box 8); FSC: Minutes of the Spain (Executive) Committee, 
15 August 1938; Minutes of the Spain Committee, 20 October 1938. 
'Richard Herr, An Historical Essay on Modem Spain, University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1971, p. 220. 
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4.1 Working with the Nationalists 
Earl Smith (Methodist) and Dan West (Church of the Brethren) arrived in Burgos 
in June 1937, and were immediately obliged to register with the police and with the 
Banca de Bilbao? Although the team was peripatetic and actually spent little time 
in Burgos, for ease of reference I will describe them as the Burgos unit. 
All relief work in Nationalist Spain had to take place in association with 
Auxilio Social, the Nationalist women s relief organisation. Initially lack of 
transportation and of other suitable relief partners encouraged this alliance, and as 
the work developed a structure and direction the association with Auxilio Social 
became more rather than less useful. Although a warehouse and office was secured 
in Bilbao, the AFSC Mission in Nationalist Spain was far less rooted to place. 
Needing to store large amounts of goods in safe places whilst they themselves were 
absent either identifying potential recipients or delivering goods encouraged ever 
greater reliance on the services of the Auxilio Social for basic administration and 
supervision. The Auxilio Social in Bilbao was able to provide storage space, some 
transportation and a number of women to assist in sorting through the goods 4 This 
brought West and Smith into contact with rather different attitudes than those of 
either Esther Farquhar or Alfred Jacob's co-workers. 
The three ladies who helped us divide it [the first delivery] for 
different places were surprised at the quality of the shoes and 
underwear. One said the shoes were too good for the children of the 
Reds-not with malice, but because they are poor. She said, "These 
are good enough for anybody. " We think so too, rich or poor 5 
The unit also relied on the Auxilio Social to direct them to often distant and 
inaccessible villages which the authorities felt needed help. Once there, the practice 
'Earl Smith and Dan West to John Reich, 24 September 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
4Dan West to John Reich, 21 November 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). The relief workers do not indicate from where the 
female work force was drawn, but Stanley Payne suggests that some service was demanded 
from every able-bodied unmarried woman in Spain who was not otherwise employed through 
the Falange Seccion Feminina. Stanley G. Payne, Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1979, p. 203. 
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was to work either through the Auxilio Social, as indicated above, through the 
Mayor, or through the school teachers. This potentially legitimised Auxilio Social's 
public agenda, but there is evidence that the unit was aware of this problem and 
that the impression of impartial assistance from representatives of Auxilio Social 
may have been assumed for the sake of the censors. Earl Smith was careful to 
emphasise the positive aspect of such interaction: sharing a meal with the officials 
of Vallamanin, Smith commented, "Eating together is always a good thing for it 
pulls down the barriers and makes one group of many differing people". 
AFSC operations in Nationalist Spain were shaped to a far greater extent by 
the political colouring of the zone. Government relief in the Republic was partisan, 
but on the whole, the exigencies of the situation restricted the degree to which the 
authorities could take the time out to supervise non-governmental and foreign 
relief agencies. In contrast, the feeding stations which Dan West observed were 
clearly Falangist: although the children were selected "without prejudice" and a 
number were the children of "Red" fathers, orphaned by the war, Smith and West 
noted that on the wall was a picture of General Franco, surrounded by laurel. This 
was surrounded by flags of the various political groupings of the Nationalists, and 
below that hung the emblem of the SCIU 7A later letter suggested that West and 
Smith found the general atmosphere rather militaristic, ' in one orphanage where 
boys predominated, the children entertained their visitors with a Falangist song. ' 
In order to distinguish themselves from this work, West and Smith displayed the 
Quaker Star and the words, "Sociedad de Amigos Quäquaros: Servicio 
Internacional" on the sides and the windshield of the truck they borrowed from the 
SCIU, prompting the sorts of enquiries which enabled them to explain the mission 
'Earl Smith to John Reich, second letter, 15 January 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
7"The New Comedors at Los Corrales", by Dan West, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers (from and to) (Box 8). 
8Dan West to John Reich, 8 December 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
'Earl Smith to John Reich, no date (received 13 December 1937), Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
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further and emphasise their distinctiveness and their neutrality. 1° In the heavily 
politicised context, defining and maintaining a visible neutrality was not always 
easy. Earl Smith explained, 
Many people can hardly believe that Americans are helping 
them because they think that most of their sympathy is with the 
other side. We have been asked if this is one of the ambulances that 
was taken from the "Reds". We have had to explain that we are the 
Quakers and we are doing work on the "White" side too. .. They 
suspect us because we are Americans. They suspect us because we 
are democratic. They suspect anyone who is liberal. We have done 
everything we could do to dispel that suspicion. We feel that part of 
our mission is spiritual and we are willing to let them realize that 
though we are helping them we are not endorsing entirely the 
Phalangist regime " 
However, as the units in Murcia and Barcelona had discovered, all too often 
Earl Smith found that his sympathies were assumed. His talk at Santiago 
University, to be held under the auspices of the Friends of Spain, was called off 
after Smith had a talk with the Spanish ambassador, "... and disillusioned him on 
his hopes that I could help convince people to support their war. I said I was with 
him politically but not militarily. They told me they were unable to get the 
auditorium. And I believe them. But if I had supported their war, they would have 
found some place". " Smith's assurance of political sympathy would be more 
disturbing if it did not run parallel to Jacob and Parker's identification with the 
Republic. The AFSC seem to have accepted that neutrality could best be achieved 
by balancing the interests represented, rather than attempting to secure political 
neutrals. 
'°Earl Smith and Dan West to John Reich, 9 October 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8); Earl Smith and David Blickenstaff to 
John Reich, 22 January 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, 
Workers from/to (Box 8). 
11iEarl Smith's Report", June 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Reports, General (Box 9). 
12Earl Smith to John Reich, 1 October 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938. Individuals, Earl Smith 
(Box 9). 
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Assessing levels of need was not easy, particularly as the Nationalists, from 
whom most information had to be drawn, had their own agendas which were often 
contradictory. The Nationalists were anxious both to prove their expertise and 
efficiency at maintaining their own population, but were also keen to emphasise 
the iniquities of the Republican government and the deprivation it caused in the 
Nationalist zone. For example, in a letter to Wilfred Jones, Count de Vallellano, 
President of the Spanish Red Cross in Burgos, expressed his gratitude for the 
interest which the Friends were taking in the Nationalist zone, but continued: 
I well know the sentiments of justice which animate the 
Quakers; it is for this reason that I permit myself to call your 
attention to the fact that the Marxists have seized all of the gold of 
the Bank of Spain, also all funds belonging to the Red Cross, 13 and 
to bring to your attention the fact that the territory and the 
population of the Nationalist zone are much larger than those of the 
Marxists... that is to say that we have less means and more need 
than the Marxists 14 
How this was received is best summed up by the $1,000 per month assigned 
to Dan West and Earl Smith in the Nationalist zone in September, as compared to 
the $2,500 a month assigned to Murcia alone, with yet more AFSC money going to 
Barcelona. "' The reality was that the Nationalist zone had the majority of the 
agricultural land and very few of the refugees. Those refugees who had headed 
into Nationalist territory tended to be the better off, in a position to support 
themselves to some degree in an area which still had food for sale. Whilst the 
advance of the Nationalists did move real cases of hardship into the Nationalist 
zone, two factors mitigated the effects of this. As areas were occupied they were 
brought back on to the "right" side of the agricultural/ industrial divide and it 
13The Spanish Red Cross had continued activity in the Republican zone, assisted by the Swiss 
Red Cross. 
1"Count de Vallellano, Spanish Red Cross Supreme Assembly, Burgos to Wilfred V. Jones, June 
14 1937 (translation), Committee on Spain 1937: Delegation to Spain, E. Cadbury and Wilfred Jones. 
"John F. Reich to Earl Smith and Dan West, 23 September 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
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became theoretically possible to for them to gain access to food supplies. In 
practice, this varied according to local geographical, political and economic 
considerations. Secondly, in many areas occupied by advancing Nationalist troops, 
people did not wait to be "liberated" but moved deeper into the Republican zone, 
placing an ever larger burden on the area of the country least able to feed them. 
The accusation about the gold ignored the Republican government's agreement to 
accept responsibility for all relief related debts incurred by the Nationalists. The 
reverse was not the case. 
Some of this disparity was reflected in the reports which West and Smith 
sent back to the USA. On a return trip from Santander they stopped at Caldas, a 
village between Reinosa and Santander. Although there was a good deal of 
destruction to be seen there were very few children, most of them had been 
evacuated 16 Furthermore, the pre-war religious, charitable infrastructure in the 
Nationalist zone remained largely intact. In Santander, for example, West and 
Smith saw a colony of eighty boys and sixty girls, more than forty of whom were 
orphans, although it was not made clear whether they were war orphans. These 
children were in the care of nine nuns at the local convent; only a few looked very 
thin and with three cows on the property the convent had its own supply of milk. 
Rather than food supplies, West and Smith requested vitamin supplements. 7 The 
convent children were experiencing the general shortage of clothing and skin 
complaints were prevalent, but there was none of the typhoid or tuberculosis 
prevalent in the Republic. Although Earl Smith observed many ill-clothed children 
and destroyed villages, he did not record evidence of starvation. 18 Where local 
charities did not exist, the activities of Auxilio Social ensured that most urban areas 
were well catered for. West and Smith were directed to take material aid out into 
the more isolated villages and regions where more centralised agencies might be 
unable to reach, and in this cause they secured the use of a car offered by Mrs. 
"Earl Smith and Dan West to John Reich, 9 October 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to) (box 8). 
"Ibid. 
"Earl Smith to John Reich, 16 October 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
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Small of the SCIU, which was active in Nationalist as well as Republican Spain. 
" 
4.2 Relief 
The main cause for concern in Nationalist Spain was the shortage of clothing for 
children up to fourteen years of age. Cut off from industry, and with a 
predominantly military government which concentrated on the purchase or arms 
and the arrangement of alliances, civilian industrial produce was in short supply 2° 
Under clothing and shoes were in particularly short supply? ' Other requirements 
were blankets and medical equipment. However, it is in the provision of clothing 
that the Friends most deviated from their stated aim of assisting only children. All 
clothing offered to the Philadelphia office was accepted, and whilst that for 
children was actively solicited, none was refused' In addition, the $1,000 per 
month that Philadelphia made available to the Burgos unit was allocated to the 
purchase of clothes for the coming winter, rather than food. After the first shipment 
which was expected from the USA in November, Earl Smith anticipated that where 
the money was used to purchase clothing, this would be done in Britain in order 
to save shipping costs? 
The clothing originated from two main collecting points: the clothing room 
of the AFSC itself and the Mennonite Central Committee? ' Drawing on a wide 
contributing constituency (the AFSC solicited non-Quaker organisations and had 
a number of long standing connections on which it could rely, such as the 
19This tends to support Alfred Jacob's allegation that Mrs. Small was over-stretched. See 
Chapter Two. 
20Earl Smith and Dan West to John Reich, 2 October 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to). 
21Earl Smith and Dan West to John Reich, 24 September 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to). 
'Earl Smith and Dan West to John Reich, 26 October 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to). 
23Earl Smith to John Reich, 16 October 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
2'John Reich to Earl Smith and Dan West 1 November 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
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Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Council for World Friendship amongst 
Children), the AFSC could guarantee around 200 pounds of clothing per bale and 
the Mennonites around 100 pounds 25 In common with their co-workers in 
Republican Spain, West and Smith were keen on the philosophy of self-help, even 
in war-time and amongst children, and they proposed that a new independent 
orphanage being established which did have some shoemaking equipment, be 
provided with leather and needles rather than shoes. Wool would be provided for 
the stocking machines the orphanage possessed so that they might knit stockings 
both for themselves and for the AFSC workers to distribute elsewhere Z6 
The small unit in Nationalist Spain was in a poor position to develop overall 
criteria for relief. As the unit travelled from area to area, rarely repeating a call, 
direct comparisons between different villages could not be made, and it was 
impossible to rank areas without visiting before hand. In order to ensure good will, 
visits might have to include some dispensation of relief to people who proved to 
be relatively secure in comparison to the inhabitants of the next village. In the event 
it was easier to simply visit each place once and give to the most needy, irrespective 
of any comparisons that might be made subsequently, but the unit was compelled 
to operate a rather parsimonious policy on the assumption that the next village 
would be worse than the last. In Ubidea, a small village which had been near the 
front until the previous Nationalist advance, there appeared to be little war 
damage, but "need aplenty". A young school teacher helped round up seventy-five 
children and Smith and West, assisted by the newly arrived David Blickenstaff 
(Church of the Brethren), gave out nineteen pairs of shoes, a dozen pairs of 
underwear and eight blankets. 
It cut deep to have to refuse the appeals of those who got nothing, 
but we felt we had to do it. We are not here to meet all the needs of 
everybody; we want our limited supplies to go to the neediest 27 
'John Reich to Dan West, Earl Smith and David Blickenstaf f, 13 December 1937, Committee on 
Spain 1937: Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
26Dan West to John Reich, 21 November 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
27Dan West to John Reich, 8 December 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
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However there is no indication that the unit ever defined or identified the 
"neediest". One small point which West noted was that the school teacher who 
assisted them was unemployed as the new regime had not yet re-opened the 
schools, an indication of the relatively low value placed on general schooling in 
comparison to the Republican authorities who strove to keep the schools going 
both as places of learning and as centres of relief? ' At Dima, another small town, 
eight pairs of shoes and underwear for twenty-six children were left with the 
Mayor's secretary for distribution and, at Ochandiano near Bilbao, West and Smith 
watched whilst the Mayor made a list of those most in need and handed out the 
clothing. In Santander, the clothes were given to the Mayor who handed them over 
to the young woman who headed up the Falangist work in the community, 
potentially granting Auxilio Social a propaganda coup. 9 This approach, whilst 
making the most of local cooperation, and allowing the unit to cover a wide area 
(at least the three provinces of Burgos, Viscaya and Asturias) undermined the 
AFSC commitment to making personal connections with the recipients of relief, 
and severely reduced the extent to which the relief workers could ensure 
impartiality. 
The first real war related need West and Smith met was in the city of 
Oviedo. Much of the town was uninhabitable, only three buildings in the city were 
undamaged yet many thousands of people remained and returning refugees were 
adding to their number. Many were living in basements and cellars. Oviedo's 
children were scattered in temporary and permanent orphanages for seventy miles 
around, and housed in very poor conditions. 
One of our experiences that tugged at our heart strings was that of 
giving out forty blankets to 652 children. Several of the little ones 
who did not get blankets walked up to them and felt them; one child 
petted the blankets and then walked outside into the night cold. 
Forty-or more likely eighty-no doubt slept warmer that night; but 
we fear that nearly six hundred must have passed an even less 
'Ibid. 
29Ibid. 
153 
comfortable night than before. 
These 652 children were being fed twice each day by Auxilio Social, but although 
AFSC workers observed the total lack of milk, they continued to direct their effort 
towards the provision of substantial clothing and blankets for these children. 
Apparently the unit decided to respond to the general need, rather than to specific 
incidents of localised hardship 3° During visits to some of the orphanages they saw 
little signs of malnutrition, but adequate clothing, particularly shoes, were very 
scarce? ' In February 1938, in Bilbao, the Burgos unit handed out 300 baby 
garments, from a donation by the SCIU, to the residents of a children's home. From 
the same donation, several hundred pieces of cloth were given to the local Auxilio 
Social, and several more bolts of cloth were taken to an orphanage which had fifty 
nuns able to sew for the children? ' In the large feeding stations of the Falangists 
in Oviedo the unit gave out 400 cakes of soap and pairs of shoes to 400 children, 
and underwear to seventy of them. An indication of relative levels of need is that 
in late February 1938 David Blickenstaff reported that there was a growing 
shortage of meat and, "upon the recommendation of the provincial Auxilio Social 
we have just ordered $350 worth of tinned beef"? * This contrasted sharply with the 
situation in Barcelona where the emphasis was on bread, rice and milk. 
Need in Nationalist Spain appears to have been defined by region rather 
than any movement of population. Those villages in more inaccessible areas clearly 
suffered, but the worst need was in the "liberated" zones. In Amorebieta, Guernica 
and Durango, a year after the war passed through them, there were still severe 
30iDan West's Report", 1 February 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Reports, General (Box 9). 
31Earl Smith to John Reich, no date (received 13 December 1937), Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
32Earl Smith and David Blickenstaff to John Reich, 24 February Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
'Earl Smith and David Blickenstaff to John Reich, 22 January 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
'David Blickenstaff to John Reich, no postal date, received 4 March 1938. Committee on Spain 
1938: Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
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shortages of basic clothing and bedding, as well as evidence of malnutrition In 
areas which fitted into both categories the need was particularly severe. After a day 
driving in the mountains, the unit came to the town of La Arboleda. Although 
undamaged by bombs or shells, the absence of most of the men (in prison, fighting 
on the other side, dead or missing) had reduced many large families below the 
poverty line. Malnutrition was rife, despite the presence of the Auxilio Social, and 
the unit promised to try to bring in cod liver oil ' Four barrels of cod liver oil were 
received from Norway: two were sent to Oviedo and the schools of Bilbao and two 
were divided into smaller consignments and sent to other cities 37 
Having, in Earl Smith's opinion, fulfilled their promises to the provinces 
which they had been visiting, the unit decided to turn its attention to Aragon. The 
consensus of opinion between the Red Cross and the Auxilio Social was that it was 
in this area that the need was greatest. This change of direction however, also 
required a change in supplies as Aragon needed foodstuffs more urgently than it 
needed clothing. Luckily, condensed milk and dried fish formed part of the stock 
waiting in customs in early April and the switch was one that could be made 
speedily? ' In late April, however, when David Blickenstaff returned from a stay 
with his father in Marseilles, the unit was still distributing blankets and clothing in 
most of the villages they visited 39 So far, the Burgos unit had received around 1500 
pounds of clothing to distribute and were feeding 2,000 children in Aragon, but the 
poor fund raising which affected Murcia in the early months of 1938 had a similar 
effect upon Burgos 40 
35Earl Smith to John Reich, 31 March 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain, Workers from/ to (Box 8). 
"'Ibid. 
37Earl Smith to John Reich, second letter, 15 January 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
'Earl Smith to John Reich, 4 April 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, Nationalist 
Spain, Workers from/ to (Box 8). 
39Earl Smith and David Blickenstaff to John Reich, 21 April 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
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From May 1938 the Burgos unit began to receive funds from the 
International Commission, a Quaker initiated international effort based in 
Geneva 41 Funding from Philadelphia had been cut from $1500 to $1000 per month, 
but it was hoped that the International Commission might be able to pick up some 
of the slack: ' Once the funds were flowing, and news came through in May that 
they were, it was expected that 5,000 children on the Nationalist side would be fed 
by this means 43 This was particularly helpful as Nationalist advances westward 
had engulfed the civilian populations of Teruel, Zaragoza and Huesca, creating a 
new relief problem. In the tradition of Friends' relief work, Earl Smith began to 
anticipate post-war reconstruction work. Many of the farmers the unit visited in 
Zaragoza in June had lost two if not three crops and were dependent upon charity 
and credit until such time as another crop could be brought in a4 
On the surface, the unit seemed to approve of the work undertaken by 
Auxilio Social. Smith felt that the work was carried on efficiently, with two hot 
meals each day given to some 150,000 children in feeding stations. Many more 
were receiving rations to be eaten with their families, and the work of the SCIU and 
the AFSC was officially welcomed as supplementary45 Unofficially, however, the 
story was slightly different: in a letter sent from France and which Earl Smith 
cautioned should not be quoted from, he explained briefly that the International 
Commission canteen which was to have been established in Burgos by June had 
been held up and that preparations had been suspended as the local Auxilio Social, 
jealous of their status and anxious to be seen to meeting all local needs, had placed 
41Hugh Thomas wrongly suggests that the International Commission was a Quaker 
organisation. Although the initial impetus came from the Friends, particularly Edith M. Pye, 
the International Commission was a coalition of different agencies and interests. Hugh Thomas, 
The Spanish Civil War, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1986, p. 863. 
"John Reich to Earl Smith and David Blickenstaff, 11 May 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
43John Reich to Earl Smith, 25 May January 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
44Earl Smith and David Blickenstaff to John Reich, 2 June 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers from/ to (Box 8). 
45Earl Smith and David Blickenstaff to John Reich, 9 May 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: 
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difficulties in the way of its establishment. This pattern was to be repeated, 
hampering the good which might have been done and giving cause to worry for the 
success of the International Commission mission 46 In a report written when Earl 
Smith returned to the USA (and therefore uncensored) he wrote: 
.... in one of those districts where many of the bread winners are 
missing... there is a Phalangist canteen where they feed some 250 
children per day. There is need for food for at least 500 children in 
addition to these 250 children... We intended to provide one meal a 
day for 300 children... When we got to Burgos we heard that several 
days before all preparations had been suspended because word had 
been received from headquarters that the Red Cross would not be 
permitted to have a canteen there without the aid of the Phalangist 
Aid. Later they said specifically that they would not allow a canteen 
there... That is political. It is part of the program that all people must 
be taken care of and so the pretenses are that all people are being 
cared for.... this man came and told us that there was no need for 
Franco is the father of us a1147 
Although the unit was prepared to work through Auxilio Social canteens, 
Smith felt there to be some severe drawbacks. Any money which went direct to 
Auxilio Social would be potentially substituting for money already being spent by 
the State. "We would have to pay the State for a place where they would normally 
have a station, "48 and there was little evidence that it would increase the number 
of children being fed. The other problem was Smith felt that the Auxilio Social was 
not always willing to help those towns which had just been taken if no good 
looking building could be found to use, "Fifty per cent of the purpose of the 
Phalangist canteens is to educate children at the table to get them to be good 
Phalangists. If they cannot provide nice places, they will let them get their 
'Earl Smith to John Reich, 2 June 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, Nationalist 
Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
47"Earl Smith's Report", June 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Reports, General (Box 9). 
48Ibid. 
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subsistence as best as they can. i49 Auxilio Social's unwillingness to emulate the 
Republicans and simply appropriate suitable buildings hindered operations. 
As the war shifted further into Republican territory, evacuated populations 
were returning to their homes in the new Nationalist zones, but returning evacuees 
often found their homes destroyed, and their equipment, furnishings and livestock 
stolen along with their grain supply. Republican currency was now worthless, 
leaving refugees penniless and unable to secure supplies. In spite of this one mayor 
asserted, "We can provide for ourselves the rest of this year; but next year, who 
knows? "' Reflecting on this, Charles Ewald, a Chicago Quaker who replaced Clyde 
Roberts in August 1938 and David Blickenstaff asked that as large a proportion of 
the available wheat from the Red Cross as Reich deemed wise be made available 
to the Burgos unit. The principal problem now was not actually shortage of food, 
but the wherewithal to purchase it, thus the Nationalist expansion threatened to 
exacerbate shortages in the following year and there was no guarantee when the 
wheat would arrive. Farm lands had been fought over after they had been plowed 
and sown and the local crops were often destroyed 51 
In September news came through that 60,000 barrels of American flour were 
to be made available to Nationalist Spain via Red Cross 52 David Blickenstaff 
crossed the border and went to Geneva to consult with M. De Lillihöök and the 
International Commission about arrangements for their planned canteens. Writing 
from Geneva, and hence free of the fear of censorship, Blickenstaff wrote: 
After seeing what splendid cooperation the workers receive from the 
Republican authorities on the other side, it is clear that we have a 
few problems to solve that for them do not exist. As is so 
characteristic of Spain, where our relationships are of a personal 
"Ibid. 
"David Blickenstaff to John Reich, 11 July 1938. Committee on Spain: Correspondence, 
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nature they are fine. But one cannot help coming to the conclusion 
that officially we are not too welcome. No doubt Charles has written 
you about the military order that was brought to attention the day 
before I left by the national officials of the Auxilio Social, saying that 
in future we could not be allowed to make any personal 
distributions of supplies. If this means what it says (and we were 
assured that it did) it changes many aspects of the work? 
The Nationalists remained unwilling to countenance the establishment of non- 
Falangist (and non-Catholic) canteens, and as Nationalist hostility deepened it 
appeared that the best plan would be to supply the authorities with the materials 
available, and monitor its distribution. The lack of Nationalist cooperation might 
have led to an AFSC withdrawal, but the evidence of growing need in the region 
halted such drastic action. Blickenstaff believed that, aside from the issue of 
maintaining non-partisanship, the political situation in itself required the AFSC 
presence. 
... our work in 
Nationalist Spain has found real justification in the 
fact that we have been able to meet some of the need in places where 
the politically minded official relief organization has not done 
anything... It is a political organization and we have had to come to 
the regrettable conclusion that although one finds many fine people 
connected with it, it is an organization for the purpose, primarily. of 
furthering a political movement. Children sometimes go hungry 
where this purpose would not be served. Our opportunity to be of 
service has been in such "gaps" in the Auxilio Social program' 
Any suggestion that the AFSC become simply financiers of Falangist projects 
threatened this justification. Although assurances were given that the AFSC 
representatives might make inspections to assure themselves that the distribution 
was in accordance to AFSC wishes, Blickenstaff expressed some scepticism: "This 
order is nothing more than a part of their plan to see to it that all social work done 
David Blickenstaff to John Reich, 4 October 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain, Workers from/ to (Box 8). 
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in Spain will reflect to the glory of the Nationalist movement (and it hurts my 
conscience a bit to have our help turned to such ends). "' In response Philadelphia 
cabled that whilst distribution might go through Auxilio Social and Cruz Roja (the 
Spanish Red Cross), the AFSC would not relinquish freedom of oversight ' 
In October Charles Ewald wrote to the Sub-Secretary of Foreign Affairs in 
Burgos confirming that the Nationalist Government was dealing directly with the 
Americans in arranging for shipping of the flour, and that the Nationalist 
Government would be responsible for transporting it from Bordeaux to Spain and 
for the handling charges involved. On reaching Spain, the flour was to be handed 
over to the Auxilio Social whose plan for distribution was to be cleared by David 
Blickenstaff who was to be stationed in Bordeaux 57 In the event, the French dock 
workers refused to handle wheat intended for Nationalist Spain. When this matter 
was settled with a written commitment from Blickenstaff that the wheat was 
intended for the civilian population, they unloaded the wheat into the warehouses 
but refused to transfer it to the German ship chartered for the purpose. The German 
government issued an edict that the ship was not to leave Bordeaux without the 
cargo and that the crew were not to be given shore leave. When this was finally 
settled word came through that the Nationalist government was disputing its 
responsibility for handling charges which again delayed the loading. The money 
arrived only after a considerable delay and whilst David Blickenstaff was prepared 
to suggest that it might have been a genuine mistake, Allen Hole, AFSC 
representative in the Paris Center and the handling agent for relief supplies for 
Spain, preferred to believe that the Nationalists were attempting to avoid spending 
any more foreign currency than they absolutely needed to, but acknowledged that 
"no one on this side knows more than a part of the story. ""' This incident pointed 
Ibid. 
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to a need for greater centralisation. Allen Hole felt that a full-time administrator 
was needed in France, whatever was done in Spain, and suggested for this purpose 
an office in the Paris Center, "a first-rate secretary", equal authority with 
Philadelphia and London and immediate control over a sizeable amount of money. 
He should also be able to act as a central clearing house for information from all 
three countries, Spain, America and England 59 In November the Committee on 
Spain decided to appoint a businessman, rather than an experienced relief worker 
or missionary, to head up the work in Spain, partially in the hope that it would 
improve communications with the Nationalist authorities 60 Summarising the 
situation in late 1938, Hole wrote, "Nationalist officials never know anything or 
else it is always somebody else's responsibility... it would be a great advantage to 
know what the respective governments agreed in writing. i61 This last point was 
particularly applicable to the Nationalists who continued to insist to David 
Blickenstaff that they were not responsible for the payment of port and loading 
bills at Bordeaux as previously agreed. 2 In the meantime, however, Paul Bowman, 
another young man and member of the Brethren, was sent out to assist David 
Blickenstaff 63 David Blickenstaff, despite his desire to begin graduate work, had 
been encouraged to stay on and promises were made that the AFSC would 
endeavour to support him when he eventually began his studies. 
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4.3 The AFSC Field-Workers in the Nationalist Zone 
As is evident from the rapid change of names in the previous sections, the AFSC 
experienced difficulties maintaining any continuity of workers in Nationalist Spain. 
Very few of the workers in the Nationalist zone were actually Quakers and, 
although keen to participate in the mission, had commitments elsewhere to Church 
and family to which they often became anxious to return. After Wilfred Jones (a 
Quaker) departed, he was replaced in June 1937 by Earl Smith (a Methodist 
missionary from Paraguay) and Dan West (of the Church of the Brethren); David 
Blickenstaff (a young member also of the Church of the Brethren) joined them in 
October 1937. However, none of these men intended an extended stay. That both 
West and Smith left their wives at home seems indicative of this intention, but it 
may also be a difference in the attitude of the Churches; of the married relief 
workers, all the Quakers worked as couples but all the non-Quakers left their wives 
behind. 
In January 1938 Earl Smith began to think of returning home to see his 
family, and to return to his mission in South America. As Dan West travelled home 
on 5 January to conduct a speaking tour to raise funds for the relief effort, this 
jeopardised the continuity of the mission 64 David Blickenstaff, the only 
representative in the Nationalist zone to stay any length of time, was a man in his 
early twenties, and it was not felt suitable that he should stay alone despite the 
manifest competence of Alred and Norma Jacob, both in their late twenties. 
Consequently, pressure was brought to bear on Earl Smith to extend his stay until 
June 1938; however, Earl Smith had made clear from the beginning that he only 
intended to serve six months, and in mid-December he requested that a 
replacement be found so that he might leave in February. Smith was to return to 
his mission in Paraguay in June and wanted time to think, study and write 66 This 
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letter caused great anxiety in the Philadelphia office. The main problem was that 
Dan West did not speak Spanish, indicative of the surprisingly low status 
apparently given to language skills in the selection of relief workers 6' John Reich 
wrote concerned that Smith's resignation would be a "grave blow" to the work; as 
far as Reich could see, no alternative worker of equal calibre was available. If 
companionship were the issue, then the AFSC would be happy to arrange for Mrs. 
Smith to travel to Spain. "We feel it is exceedingly necessary to keep in the field a 
seasoned administrator who both knows the language and represents to the highest 
degree the spirit in which we seek to work. "' Dan West was also planning to 
return to the USA, desiring to spend more time with his family and to work 
directly with his church 69 Worries about potentially rapid political changes in 
Spain only made the AFSC's concern more urgent and with this in mind Clarence 
Pickett applied to the Methodist Episcopal Foreign Mission Board for Smith to 
remain in Spain until June of 1938. 
I know that we are asking a good deal of you to accede to our 
request. We only feel justified in making it because of the unusual 
contribution that Earl Smith is making. But since we are all 
attempting to bear a Christian testimony to a pagan world, we felt 
that it was at least right to state our concern to you... 7° 
Although Earl Smith was prepared, with his wife's approval, to extend his 
stay he made the interesting comment that "Dan [West] and I have thought that six 
months was a good term. Less was too little; more might also have some 
Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
67I am not sure whether David Blickenstaff spoke Spanish, but Alfred Jacob asserts that he was 
a young man, who left college in order to go to Spain. Personal correspondence, Alfred Jacob 
to Farah Mendlesohn, 11 December 1995. 
"John Reich to Earl Smith 14 December 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
69Dan West to John Reich 5 March 1938, Committee on Spain 1938, Correspondence, 
Individuals: Dan West (Box 7). 
"Clarence E. Pickett to Methodist Episcopal Foreign Mission Board, 23 December 1937, 
Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to). 
163 
disadvantages. "" clearly there exsisted a difference of opinion between the 
respective missions and missionaries as to the proper length of stay; with the 
exception of Charles Ewald, a very recent convert, none of the Quaker workers saw 
their mission as for anything other than the duration. Only Francesca Wilson, a 
non-Quaker with strong familial connections to the Friends and who was bound 
by her school vacations, had any notion of cutting short her service; for the others, 
the "natural" length of service was the period of need. In Barcelona, all the short- 
stay volunteers were non-Quakers. 
In the event, the Methodist Board of Missions refused to extend Smith's 
contract past June 1938, stating that his services in South America were such that 
they could not spare him longer, an occurance which suggests that the AFSC could 
not count on their allies' continued willingness to prioritise AFSC projects! ' Smith 
ended by writing: "Let me say in conclusion that I shall always count it as a 
privilege to have been permitted to work and have fellowship with the Quakers 
and the Church of the Brethren. " In particular he stressed that his departure was 
not due to a lack of interest in the work, but he felt strongly that his regular 
mission posting required his presence " The difficulty may have been the clash of 
different traditions: both the AFSC and the FSC assumed that they could call on 
those in mid-life to drop their worldly commitments to witness to their testimonies. 
Traditionally their relief workers had been in their forties and fifties, mature 
businessmen with time to spare. Young people were usually employed on domestic 
projects. The Methodists appeared to make no such assumptions and clearly 
expected the contribution of the established man to be sporadic and of short 
duration. Both the Mennonite (Murcia) and Brethren representatives were young, 
the type of individual who had time, but whom the Friends regarded as untested 
and immature, suitable for small summer projects but not large-scale relief efforts. 
As I have already discussed, the British Friends shared similar views but had a 
7'Earl Smith to John Reich, 15 January 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
72John Reich to Dan West 8 March 1938, Committee on Spain 1938, Correspondence, 
Individuals: Dan West (Box 7). 
73Earl Smith to John Reich, 9 April. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, Nationalist 
Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
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smaller pool from which to draw. 
Because he intended to leave in June 1938, Earl Smith was anxious that a 
suitable replacement be found as quickly as possible, but was also concerned that 
this be a well qualified candidate; once again, language skills were secondary to 
other qualifications. Smith declared, "personally, if you have to choose between 
that and the spiritual I would advise the latter". 74 Clyde E. Roberts (a California 
Quaker) was announced as the replacement for Earl Smith: "a mighty fine 
man-quiet, steady and with good judgement", and best of all, he expected to stay 
for at least a year, promising an end to the rapid turn over of workers! ' When he 
returned home, it was hoped that Earl Smith would go to meet the Brethren at their 
headquarters in Illinois in order to report back on the work. In the meantime, 
Roberts arrived in Bilbao at the end of May, and Earl Smith crossed the 
International Bridge into France at the beginning of June. 76 
Clyde Roberts was one of only three Quakers sent to the Nationalist unit. 
There is no documented evidence but it is possible that he was selected because of 
his west coast origins. As a California Quaker, he would most probably originate 
from a programmed meeting, indistinguishable from other mainstream American 
Protestants, his politics would tend to be more conservative than those of East 
Coast Friends and hence he was potentially more amenable to both the Burgos unit 
and the political context in which he found himself than would have been the 
Quaker workers in the Republic, none of whom came from further west than 
Chicago, and all of whom seem to have had liberal leanings? It is hard to ignore 
""We need people with experience and some knowledge of the language. New workers are 
almost a liability for the first six months, especially on the Nationalist side, which has been so 
irritated by the frequent coming and going of short term people. Since Ewald can only remain 
four months, we are all the more anxious for David to remain, if he will": ibid. John Reich to 
Dan West, 20 June 1938, Box 7: Committee on Spain 1938, Correspondence, Individuals: Dan 
West. 
75 Earl Smith and David Blickenstaff to John Reich, 9 May 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
76Earl Smith to John Reich, 2 June 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, Nationalist 
Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
"See Hamm, The Transformation ofAmerican Quakerism, op. cit., for discussion of the regional 
distribution of different Quaker practice. 
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the fact that until the end of the war and the appointment of Howard Kershner as 
overall director of the joint mission, only three Quakers, Clyde Roberts, Wilfred 
Jones and Charles Ewald were sent to the Nationalist zone. As there is no 
documented discussion on the matter one can only speculate, but the tendency of 
Friends from East Coast unprogrammed Meetings (those most likely to volunteer) 
towards political liberalism may have prompted a preference for politically 
conservative mid-western candidates from allied churches. 
The need to replace Esther Farquhar in Murcia led to some redeployment 
and at the end of June 1938, Charles Ewald, of Chicago joined the Burgos unit, his 
offer of only four months accepted almost cetainly because of his fluent Spanish, 
administrative experience and the chance for a Quaker presence in the Burgos 
unit? ' Just before leaving for Spain Ewald, already an attender, had joined the 57th 
Street Meeting in Chicago, Illinois, the meeting of which Sylvester and Wilfred 
Jones were members. John Reich noted: "we feel his action will greatly strengthen 
him in his work. r79 Clyde Roberts went into France and thence to Murcia whilst 
David Blickenstaff was offered his choice of either returning to the USA after a 
year, or continuing, his fluent Spanish and mounting experience increasing his 
value to the AFSC 80 Conscious of the difficulty of securing replacements the AFSC 
endeavoured to persuade Ewald to stay longer: "We need a man who can travel 
freely in Europe and on both sides of the battle lines in Spain. He should have the 
experience and judgment of a man like Charles. "81 A letter from Mrs Agnes Ewald 
indicates that Charles had been active in some strenuous duty some time before the 
work in Spain and she felt strongly that he deserved a rest BZ Victor, Charles 
78John Reich to Dan West, 3 August 1938, Box 7, Committee on Spain 1938, Correspondence, 
Individuals: Dan West. 
79John Reich to 57th Street Meeting, Chicago, IL., 5 July 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: 
Personnel, Individuals, Charles Ewald (Box 9). 
80John Reich to David Blickenstaff, 28 June 1938; David Blickenstaff to John Reich, 29 June 1938. 
Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
'John Reich to Mrs. Charles J. Ewald, 28 September 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Personnel, 
Individuals, Charles Ewald (Box 9). 
"Mrs. Agnes Ewald to John Reich, 2 October 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Personnel, 
Individuals, Charles Ewald (Box 9). 
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Ewald's son, was also asked but felt unable to go to Spain ' Clearly, Victor 
Ewald's refusal of this post precipitated the decision to bring in Howard Kershner, 
but in the meantime David Blickenstaff was to operate alone. Having decided to 
stay, by late 1938 David Blickenstaff had picked up a great deal of seniority, and 
in recommending a replacement for himself, Ewald suggested that they no longer 
try to find a mature man with the expertise to take over control, but instead look 
for a younger person who could work as junior associate with Blickenstaff, who 
had by this time established working relationships with a number of officials. 
Charles Ewald's report on the intrinsic stress of the post emphasised that the 
amount of travel required in this predominantly rural area argued for a young and 
vigorous representative. A robust middle-aged man, Charles Ewald noted "I have 
climbed more steps since I reached Spain than in any 10 years of my life". Relief 
work in Nationalist Spain was clearly a job for the young " 
Ironically, by September the AFSC was beginning to worry about the effecct 
of overlong assignments on both health (see Chapter Three on Esther Farquhar) 
and on the political susceptibilities of the field workers. A letter from the AFSC's 
Geneva representative suggested that David Blickenstaff was both lonely and 
beginning to be influenced by Francoist propaganda. No further evidence was 
supplied to support this suggestion-a letter earlier in the year, posted whilst 
Blickenstaff was in France began "What a great feeling it is to be in a free country 
again! "- , but Dan West 
began to argue for bringing David Blickenstaff home for 
his own good 86 Reluctantly, John Reich agreed to consider it, but as it soon 
emerged that David Blickenstaff actively did not want to return, and as there was 
no queue of workers wanting to go to Spain, the matter was dropped. With Charles 
Ewald returning and the unavailability of any other Spanish speaker, David 
'John Reich to Mrs. Charles J. Ewald, 14 October 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Personnel, 
Individuals, Charles Ewald (Box 9). 
"Charles Ewald to John Reich, 19 August 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
'David Blickenstaff to John Reich, no postal date, received 4 March 1938. Committee on Spain 
1938: Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
"Dan West to John Reich 20 September 1938, Committee on Spain 1938, Correspondence, 
Individuals: Dan West (Box 7). 
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Blickenstaff was simply too much needed, despite the later posting of Paul 
Bowman (also of the Church of the Brethren). The problem was that without the 
provision of a new truck, a third member of the team could not increase the amount 
of work carried out, despite the influx of International Commission and American 
supplies, and there was a commitment to send no more workers than were 
neccessary g' Reich remained concerned, however, that a "mature" man be found 
to supplement this otherwise unusually young team! ' 
4.4 An Alternative Witness 
Although the AFSC was extremely active in Nationalist Spain, whilst the war was 
being fought there were only ever three Quakers in the Nationalist zone. Instead, 
Quaker relief in the Nationalist zone, was conducted almost entirely by members 
of the Church of the Brethren (Dunkerds) and Methodists. The Brethren were a 
traditional ally of the Friends and with the Mennonites had already cooperated on 
matters of relief work and to secure conscientious objection on religious grounds 
in the First World War. As already discussed, it is not clear from the documents 
whether the absence of permanent Quaker workers in Nationalist Spain was a 
deliberate policy (the short appointments of Roberts and Ewald suggest not), but 
it did alter the nature of the AFSC witness as practised in the field. 
None of the workers in Spain manifested publicly the type of witness that 
emerges so strongly from the letters of Alfred Jacob or Emily Parker. In part this is 
simply due to the short duration most of them served. It is unfortunate that David 
Blickenstaff, the most long serving member of the team, was its most junior 
member until late 1938 and therefore took little part in the official correspondence 
-we rarely hear his voice in the letters. His span as senior member lasted only a 
few months until the appointment of Howard Kershner as Director of the entire 
mission in December 1938, but despite this he was often described in glowing terms 
'David Blickenstaff to John Reich, 24 August 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain, Workers from/ to (Box 8). 
88John Reich to Dan West, 22 September and 10 October 1938, Committee on Spain 1938, 
Correspondence, Individuals: Dan West (Box 7). 
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as an "excellent representative of the AFSC" 89 Earl Smith was a Methodist minister 
who had been director of a settlement house in Montevideo, under the Board of 
Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, for a long time. His time in 
Spain was a period which ordinarily was granted for sabbatical leave to give the 
missionaries a chance for study and recuperation; " helpfully, he was also a 
pacifist 91 Dan West was a member of the Oakland Church of the Brethren but his 
peace-time occupation is not mentioned in any of the correspondence. Neither man 
spent a great deal of time discussing his motives, but occasionally their approach 
to the work emerges. 
Like Alfred Jacob, the field workers in the Nationalist zone were keen to 
involve local workers when they began to open International Commission canteens 
in October 1938. 
This first demonstration showed the local folks that children can be 
cared for. And within a week they had put into operation in the 
same building another comedore for one hundred and forty other 
needy youngsters from the same locality. And they followed Mlle. 
Müller's plan, even down to the arrangment of the tables.. .. show the 
local leaders how it can be done. They will take courage and do 
more themselves. After a while they will carry the whole burden 
themselves 92 
However, whereas the Friends in both Barcelona and Murcia made close 
friendships among their Spanish colleages, it is noticeable that there were far fewer 
personal contacts between workers and Spaniards in the Nationalist zone. There 
are few discussions of specific individuals in the letters and the impression given 
is that those who worked in the Nationalist zone had a difficult time both with the 
89Earl Smith to John Reich, 31 March 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
90John Reich to Earl Smith, 15 June 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938. Individuals, Earl Smith (Box 
9). 
"Esther Farquhar to AFSC, 2 February 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, Esther Farquhar (Box 8). 
92 "The New Comedors at Los Corrales", by Dan West, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers (from and to) (Box 8). 
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authorities who resented their presence and were reluctant to admit need, and with 
individuals who were cautious about becoming friendly with Protestants. In letters 
written from Paris, workers on leave were cautiously condemnatory of the situation 
in the Nationalist zone with its rejection of conciliation, but there was little 
evidence of actual sympathy with the Republic. 
The disorganisation that the Burgos unit frequently found in the Nationalist 
zone did little to endear the Spanish to their hearts. Already mentioned are goods 
left on the docks for lack of financial authorisation, but in addition West and Smith 
found that the general attitude left room for pilfering; they were alarmed to recieve 
complaints from the Red Cross that much of the sixteen bales of clothing delivered 
to Bilbao were worn out and unusable 93 An inventory taken at the Bilbao hospital 
suggested fewer poor quality goods than had been intimated, but as Dan West 
pointed out, the shoe pile appeared to have diminished during the time he took a 
break. He observed: "I had a feeling that this counting business was not the most 
desired activity. ""' This was not intended to cast moral opprobrium upon the 
workers in the hospital: most, if not all would have been in need of some material 
aid and Earl Smith was anxious to stress what hospitality and generosity they did 
meet. 
... everywhere we 
find good people, among the rich and 
powerful as well as among the poor. Some are making great 
sacrifices, and the experience is doing them good. Some have caught 
an ideal and they feel it worth living for. (Many are offering their 
lives for God and Country. ) Some work long hours without pay that 
human needs may be met. Most are very courteous and kind. And 
now and again we find an all-including loving heart, a veritable 
spiritual treasure 95 
Alternatively, as John Reich suggested, various cargoes had been confused and this 
93Earl Smith and Dan West to John Reich, 24 September1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
"Dan West to John Reich, 27 October 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
"Earl Smith to John Reich, no date (received 13 December 1937), Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
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was not in fact the AFSC shipment; of sixteen bales of clothing sent from 
Philadelphia only 627 pounds was second-hand. The solution was to have the 
inventories taken in the USA forwarded to the relief workers rather than asking 
them to take it on trust, and to distribute the clothing themselves. This was 
important also because with only the reluctant cooperation of Auxilio Social it was 
too easy for goods to slip through unsupervised 96 However, for both West and 
Smith need had to be understood as mutual. In an appeal for more assistance from 
North and South America, they argued, "we of North and South America also 
need: we need this attitude and experience of of general brotherliness, which 
partakes neither of partisanship nor of selfish aloofness. "' In this model of charity, 
the need of the donor to give was vital and might make up for any deficiencies in 
impact, "A great wave of loving kindness on American's part will not win or lose 
the war for one side nor the other, but it may save some child from pneumonia and 
it will surely mitigate the winter sufferings of a war inflicted good people. i98 
However, in writing of the type of work which they were facilitating in their 
"statement of policy", Dan West was clear that neutrality and charity were not 
sufficient: "All we do must fit with our way of life. "99 In this vein, the members of 
the Burgos unit appear to have been more willing to express their faith on paper 
than were their opposite numbers in the Republic. For Earl Smith, prayer was as 
much a part of his work as was the relief effort: 
Their need is not exclusively physical. Frequently we catch a 
glimpse, a hint, a strain of spiritual need so great that we are 
depressed ourselves and must return to prayer in order to live fully 
and perhaps to help 100 
96Ibid. 
97Earl Smith and Dan West to John Reich, 2 October 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
"Ibid. 
99Dan West to John Reich, 21 November 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
"'Earl Smith to John Reich, no date (received 13 December 1937), Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain (from and to) (Box 8). 
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The religious context in which the Burgos workers operated almost certainly 
enhanced their awareness of their own religious faith. Surrounded by a hostile 
Catholic population, who looked on them with as much suspicion as welcome, it 
is unsurprising that the workers were self-conscious about their faith, and there is 
evidence also of a deep rooted anti-Catholicism, similar to that of the Friends in 
Murcia and Barcelona, and dressed in the garments of rationalism. Dan West 
attended a Catholic mass and was touched by the "simple faith" of the 
worshippers, but viewed the ritual as exotic, alien and ultimately exploitative. Earl 
Smith wrote: 
The lights, the incense, the robes, the forms, the dressing, the ornate 
fixtures, the sober faces, the images, the pictures of important 
religious events, of battleships, the tables and statues-certainly do 
something. Dave is reminded of similar things in India. .. The 
money and labor and perhaps hope, put into visible form mught be 
justified if the priests who came through their training had been 
really helpful to the problems of people... I can understand the fury 
of those who want to be rid of it "' 
It is not clear that these feelings made of West a Republican sympathiser. He noted 
warmly a meeting with a Miss Catherine Fitzgibbon on his return to the USA, she 
"is an ardent Catholic, but anxious to stop the fighting. She thinks there is not much 
difference between Communism and Fascism, " a comment which indicated that 
not all American Catholics were pro-Franco, in part, perhaps, because the 
American Catholic Church had already defined for itself a new relationship 
between Church and State which had little place for the European hierarchy "' 
Perhaps the greatest difference manifested by the Burgos team was their 
attitude to the poverty they met. Although all the participants shared a witness to 
peace, there are differences in the nature of their testimonies. The Friends also held 
a testimony to social justice which frequently involved the Friends in domestic 
"'Earl Smith to AFSC (from Newville, PA. ), 18 February 1938, Committee on Spain, 1938. 
Individuals, Dan West (Box 9). 
... Dan West to John Reich 5 March 1938, Box 7: Committee on Spain 1938, Correspondence, 
Individuals: Dan West. 
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politics. The Dunkerds were firmly rural, far less involved in domestic politics and 
were more conservative than their Quaker allies whilst the Methodists were 
politically very varied, depending in part on regional origin. The AFSC unit in 
Burgos concerned itself with distinguishing "natural" poverty-which either could 
not be helped or was caused by inefficiency and poor working habits-from the 
poverty caused directly by war. Unlike either the Murcia or Barcelona Friends, the 
workers in the Nationalist zone felt disturbed when their aid went to areas 
suffering from long-term poverty rather than the effects of war. Earl Smith and 
David Blickenstaff reported a relief delivery to Loredo: "We were told of great need 
there, and it is true that there are many needy families. But the need is due almost 
entirely to seasonal employment and bad management. We saw no destruction in 
the town. "103 No such qualms appear to have been felt by the Friends. The Quaker 
Clyde Roberts, who served first in the Nationalist zone and was then stationed in 
Murcia suggested that to "discriminate between the town's people and refugees is 
almost inhuman and raises local difficulties. i104 But it is not evident that the unit 
in Nationalist Spain found any difficulty in making such decisions. Unlike the units 
in Murcia and Barcelona, the Burgos unit did not connect deprivation in war-time 
with peace-time poverty, and preferred to attempt to establish what was suffering 
due specifically to war. Returning from a trip through Asturias, Smith and 
Blickenstaff assessed it as the neediest province, with a need directly due to war: 
"as the natural resources of the province seem to be abundant, ... economically the 
district will doubtless get on its feet again. "los However, despite this tendency to 
make moral judgements there remained a general desire to spread the gifts as far 
as possible. 
"'Earl Smith to John Reich, second letter, 15 January 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers from/to (Box 8). 
"Clyde E. Roberts to John Reich, 27 August 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
"'Earl Smith and David Blickenstaff to John Reich, 22 January 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: 
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Chapter Five: 
The Last Year of the War 
In the last year of the war conditions in the Republic deteriorated rapidly. There 
were increasing food shortages in Republican territories, and in Barcelona the unit 
was seeing children too undernourished to attend school. Every town and village 
was crowded with refugees for whom there was little extra food and a shortage of 
bedding, clothing and medical supplies. Transport problems were increasing: Elise 
Thomsen, in Barcelona, found it difficult to get permission to use the Citroen, and 
petrol was scarce. ' In Nationalist territories, deprivation was growing in the 
northern villages, particularly in the mining areas of Asturias. Combined Quaker 
relief in Republican Spain was now well over $6,000 monthly, supplemented by 
gifts in kind. AFSC workers in the Nationalist zones were spending $1,500 monthly 
with gifts in kind approximating as much as $2,000 per month. 
In Britain, Edith Pye reported that there were still 2,800 Basque children in 
the country who needed financial support. The National Joint Committee, 
experiencing the same shortage of funds as other organisations, reported that only 
one month's money remained for this purpose? Many of these children were either 
orphans, or their parents were already refugees. By February, the Basque 
Children's Committee, the main organisation responsible for their welfare, had 
decided to return another one thousand children to Spain. Edith Pye made it clear 
to the Spain Committee that she did not think this to be in the best interests of the 
children, but the problem was aggravated by Home Office insistence that the 
children should not be placed in private homes but kept in colonies 4 And yet, with 
the diminishing availability of funds, the Salvation Army and a number of Catholic 
1FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 12 January 1938. 
2AFSC: Minutes, General Meeting, 28 January 1938. 
3FSC; Minutes of the Spain Committee, 25 January 1938. 
'Ten shillings per child per week had to be guaranteed by the Basque Children's Committee 
and all children had to be housed and educated in private institutions rather than British 
homes: Dorothy Legaretta, The Guernica Generation: Basque Refugee Children of the Spanish 
Civil War, University of Nevada Press, Reno, Nevada, 1984, p. 102. 
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groups had been forced to return the children for whom they were responsible to 
the already financially strained main colonies 5 It was decided to try and discover 
what had happened to those children who had been returned, but in the end it was 
the AFSC rather than the FSC which agreed to help repatriate these children. ' 
The emergence of the International Commission on Child Spanish Refugees, 
a Quaker-initiated project, at the beginning of 1938 provided strong political and 
financial reinforcement for the relief workers. A charitable body made up of 
prestigious international names and under the leadership of Judge Hansson of 
Switzerland, its sole purpose was to persuade governments to donate either money 
or surplus food to the impartial relief of Spanish children. As more refugees found 
themselves absorbed by the Nationalist advance, this impartiality became easier to 
demonstrate. Edith Pye, T. Edmund Harvey and Hilda Clark, all British Friends, 
were serving on this Commission, 7 and in April a telegram from Judge Hansson 
instructed the Barcelona Unit to go ahead and feed 5,000 children from existing 
stores. Needs and prices for more stock was to be wired through to the 
International Commission in Geneva .8 
Initially the International Commission's appeal was directed to thirteen 
governments. In January 1938, Edith Pye, the FSC representative on the 
Commission, reported that the British Government had promised £25,000 on 
condition that the target sum of £147,000 could be raised first from other 
governments (such tied giving was to characterise the British government's 
approach). ' Meanwhile, Clarence Pickett of the AFSC was in negotiation with the 
American government for surplus wheat for the International Commission, whilst 
the International Commission was able to report in February that Denmark and 
Norway had promised 20,000 crowns, as had Norway, and an equivalent sum had 
5FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 16 February 1938. 
'FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 10 March 1938; AFSC: Minutes, Committee on Spain, 
22 April 1938. 
'AFSC: General Meeting. 27 May 1938. 
'Dorothy Thompson to Friends House, 22 April 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, London-Spain (Box 7). 
'FSC: Minutes of Spain Committee, 12 January 1938. 
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been promised by New Zealand. Ireland, Australia, Finland, Belgium and 
Switzerland had all expressed an interest. 10 Despite rapid fund-raising, however, 
physical manifestations of International Commission Relief were slow to develop. 
By the middle of March £37,000 had been promised from eight governments and 
the International Commission was trying to get the British government to 
withdraw their conditions. 11 Edith Pye felt that if the money did indeed materialise, 
it should be possible to feed 60,000 children in the whole of Spain for at least one 
hundred days, necessitating more workers on both sides. International Commission 
estimates in March suggested that at least 250,000 children were suffering from 
under-nourishment 12 
In Barcelona, FSC canteens were feeding 300 city dwellers and 6,000 refugee 
children. Alfred Jacob was clear in his sense of the escalation of need: "The former 
problem was under-nourishment: now it is one of keeping the children alive. "13 In 
response the AFSC donated another $3,000; however, the AFSC saw signs that its 
capacity to raise funds might be coming to an end. John Reich reported: "It is 
difficult to raise money in America for Spain, as it is complicated with the appeal 
for relief in China, which touches the USA more closely. ""' Isolationism was also 
a powerful factor: the American Red Cross had withdrawn from attempts to raise 
funds directly from the public, having met resistance to their fund-raising attempts 
for both China and Spain. They preferred instead to designate the AFSC as their 
representatives in Spain, and engaged in negotiations on their behalf with the 
American government for surplus wheat is 
Through March 1938 the Nationalists advanced eastwards, and on 16 March 
Barcelona was bombed for the first time. The relief workers faced disruption of 
10AFSC: Minutes, Committee on Spain, Executive, 11 February 1938; FSC: Minutes of the Spain 
Committee, 16 February 1938, "Confidential Meeting on the International Commission". 
11FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 19 March 1938. 
12FSC: Minutes of the Spain (Executive) Committee, 9 March 1938. 
13FSC: Minutes of the Committee on Spain, 10 March 1938. 
"Ibid. 
13AFSC: Committee on Spain, Executive, 11 February 1938. See also, Foster Rhea Dulles, The 
American Red Cross: A History, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1950, pp. 342-345. 
176 
relief supplies and a new exodus of refugees into the Southeastern provinces of 
Alicante, Murcia and Almeria, where Esther Farquhar, Emily Parker, Francesca 
Wilson and the Mennonite representative Levi Hartzler were maintaining two 
hospitals, two feeding stations for babies and thirteen workshops for refugee boys 
and girls 16 Although relief in Nationalist Spain was proceeding smoothly under the 
AFSC representatives Earl Smith and David Blickenstaff, there were serious 
discussions in progress as to whether FSC workers would be allowed to continue 
relief under a Nationalist government. With the advice of Mr. Pollock at the 
Foreign Office the FSC decided to send a representative to talk to Nationalist 
officials in Burgos. 7 Alarmed by the deteriorating political conditions and 
uncertain over the future of Spanish relief, the Board of Directors of the AFSC sent 
a cable authorising AFSC relief workers to leave Spain as and when they felt 
necessary. The FSC, with similar worries, decided to issue certification to all their 
Spanish employees in the hope that this would offer some protection in the case of 
political recriminations18 
At the end of April the International Commission was able to announce that 
with the help of twelve governments it was able to release $22,000. Under pressure, 
the British government had withdrawn its £25,000 conditional offer and had 
allocated £10,000 to be used as soon as £10,000 from other sources was made 
available, a sum which was raised rapidly 19 The International Commission was not 
a relief agency as such, so the money was largely distributed through the channels 
of existing relief organisations, including the SCIU, the Red Cross and inevitably 
the Quakers; Friends on both sides of the Atlantic had endorsed the principle of 
"unity in the work as impartial relief in both Loyalist and Nationalist Spain", which 
assisted the neutral image of the Commission 2° Gilbert MacMaster, the AFSC 
"AFSC: Minutes, General Meeting, 22 April 1938. 
17FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 28 April 1938. 
18AFSC: Minutes, Board of Directors, 16 April 1938. FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 5 
April 1938. 
19FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 28 April 1938. 
20AFSC: Minutes, General Meeting, 27 May 1938; Minutes, Committee on Spain, 22 April 1938. 
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representative in the Paris Center, was asked to represent the FSC 
in so far as 
contact with the Nationalists officials was concerned 
21 With permission to spend 
£4,200, Friends drew on current stocks to begin the immediate feeding of 2,000 
children in Nationalist Spain and 5,000 children in Republican Spain. The rules of 
cooperation had yet to be worked out, but the International Commission's role 
appears to have been largely supervisory? ' 
5.1 New Workers, New Personalities: the leadership of Clyde Roberts 
With the anticipated arrival of International Commission finance it was possible for 
the AFSC to contemplate expansion. Charles Ewald, a former YMCA worker, was 
to be sent to the Nationalist zone, and major expansion wasplanned for Republican 
South-East Spain: the new workers were Martha Rupel, a member of the Brethren 
and a trained nurse; Florence Conard, a Young Friend, a Spanish speaker and a 
graduate of Oberlin and Wellesley, and the daughter of Philip Conard, YMCA 
representative in Uruguay; and Alfred and Ruth Cope, for three years in charge of 
the AFSC regional offices in Chicago and Directors of the Mid-West Institute of 
International Relations (but for all that approximately the same age as the Jacobs). ' 
Alfred Cope's chief duties were book keeping, stock-taking and learning Spanish. 
His report that many of the records contained "missing links in the chain" may 
help to explain why a worker not directly engaged in relief was sent out, something 
that was not normal practice? ' Esther Farquhar's poor handling of the accounts, 
which by her own testimony were rarely straight ("I am not a good 
administrator-I haven't the capacity to handle details and keep reports")' and 
Levi Hartzler's similar lack of competence in this area, almost certainly contributed 
Z'AFSC: Minutes, Committee on Spain, 22 April, 1938. 
22FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 29 April 1938 and 2 June 1938. 
'AFSC: Minutes, Committee on Spain, 17 June 1938; John Reich to Emily Parker, 20 June 1938, 
Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
24Alfred Cope to Dorothy Thompson, 27 August 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 26 May 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, Esther Farquhar (Box 8). 
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to Cope's selection 26 Martha Rupel, it was hoped, would act as a visiting nurse, 
training assistants in the process .7 In August the 
FSC also despatched a Dr. Audrey 
Russell to Barcelona as a medical advisor, who would serve as a representative of 
the International Commission. Plans to send Kenneth Douglas, a Friend of long 
standing, to Nationalist Spain in response to AFSC requests for a British worker 
were frustrated by the inability to secure visas for Nationalist-controlled territory? ' 
Clyde Roberts took over as the head of the Murcia unit in August 1938 and 
drastic reorganisation took place, both of the work and of the modes of reporting. 
From now on, all members of the unit were able to write freely to Philadelphia, but 
all director's reports had to be countersigned by another member of the unit, 
presumably to ensure openness and consensus. All letters were to be written in 
duplicate and copies filed for future reference and made accessible to all members 
of the unit upon request to the field director? ' Reports became much more detailed 
and standardised in style. This greater organisation may have resulted simply from 
Roberts' own background in business, but with the end of the war approaching, a 
concern for discretion may also have been a major issue-anything relating to relief 
work had to be checked and countersigned by Roberts. In terms of individual 
involvement, whilst the unit obviously continued to work together on many 
projects, Roberts decided that "Each staff member should expect to have some part 
of the work that can be considered as their very own for which they shall receive 
credit or blame" following the model of practice adopted in Barcelona after the 
departure of the SCIU 30 This created the freedom which the Mennonite workers 
had been pushing for, and ostensibly provided recognition for the more junior 
workers. However, there is some evidence in the correspondence that Roberts' 
"Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 6 May 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, Esther Farquhar (Box 8). 
'Clyde E. Roberts to John Reich, 27 August 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
ZBFSC: Minutes of the Spain (Executive) Committee, 15 August 1938; Minutes of the Spain 
Committee, 20 October 1938. 
" "Tentative Plan for Coordination of Work of AFSC Spanish Relief", Clyde E. Roberts, 25 
August 1938. Committee on Spain: Reports, Murcia (Box 9). 
-'Ibid. 
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approach rebounded. Murcia appears to be the only unit to have held formal 
meetings and to have attempted to maintain a Quakerly method-at one such 
meeting (18 March 1939) an epistle from Meeting for Sufferings was read. This was 
probably because they were the only unit with a high proportion of Quakers, but 
it also appears to have been an innovation of Clyde Roberts. Although on the 
surface Roberts' approach would seem to provide valuable room for the 
distribution of praise and credit, in practice his ethos appears less positive. In his 
semi-annual report, for example, he wrote of the organisation: 
... we need humbly to confess our inadequacy and correct as far as 
possible our mistakes. We need to consult each other more but 
cannot stop too much to talk when people around us are suffering 
as they are; neither can we afford to be arbitrary nor act upon snap 
judgement. We need positive and prompt action in the face of these 
emergencies, yet we must take some time for deliberation and 
reflection. We need modestly to confess that our work is relatively 
small as compared to the need: its importance depends greatly upon 
the spirit that we bring to it 3' 
Whilst the sense of the comments appears sensible, the style suggests that no-one 
could escape criticism. Furthermore, the tone was reminiscent of a revival meeting 
with an emphasis on confession, an approach alien to the Friends from 
unprogrammed meetings who made up the core of the Murcia unit. Reinforcing 
this interpretation is an indication of a possible generation clash: "I felt that the 
younger members of the staff were apt to be over confident in their judgements and 
sometimes warned them accordingly. "32 Despite Robert's opinion that differences 
of opinion stemmed from the diverse backgrounds of the staff, Murcia was the 
most homogenous of the units-only Martha Rupel was not a Friend, Rather, 
what seems to have been lacking was the joyful inspiration which both Alfred Jacob 
"Semi-Annual Report of C. E. Roberts, 18 January 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Reports, 
Murcia (Box 13). 
"Personal Report of Clyde E. Roberts' AFSC Service in Spain. Committee on Spain 1940, 
Reports (Box 19). 
33 Ibid. 
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and Esther Farquhar exuded. Ruth Cope displayed this approach far better than 
Clyde Roberts, revelling in both the faults and the virtues of the staff, "both for the 
pure pleasure it gives, and because it has a rather beneficial effect on the whole. ' 
Neither the Copes nor Florence Conard appear to have been very comfortable 
working with Clyde Roberts and when Howard Kershner took over the directorate 
of the whole mission he despatched Roberts as representative to Almeria, where 
a mature worker was required who could be trusted to work independently from 
the main units. To give Kershner credit (as he will be coming in for severe criticism 
later), he handled this with tact and diplomacy, requesting the Murcia unit to 
choose a person from their number to work independently in Almeria. When Clyde 
Roberts was, inevitably, selected, he replaced him in Murcia with Emmet Gulley, 
in whom he had at this time a great deal of confidence ' This proved rather more 
satisfactory to the unit which had no further organisational difficulties in the 
remaining year of its service. Clearly, the choice of suitable leadership was crucial. 
5.2 Relief Work 
By August 1938, the Murcia unit had a large number of projects underway: three 
hospitals, two in Murcia and one in Alicante (the Almeria one had closed); milk 
canteens for babies in Lorca and Almeria; lunches in Murcia for refugees; the 
warehouse for food and clothing; breakfasts for school children and old people; 
food for transient refugees; and a dining room in Almeria for local children. 
Smaller projects included the good will suitcases still coming from American 
children's organisations, the workshop in Murcia and the schools and evening 
classes' Florence Conard, as one of the fluent Spanish speakers, went to Almeria 
to supervise the establishment of the first International Commission Canteen there. 
It was to start with a capacity of 400. Another canteen was already functioning in 
"Ruth Cope, Minutes of the American Friends Service Committee, Murcia, March 25,1939. 
Committee on Spain 1939, Minutes, Murcia (Box 13). 
35As Howard Kershner later attempted to cast doubt on Gulley's probity this is an important 
point of which to be aware. Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 16 January 1939. Committee on 
Spain. Coms. and Orgs.: Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in 
Spain-Correspondence, from/ to Howard Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
"'Projects by Classification", 25 August 1938. Committee on Spain: Reports, Murcia (Box 9). 
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Crevellente (Alicante province), with a capacity of 500 children. However, the 
increasing supplies meant that the cars were more inadequate than ever and the 
need for trucks more urgent? ' One consequence of this was a decision to limit 
orders to staples: any variety in purchasing would reduce the economy of bulk 
buying? ' Jacob wrote from Barcelona, where the situation was worse: "The 
hopelessness of the search for food affects everybody. Nothing is available in the 
shops, not even the omelette powders, soup cubes, and sugar beets there used to 
be". " This affected the local population and the refugees equally, heralding a 
profound shift in the Friends' feeding policies which would, very soon, cease to use 
status as any indication of need. Clyde Roberts wrote, 
We are finding it more and more difficult to confine our help to the 
children. Old people make a pitiful appeal and come to us daily. 
Nursing mothers have had some attention from the beginning of our 
work and it appears now that work for pregnant mothers is just as 
important. For example our work with babies reveals that their 
troubles began with prenatal undernourishment-To discriminate 
between town's people and refugees is almost inhuman and raises 
local difficulties so that we have begun with the smallest children 
and raised the age of admittance until the quota was filled... We are 
forced to say that if a child is more than five years old we can give 
no help which is also inhuman 40 
Most refugees were receiving only one, rationed, meal a day, consisting of 
chickpeas or greens, and one pound of bread a week, with daily porridge for the 
children. Prior to the intervention of the International Commission the Barcelona 
unit struggled to meet the goal of a cooked breakfast for every child who needed 
"Clyde E. Roberts to John Reich, 3 August 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
'Ibid. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 26 April 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Barcelona (Jacob) (Box 7). 
40Clyde E. Roberts to John Reich, 27 August 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
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one. Vic and Granollers were both served by Friends' canteens, each providing 
breakfast for between 500 and 800 children. The Swiss, as their contribution, 
supplied stewed fruit for the breakfasts, when it could be obtained. In Manresa, 150 
children were fed in a canteen run by a local committee and supplied by the 
Friends. Although regular visits were made to monitor progress and the honesty 
of distribution, the principle of depending primarily on local labour remained 
typical and assisted the Friends both in shaping the culture of their relief, and in 
accommodating some of the agendas of the local population. Thus in Puigreig, 
We saw a little man arguing with some of the children and asked 
what it was about. It was the schoolmaster rating them because they 
wouldn't come to school in the rain, but turned up promptly for the 
afternoon cocoa. We arranged with him that only those children who 
attended school were to have the food.. 91 
Even for the relief workers, concerned to maintain enough energy to do their work, 
available supplies were very tight. Dorothy Thompson, of the FSC, writing to John 
Reich from Barcelona, reported that there was no meat, except for canned beef, no 
butter, cheese, eggs, bacon, tea or coffee except in very small quantities, and very 
little bread. Beans formed the staple diet, supplemented with dried cod from 
Denmark. Thomson described a typical day's fare for the workers. 
Breakfast-porridge and Cadbury cocoa and milk powder. They 
send out 16 cwt. per month to us and... you are now sending raisin 
blocks about five cwts. each in addition. Grand friends. This meal is 
about 730 or 8 a. m. Lunch is at 2 p. m. and consists of a plate of soup, 
a plate of beans and a plate of lettuce and sometimes corned meat or 
something that looks like a fried potato but is not. On Sunday for a 
treat we had dried cod and potato. Supper at 9 or 9.30-they dine 
late in Spain-is a similar meal. Dessert oranges or nuts. But the 
former are very poor 42 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 26 April 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Barcelona (Jacob) (Box 7). 
42Dorothy Thompson to John Reich, 25 April 1938, Committee on Spain, 1938: 
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News came through in April that the International Commission was to go ahead. 
Dorothy Thompson wrote to John Reich listing the extent of the British Friends' 
commitments. The figures, listed in Appendix D, are interesting in that it is perhaps 
the first time that we have a clear picture of the British Friends' relief 
responsibilities. By 1938, although the FSC was the centre of the Quaker 
distribution network in Barcelona, the unit was acting as a clearing house and 
management structure for relief: much of the money and resources actually came 
from AFSC, the International Commission and other, smaller, agencies. 
The colonies had been perhaps the most challenging of the Friends' 
commitments and, inevitably, the most difficult to keep up, as they relied on 
individual sponsorship. They also fed and cared for only a small number of 
children which, by 1938, despite the British Friends' belief that colonies offered 
more than physical relief-an issue which will be discussed in Chapter Seven-was 
becoming a dilemma. The strain on resources kept supplies to the colonies tightly 
controlled and restricted in the main to those materials which they could not 
possibly supply for themselves, such as milk and bread 43 
5.3 The Impact of the International Commission 
From early 1938, the Friends began to draw up plans to distribute what they hoped 
would be a substantial supply of wheat from the countries contributing to the 
International Commission. Alfred Jacob, principal coordinator until the 
appointment of Howard Kershner, submitted a proposal to the AFSC which 
planned distribution of bread to refugee canteens, semi-colonies, refugee children, 
infants, toddlers and to schools. The last recipient was particularly important as the 
Friends maintained the use of food as an incentive for school attendance 
throughout the war 44 A rough estimate suggested that a six-months distribution 
to these recipients would total around 22,000 tons of wheat-coincidentally the 
43Dorothy Thompson to John Reich, 25 April 1938, Committee on Spain, 1938: 
Correspondence--Barcelona (Jacobs), (Box 7). 
44Memorandum concerning distribution in Republican Spain of 22,000 tons of wheat during six 
months. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence-Barcelona (Jacobs) (Box 7). 
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amount of wheat envisaged to be available to Republican 
Spain at the outset: The 
majority of the International Commission wheat was distributed through the 
Friends in Barcelona, Murcia and Alicante, and by the Swiss Red Cross in Madrid. 
In the Nationalist zone, the wheat was supervised by the Friends, but was in 
practice controlled by the Falangist organisation Auxilio Social: sensing victory 
by 
the end of 1938 they became increasingly jealous of their territory. There was some 
debate as to how impartial distribution of the International Commissions wheat 
would have to be, but Dan West suggested that there would be no serious 
objections to most of the wheat going to the Loyalist side. The Nationalists did not 
need it and were increasingly looking to the future and the population which they 
hoped to take over 46 The wheat and flour itself was to be warehoused in as wide 
a number of areas as possible in order to reduce pilferage and to increase security. 
In theory, both governments agreed to take care of this matter 47 In common with 
Friends' policy as it had emerged in Spain, very little of this wheat was to be 
administered directly; Friends simply did not regard it as efficient to send out 
expensive American and British workers and felt that there were spiritual 
advantages to working with and through the people they were there to help . 
9' The 
International Commission adopted this preference for already established 
organisations and, because of the scale of the relief involved, frequently offered 
help directly to the municipal authorities. The Friends' relief workers were 
increasingly employed in a supervisory capacity. Importantly, Jacob was able to 
45 1. Refugee canteens 25,000 children 230.850 kg. 
2. Semicolonies 3,335 30.000 
3. Refugee children 3,000 27.000 
4. Infants 25,000 56.000 
5. Toddlers 12,000 86.000 
6. Schools 144,000 1296.000 
7. Gifts 93.000 279.000 
Total 306,052 children 20,000.103 kg. 
Memorandum concerning distribution in Republican Spain of 22,000 tons of wheat during six 
months. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence-Barcelona (Jacobs) (Box 7). 
46Dan West to John Reich, 22 June 1938, Committee on Spain 1938, Correspondence, 
Individuals: Dan West (Box 7). 
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report that the system of control over the foodstuffs seemed watertight and, 
perhaps more importantly, "an atmosphere of affectionate service for children 
prevails. "" Jacob estimated the monthly consumption in the first seven 
International Commission dining rooms at 54 tons of dried vegetables ("beans, 
chickpeas, rice, lentils, split peas, macaronis, etc. "), 27 tons of meat and fish, in 
addition to 100g of bread per child and 50-75g of chocolate or jam. However, this 
was also dependent on American supplies reaching the Food Supply department. 
Consequently, the Jacobs were anxious that any surplus foodstuffs that could be 
obtained from the USA should be secured for Spain 50 
In 20 June 1938, Edith Pye was able to report that over 11,000 children were 
being fed by the International Commission in fifty-four canteens with the 
expectation that this number would be increased. The Swiss Committee was 
supporting a further ten canteens with over fl. 1,500; however, where there were 
no canteens Edith Pye reported terrible conditions. After the maximum of 20,000 
children were taken into the canteens there would still be an estimated 20,000 
children in need. The estimated cost for this operation worked out at £100 per 1,000 
children per month, or two shillings per child per month 51 Although resources 
were being stretched to accommodate the maximum demand, by July reports 
indicated that starvation in Catalonia and the South was such that the International 
Commission could not manage alone 52 It was still hoped that the League of 
Nations would step in to provide administrative and financial help, but in the 
event, they did not send an investigating commissioner until October 1938? The 
concern was such that for the first time the FSC Spain Committee met throughout 
the summer months. 
99Alfred Jacob to John Reich, 11 October 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence- 
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50Ibid. 
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In August the International Commission were feeding 1,595 children daily 
and the AFSC in Murcia were issuing 6,100 regular rations (it is not clear whether 
this is the number of children being fed, but I would suggest not). Another 3,763 
rations of unprepared food were being distributed to families and groups. By the 
end of September it was anticipated that the International Commission would be 
supplying 5,000 children daily in the region around Alicante and Almeria. The 
quality of the food remained an issue and Dr. Audrey Russell requested that "if 
possible at least 5 p/c of middlings (containing the germ and parts of bran) should 
be sent separately with the flour for addition at this end where advisable. " This 
strongly suggests that the International Commission were sending milled white 
flour' A request for fat was also made as it was believed that "the best nutritive 
value is got out of starch when some sort of fat is added. "' In October Alfred Jacob 
anticipated that eventually the dining rooms would total nineteen, with feeding 
capacity for 69,870 children, fed in two shifts 56 
Although International Commission work was intended as an increase in 
the work already being done, the realities of the situation were such that at least 
600 children already fed by the Murcia Unit would now be supported by the 
International Commission 57 In part this was because the International Commission 
food could be used only for refugee children 58 Considering the equally abysmal 
condition of non-refugee children it made sense for the Friends to use the 
International Commission food for their refugees and reserve their own stocks for 
others 9 In January 1938 the AFSC had offered $1,000 per month for child feeding 
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in Barcelona and this was diverted to non-refugee children 60 It did, however, 
require the segregation of refugee children into separate dining rooms for the 
purposes of bookkeeping 61 
By the end of September the Murcia unit had expanded the International 
Commission canteens to outlying villages and taken on another thousand 
children 62 The distribution of International Commission milk and wheat was 
complex. In Catalonia, the International Commission distribution was to be 
expedited by Alfred Jacob; in the provinces between Valencia and Madrid the FSC 
and the Swiss Committee were to take charge, and in Murcia, Alicante and Almeria 
the AFSC workers took responsibility. In Jaen, Granada and Ciudad Real, the 
Mennonites were identified as the agents for distribution-the first time they had 
been singled out as distinct from the AFSC unit to which they were attached. ' In 
Republican Spain, the Spanish Red Cross lacked the weight to be anything but 
auxiliary ' However, a series of letters throughout October 1938 suggests that 
initially there was some confusion surrounding the position of Red Cross flour in 
this arrangement. John Reich, in discussion with the field workers, had assumed 
that the International Commission would receive flour first in order to meet its 
commitments and that the rest would then be divided between the agents listed. 
Clarence Pickett, however, made an alternative arrangement that all the flour 
under the aegis of the International Commission would be for them to distribute. 
These crossed wires seem to have come about because of a misunderstanding of the 
relationship of the International Commission to collaborating organisations, which 
"'Alfred Jacob to John Reich, 18 January 1938, Committee on Spain, 1938: Correspondence- 
Barcelona (Jacob) (Box 7); Dorothy Thompson to Friends House, 22 April 1938, Committee on 
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varied from region to region. In the south-east, the International Commission was 
represented by M. Ogliati, who was a nominee of the Swiss Committee. His 
assistants were charged with shipping International Commission goods to the 
Murcia Unit and inspecting the canteens which the unit set up on their behalf. In 
November, John Reich was still saying that the units on the ground had the final 
say in the distribution of the flour, and that 55% of the International Commission 
funds were to go to M. Ogliati as head of the regional International Commission 
and of the Swiss Committee, and 45% would be at the disposal of the Friends `6 The 
arrival of the flour initially paralysed activity whilst responsibility was established. 
During this time the Murcia unit endeavoured to find out which areas were most 
in need, whilst aware that this might prove presumptuous 67 Clyde Roberts was 
concerned that the Murcia unit's actions not be perceived as a bid for AFSC 
supremacy in the field. "Friends may well take a subordinate place, satisfied with 
having shown the way and with having had a good part in launching the 
Commission itself. Only make it international and keep it so. "' However, Roberts 
added a rider, "The Quaker special work should go on, if it can be financed, 
because we have so many fine projects that the International Commission cannot 
take over unless they change their rules. Hospitals, baby clinics, colonies, 
workshops, schools and clothing distribution. "69 Prior to the actual arrival of the 
International Commission wheat, this had meant that supplying Commission 
canteens had meant an expansion of Friends' work at their expense. In a review of 
the situation in Murcia, requested by John Reich, Clyde Roberts wrote in 
November: 
As we anticipated, the number fed by the Friends has not increased 
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and may decrease but meanwhile the new feeding by the 
International Commission is increasing daily. The total for Friends 
is about 6,765persons, mostly children. That doesn't include adults 
who work for us, nor their families. The total for the International 
Commission will reach 9,000 daily... When the flour comes in we 
will soon be giving bread rations to several thousand more. The 
International Commission feeding is just beginning to relieve the 
Quaker load as you expected it to do. 70 
The arrival of International Commission flour allowed for a bread distribution to 
a large number of schools in both Barcelona and Murcia. The significance of the 
expanded bread distribution to schools was emphasised by Ruth Cope: "One 
school, a half block beyond the city limits (a school of the junior high status) which 
was of course ineligible for the 4,000 breakfasts which the Mennonites started here, 
dropped in attendance, I understand, from 70 to 10 pupils, for the mothers 
transferred their children to schools giving breakfasts. "71 It was this need to feed 
non-refugee children that made it so essential for the Friends' units to have control 
over the Red Cross flour. 2 Alfred Cope wrote that the clinics weighing children 
had noted that only one child out of a batch of thirty-two was "normal". Most were 
found to be over 25% under the expected figure for their height, and many over 
50% under weight. 73 The infant mortality figures which had decreased steadily 
under the Republic had begun to rise rapidly in 1938.74 
The available clothing had now been distributed. Most of it had gone to the 
different refugios in and around Murcia and Barcelona. A total of 1,475 people in 
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the refugios and 327 people outside them had received clothing but there was a 
clear need for more clothing before the cold weather set in! ' 
5.4 The End of Republican Spain 
With the continued advance of the Nationalist armies, the Friends became 
concerned that canteens could not be maintained. Ways to keep the work as flexible 
as possible began to be explored, and plans to send milk canteens on lorries to the 
French borders were begun. Dermod O'Donovan, an Irishman who had been 
working for the Barcelona unit, was asked to go as a permanent worker to 
Marseilles to purchase for Catalonia and Southern Spain on behalf of the 
International Commission and maintain a continuity of supplies, which had been 
made difficult by the refusal of many shipping companies to carry goods for Spain. 
Only those British ships carrying nothing but relief supplies could be convoyed by 
the Navy. Barbara Wood, the Friends' shipping officer in Valencia, was particularly 
affected by troop movements. In April the Nationalists had reached Vinaroz, a 
small town on the east coast, successfully cutting off Valencia and Madrid from 
Barcelona, and preventing the transportation of goods or people from one area to 
another. 7' 
In August John Reich had written to Clarence Pickett about the possibility 
of securing surplus foodstuffs; having seen an article in the New York Times that 
Secretary Wallace was trying to dump 100 million bushels of wheat in foreign 
markets. In early September the United States Government and the American Red 
Cross agreed to cooperate in providing Spain with large quantities of surplus flour, 
in addition to that supplied by the International Commission. " Up to 250,000 
barrels of flour were secured, to be delivered free of charge by the American 
Mercantile Marine Service to neutral ports. The flour had to be distributed 
impartially to refugees on both sides, and the Red Cross had to find the funds to 
"Clyde E. Roberts to John Reich, 11 November 1938 Committee on Spain: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, October-December (Box 7). 
76FSC: Minutes of the Spain (Executive) Committee, 15 August 1938. 
77John Reich to Murcia Unit, 7 September 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
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pay for milling and transporting the flour to the Atlantic seaboard-funds which 
in practice had to come from the Friends-but the Maritime Commission would 
transport it free of charge into Europe, where the Spanish governments would 
furnish all additional transportation into Spain, including the loan of at least twenty 
trucks for this purpose. The milling costs for the first 100,000 barrels were to be 
borne by the Red Cross, estimated at around $70,000 to $100,000. The AFSC were 
to administer the food relief, and were responsible for the costs of transport from 
neutral ports to Spain, as there was no American Red Cross presence in Spain. 78 
Ironically, the news of the Red Cross flour meant that the wheat appeal of the 
Church of the Brethren, which had solicited gifts in kind from Dunkerd farmers, 
was somewhat redundant, and rather embarrassedly John Reich asked that the 
wheat collected be sold to provide funds for Spain and for transporting the 
agricultural department flour'9 The provision of such large quantities of American 
flour modified the impact which the International Commission, with its restriction 
of aid to refugees only, might have had. This offer of flour enabled a 25% increase 
in the number who could be fed at the International Commission canteens, 
reaching a total of 50,000 children. The British government also agreed to donate 
another £5,000 when the total from other sources reached £20,000 and again at 
£30,000 80 More flour was on its way to Southern Spain by October, where it was 
hoped to feed another 200,000 children in an area which included Madrid! ' There 
was some concern that the flour would not be accepted by Franco, as unless and 
until an eventual Nationalist take-over he would receive only a quarter or a fifth 
of the total amount. For propaganda reasons it might have made sense for him to 
declare that there was no need of the flour, and thus to place doubt on the 
"John Reich to Clarence Pickett, 25 August 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Paris Center-Spain (Box 8). 
"John Reich to Clarence Pickett, 25 August 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Paris Center-Spain (Box 8). 
80FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 21 September 1938. 
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neutrality of the project, but in the event it was accepted 
82 
With the news that so much more food was coming in, john Reich approved 
funds to purchase trucks, with the understanding that the International 
Commission would continue to furnish food supplies for current activities. 
However, the trucks were not to be ordered immediately as Reich held some hope 
that trucks might be forthcoming from the Spanish government. In this, Reich 
showed more optimism than judgement 'A letter from Levi Hartzler on 13 
September was similarly sceptical, pointing out both that the unit thought the 
trucks were already on their way, and that promises from the Spanish government 
had been interpreted as "something similar to what we already have and will not 
entail control of the trucks by the organization. "" In a war trucks were liable to be 
reclaimed for military purposes. The nature of the Commission's work, in a large 
number of canteens spread over a large number of scattered villages, made AFSC- 
controlled transport an essential ' In November, however, John Reich was still 
awaiting confirmation from the Spanish government that the ten trucks promised 
were on their way 86 
The expansion which the American flour made possible allowed the FSC to 
send out more staff. Lucy Palser (a Somerset Quaker) was sent out as housekeeper- 
warden of the Barcelona Unit, and Richard Rees as a driver, "' whilst Joyce Richards 
went out to work in what were known as day- or semi-colonies, day centres where 
refugee children were fed and educated before returning to their parents in the 
82John Reich to Clarence Pickett, 13 September, 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Paris Center-Spain (Box 8). 
'John Reich to Murcia Unit, 7 September 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
8'Levi Hartzler to John Reich, 13 September 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
'Ibid. 
86John F. Reich to Clyde Roberts, 10 November 1938, Committee on Spain: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, October-December (Box 7). 
"Richard Rees appears to have had no formal connection to the Friends other than a desire to 
help. As heir to a baronetcy he may have been Church of England. In 1940 he left the service 
of the International Commission and joined the army. 
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main refugee centres at night. An emerging problem was that the units were 
increasingly operating under the guidance of more than one authority, their own 
"home office" and the International Commission. This may have been more of an 
issue for the AFSC units who were used to much closer supervision 88 None of this 
was helped by the erratic nature of overseas mail: letters between Spain and 
America might take anything between fourteen days and six weeks (a combination 
of censorship and the disruption of shipping), which persuaded the AFSC to use 
telegrams to confirm all mailed communications 89 
As money became shorter but responsibilities more plentiful with the arrival 
of Red Cross and International Commission Relief, Alfred Cope moved to tighten 
up the purchasing policy of the Murcia Unit. First, after initial expenses in America 
had been deducted, funds for relief would be transferred to the FSC in London who 
would then order supplies and deduct the cost, only ordering when the Unit was 
in credit. Instead of sending in orders, waiting for prices and then selecting goods, 
requests were listed in order of priority and the list filled as money became 
available. This both speeded up the system and prevented the overspending that 
had been endemic in 1937.90 As a third measure all orders and all exchange of 
currency were to be suspended until November, when large deliveries were 
expected; this was to facilitate the accumulation of credit. Concerned about the 
need to maintain supplies, Alfred Cope wrote to Dorothy Thompson with three 
months' orders simultaneously to ensure at least one month's reserve supplies, but 
in addition, it was decided in September not to expand any of the projects in order 
that expansion might be possible when winter arrived 91 As a final point, it was 
suggested that the practice of encouraging workers to take vacations outside Spain 
88Levi Hartzler to Clarence Pickett, 13 September 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
"Alfred Cope to his family, (no exact date), c. October 1938, Committee on Spain, 1938: 
Correspondence, General, October-December (Box 7). 
"Alfred Cope to Dorothy Thompson, 23 September 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
"Alfred Cope to Dorothy Thompson, 9 September 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
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cease. Vacations in Spain would assist the stockpiling of 
funds 92 It might be 
imagined that with the growing exigencies faced by the Murcia Friends, the more 
peripheral, non-food related work would have been laid down, 
93 however, it was 
felt that the workshops and schools fulfilled a vital social role, both educating and 
helping to lift morale. The supplies used mostly came from interested groups 
willing to sponsor individual projects and the cost was very low in terms of food 
and clothing 94 
In September, the reports to be sent back from Barcelona indicated that there 
was now little difference between the condition of the civilian population and the 
refugees. In Madrid, which was rather more peaceful than it had been, the 
authorities were now providing relief irrespective of status 95 5,000 children in 
Madrid were now receiving milk from the Spanish Red Cross, with the FSC 
responsible for 1,000 of this number. 500 children felt to be particularly at risk were 
receiving Bovril and cod-liver oil. Shortages of vitamin B and D were particularly 
evident and nutrition-related illnesses, including tuberculosis, were on the increase. 
In Valencia, which was well supplied with fruit, vegetables and rice, milk was also 
very scarce with municipal authorities only able to supply children under two 
years old. Alicante, in contrast, was suffering destitution. Between Alicante and 
Valencia no village had bread, and the rice crop in particular had been affected by 
a lack of manpower and manure. The disruption of supply lines was making it 
difficult to rectify such disparities. In his report in late October Alfred Jacob said 
that he hoped, with the assistance of the American flour, to be able to distribute 
3,000 tons of flour every three months through the schools. This had the desired 
'Clyde E. Roberts to Dorothy Thompson, 15 October 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, Murcia, General, October-December (Box 7). 
93The shortage of resources is attested to by Emily Parker's decision to open up the children's 
bean bags to make stew. When they had been made, the workers had thoughtfully labelled the 
contents with just such an eventuality in mind. The material from which they were made went 
to patch the older boys' trousers. Emily Parker to the Kullys, 21 November 1938. Committee on 
Spain, 1938: Individuals, Parker, Emily (Box 9). 
"Clyde E. Roberts to John Reich, 27 August 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
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effect of increasing school attendance by 30%. 9' In addition, the Ministry of 
Economy in Catalonia had created a number of children's dining rooms in each of 
which children over four years old would be fed. The government supplied all the 
food except the bread which would be supplied by the FSC. It was hoped that a 
total of 20,000 children could be fed this way, with each child receiving a ration of 
200 grams made up of skimmed milk, sugar, cocoa, biscuits and cod-liver oil. In 
order to spread relief as widely as possible, only breakfast would be provided 97 
With children under two having milk ration cards, the only group left unattended 
were the two to four year olds. Audrey Russell and Kanty Cooper decided, with the 
support of the Committee, to begin a pre-school scheme for these children and 
provide a much needed ration of bread in the morning, as a supplement to the mid- 
day meal supplied by the Catalan authorities. Audrey Russell estimated that there 
were 36,000 children between the ages of two and five years in Catalonia and only 
one child in ten of these was currently receiving relief. Even when all the flour 
arrived it was thought that only one-third could be fed. "A short time ago it was 
a question of feeding the children; now it is actually a question of keeping them 
alive" 98 
In Nationalist Spain, Charles Ewald reported that Auxilio Social was feeding 
150,000 people in its canteens, whilst the Government made grants to the families 
of soldiers at the rate of five pesetas per adult per day, and two pesetas for each 
child over three years old. In the International Commission canteens, under the 
auspices of the Spanish Red Cross, between 700 and 1,000 children were being fed 
at Huesca, Apiez, Allepuz and Malaga, in part with wheat from the American Red 
Cross. No shortage of milk was reported, with some areas holding a surplus' 
Although by late November the Barcelona Unit was distributing the Red 
Cross flour, the difficulties of getting into Southern Spain meant that the Murcia 
96FSC: Minutes of the Spain (Executive) Committee, 10 November 1938, "Audrey Russell's 
Report". 
'FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 20 October 1938. 
98FSC: Minutes of the Spain (Executive) Committee, 10 November 1938, "Audrey Russell's 
Report". 
99FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 10 November 1938. 
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Unit was yet to see its first 860 tons 100 Allan Hole in Paris reported that getting 
goods into Murcia was increasingly difficult. 101 However, at the end of November 
the three months' supply of milk for the canteens did arrive, enabling the Friends 
to relax their caution over the feeding programmes, and in December the first 
supply of Red Cross flour was delivered to Murcia 102 This was not achieved 
without some danger. Clyde Roberts reported that the port was bombed several 
times whilst the flour was being unloaded "' 
Despite this, it took time for the flour and milk to clear customs and then to 
be delivered to the outlying regions. In early December, Levi Hartzler, returning 
from time in the US, found little progress in Jaen or Ciudad Real. In neither had 
canteens been established, and there were serious problems finding warehousing 
and office space. Four canteens were in preparation and would be ready to go 
when the supplies arrived and it was planned to provide breakfasts for between 
1,500 and 2,000 children. The urgency of the need for supplies had increased: in the 
regions under Mennonite care, the municipal authorities had already run out of 
milk 104 
The American flour, when it arrived, turned out to be wholemeal, ostensibly 
the better choice. However, the Spanish bakers, unused to wholewheat flour and 
without yeast available, had some difficulty in getting the bread to rise. The unit's 
preference was for either white flour or for wheat, but the latter was unlikely from 
the American source as one condition of this sale of surplus foodstuffs to the Red 
1°°John Reich to Murcia Unit, 25 November 1938 Committee on Spain: Correspondence, Murcia, 
General, October-December (Box 7). 
"]John F. Reich to Alan Hole, 25 October 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, Paris 
Center-Philadelphia (Box 8). 
102Ruth Cope to John Reich, 26 November 1938; Clyde Roberts to John Reich, 7 or 8 December 
(not fully dated), 1938, Committee on Spain: Correspondence, Murcia, General, October- 
December (Box 7). 
103Clyde Roberts to John Reich, 7 or 8 December (not fully dated), 1938, Committee on Spain: 
Correspondence, Murcia, General, October-December (Box 7). 
104Levi Hartzler to John Reich, 9 December (not fully dated), 1938, Committee on Spain: 
Correspondence, Murcia, General, October-December (Box 7). 
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Cross had been that it was milled in the USA. 105 One positive change was that the 
International Commission eventually moved to provide wheat to be milled in 
Spain, advantageous in a number of ways in that it put work into the economy, and 
the leftover bran could be used elsewhere, particularly for cattle-feed to help 
maintain what little there was left of local milk production 106 
In December the arrival of the Red Cross American flour allowed for a 
general change of policy which removed the Friends' necessity to focus 75% of 
relief on refugees and allowed them to select on the basis of need only, although 
it was felt that giving the refugee children priority was still advisable 107 By this 
time over 50% of children in some regions were suffering from trachoma. Drugs 
were in short supply and Alfred Cope requested that a list furnished by volunteer 
doctors be filled if possible. Also badly needed was another truck. Although it was 
hoped that the truck, which was to be shared between the workers in Murcia, Jaen, 
Ciudad Real and Almeria, would have a capacity of 31-5 tons, Alfred Cope 
requested that its chief feature be its toughness, "otherwise it might just as well be 
delivered off the dock to an internment in the Mediterranean before it gets here" 108 
The necessity for this purchase was increased by the failure of the promised 
government trucks ever to materialise. As anticipated by the Unit, they were 
always too much in demand for government purposes. The only civilian goods 
which were now being cleared through the ports were those marked for relief 
organisations109 None of the ten trucks promised by the Catalonian government 
had ever materialised and without at least three 3-ton Bedford trucks the American 
wheat could not be distributed. In the end, the three trucks were purchased by the 
National Joint Committee, R. A. Pilkington and the Misses Pilkington (of the 
1°5Clyde Roberts to John Reich, 7 or 8 December (not fully dated), 1938, Committee on Spain: 
Correspondence, Murcia, General, October-December (Box 7). 
'"Clyde E. Roberts to John Reich, 11 November 1938 Committee on Spain: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, October-December (Box 7). 
"Alfred Cope to John Reich, 20 December 1938, Committee on Spain: Correspondence, Murcia, 
General, October-December (Box 7). 
"'Ibid. 
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Pilkington glassware company) respectively, and were sent to Spain at the end of 
December "' 
By late December the delivery and distribution of flour was going much 
more smoothly. Clyde Roberts wrote, "We solved the problem of flour transport 
happily by using more than half rail shipments. In that way we achieved a more 
prompt delivery and avoided the trouble of managing a fleet of trucks, in itself a 
difficult problem". "' This enabled 53,900 children to be fed with the Red Cross 
bread and another 9,810 with International Commission rations. The total of 63,710 
children was somewhat more than the rations strictly allowed for, but as Ruth Cope 
pointed out it was difficult for the Friends to prevent the municipal authorities 
from spreading the rations as far as they would go 112 
Although the need for large-scale food relief was escalating, some small 
projects did continue, including the summer colonies, designed to give refugee 
children a vacation from their difficulties 113 But the colonies, which the Friends had 
always supported in principle, were running into trouble by late 1938. The 
Barcelona unit had always supported them directly, but the Murcia unit had left 
them as the responsibility of the local municipality. By December, however, the 
municipalities' food-stocks were depleted, and although they had money there was 
little to buy. The Murcia unit decided to provide bread for all the colonies, and 
Cadbury's cocoa, donated by that company, for those thirty colonies with the 
largest proportion of the youngest children 114 Other responsibilities, such as the 
provision of food parcels (sponsored by friends and relatives), were becoming 
"oFSC: Minutes of the Spain (Executive) Committee, 10 November 1938; Minutes of the Spain 
Committee, 24 November 1938 and 20 December 1938. 
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onerous, and although Friends continued to honour their commitments they were 
increasingly reluctant to take on new ones, and found the established recipients 
often ungrateful and critical of the help that could be offered 115 The only 
justification that Barbara Wood could offer for the parcels policy was that it was a 
means of collecting considerable funds, as the parcels were usually paid for in 
dollars or pounds: "it is only fair that those who have friends abroad able to help 
them should be 'taxed' in favour of those who have not. . 016 
In December 1938, the League of Nations Commission studying Spain urged 
that a director be appointed to coordinate the work of all agencies sending food 
into Spain. In discussion with the AFSC, the FSC and the League of Nations 
Commission suggested that the AFSC appoint a food administrator for their own 
supplies, with the intention that other agencies come under this administration, as 
the AFSC was responsible for very large amounts of the food relief "7 With the idea 
that such a director would serve for an initial seven months, the AFSC offered the 
position to a New York businessman and his wife, Howard and Gertrude Kershner, 
who in November had actually offered their services for China, an area which 
traditionally attracted members of the evangelical wing "8 The Kershners sailed for 
Spain in January 1939, accompanied by Emmet Gulley, a Professor at Pacific 
College, Oregon, and a former Quaker missionary in Mexico. In addition, Kershner 
was provided with an assistant: Samuel Ybergoyan, the Uruguayan Consul in 
Lyons who spoke English, French and Spanish-119 The appointment of Howard 
Kershner to a position which would eventually oversee all Friends' relief was to 
have considerable consequences for the relations between relief workers, the public 
and the Spanish Governments. Kershner's posting was conditional upon the 
""John Reich to Barbara Wood, 4 August 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Valencia, (Box 8). 
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"'AFSC: Minutes, Board of Directors, December 1938 
"BAFSC: Minutes, Board of Directors, 2 November 1938. 
119John Reich to Alfred Jacob, 30 December 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence- 
Barcelona (Jacob) (Box 7). 
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securing of wheat through the Red Cross, but it was hoped to obtain up to 500,000 
bushels a month. In addition, $1,000,000 needed to be raised in administration 
costs, of which the AFSC agreed to raise $25,000 in the USA 120 If this programme 
could be carried through, it was hoped that 1.5 million refugees might be fed 121 At 
the same time, the President of the United States increased American involvement 
by forming his own Presidential relief committee under George MacDonald, with 
the aim of raising $1.5 million for Spanish relief 1" With this level of finance 
potentially available, Edith Pye was able to report to the FSC that the International 
Commission had undertaken to feed 31,000 children in Catalonia through January 
and February 19391' 
... AFSC: Minutes, Committee on Spain, 2 December 1938. 
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Chapter Six: 
The Aftermath 
The speed at which events moved in early 1939 shattered established plans. It 
became ever more important to maintain a flexibility of approach and to delegate 
as much power to the field workers as possible. Although the greatest need 
continued in Loyalist Spain the shifting political situation convinced the 
International Commission that Howard Kershner's first visit should be to the 
Nationalist authorities in Burgos. ' In the event, the rapid fall of the Republic 
ensured that Kershner never visited the Republican Government and had little 
contact with the Republican authorities on which to base his view of the situation. 
In January 1939 the Friends, through the International Commission, 
estimated that at least 10,000,000 were starving? The American shipments of 14,300 
bushels of flour and 72,000 bushels of wheat barely touched the periphery of the 
problem. In 1938 the International Commission had received £85,000 from the 
Scandinavian governments and £20,000 from Britain with the understanding that 
other money would be forthcoming, and this was used to buy wheat and milk from 
those willing to sell, mainly the USA? Early in the New Year Audrey Russell cabled 
the National Joint Committee to inform them that milk supplies in Madrid and 
Barcelona were reaching exhaustion. Although regular supplies were due within 
two weeks, twenty-eight tons of skimmed milk were needed urgently. A letter of 
5 January from Barcelona indicated that over 140,000 children were now being fed 
in what was essentially a unified relief effort supplied by the International 
Commission. The British National Joint Committee could not promise more than 
£350, so the FSC agreed responsibility for a further £800 worth of purchases. With 
funds running so short, Edith Pye issued new press releases hoping to receive at 
'Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 11 January 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: 
Int'l Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
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least £4,500 in special donations. " 
On 15 January the Nationalist forces entered Tarragona on the east coast. In 
the previous three weeks they had advanced at a rate of eight to ten kilometres per 
day. In Barcelona, the relief staff decided that they should divide into two groups, 
with Alfred Jacob, Lucy Palser, Kanty Cooper, Muriel McDiarmid and Robert 
Wheeler staying in Barcelona whilst the others went to Gerona to continue work 
with refugees there. A concentration of refugees on the northern border with 
France had led to the necessity for new supply centres on the crossing, and on the 
Barcelona road to serve refugees coming in from the South and West. As the 
nationalist armies advanced, the refugee crisis began to spill over into France. 
Norma Jacob reported that the refugee authorities in Perpignan estimated that 
there were already 17,000 refugee children in the Vic district alone 5 To make 
matters worse, several International Commission canteens were closed due to the 
advance of the Nationalists, and the flexibility of the Barcelona team was 
constrained by the mobilisation of all Spanish personnel, notably the Spanish truck 
drivers. Many of the colonies had to be evacuated, some into France, others into 
Barcelona. The scarcity of transport encouraged the International Commission to 
decide that £1,500 might be spent on the purchase of additional trucks rather than 
relying on the collapsing relief infrastructure. On 30 January, Edith Pye cabled to 
say that the FSC workers had been bombed out of Gerona. All were safe, and the 
workers had organised emergency canteens to provide hot milk and bread to 
refugees on the way to the frontier. Conditions on the road were dreadful, often 
choked with refugees and impassable for miles. ' 
With the fall of Barcelona on 26 January 1939, new issues of organisation 
and neutrality arose and there was growing concern over the safety of cargoes and 
personnel. In late January Kershner attempted to ensure the safety of both in 
discussion with the Nationalist authorities, but had to be satisfied with only verbal 
'FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 11 January 1938. 
$FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 25 January 1939. 
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assurances! Senor Cardenas, the Nationalist representative in the 
USA, admitted 
for the first time to Clarence Pickett that the Nationalists had a refugee problem 
and asked whether it would be possible to increase the shipments of 
flour to 
Nationalist Spain in view of the capture of parts of Catalonia which were in great 
need .8 It was anticipated 
by the AFSC that if the entire area controlled by the 
Republicans fell to the Nationalists, approximately six million people in Madrid 
and the surrounding areas would further drain the food supplies. Nationalist 
officials concurred with these estimates and requested as much help as could be 
supplied. ' With the assistance of the USA's President's Commission and the 
American Red Cross, 14,300 barrels of flour and another 72,000 bushels of wheat 
were shipped to Spain in January and February; it was envisaged that relief would 
be needed at least until the year's crop could be harvested lo 
The fall of Barcelona in January 1939 kept the FSC unit out of touch for some 
time. When Alfred Jacob did contact the FSC and AFSC it was to request 
permission to continue relief work under Auxilio Social. The Auxilio Social would 
take over the administration of all those colonies which had not been evacuated to 
France, but requested that the FSC continue financial support. All private canteens 
were to close and children would be fed through Auxilio Social dining rooms. 
Audrey Russell was to continue with her mobile dispensaries with financial 
backing from the National joint Committee 11 Other matters failed to go as 
smoothly. Many of the children from the Friends' colonies who were evacuated to 
France became mixed in with other groups, and even when colonies were 
reconvened it was not clear that the same children were being supported. Many 
of the food stores along the Spanish frontier were appropriated or looted, whilst 
regional storehouses in Catalonia came under the control of Auxilio Social. 120 tons 
7Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 23 January 1939; Howard Kershner to General Franco, 13 
February 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs: Int'l Commission for Relief of Child 
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of food were completely lost on the railway during the Nationalist advance into 
Catalonia, and another eight tons of food carried on a French lorry was also lost; 
there was some evidence, even admission, that stores were being confiscated by 
advancing troops. Of the FSC vehicles, two cars and two lorries were taken to 
France; the others were either abandoned after breaking down, were stolen, or 
were confiscated by the Nationalists. The whereabouts of those workers who had 
been sent to Gerona-Robert Wheeler, Muriel McDiarmid, Lucy Palser and Kanty 
Cooper-was unknown' When Alfred Jacob was able to give a clear report, it was 
to say that Barcelona workers had been obliged to start afresh with new stores and 
a new house 13 
When the flight for the border began in March 1939, and the French began 
to allow Spanish refugees to pass, Norma Jacob, Kanty Cooper and Lucy Palser of 
the Barcelona unit drove to the border, where they set up a mobile canteen; with 
them was Domingo Ricart, who needed to leave Spain for his own safety. 14 The 
Quaker workers, acting on behalf of the International Commission, were able 
during the worst period of the flight to give out some 200,000 hot rations on both 
sides of the frontier, "some from mobile canteens established on lorries brought out 
from Barcelona, others in feeding stations set up by the Spanish [Republican] 
authorities, and others in the camps to which women and children were taken after 
entering France: '" Although the greater part of Friends' work was to remain 
within Spain until the end of the year, they responded rapidly to the needs in 
France and on the French border. The Comite Nacional de Ayudalb had opened 
canteens at the main exit points on the Spanish side of the frontier and was trying 
to provide hot drinks for children and the sick. The International Commission had 
'2FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 1 and 15 February 1939. 
13FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 20 February 1939. 
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16This apparently bi-lingual title is as cited in FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 20 February 
1939. 
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already moved into Perpignan and both the AFSC and the FSC agreed to continue 
their financial support. " Lorries distributing milk gave out approximately 96,000 
rations after reaching the French side of the border, whilst eleven lorry loads of 
food were distributed on the Spanish side by Audrey Russell and volunteers 
Richard Rees and William Brebner. Many children were camped with their 
responsables on the Spanish side of the border until they were vaccinated and then 
sent by train to the interior. " By March, Edith Pye estimated that half a million 
refugees had entered France, with approximately 130,000 women and children 
distributed around four French departments 19 
In March, John Reich, visiting Spain, drew a picture of increasing hardship, 
"amounting to actual starvation". The combined efforts of the AFSC, the FSC and 
the International Commission were contriving to feed approximately half a million 
children per day, but this fell far short of meeting the immediate need. At the same 
time, need in southern France was growing: an estimated 400,000 refugees were 
destitute and homeless. In an attempt to begin meeting this emergency, $300,000 
was set aside by the International Commission? ° However, raising funds was 
becoming ever harder; many Spanish aid groups saw their function as supporting 
Republican Spain. With the demise of the Republic they began to wind up their 
efforts. The Spanish Child Welfare Fund had already begun to disband, and whilst 
some organisations had funds in hand-the Committee for Impartial Civilian Relief 
held $40,000 of which $23,000 was owed to the Red Cross-the lack of success 
which was reported by the USA President's Committee appears not untypical. The 
Spanish Child Welfare Association reported in April that continued fund-raising 
among the American people would be difficult unless Franco could be seen to show 
clemency to those who had supported the Republican government. In Britain, 
where most of the aid groups had been fiercely partisan, the problems of raising 
I'FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 9 February 1939. 
18FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 15 February 1939 20th February 1939. 
19FSC: Minutes of Friends Service Council, 30 March 1939. 
20AFSC: Minutes, General Meeting, 18,19 and 20 March 1939. 
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money were equally, if not more, difficult 21 
6.1 Working with the Nationalist Government 
In January, the AFSC informed the Nationalists that they would be willing to 
continue child feeding only if the present organisations, operated by the Quaker 
units, could continue. In particular, the AFSC refused to authorise the turning over 
of supplies to Auxilio Social. ' In conversation with Nationalist officials in Burgos, 
Howard Kershner had received full assurance that relief supplies would be 
admitted duty free and subject solely to AFSC control and administration. As a 
condition of supply, the Nationalists agreed that ships bearing relief supplies only 
to the remaining Republican ports would be free from attack, and under these 
assurances arrangements were made by both governments to furnish ships to 
transport the wheat from New York to Spain. Despite unfavourable reports from 
David Blickenstaff in the Paris Center on political conditions in Nationalist Spain, 
Howard Kershner's recommendations were accepted and relief supplies 
proceeded. However, it was not clear how long work would continue. David 
Blickenstaff felt strongly that Auxilio Social might want more control over the relief 
work that either the Friends or the International Commission might care for, and 
Nationalist actions in Barcelona confirmed this concern'a 
From March 1939, the Friends' relationship with Auxilio Social began to 
formalise, in part through the good offices of the International Commission and 
Howard Kershner. David Blickenstaff was provided with an office to supervise the 
allocation and distribution of all food and clothing sent by the Commission and the 
organisations collaborating with it. Despite previous assurances, although the 
Quaker units would be allowed to inspect freely, with guaranteed use of cars, they 
would not be permitted to run their own relief facilities. "' In return, recipients and 
the newspapers would be informed of the origin of gifts, and the International 
2'AFSC; Minutes, Committee on Spain, 24 February 1939,20 March 1939, and 28 April 1939. 
12AFSC: Minutes, Committee on Spain, 27 January 1939. 
23Ibid.; FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 15 February 1939. 
24FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 8 March 1939. 
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Commission would be reimbursed for transportation and handling charges on 
previous shipments into Nationalist Spain. 
The major condition of this relief package was that no grain should be 
exported during the period in which the International Commission was supplying 
grain to Spain, but at the end of January rumours had begun to circulate that the 
Nationalists were exchanging wheat for German munitions' The Friends felt 
strongly that such action, in addition to making fund-raising difficult, was 
fundamentally unethical. "If this practice continues, we will be ridiculous for 
sending in wheat for relief purposes. "26 This stance was taken even though the flour 
sent was not that provided by the International Commission. 
With the capture of Barcelona the main issue was to what degree the 
Nationalist authorities would permit the continuation of the Friends' relief work. 
Initial signs were good. The American Red Cross stated that it would not continue 
to send shipments of flour unless it had assurance from the Nationalist 
Government that the British workers would be able to administer supplies in 
Catalonia as they had previously: the Red Cross were able to report that "We 
received a telephone call this morning from the Nationalist official in Washington 
stating that the Nationalist Government had accepted our offer. i28 The FSC, with 
no contact with their field workers through most of January, however, had received 
no confirmation of this, and had instead contrary reports from Edith Pye and 
Howard Kershner. The Nationalists quickly requested that food be sent under the 
'Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 25 January 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: 
Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
26Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 3 February 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: 
Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
27Howard Kershner to Lillian Traugott, 10 February 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and 
Orgs.: Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to 
Howard Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
28Lucille H. Stephens (secretary to John Reich) to Dorothy Thompson, 2 February 1939. 
Committee on Spain 1939, Corns. and Orgs : Friends Service Council Correspondence, from/to 
(Box 10). 
29Dorothy Thompson to Lucille Stephens, 15 February 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Corns. 
and Orgs.: Friends Service Council Correspondence, from/to (Box 10). 
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auspices of Auxilio Social, which did not quite accord with the notion of the 
Catalonian unit continuing business as usua13° Under the new agreement, Alfred 
Jacob hoped to return to Barcelona as an International Commission Inspector, in 
which position the FSC was willing to support him financially. Despite the 
increasingly inauspicious circumstances, it was still hoped that he would be able 
to take up his original concern and establish a Quaker Centre in Spain. However, 
despite an agreement made with the International Commission, all cars and lorries 
were being commandeered by the Auxilio Social, hampering the mobility of the 
relief workers? ' The only cars still wholly under the control of the FSC were now 
in France, and relief workers were beginning to request transfers to the French 
camps. By the end of March 1939, nine FSC workers had been transferred in 
addition to Audrey Russell, who, although paid for by the FSC, was an 
International Commission representative? ' Barbara Wood decided to return at 
Easter 1939, in part for family reasons, and it was decided to send Emmet Gulley 
to Valencia in her place ' 
The rapid Nationalist advance of February had led to a number of the 
International Commission and FSC canteens being abandoned in Catalonia, but 
where possible, remaining canteens sought to expand, receiving refugee children 
from other areas. At the beginning of January 93,000 children in Barcelona were 
receiving bread from American flour through the Friends and the International 
Commission. In Catalonia as a whole the figure stood at over 142,000?, In early 
1939, Charles J. Ewald was able to report a milk surplus in Nationalist Spain, ' but 
as a tenuous "normality" resumed, food prices began to spiral above the level at 
"Ibid. 
31FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 8 March 1939. 
32FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 8 and 23 March 1939. 
'Dorothy Thompson to Lillian Traugott, 21 March 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Corns. and 
Orgs.: Friends Service Council Correspondence, from/to (Box 10). 
'Bulletin no. 31,7 February 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Corns. and Orgs.: Friends Service 
Council-Friends Service in Spain, Bulletin (Box 10). 
35Report on the Relief Situation in Nationalist Spain, Charles Ewald. Committee on Spain, 
Reports, General 1939 (Box 13). 
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which most might afford them 36 A shortage of raw materials had led to 
widespread unemployment: all Republican money had been cancelled and workers 
in some industries were dismissed. For those in employment, pre-war wages had 
been enforced, but there were no price controls and inequalities in recompense 
compounded the difficulties? ' Alfred Cope reported from Murcia: 
Landlords who had been paid rent in Republican money, got, 
after Franco took over, an enforced payment of an equivalent 
amount from those who had occupied their property during the war. 
During the war we rented a house from a man who was in a 
Republican prison and paid the rent to his agent. When Franco came 
in, or rather his group, we had to pay the landlord again in 
Nationalist money. These regulations of course applied only to the 
owners of property. The farm laborers and the like got paid with the 
then worthless Republican money on the first payday after the 
change, and of course received no restitution for their savings lost? ' 
This rapid enforcement of "normality" was vital to the Nationalists' external and 
internal propaganda war, and a formal public assertion of their ability to feed and 
clothe the country. However, the scarcity of food combined with the end of the 
strict rationing imposed by the Republican government forced the Auxilio Social, 
in these early days, to accept material assistance wherever it could be secured. 
Auxilio Social was feeding 120,000 destitute people a day in Catalonia and the 
surrounding towns, and this reinforced dependence on FSC milk and International 
Commission wheat 39 Anticipating a period of civil disorder, the Friends' unit in 
Barcelona had attempted to alleviate shortages by ensuring that all colonies, 
hospitals and canteens had at least two months' reserves and could cope with being 
cut off from their line of supply. Petrol had been stored in a number of different 
'Confidential Memorandum on Religious and Political Conditions in Spain by Alfred H. Cope, 
Committee on Spain 1939, Reports, General (Box 13). 
37FSC; Minutes of the Spain Committee, 11 May 1939. 
"Confidential Memorandum on Religious and Political Conditions in Spain by Alfred H. Cope, 
Committee on Spain 1939, Reports, General (Box 13). 
39FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 11 May 1939. 
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locations and drivers were instructed to strip their vehicles of spark plugs and 
wheels to preclude confiscation. All workers carried copies of the 
"agreement" 
obtained by Howard Kershner in order to forestall any over-enthusiasm on 
the part 
of local Nationalist sympathisers. Where possible, the details of the agreement were 
allowed to leak shortly before the take over 40 
However, not all relief workers found Auxilio Social to be cooperative. In 
Murcia the military confiscated relief supplies. In April Emmet Gulley wired Paris 
that his storehouses had been locked by the military authorities and Auxilio Social 
had demanded that he turn over all trucks and food. Although Sr. Bedoya 
instructed employees at local level to cooperate with the International Commission, 
the situation was not immediately resolved 41 Attempts to retrieve the four or five 
boat-loads of food seized by General Aranda's troops were not successful, despite 
the intervention of the American consul and threats from Howard Kershner that 
the International wheat supply would be discontinued if the supplies were not 
either returned or paid for. Eleanor Imbelli's work in Cuenca "evaporated" and in 
Valencia the police raided the office and attempted to arrest Emmet Gulley, an 
event prevented by the intervention of David Blickenstaff, whose long sojourn in 
Nationalist Spain gave him some authority and protection. The two workers, 
concerned to protect Spanish colleagues, burned the records to prevent them being 
confiscated by a higher authority. For the Friends, these events offered a very 
particular challenge to their work, threatening to undermine the visibility of their 
witness to neutrality and reconciliation. Ruth Cope wrote sadly: 
Unfortunately the first Nationalist officers to come into the 
territory did not have the least idea who we were and assumed 
directly that we were reds. It was hard to bear this at first, as we 
might well have been sent to Nationalist Spain in the first place. It 
was even sharper, because Alfred and I had helped in the raising of 
40Report of the Spanish Child Feeding Mission from August 1938-15 May 1939 as seen by Alfred 
H. Cope. Committee on Spain 1939, Reports, Murcia (Box 13). 
41FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, p. 270, "Report of Conference on Spain, 26 May 1939. " 
Howard Kershner to john F. Reich, 4 April 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs: Intl 
Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
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so much money in Chicago and so many people had told us that the 
reason they gave to our work and not to other relief projects was 
because ours was neutral. But it is not a virtue to be merely neutral 
any more, it seems. 
Goods were going missing on the railway and conditions were deteriorating. With 
the uncertainty of the food supply it was impossible for the Quaker and Mennonite 
units to maintain an adequate feeding programme. The American milk, sugar and 
cocoa that was coming in had become essential supplies rather than a supplement 
to the bread rations'3 The hardest part was the need to withdraw what little adult 
feeding had been done: 
Saying no to ill adults because there is not enough for children even 
is the hardest thing... You have to hold some rules like iron or you 
will be hindered past endurance (or efficiency), but it is hard to keep 
turning down people, especially acquaintances 44 
Some of the problems were due simply to internal turmoil amongst the 
Nationalists. In Murcia the Friends experienced four new Nationalist governors in 
as many days: each one was contacted and new documents signed to temporarily 
protect lives, property and the relief work, but each time the Friends were forced 
to deal with strident demands for food in return for promised assistance which 
"vanished the way of all good things. "45 As the Friends in Murcia gained 
experience they learned to be wary with the gifts they made: 
We often made experimental acts of cooperation, making a gift of 
food or clothing on a small scale and seeing how it was given out. It 
soon became clear that the confusion and unreliability were very 
complete. One agency or office would be friendly; others were 
42Ruth Cope to Family. 7 May 1939. Committee on Spain, 1939, Individuals: Cope, Alfred and 
Ruth (Box 13). 
'Levi Hartzler to John F. Reich, 20 February 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Correspondence: 
Murcia, General (Box 12). 
"'Ruth Cope to John F. Reich, 25 February 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Correspondence: 
Murcia, General (Box 12). 
4'Report of the Spanish Child Feeding Mission from August 1938-15 May 1939 as seen by Alfred 
H. Cope. Committee on Spain 1939, Reports, Murcia (Box 13). 
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hostile and confiscatory in attitude 46 
Far from bringing supplies with them, many sections of Auxilio Social appeared 
desirous to depend on the supplies of the voluntary relief agencies, if not through 
the extorted gifts, then through confiscation and enforced sales 47 Sometimes the 
pressure brought to bear on the Friends was overtly political. The final governor 
to be appointed to Murcia was presented with a list of projects and staff and a draft 
of the agreement made with Auxilio Social in Burgos. 
Against charges hurled against us of communism, partiality, 
incompetence, laxness of morality, political bias of employees and 
of generally being unfit to exist in liberated Spain, David 
[Blickenstaff] aided us in making emphatic denials.. 48 
Demands for written charges softened the attack, as did the offer to turn over the 
central canteen of over 1,000 children to Miss Pedreno, the local Auxilio Social 
delegate. In return the Friends asked that regular reports be made; this was granted 
as a right, but not fulfilled. The sacrifice of the central canteen proved a mistake: 
the staff were immediately discharged and replaced by inexperienced but 
politically reliable individuals. The weight records were discarded and reports of 
poor food and petty theft began to leak out. An ex-employee reported later that 
some of the supplies were being sold by officials. When the Friends were informed 
that the canteens' reserves were exhausted they declined to supply more food, 
refusing to jeopardise their reputation for impartially distributed relief merely in 
order to preserve a nebulous political neutrality. 
Miss Pedreno also demanded that the children's hospital be closed and its 
staff and structure be turned over for her use as a children's home. Despite the fact 
that many of the children were very sick they were forced to evacuate, some to 
home and a small number to a smaller and less suitable location. The staff declined 
to remain at the institution and those who did not go with the children dispersed. 
Three weeks later the hospital was reported as operating as a children's home, but 
46roid. 
"Ibid. 
"Ibid. 
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contained no children, and Alfred Cope felt that reports suggesting that the aim 
had been to secure the building and its supplies were probably accurate 
99 Emmet 
Gulley cabled on 2 May to say that all the hospitals had been closed 
50 The hospital 
in Murcia under Sylvia Pitt was ordered to close down by an Auxilio Social 
delegate anxious to use the building as a children "s orphanage; the sick children 
were turned over to the local hospital5' On their return to London the nurses, 
Sylvia Pitt and Rachel Marshall, wrote of the work in Murcia: 
The canteens were restaffed with Fascist girls, but continued to use 
our food. The 26 colonies of refugee children were disbanded... We 
were informed that our hospital and equipment were needed for 
orphaned children. Therefore, the sick children were removed to the 
Provincial Hospital to be nursed by nuns... We had the good fortune 
of meeting some of these friends again in Madrid. One mother told 
us how it had taken six days and nights to get there, travelling in 
cattle trucks... Her baby had died on the second day; her home was 
destroyed. It was very difficult to obtain food or work 52 
The Alicante hospital, which opened on 1 September 1937, closed on 5 May 1939. 
Most children returned to their parents or to the colonies for evacuated children. 
Those without parents or whose families had left Spain were admitted to colonies 
run by Auxilio Social' All the refugees were immediately ordered back to their 
various cities, and for twenty days there was no bread in Murcia at all, Despite 
this, many Nationalists who had experienced the Friends' work during the war 
were willing to assist, if only secretly, and this allowed the truck drivers to continue 
99Ibid. 
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circulating. Between $8,400-$10,000 worth of food was distributed. The policy of 
placing large reserves of food in local villages had also been successful and allowed 
villages to make local decisions about reopening canteens 
A growing concern was that the authorities had made no provision for 
refugees returning home. The Friends decided to make some arrangements and 
upon the presentation of identification papers, refugees were given condensed milk 
for small children and fish and potatoes for older members 56 Supplies not suitable 
for distribution (usually the results of gifts in kind) were sold for approximately 
$5000 and small gifts, as well as the right to buy some of the remaining stock, were 
given to those Spanish workers who felt they could accept 57 In May, after a visit by 
Howard Kershner, Ruth and Alfred Cope, Mary Elmes and Jean Cottle crossed the 
border into France, taking with them all the complete office records of the work, 
leaving only copies of financial files in Murcia 58 By the time they left their only 
permitted role in the relief work was "inspection" of a kind which precluded 
criticism. Alfred Cope left Valencia with "the feeling that you will be treated 
politely and that you will be disregarded. X59 In Valencia Emmet Gulley, only 
recently appointed to replace Barbara Wood, wrote to John Reich that almost all the 
work would have to end or change out of all recognition: 
The new totalitarian state cannot permit foreign organizations to 
function. We have an arrangement with their national organization 
"Auxilio Social" so that we may cooperate with them. They do the 
actual feeding and our work will now consists in turning our food 
over to them, inspecting the work and especially in carrying to them 
the message of goodwill and love of the peoples of the many 
'Report of the Spanish Child Feeding Mission from August 1938-15 May 1939 as seen by Alfred 
H. Cope. Committee on Spain 1939, Reports, Murcia (Box 13). 
'Ibid. 
'Ibid. 
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countries cooperating in this work 60 
Under this new system, the Friends would be restricted to the role of "ambassadors 
of goodwill and friendship", a role which they were inclined to refuse but 
continued to fulfil in order, they hoped, to provide some protection to their Spanish 
colleagues and to inspire impartiality in the relief distribution. This marked the last 
attempt of the Quakers to promote a message of conciliation 61 Only when this 
aspect of the work was blocked did the Friends finally abandon Spain. In the 
interim, Emmet Gulley was to stay, as Quaker representative for the whole of 
Spain, accompanied by Willi Begert, a representative of the Swiss Red Cross and 
Clyde Roberts in Almeria. In Almeria the situation was somewhat different in that 
Roberts' staff were non-Quakers and "somewhat rightist" and although the work 
was taken over by Auxilio Social, a number of their new agents were individuals 
who had been working with the Friends throughout the war, and it was thought 
that the conditions might actually improve with the change-over. Alfred and 
Norma Jacob agreed to remain under similar conditions in Barcelona, motivated 
by their continuing concern for Spain. 
In June it was decided to continue work in Spain over the autumn and 
winter, but the Mennonites' building-projects proved impossible. In July the FSC 
agreed to cooperate with the AFSC in establishing an office in Madrid for the 
purpose of assisting repatriation. ' Florence Conard was asked to return to Madrid 
in September in order to assist in this work and monitor relief distribution. Lester 
Hershey was to undertake similar work in Valencia. Alfred and Norma Jacob 
proposed taking their children to Tossa where a hotel was available which they 
might turn into a Quaker centre and rest home `3 David Blickenstaff and Paul 
Bowman were to remain in Bilbao. For himself Emmet Gulley saw the greatest part 
"Emmet Gulley to John F. Reich, 26 April 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Correspondence: 
Valencia (Box 12). 
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of their work to lie in reconciliation, "the healing of broken spirits and the calming 
of hatreds". " 
In Madrid, the entry of the Nationalists had caused major problems to the 
relief organisations. The two Swiss workers had their vehicles confiscated, and 
these were returned only after high level intervention. They were required to pass 
on their goods in an orderly way to Auxilio Social but felt that "they had more self- 
respect than to stay and watch what was going on. " As the Friends had not had 
a representative in Madrid since the split with the Save the Children International 
Union in 1937, this left Madrid without a neutral relief force until Florence Conard 
arrived. Isolated for much of the war, serious malnutrition was endemic-Auxilio 
Social found that it had to feed fully half of the city . 
66 As supporters of the right 
began to find jobs some of the need lessened, but there remained more to do than 
Florence Conard felt any one organisation could cope with 67 However, Florence 
Conard's role was limited to that of observation, and even this was hedged around 
by restrictions; work for the "healing of broken spirits" was implicitly excluded. 
This week I interviewed the delegate of the district Congress.... He 
told me it was absolutely forbidden to give political propaganda in 
the Comedores (something which made me mentally raise my 
eyebrows but I was in no position to argue). I explained in as simple 
language as I could muster that as far as I could see explaining that 
people in other countries felt full of friendliness and affection for 
Spain and the Spanish people wasn't political propaganda. But he 
insisted that it was... ' 
The Nationalist embrace of social autarchy (they were, after all, importing 
"'Emmet Gulley to John F. Reich, 26 April 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Correspondence: 
Valencia (Box 12). 
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munitions) inexorably excluded outside relief organisations. Over a short period 
of time, the facilities to explain to children where the food came from was 
gradually withdrawn from most of the feeding stations Florence Conard visited 69 
Despite the efforts of Auxilio Social, which Conard generally approved, the general 
conditions in Madrid were, if anything, rumoured to be deteriorating, in part 
because a free market in food had been reopened. This changed the context in 
which people ate and increasingly alienated some of the relief workers. In a last, 
hand-written addition to her letter Florence Conard wrote: 
It is one thing to bring food into a country where everybody 
but a few grafters... eat the same thing-where the best hotels serve 
the same lentil soup the soldiers and "refugiados" eat-where a 
piece of cheese is as much of a luxury to the Head of a Refugee 
Committee as to the least of his brethren.... 
[But when]... I pay 10 pesetas for a meal of meat, fish, cheese, 
etc... in the Hotel, and M. can't find 1.90 for a tin of milk of her 
baby... When anyone with money can have anything to eat and 
drink, when the soldiers are fed more than they can eat and 3/ of the 
city goes hungry hungrier than during the war... when the stores 
are full of food and lean, sunken-eyed children press their noses 
against the panes... well-what about it? I for one, lose my appetite. 7° 
Although it had never been openly discussed, the context of rationing and the 
attempt of the Republican authorities to ensure an equity of food supply had been 
an ideal ideological atmosphere for the Quakers. Its loss was a shock and alienated 
the units more rapidly than their formal exclusion by the authorities. Changing 
relief methods further underlined the shift in ideology. Auxilio Social moved away 
from the collectivity of the dining rooms providing aid to family units, often as 
food to take away, despite the evidence that many recipients had little access to 
"Florence Conard to Emmet Gulley, 24 May 1939. Committee in Spain 1939. Correspondence: 
Workers in Spain, from/to (Box 12). 
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either cooking facilities or fuel. 71 This was apparently an ideological decision 
intended to reinforce the family as the primary economic and social unit, or it may 
have been to avoid possible political trouble focussed in the dining rooms. Either 
way, it appeared to the Friends to be less efficient in terms of fuel and to reinforce 
the isolation experienced by many in distress. Certainly, both the dining rooms and 
the colonies fell out of favour with the Nationalist authorities. 
One particular concern for Conard was that little provision seemed to be 
made for pregnant and nursing women. 72 This concern was reinforced by the 
rumours, confirmed by observation in the canteen at Chamberi, that Auxilio Social 
was giving milk to adults who were not sick. Conard envisaged a severe winter 
shortage, even though Auxilio Social had begun to tighten up on the numbers who 
were being fed 7' Howard Kershner sent assurances that there was enough milk 
until the local supply could take over, but Conard, used to the cautious measures 
in Murcia was reluctant to accept what she saw. 74 Conditions in the Auxilio Social 
canteens did not cheer her; she found them on the whole unsanitary as well as ugly, 
and the workers were unwilling to take advice. The children's home she visited did 
not receive compliments either. In one home she was informed that the children 
had arrived very dirty and poorly clothed from "red" colonies, but on observation 
a month later they appeared to be in the same condition! ' 
Throughout the first six months of the Nationalist occupation of Barcelona, 
Alfred Jacob had continued to monitor International Commission relief 
distribution, but had no control over its destination! ' After a brief holiday, he and 
Norma returned to Barcelona with their children, planning to open a Quaker 
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Centre along the lines originally planned. It was hoped by the FSC that an AFSC 
presence might be maintained at the Centre, but Alfred Cope, on his return to the 
USA, cautioned that Howard Kershner had expressed a desire to withdraw entirely 
from relief supply in Spain by August 1939. " However, in the event, a poor harvest 
in August meant that the International Commission continued feeding through the 
summer months! ' 
With the outbreak of the European war, the position of Friends workers in 
Europe was increasingly precarious, although it was hoped that American 
neutrality would provide some protection for AFSC workers at least! 9 Most of the 
American workers in Germany had left in late August to attend a conference in 
Zurich-which was eventually cancelled-and experienced difficulties gaining re- 
entry 80 Faced with a general deterioration in the political climate, the AFSC 
workers were now leaving Spain: David Blickenstaff returned to the USA in 
September; Clyde Roberts, Paul Bowman, Florence Conard, Lester Hershey and 
Wilbert Nefziger followed soon after, and Emily Parker returned in October. 
Twelve relief workers stayed on or transferred to France as International 
Commission inspectors. Noted in the minutes is the deep spiritual significance each 
reported from the work in Spain! ' Clarence Pickett suggested that in the event that 
it was not possible for the AFSC to continue distribution of the current shipload of 
wheat, that it be turned over to the American Red Cross and from thence to the 
American Ambassador to Spain for administration by Auxilio Social 82 Already a 
71AFSC: Minutes, Foreign Service Section, 15 June 1939; FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 
p. 268, "Possibilities of Future Work in Spain"; AFSC: Minutes, General Meeting, 1939. 
78AFSC: Minutes, Committee on Spain, 1 August 1939. 
79AFSC: Minutes, Board of Directors, 6 September 1939. 
80AFSC: General Meeting, 29 September 1939. In mid-September Howard Elkington and his 
wife returned to Berlin, Homer and Edna Morris were in London waiting for visas for Germany 
and Sylvia Perry was on her way to join Harry Champeney in Amsterdam. The Amsterdam 
Center was increasingly concerned with providing help for refugees, as was the Paris Center, 
to which it was hoped another American and a British Friend could be sent. AFSC: Special 
Meeting of Foreign Service, Board of Directors, Refugee Section and others, 12 September 1939. 
81AFSC: Minutes, General Meeting, 29 September 1939 and October 211939. 
82AFSC: Minutes, Committee on Spain, 25 April 1939. 
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savings account had been set up to provide for the liquidation of the Committee. 
By June, the AFSC had decided that it would not spend any more money on 
independent projects in Spain, although it would continue to contribute to the relief 
and personnel expenses of the International Commission. Preferring to reserve its 
funds for resettlement projects in Mexico, the AFSC decided against making plans 
for reconstruction work, in part due to other, more pressing needs and in part 
because it was already becoming clear that such assistance would not be welcome 
and could not take place within the restrictions the Quakers would require " As a 
national body with a propaganda war to win, Clyde Roberts felt that Auxilio Social 
"still cling too much to the theory that they can feed everybody while actually they 
cannot. " In his opinion they had devised no good system of determining who to 
feed and the result was that toddlers and infants, often the least demanding, were 
neglected in many of the areas he visited ' The emphasis of the feeding had 
changed, however: milk was no longer a commodity in huge demand. As bread 
became more widely available, nursing mothers needed less assistance and the 
demand seemed to be for vegetables and grain. The extra grain which was in 
transit was offered to the French government for use in the refugee camps 86 
Many of the relief workers resented the inefficiencies of the Nationalists and 
their continual hostility to assistance. It was no longer possible for the Quakers to 
act openly in a context where relief was appropriated. Under Nationalist rule, 
badly needed supplies were left on the dockside sometimes for many months 
before being allowed to clear customs. 7 
'AFSC: Minutes, Committee on Spain, 24 February 1939. 
84FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 8 June 1939; Minutes of the Spain Committee, p. 270, 
"Report of Conference on Spain, 26 May 1939". 
"Report of Clyde E. Roberts, Almeria, Spain, for months of June and July 1939. Committee on 
Spain 1939, Reports, General (Box 13). 
"Howard Kershner to John Reich, 8 May 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs : Intl 
Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
"Howard Kershner to Lillian Traugott, 10 February 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and 
Orgs.: Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to 
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300 tons of flour which we are now sending to Barcelona will 
without doubt have to be turned over to the Auxilio Social [despite 
instructions to the contrary from Philadelphia]... neither the 
American Friends Service Committee nor the American people are 
given any credit in connection with the flour, but that it is used as a 
means of propaganda for the glory of the Franco Government! ' 
Such action did not merely prevent a Quaker witness, it placed it at the service of 
an ideology which was anathema to many Friends. Whilst willing and eager to 
assist the people of Spain, they were not willing to become party to political 
propaganda. In addition, a report from Howard Kershner made clear that the 
Nationalists' agenda placed a low priority on civilian relief. It took two weeks of 
negotiation to extract promises that pilfered or appropriated goods would be 
returned, by which time most of the food had been consumed by the army 89 The 
Auxilio Social, as an auxiliary wing, did not have the authority to delegate at 
regional level or to overrule the military. Kershner wrote: 
I have seen food rotting at the dock at Valencia within half a mile of 
starving people and no available lorry to take it to them. At the same 
time I have seen hundreds of lorries hauling soldiers and thousands 
of able bodied men marching in parades and every responsible 
official and most of the people, going to innumerable bull-fights and 
fiestas 9° 
However, with the embargoes lifted it was now possible for Spain to buy its own 
wheat at five cents a bushel, half the price which the Food Surplus Commodities 
Committee were offering. This combined with the waste that Kershner reported 
and the confiscations by the army disinclined either the Friends or the International 
Commission to continue large-scale relief in Spain, although in the event it 
"Ibid. 
"Report of the Mission of the Director to Spain, 13 April - 15 May 1939. Committee on Spain 
1939, Reports, General (Box 13). 
"Howard Kershner, report: "Three Weeks in Spain", April 1939, Committee on Spain, 1939. 
Corns. and Orgs,: Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain (Box 11). 
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continued into 1940 91 Ironically, there were now shortages in the Nationalist zone 
as food was diverted to the liberated territories. Whilst luxury goods, such as 
canned meat, were now available, there was a persistent shortage of low-priced 
foods such as peas, beans, rice, sugar and milk 92 Although Auxilio Social was 
anxious for feeding to continue, it asked that some proportion of the money might 
be diverted for the purchase of medical equipment. Many of the workers continued 
to argue that food was more important, but Kershner expressed it as his opinion 
that some ten or twenty per cent of funds might be employed for such purposes as 
medical units that might leave lasting memories of the Quaker work. Eventually, 
this resulted in a number of mobile medical units, mounted on light trucks, which 
could serve the more inaccessible villages 93 
In July 1939 Alfred Jacob lamented the disappearance of the huge Friends 
and International Commission organisation, the scattering of the Spanish 
collaborators and the departure of two-thirds of the foreign volunteers, despite the 
continuing and evident need. 
We are almost tempted to feel that all our work has gone for nothing. 
And yet we know that this is not so. Many hundreds, perhaps 
thousands, of Spanish children certainly owe their lives to our relief 
services. Innumerable mothers are grateful for the timely help that 
made so much difference in the dreary life of the refugee. 
Concluding, Jacob looked to the future and the possibility that missionary 
activity-"finding people to whom the ideas of Quakerism are congenial"-might 
have to be given up? Future tasks would simply be to observe and try "to filter out 
truth from the ceaseless rumours, propaganda, criticisms, accusation and 
aspirations which surround us", in particular Jacob was interested in education, in 
"Howard Kershner to John Reich, 6 May 1939. Howard Kershner to Clarence Pickett, 8 June 
1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: Int'l Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in 
Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
`Report of Clyde E. Roberts, Almeria, Spain, for months of June and July 1939. Committee on 
Spain 1939, Reports, General (Box 13). 
93FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 21 September 1939. 
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social service, in religion, wages and prices, in nutrition, social reconstruction and 
every aspect of life: "We shall be eager to see what new developments General 
Franco can bring about in a positive way, and what relationship these may have to 
the permanent welfare of Spain. "95 
By November preparations were well under way to deal with the 
constricting conditions of war-time. The officers of the AFSC and its Refugee 
Section had been authorised to take such action regarding foreign personnel and 
the relocation of available funds as might be required 96 Although Spain was still 
being dealt with by a separate AFSC committee, the cessation of hostilities and the 
increasing concern with the refugee situation in France meant that the Spanish 
work was in the process of being absorbed within the more general crisis. The FSC 
had not issued another appeal for funds since October, and the only FSC 
representatives in Barcelona were the Jacobs and their children 97 In December 
Eleanor Stabler Clark, speaking for the AFSC, outlined four areas of continued 
activity: 
(a) The administration of colonies for Spanish children in France; (b) 
Assistance to Spanish refugees in North Africa; (c) Aid to Spanish 
refugees in Mexico, under the direction of Daniel and Elizabeth 
Marsh Jensen; and (d) Relief work in Spain itself 98 
The latter was gradually coming to an end, but work in Mexico, France and North 
Africa was expanding, although it was not clear how much money would be 
available. ' As a conclusion of the work in Spain it was intended to send six or eight 
more mobile medical units, a long-term reminder of Friends'work. 10° 
The last American workers to leave were Clyde Roberts and Aldis and Cora 
Easterling. Florence Conard returned to Madrid to marry an Englishman and 
95Ibid. 
96AFSC: Minutes, Board of Directors, 4 October 1939. 
9''FSC: Minutes of the Friends Service Council, 5 October 1939. 
"AFSC: Minutes, General Meeting, 2 December 1939. 
99AFSC: Minutes, Committee on Spain, 12 December 1939. 
100AFSC: Minutes, General Meeting, 2 December 1939. 
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although still in situ in early 1940 it is not recorded when she departed 101 The final 
entry for the AFSC Committee on Spain is May 14 1940. There was no formal 
announcement that the committee was to be wound up but concern for Spanish 
refugees had become part of a far larger picture and gradually it was absorbed into 
the work of the Refugee and the European Relief Committees, formed in June 1940. 
The Jacobs moved to Tossa in June hoping to run a small Quaker centre, but in the 
first week of July the FSC decided to lay down102 all of the European field 
committees, accepting that they could not function effectively under war-time 
conditions 103 On 18 July 1940 the FSC received a cable informing them that the 
authorities had arrested Alfred Jacob. He had been asked to meet a train carrying 
refugees into Spain at the border. The train had not arrived and he was arrested by 
the local authorities on a charge of spying and sent to Madrid. On the good offices 
of Howard Kershner, Jacob was eventually released but charges of owning an 
illegal vehicle were left on his record and he was ordered to leave Spain 
immediately 10' In her memoirs Norma Jacob wrote, "By the summer of 1940 I was 
fairly well convinced that if the dictator didn't yet know that there was a 
fundamental incompatibility between Quakerism and his theory of society, we 
were wasting our time. "105 The work in Spain was over. 
101John F. Reich, to Dr. Alberto Guani, Foreign Minister, Montevideo, Uruguay, 31 January 1939. 
Committee on Spain, Personnel, Individuals: Ybargoyen, S. (Box 13). 
""Lay down" is Quaker terminology for formally closing a project. 
103FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 11 July 1940. 
104Interview with Alfred Jacob, Pendle Hill, PA., USA, 13 January 1997; FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, addition to Minutes of July 111940. 
"'Norma Jacob, "The Spanish Civil War", in Piers Anthony, Bio of an Ogre, Ace Books, New 
York, 1988, p. 240. 
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6.2 France 
In 1940 with the end of most Quaker work in Spain the AFSC and the FSC turned 
their attention to the relief and resettlement of the Spanish refugees who had fled 
to North Africa and to France. This thesis concentrates on the Friends' activities in 
the Spanish Civil War, but without some consideration of its aftermath the story 
feels unfinished. As the Friends themselves pointed out to the many organisations 
who did pull out in 1940 and 1941, the end of the war did not mean the end of the 
story. The actions of the AFSC and the FSC in the last two years that they were able 
to operate on the continent was a further manifestation of their commitment to the 
message of peace, reconciliation and justice to which they witnessed. For the 
Friends, the Spanish refugees were more than a symbol of a lost cause. 
In the first months of 1940 no new workers were sent to Spain and of the 
AFSC, only Howard Kershner was still a regular visitor. The eight remaining FSC 
workers had been transferred to France, where as late as July 1940 the British 
Friends were maintained under the aegis of the International Commission 106 When 
the International Commission withdrew from France in July 1940, the work was 
again taken over by the American Friends Service Committee, who maintained 
workers there until the final fall of France in 1942107 
Once in France the Spanish refugees found a poor welcome. The original 
refugee camps were strained to breaking point, and the huge numbers crossing the 
border in the spring and summer of 1939 could not be accommodated 108 Whilst 
some effort was made to house the women and children in school buildings and 
hospitals, the men were herded onto beaches where barbed wire and latrines were 
erected. In one of the largest camps at Argeles the only shelter was a burrow in the 
"Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 21 July 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs : Intl 
Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
107FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 11 July 1940. 
"Edith Pye estimated the numbers of refugees in the region of 230,000. Dorothy Thompson to 
Lillian Traugott, 2 August 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Coms. and Orgs : Friends Service 
Council Correspondence, from/to (Box 10). 
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sand 10' This camp, one of the worst, was closed by August and the men relocated, 
some to a camp at St. Cyprien where married quarters were available for those who 
had wives and children with them 110 The problems for the refugees in France were 
far greater than many had experienced in Spain. The refugees in France were 
isolated from local communities and hence from assistance. Furthermore, the 
people around them were not sharing to any degree in their privations and were 
often hostile lu 
The move into the French camps changed the nature of Friends' relief work. 
Until the outbreak of war, although food was in short supply most women and 
children were adequately cared for and feeding able-bodied men had never been 
within the remit of the Friends' committees or the International Commission. With 
eight workers, two cars and two small trucks it was hoped to distribute one and a 
third million francs worth of clothing and bedding to the women and children 
scattered in France. Another one and a half million francs was to be spent on the 
men's camps. Kanty Cooper, Barbara Wood and Lucy Palser, who had left Spain 
in March, were by this time working with the Commission d'Aide aux Enfants 
Espagnols Refuges en France, assisting the women and children who had been 
spread around a number of Departments 112 The French authorities could offer 
nothing but basic rations and as very few Spanish men were allowed to take work 
outside the camps there was nothing to do. Individual letters to the Friends 
testified to the misery which many felt 113 The team reported that many women 
"'Francesca Wilson, "Report on the Civilian Camp at Argeles", 28 April 1939. Committee on 
Spain 1939, Corns. and Orgs.: Friends Service Council Correspondence, from/ to (Box 10). 
"'Friends Service Council Bulletin, no. 37,4 August 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Corns. and 
Orgs.: Friends Service Council Correspondence, from/ to (Box 10). 
"'Lucy Palser and David Luscombe, 27 July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Coins. and Orgs.: 
Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Spanish Refugees in France (Box 11). 
'u Dorothy Morris had come from Lyttleton, New Zealand and had gone to Spain from England 
with Sir George Young in February 1937. In November she went to Southern Spain to work for 
the AFSC in Murcia and in February 1939 moved to Perpignan with Dr. Audrey Russell after 
leaving Spain because of earlier International brigade connections. Friends Service Council 
Bulletin, no. 36,7, July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Corns. and Orgs.: Friends Service 
Council Correspondence, from/to (Box 10). 
113 Translated letter to Ruth Cope, name of sender omitted. Committee on Spain 1939. 
Correspondence: Murcia, Copes (Box 12). 
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had nothing to do all day but lie on mattresses and it was hoped that cloth, needle 
and thread and educational materials could soon be provided 
114 In this way, 
Friends' relief work shifted rapidly towards the provision of moral assistance. 
Francesca Wilson felt strongly that this type of assistance might make a huge 
difference to the rate of illness within the camps. As food was not initially in short 
supply, relief tended to be in the form of winter clothing, soap, books and other 
small articles such as stamps and razors 115 Barbara Wood and Kanty Cooper 
reported that the allowance of only two stamps a week was felt sorely by the 
refugees, many of whom were intellectual and for whom writing and receiving 
letters was a vital part of their connection to the world 116 Much of this relief was 
predicated upon what the Spanish camp leaders requested to support their own 
efforts at mobilising the educational and vocational expertise which existed among 
the camp inhabitants. The stress on education was important for more than just 
traditional Quaker concerns for self-help: there was a consciousness that those who 
were to settle in France would need language skills and some knowledge of the 
country. In many of the camps, the presence of a large number of very well 
educated people led to the emergence of small schools and study groups, often 
teaching French. In some cases the French authorities were able to provide teaching 
materials, but Mary Elmes hoped that it might be possible to provide some books 
for the very small circulating libraries 117 
The conditions in the camps were improving by August 1939, from the point 
of view of both food and living quarters, but there was still massive overcrowding 
and little to do. Most had exhausted what little money they had when they 
"'Bulletin no. 34,10 May 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Corns. and Orgs.: Friends Service 
Council-Friends Service in Spain, Bulletin (Box 10). 
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escaped "' Shortages of shoes and clothing were worsening as many 
had little to 
begin with. Many were refugees many times over and recognised the 
Friends from 
Catalonia 11' By August 1939, the British Friends could report that 50,000 men in the 
French camps had volunteered to return to Spain, and almost 20,000 
had been 
absorbed into the work force, but that out of a total of 230,000 this was only the tip 
of the iceberg 120 Unfortunately, repatriation did not always offer an acceptable 
solution. Relief workers reported: 
Refugees continually give as their reason for not returning to Spain, 
fear of unemployment and persecution, based on the news they 
receive from their relatives in Spain. They will be told, for instance, 
that if they return their grandfather will give them work with 
him-the grandfather being dead years before; or that so-and-so has 
gone to live with his uncle, the uncle having died before the war'xl 
The French work was inevitably disrupted by the outbreak of war with 
Germany. One matter that had to be resolved was the status of relief workers. All 
Americans were warned to leave Paris in August, but the American Friends 
decided to stay 1" The British Friends also remained, under the umbrella of the 
International Commission 123 
War brought currency restrictions and it was no longer possible for the 
AFSC to pass money to Spain through London; the AFSC account with Friends 
House was closed in November and all International Commission money was 
1. Friends Service Council Bulletin, no. 37,4 August 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Corns. and 
Orgs : Friends Service Council Correspondence, from/ to (Box 10). 
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transferred to New York for safety in September 1939124 Despite this, the 
International Commission began to consider enlarging its scope to deal with 
refugee children of all countries engaged in the war 
1" 
In October 1939 there remained 182,000 Spanish refugees in France of whom 
100,000 were women and children 126 The AFSC offered to take care of the children 
if the International Commission would take on the medical care of the injured and 
mutilated men, care of the aged and migration and resettlement plans. This was 
suggested because the AFSC's constituency had traditionally been most easy to 
mobilise for child welfare. ' However, whilst the International Commission agreed 
to some emendation of its remit it felt that it could not take on all of these 
responsibilities and, like the AFSC, felt itself committed to the care of children, now 
very much the minority of those in need 128 Furthermore, the context of the mission 
was changing rapidly. Two million French people had been evacuated from the 
war zones and this was overshadowing the issues of Spanish relief. It was 
becoming imperative that some money be found to extend relief to French children, 
if only for moral purposes: "it would increase our influence and make it possible 
for us to exercise a greater degree of protection and to render more assistance to the 
Spanish people. ""' Because of the alteration of the nature of the work in late 1939, 
"'John F. Reich to Emily Hughes, 22 November 1939; Emily Hughes to John Reich, 6 October 
1939 Committee on Spain 1939, Coms. and Orgs.: Friends Service Council Correspondence, 
from/to (Box 10); Howard Kershner to Clarence Pickett, 12 September 1939. Committee on 
Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: Int'l Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in 
Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard Kershner, August-December (Box 11). 
"Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 8 September 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: 
Int'l Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, August-December (Box 11). 
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the International Commission removed the word Spain from its masthead, leaving 
its title as the "International Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees" 
130 
It was hoped initially that the war would create a large demand for labour 
and thus take many of the able-bodied Spanish men out of the camps, leaving the 
old and sick in the care of the Commission 131 However, the war hardened attitudes 
to the refugees: regarded at best as an unhelpful burden and at worst as a security 
risk they were shunted from place to place, and camps near the Spanish border 
were moved. 132 No attempt was made to mobilise Spanish men into the French 
army until November 1939 when the usual five-year contract for the Foreign 
Legion was amended to "for the duration of the war", but this was voluntary, and 
there was no attempt at conscription 1 It was felt by many that to assimilate the 
Spanish into the army would be a breach of neutrality, and French rightist circles 
in particular opposed any such propositions. Added to this was a growing wave 
of French nationalism which made circumstances uncomfortable 134 Assimilating 
Spanish men into the work force was not easy in part because of local hostility in 
some areas, whilst in others employers took advantage their precarious position, 
'Michael Hansson to Clarence Pickett, 5 August 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: 
Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, August-December (Box 11). 
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231 
offering extremely low wages and long hours 
1' 
The French authorities were losing sympathy with their foreign guests, both 
because of their own situation and because French politics was swinging to the 
right. Under the stress of war many of the less able people were under pressure 
from the French authorities to return home 136 Reports were coming in to the AFSC 
of the forcible repatriation of widows. Women's refugee status seems to 
have 
depended on the refugee status of their husband, father or son; otherwise, like 
orphans, they were claimed by Spain, and France cooperated in returning them, 
even if their own safety could not be assured 137 In blatant contradiction of his usual 
faith in the Nationalists' goodwill, Kershner reported, "On more than one occasion 
refugees have reported to me that women so repatriated have been either executed 
or imprisoned within a week of their arrival in Spain. o11313 One difficulty was what 
to do with already existing colonies of Spanish children in France. The AFSC was 
reluctant to simply return them without some guarantees, but the situation was 
rapidly turning into a permanent charge 139 
Working with other organisations could lead to difficulties. The 
International Commission had a long association with the Spanish Refugee Relief 
Campaign in New York but began to feel that this organisation's own associations 
in France might jeopardise the relationship between the International Commission 
"'Howard Kershner to John Reich, received 7 December, 1939, Committee on Spain, 1939. 
Corns. and Orgs.: Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain (Box 11). 
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and the French government 140 Other organisations also had commitments of their 
own and could not be relied on to follow through with their initial interest. In 
December Kershner was perturbed to hear that the Confederated Spanish Societies 
had withdrawn its support of its colonies, caring for 700 children, which had 
already been established 14 By December 1939 the funds of many organisations 
were exhausted and the International Commission found itself taking over the 
colonies of a number of smaller organisations, including those belonging to the 
Swedish Committee 142 Another problem was that in war-time conditions all 
imports were liable to military requisition, making it risky for the Commission to 
bring in blankets and clothing 143Although refugees were encouraged to become 
self-supporting, there was an "iron clad" rule that refugees might not travel from 
Department to Department, whether to look for work or that a colony might be 
moved to safety, or to reunite families 14 
Kershner felt that some of the problems they were experiencing were 
deliberate: "If the truth were known, I think the French Government is opposed to 
having the refugees made so comfortable in France that they will not want to return 
to Spain. "145 However, it would be unfair not to point out that the French bore the 
brunt of the refugee exodus. In June 1939 alone the French government had spent 
140Howard Kershner to Herman Reissig, 30 November 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and 
Orgs.: Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to 
Howard Kershner, August-December (Box 11). 
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Kershner, August-December (Box 11). 
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Orgs.: Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to 
Howard Kershner, August-December (Box 11). 
"Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 25 October 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: 
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Kershner, August-December (Box 11). 
""Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 28 October 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: 
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approximately 15 million francs on the refugees and had obtained a 
further credit 
of 3 million francs for the same purpose 146 
Despite these difficulties, Friends' relief work became far more 
encompassing than it had been in Spain. As money came in from the Confederated 
Spanish Societies, an umbrella group of most of the old relief organisations, the 
International Commission and AFSC were able to abandon their policy of children 
first and women maybe and turn their attention to the majority of refugees, who 
were adult males. With $10,000 contributed by the Confederated Societies, it was 
possible to think in terms of providing appliances, tools, housing and rehabilitation 
training for mutilated men 14 Other work amongst men included finding clothing 
for those in the compulsory work gangs which France had established and assisting 
them in establishing or maintaining contact with their families148 Child feeding 
continued as usual, although increasingly the Friends were looking after more and 
more French evacuees in colonies and canteens; as many children were returned 
to Spain, it became hard to find Spanish children to fill dedicated places 149 
Consequently, the French government favoured the colonies as a way of 
accommodating French evacuee children. Conditions were not easy and money 
was in short supply, although the Spanish Refugee Relief Campaign (SRRC) and 
the Mennonites continued to support the work, but in this period of the war the 
Spanish children, at least, continued to enjoy the support of the French government 
and population 150 Workers were able to mediate between French authorities and 
camp inmates and to assist with the establishment of schools, material provided by 
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International Commission funds and milk was provided for children in the camps 
and maternity assistance where possible 151 A curious phenomenon which Howard 
Kershner observed, however, was the length of time colonies could survive after 
their sponsors announced that funds had dried up 152 The FSC workers continued 
to operate with the International Commission in the camps, distributing clothing 
and food to over 230 camps in 44 departments. 
In December the International Commission formally expanded its work to 
include French evacuees, adding a sub-department to its body. The FSC agreed to 
this step and was happy to be associated with it; Howard Kershner was anxious to 
have AFSC involvement, in part because the International Commission was not 
sure that non-Quaker elements would wish to continue with the work during war- 
time 1 However, although the AFSC had begun appealing for funds for general 
refugee services the bulk of this money went to help with the resettlement of 
refugees from Central Europe. It was unlikely that the AFSC could raise more than 
the $200,000 to which the total refugee budget already amounted 1" Whilst they 
would be happy to receive funds on behalf of the International Commission there 
was a general feeling that this would actively militate against the International 
Commission, as it would combine rather than distinguish the causes. Recognising 
the gradual disappearance of a distinct "Spanish problem", the Committee on 
Spain was subsumed into the Refugee Section of the AFSC in April 19401 
Financial support was dropping away rapidly, but some was actually 
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rejected. In January a dispute broke out when Howard 
Kershner unilaterally 
declined to pass on earmarked gifts from the SRRC to certain organisations 
in 
France 156 This was a response to the French government's ban on the 
Communist 
Party in September 1939, and its consequent attempts to monitor and shut down 
any agencies it regarded as suspicious. Howard Kershner, attempting to guard 
the 
AFSC and the International Commission from taint, refused to deal with those 
organisations with Communist sympathies. For Kershner to alienate the SRRC was 
problematic, however, as by 1940 it was the only American organisation in the USA 
which continued to raise funds for the Spanish refugees-the Confederated Spanish 
Societies represented only Spanish speaking peoples and had little influence with 
the North American public 1' When Howard Kershner returned to the USA in May 
1940, John Rich cautioned him in advance to withhold interviews with the 
American press until he was debriefed. The American political climate was 
increasingly hostile to the French government and the relief work was under 
constant criticism for being partial to French interests. 58 
In February Margaret Frawley of Boston was sent out to join the 
International Commission. A journalist and social worker she was sent partially to 
liaise with the Philadelphia office, and to send back detailed information of relief 
operations and sponsorship arrangements 
159 As the refugees had become an acute 
political problem there had arisen a culture clash between the organisations which 
contributed to the AFSC-who wished to see more direct political intervention on 
behalf of the refugees, and who had been alienated by Howard Kershner's 
acceptance of French conditions-and the AFSC itself. Margaret Frawley's role was 
to create and handle publicity, which the other workers had neither the time nor 
'Howard Kershner to John F. Rich, 2 January 1940. Committee on Spain, 1940, Corns. & Orgs.: 
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the experience to manage 160 Naturally, she was quickly sucked into the relief work. 
At the end of February a new government circular was issued declaring that all 
Spanish refugees unable to support themselves must return to Spain, an 
announcement which caused consternation amongst the refugees. In response 
Howard Kershner released a bulletin to all the Prefects instructing them that places 
would be found in colonies for children whose mothers found work 161 In May the 
French Government began to enquire into the statutes of all voluntary 
organisations and those not dissolved after the first judicial enquiry remained 
under caution. To be allowed to continue working in France a relief organisation 
had to be able to prove that it had no political connections, however indirect 162 The 
Confederated Spanish Society funds were sequestrated by the French government, 
leaving many Spanish refugees without means of support " 
By March 1940 the French concentration camps had been liquidated and the 
men had been moved into work gangs or had found work in agriculture or 
industry. However, although by May most male refugees had found employment, 
one of the problems in settling Spanish workers into employment in the 
increasingly welcoming industries was that unlike in agricultural work-in which 
many women were employed-in industry there was no actual provision of food 
to workers, and wages were paid fortnightly or monthly. Without government aid, 
and with the local prefectures having no money for this purpose, many of the 
refugees experienced greatest hardship just when they were becoming most 
established 1" Furthermore, Kershner estimated that there was a residue of 19,000 
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children, 15,000 women, 2,564 mutilated men and an unknown number of 
thousand of old and unemployable men who required continued care. Many were 
trying to emigrate but experiencing problems with visas 1" Yet despite worsening 
conditions in France, one hundred refugees a day were still coming over the 
Pyrenees in response to a Nationalist amnesty that consisted of internment and 
forced labour. 
The German advance in May 1940 led to huge influxes of refugees, both 
Belgian and French. In this context finding money specifically for the Spanish was 
next to impossible: "philanthropy is a fickle woman, pouring out her pennies as the 
headlines show the shift of battle, " Margaret Frawley wrote. In this climate, and in 
a situation where many Spanish were now settled into jobs, the best way to help the 
remaining refugees was to create a more general relief service, and to focus on need 
and not nationality 167 However, as the crisis deepened more restrictions were 
placed on foreigners and the programme of job-placement for Spanish refugees was 
suspended 16' 
By June refugee problems had escalated dramatically and the International 
Commission established sub-offices in Toulouse, Bordeaux and Perpignan in an 
attempt to deal with the emergency 169 The Friends and the International 
Commission were assisting Belgians, French, Poles, Luxembourgeois, and Spanish. 
It was no longer possible to separate the work and in practice few workers would 
have wished to170 The French authorities tended to expect the International 
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Commission to place credit at their disposal and were taken aback when specific 
orders were requested; however, despite this the French government did maintain 
concern for the refugees. In May the French government engaged the International 
Commission to inoculate all refugees against typhoid 171 In many areas the only real 
organisation was that provided by the refugees themselves, a trend of which the 
Friends approved, but at which the French government looked askance 1'Z 
As the war situation became more threatening the Friends in Paris 
instructed the Bordeaux office to secure accommodation for the Commission there, 
and plans were made to evacuate. Nineteen people were sent to Bordeaux on 8 
June. On 10 June another seven workers left Paris, leaving Richard Rees, Tony 
Gilpin, Margaret Frawley, Toot van Ordt and David Luscombe to follow, with a car 
and another lorry. A few days later, on the Saturday, news of the fall of Paris came 
through. The Bordeaux office heard that a British vessel, probably the last, was 
leaving Bordeaux, and called in all the British workers from the Prefectures. They 
arrived on the Sunday night, and on the Sunday and Monday the work and all 
money was transferred to the American, Irish and other neutral workers. In the 
absence of Howard Kershner, Margaret Frawley of the AFSC took charge, assisted 
by Howard Sturges (American), Una Mortisheas (Irish) and Wilhelm Frey (Swiss), 
and Toot van Oordt (Dutch) from the Paris office went on to join Celine Rott 
(American) at Montauban where there were many Dutch refugees needing help. 
Mary Elmes (Irish) went back to Perpignan, and Helga Holbeck (Danish) returned 
to Toulouse where she remained in charge. Donald Darling and William Brebner, 
both British, decided to remain, although Brebner had returned to Britain by 
September 173 In addition a number of French Catholics continued to work with the 
Friends 174 
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On 14 June, the Germans entered Paris. On 20 June Margaret Frawley, in the 
absence of Howard Kershner, closed the Paris office and sent the remaining 
workers on to Bordeaux. After the foreign staff left, all local French staff were paid 
off with two months' wages. All the foreign workers were asked to withdraw as 
much cash as possible from the bank and to carry the work on as long as possible 17S 
The armistice was announced on 22 June and the relief workers cabled Philadelphia 
to inform them that all relief work had been handed over to workers from neutral 
countries. 1' For the rest of June the number of refugees on the roads escalated 
enormously. The money taken from the banks was given to the field offices with 
instructions to buy supplies immediately and to feed the hungry 17 With the money 
following the refugees to Toulouse, Margaret Frawley chose to stay in Bordeaux 
and wait for the occupation: the Spaniards, as Republicans trapped in occupied 
territory, were understandably fearful 178 Furthermore, the British government 
refused to take out any refugees not listed as working with them and the American 
government was adamant that American ships should not enter French waters for 
refugees of any nationality. 179 
On 28 June Margaret Frawley wrote to say that the Germans had begun to 
"'Margaret Frawley to John F. Rich, 20 June 1940. Committee on Spain 1940, Correspondence, 
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move into Bordeaux and that she understood they intended to take over all 
services 180 When the Germans did enter Bordeaux, the Friends had fewer 
problems than they had anticipated. Returning from army head quarters where 
they had been granted permission to circulate, Frawley found two German soldiers 
waiting; recipients of Quaker feeding in 1919 they welcomed the Friends and 
helped to expedite matters: "That gratitude over two decades is something to 
treasure in these hard days. "18' 
On 1 July the French government moved to Vichy. In Toulouse the 
International Commission was feeding 5,000 a day, and another thousand in 
Montauban as French refugees began to head south. Similar problems were 
reported from Marseilles. 82 On 5 July, John Rich wrote to Luis B. Perez: 
The withdrawal of practically all foreign relief agencies from 
French territory leaves our Quaker workers alone with the burden 
of supporting the many thousands of Spanish refugee children 
formerly maintained with help from abroad. One of the last acts of 
the Raynaud Government was to place 6,500 Spanish children in our 
care. 83 
In addition, Howard Kershner reported a press release by General Franco 
forbidding further repatriation; 180,000 Spanish refugees were now trapped 
without the protection of a foreign government 1&' 
The principal tragedy was that as the work ballooned many societies 
withdrew or had their funds frozen'' The establishment of the Vichy government 
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did not prevent a blockade of all French ports, and the AFSC and the 
International 
Commission began to make presentations to the British Government for the safe 
passage of relief supplies 1' The escalation of the war also reinforced the 
American 
policy of keeping American ships out of war zones, thus preventing any 
American 
ship from being hired to take the Spanish refugees to Mexico. Ironically, the 
President's committee continued to offer $50 million for relief work if the AFSC 
could solve the blockade problems 187 Vichy also posed problems for the fund- 
raisers. In July the Foster Parents Plan (FPP), an organisation which had sponsored 
colonies, received letters from almost all the sponsors saying that if the money was 
to be used in France they would not continue to contribute: "it was their opinion 
that the Spanish children should go back to Spain rather than remain in France 
under Fascism. " As the committee shared this feeling the sponsorship scheme was 
effectively at an end, although all current stocks were to be turned over to the 
International Commission 188 Instead, the FPP took over the support of the Basque 
and Spanish children living in England, giving up on those in France, much to the 
annoyance of the AFSC who were shocked that the FPP could simply abandon 
responsibility for the children. The AFSC had long made a practice of substituting 
general funds where sponsorship fizzled out and did not really understand why 
the FPP did not do the same. The termination of an AFSC or FSC project had never 
been accompanied by the complete and immediate withdrawal which the FPP 
decided upon. It was as if the children ceased to exist for the FPP once the political 
cause they represented disappeared's9 
Sadly, having done a superb job in relocating the International Commission 
during the invasion, Margaret Frawley wrote that she had to leave in September 
in order to meet unavoidable personal commitments. There were now fifteen 
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Americans in France, soon to be joined by another two, and these would be the last 
new workers until the situation stabilised. The relief programme, although 
increasingly difficult to maintain, was still spending around Frs. 2,000,000 per 
month. Despite blockades and rigid restrictions on the transfer of funds to 
unoccupied France the AFSC had managed to buy more than 3,000 cases of Swiss 
milk and had transferred $50,000190 However, as far as the Spanish were concerned 
the writing was on the wall. In a letter home Margaret Frawley wrote, "for all 
practical purposes the unoccupied and occupied areas are pretty much the 
same" 
191 
As many children as could be sent home to relatives were now going, 
leaving many of the colonies with only a handful of Spanish children amidst large 
numbers of French and Belgians 192 Although the authorities were being 
cooperative the official services promised fail to materialise, many organisations 
simply folded up and left, and starvation began to set in amongst the refugees 193 
The AFSC found it increasingly difficult to separate their work into national 
groupings as the camps and refugee settlements were fairly mixed, and the Spanish 
refugees were no longer distinguished in all the records. This worried some 
organisations. SRRC expressed concern that the money they raised would be put 
into general relief in France, and felt that as the Spanish were solely dependent 
upon the International Commission they should have priority over the money 
SRRC raised. In reply John Rich explained that as the only money the AFSC was 
now receiving for the Spanish came from the SRRC they were in fact being 
subsidized by the general funds for relief in Europe. " Theoretically, under an 
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accord between Mexico and Vichy, all Spanish refugees were to be considered 
under the protection of the Mexican Embassy in Marseilles, and funds from the 
Spanish groups in Mexico were to go through the embassy, but this had little 
practical application as most of the left-wing groups in Mexico were unwilling to 
send money into Vichy France 195 
In total the Friends had complete care of over 1,000 children in Quaker 
houses scattered over France. An ever larger number were French, but Spanish, 
German, Czechoslovak and Polish children also made up the numbers. 
Supplementary feeding of another 30,000 children took place in 400 schools in 
Marseilles, Toulouse, Montauban, Auch, Carcassonne, Perpignan, Narbonne, 
Montpellier, Nimes and Lyons. Local French committees were also active, proving 
soup for many of the canteens, to which the Friends added rice, milk and chocolate. 
Milk was also being provided for 10,000 French babies and in the concentration 
camps of Argeles and Gurs, 196 2,000 children (the majority of who were Spanish) 
were given milk; maternity and infant clinics were maintained at Elne and 
Marseilles. 197 The Friends' work went back to where they had started, meeting 
refugees off trains and providing hot drinks and small comforts to the women and 
children. It was hoped that if funds could be raised the International Commission 
could continue to support around 900 remaining mutilated Spanish men, but the 
women and children would be prioritised. 198 An additional difficulty, which 
Frawley was anxious to avoid discussing with the Press when she returned, was 
General (Box 17). 
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whether food was by-passing the blockade and being 
diverted into occupied 
territory. She suspected that it was, but it was hard to monitor or to know what to 
do about it. '" 
On 7 April, John Rich wrote to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, to thank him 
for his assurance that the British government would reconsider passage through 
the blockade for food and clothing for adult prisoners in the French internment 
camps, but in the event, and with the American Red Cross declining to support the 
attempt to provide relief in the internment camps, the British government refused 
the request from the AFSC and the Jewish American Joint Distribution 
Committee 200 Despite this it was still intended to continue the feeding programme 
in the camps in unoccupied France until September 1941, after which supplies and 
funds would probably run out 201 The Quakers were now one of a very few groups 
to be allowed into the camps202 In 1942, when Germany occupied Southern France 
most of the AFSC workers left. It is not very clear how many overseas Quaker 
workers remained in France (perhaps two or three): there are no records of names 
in the published sources and the AFSC archives have yet to be searched for this 
information, but these workers, with the assistance of the small number of Quakers 
in Marseilles and Paris, continued to provide small-scale relief in the camps in the 
South of France, to French prisoners in SS-controlled prisons and to give some 
limited aid to deportation trains. Some work was also done amongst those in 
hiding in Toulouse. 03 
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6.3 North Africa 
In an attempt to escape Spain around 5,000 people, men, women and children, took 
ship for French North Africa in April 1939204 Once there, the majority were refused 
permission to leave the ships, although 1,700 were allowed to disembark and were 
placed in a clearing camp in Oran205 Of the remaining 3,200 none were allowed to 
disembark from the thirteen ships on which they had arrived whilst the French 
government attempted to get the British to take some responsibility for the 
refugees. Although the Friends could do little to provide long term help, as an arm 
of the International Commission their representatives were able to fumigate, clothe 
and feed the refugees in Oran and eventually to secure their disembarkation. 06 
The economic situation of the refugees was worse than in France as no relief 
dining-rooms were established and the French authorities refused to grant work 
permits. Only very small industrial projects were permitted and some refugees 
were permitted to peddle, but otherwise there was little to live on? ' Many refugees 
were placed in "Foreign Labour Companies" scattered across the French territories. 
The Labour Companies were run like prisons, work was on such tasks as rail road 
construction in the summer heat, and failure to accomplish set tasks led to beatings. 
In addition, refugees were given no assurance that they would not be extradited to 
Spain208 
The fall of France led to a huge influx of refugees into Morocco. Once there, 
the internees were classified as Travailleurs Civils Etrangers (Foreign Civilian 
Workers). Although guarded by military personnel and treated as one step up 
209In April there were 8,000 refugees stranded in Oran and 3,500 in Bizerta (North Africa). Notes 
on the conference between John Reich and the Confederation of Spanish Societies. 11 April 
1939, Committee on Spain 1939, Refugees, Spanish Resettlement in Mexico, General (Box 13). 
205Robert Wheeler, "Preliminary Report on Refugees in North Africa", April 1939, Committee 
on Spain, 1939. Corns. and Orgs.: Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain (Box 
11). 
206Howard Kershner, "Report of Mission of the Director to Spain", April 13 to May 5 1939), 
Committee on Spain, 1939. Corns. and Orgs.: Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in 
Spain (Box 11). 
207Committee on Spain 1940, Refugees, Spanish Refugees in France and North Africa (Box 19) 
T0. Ibid. 
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from slave labour (they were paid around 50 centimes a day), the designation 
wiped out all formal obligations of the military authorities. Prisoners of War cannot 
be forced to work, but the TCE could 209 The demobilisation of large numbers of 
French soldiers in French Morocco added to the problems, increasing 
overcrowding, exacerbating food shortages and contributing to the spread of 
typhus and malaria 210 The refugees were organised into camps 80 km from 
Casablanca although the AFSC managed to keep 126 invalids and small children 
outside by granting each 5,000 francs. Those who had their own means were 
interned as soon as their money ran out, and as under Vichy work was forbidden 
this occurred rapidly. 
As the Vichy government became established things worsened for the 
refugees. A report from Don Ramon Gonzalez Sicilia, who had served as 
Republican Spanish Consul in Casablanca, indicated that the contacts which had 
existed between the refugees and the French authorities had broken down. Despite 
public agreements between the Mexican government and that of Vichy, the 
refugees had no documentation other than the Foreigners' Identification Card 
issued by the French police in Morocco. When a refugee asked for authorisation to 
leave for Mexico, the Mexican Legation in France answered that permits would be 
issued in lots when a boat was assured, thus preventing people from arranging 
their own passage where possible. In June 1941, an attempt to evacuate as many as 
possible on the American ships the Winnipeg and the Wyoming failed when the 
Winnipeg was stopped and held by the British, and the passengers of the Wyoming 
were forcibly removed by the French authorities and returned to concentration 
camps. 11 
"'Report of Rudi Nobel on North Africa, 6 October 1941. Foreign Service 1941, France, Relief, 
North Africa (Box 26). 
210Statement of Health Conditions in French Morocco, Dr. William Hills Sheldon, Assistant 
Professor, Cornell University, 4 November 1941. Foreign Service 1941, France, Relief, North 
Africa (Box 26. ). 
211Refugee Services, 1941; French North Africa, Refugee Program Reports (Box 27). 
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6.4 Resettlement in Mexico 
Throughout 1939 and 1940 the AFSC had endeavoured to raise money 
for 
emigration but succeeded mainly in finding sponsors 
for specific individuals. In 
part, this was due to their reluctance to get involved with this side of the work, 
but 
also because their style of fund raising tended to lean towards small numbers of 
people giving large amounts to specific objects 
212 In addition, however, the AFSC 
had to deal with the effects of the USA's 1924 immigration act which effectively 
prohibited such sponsorship from supporting emigration to the USA. Only 
individuals could sponsor and the immigrant had to prove a connection between 
themselves and the interested party. The law had ostensibly been intended to 
prevent labour contractors from bringing large parties of people over, but it had 
always been obvious that it would prevent mass migration of any kind? " In effect, 
this forced the AFSC to look to other countries to take in large number of refugees. 
The only country to do so was Mexico. With the outbreak of war, and the invasion 
of France in 1940 migration plans became imperative. 
The Mexican Government's response to the flight of refugees from Spain 
exceeded the normal bounds of generosity. Early in the war Mexico had offered 
sanctuary to prestigious Spanish intellectuals, the elite of academic society 
"' 
Although Mexico had, since 1910, been a haven for political exiles, Mexican law 
was strict on the admission of immigrants and even stricter with regard to 
qualifications for citizenship. For the Spanish, the Mexican Government made an 
exception-seeing in the cause of the Republic a reflection of Mexico's own 
revolutionary struggles-and the Spanish refugees were offered the right to 
unlimited immigration and almost automatic citizenship 
215 Discussions in 
March and April 1939 with the Mexican government had established an initial total 
212Eleanor Stabler Clarke to Board of Directors and Committee on Spain, 12 April 1940. 
Committee on Spain 1940, General (Box 14), 
213John Rich to Herman Reissig, 19 March 1940. Committee on Spain 1940, Corns. & Orgs.: 
Spanish Refugee Relief Campaign, General (Box 17). 
214 Patricia W. Fagen, Exiles and Citizens: Spanish Republicans in Mexico, University of Texas 
Press, Austin and London, 1973, pp. 29-30. 
2151bid., p. 31. 
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of 50,000 people and a number of general principles Zlb Only refugees who wanted 
to live in Mexico could be sent-there were to be no forcible transportations-and 
if a man were to be selected his entire family would be sent. Priority would be 
given to those whose lives would be in danger if they returned to Franco 's Spain 
(in effect this meant everybody) and selections would be according to skill, ability 
and health. No political favouritism was to influence selection and the only 
restriction on the immigrants was that they were precluded from participation in 
Mexican politics-a sop handed out to the Mexican Right 217 
In April, Dr. Puche, Professor of Medicine and Rector of the University of 
Valencia and previously chief of the war sanitary services of the Republic, was sent 
to Mexico to open headquarters with a small staff, to establish the necessary 
connections with the Spanish authorities and to begin the work of looking at the 
possibilities of assimilation for the refugees 218 Because of the hostility of the USA 
to the prospect of Spanish refugees, there was a certain amount of anxiety on the 
part of the government that the Mexican plan be successful. 219 
A critical question was just what work the already overstretched AFSC 
would undertake in Mexico. There was pressure from other organisations for the 
Friends to either sponsor a Spanish colony in Mexico or to provide a welcome 
committee to assist the assimilation of refugees into the wider population, but they 
were reluctant to become involved in direct aid to a highly politicised group of 
adult and fit males, even though their selection criteria had already begun to break 
down in their work in the French camps. In addition, much of their work in Mexico 
had as much to do with settling German-Jewish refugees as it did with the 
216 Conversation between American Friends Service Committee and Confederation of Spanish 
Societies, Committee on Spain 1939, Refugees, Spanish Resettlement in Mexico, General (Box 
13). 
2"Ibid. 
Z'8Ibid.; Fagen op. cit., p. 48. 
279The Committee for Impartial Civilian Relief in Spain, the President's committee, offered to 
support the effort through the Friends, but it is not clear exactly what this support amounted 
to. Mary Carter Jones to Clarence Pickett, 7 April 1939, Committee on Spain 1939, Refugees, 
Spanish Resettlement in Mexico, General (Box 13). 
249 
Spanish -22' 
The Mexican government agreed to provide an agency to support the 
refugees; to locate, survey and divide suitable land; give title to the 
land to those 
who settled; provide machinery to drill wells; provide government agencies such 
as post offices, telegraph services, railroads and police protection; and to provide 
a large amount of equipment for free. The agencies would supply windmills 
for 
tapping water, food and clothing, tools, seeds and technical aid. In reality, the 
government simply did not have the resources, and the war in Europe increasingly 
drained the fund-raising powers of the voluntary agencies1 Properly sceptical of 
such generous offers, the Friends sent out Sir Richard Rees to investigate. 
In June 1939 Sir Richard Rees, who had worked for the AFSC/International 
Commission until 1940, was sent to Mexico to investigate conditions. Around 2,400 
refugees had already arrived, with around 800 in Mexico City. One consistent 
problem was that the emphasis on getting out those in greatest danger meant that 
a large proportion were intellectuals, many very distinguished, but most with little 
money. Whilst welcoming the refugees, the Mexican government had hoped for 
agricultural workers and mechanics. What they got was, "anything from a civil 
servant up or down to a poet" . 
222 
The local Spanish Committee had engaged itself to organise reception 
arrangements and refugees were being distributed from Veracruz to the 
surrounding villages as rapidly as possible. All were supported by the local 
committee with some assistance granted by amenable state governors, despite 
some hostility from the Right ' With the uncertain state of Mexican politics, there 
was a strong chance of the refugees becoming a political football. Rees reported 
that the Italians, Germans and Falange Espanola all had representatives in Mexico, 
220"Report of John F. Rich Representing the American Friends Service Committee in Mexico 
City, February 11-12,1940 on Behalf of Spanish and German Refugee Interests". Jewish Refugee 
Settlement in Mexico 1940 (Box 16). 
zl'FrankTannenbaum to John Rich, 30 May 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Refugees, Spanish 
Resettlement in Mexico, General (Box 13). 
222Report from Sir Richard Rees, 19 June 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Refugees, Spanish 
Resettlement in Mexico, General (Box 13). 
2"mid. 
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who appeared to be financing anti-government newspapers and politicians, and 
it 
was felt that they would encourage the Rightist press to attack the refugees 
in the 
run up to the Presidential election. For Mexicans, the Spanish 
Civil War appeared 
a struggle between the proponents of tradition and modernity. 
In the heated 
political atmosphere the war and the refugees easily became a referent 
for the 
domestic debate. ' As Cardenas was constitutionally excluded from running for 
another term, it was not necessarily in anyone's interest to support the refugees, 
particularly as the left drew its support from the Indians and peasants, 
few of 
whom read the newspapers anyway and whose land rights might be in jeopardy 
in the cause of resettlement. 
In a secondary report from Pachuca, the capital of the State of Hidalgo, Rees 
was able to report that ninety-nine families had settled down to attempt market 
gardening. Fourteen refugees had been found clerical posts with the State 
Governor, two textile workers had gone into a local factory, and builders and 
carpenters had found work locally, some on the new Civil Hospital? . 25 In Toluca 
seventy families (about one hundred individuals, which suggests many incomplete 
families) were placed but here things were less happy, with wariness and mutual 
suspicion poisoning relationships between the Spanish and the local peasants who 
resented this influx of new Spanish blood? 
" In his final report in July 1939 Rees 
gave it as his opinion that Mexico could support unlimited migration if sufficient 
funds were available for settlement and irrigation. However, the success of such a 
project would depend on the immigrants not competing in Mexican labour 
markets: instead they "should develop new territories and new industries", a rather 
optimistic and nave approach to the issues. 
' It later emerged that the cost of 
settling each farmer had proven much higher than estimated, since in order to 
224Carolyn P. Boyd, "Latin American Perspectives on the Spanish Civil War", Latin American 
Research Review, vol. 20, no. 1. pp. 202-208. 
Ibid. 
226Report from Sir Richard Rees, 19 June 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Refugees, Spanish 
Resettlement in Mexico, General (Box 13). 
227Report from Sir Richard Rees, 30 July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Refugees, Spanish 
Resettlement in Mexico, General (Box 13). 
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assure a decent standard of living for what were, essentially, urbanites, some 
industrialisation had been necessary if they were not to abandon the colonies for 
already overcrowded cities728 In the event, it seems clear that wherever the 
refugees were settled, they tended to regather and relocate in urban ethnic 
enclaves. 9 
On his return to Philadelphia Rees expressed a number of qualms. Despite 
the much vaunted neutrality of the agencies involved, Rees felt that the selection 
of refugees made by SERE (the Servicio de Emigracion de Republicanos Espanoles) 
and Ambassador Bassols (Mexican Ambassador to Paris) leaned towards Negrin's 
followers and was at least passively supportive of communism, which he feared 
would arouse the antagonism of the Mexican Right. The consolation he offered was 
that "almost without exception, the Spanish refugees coming to Mexico are most 
anxious to settle down to a normal, peaceful life and forget politics, no matter how 
interested or active they were in Spain. "230 Despite accusations that Negrin wielded 
undue influence over the migration programme, it was felt that Negrin genuinely 
wished for the services of the Friends in order to prevent the opposition using the 
refugees as political ammunition 231 However, all of this was complicated by 
disagreements within the Republican ranks` 
Initially, the AFSC's involvement with Mexico had been in resettlement 
projects for German Jews. For this purpose it was thought to send Daniel and 
Elizabeth Jensen to reside in Mexico City for a year-233 However, Daniel Jensen's 
explorations of Mexico City did not suggest an obvious task for the Jensens to 
"'Jose Puche to John Rich, 27 December 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Refugees, Spanish 
Resettlement in Mexico, General (Box 13). 
'Tagen, op. cit., pp. 52-55. 
230Report from Sir Richard Rees, 3 August 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Refugees, Spanish 
Resettlement in Mexico, General (Box 13). 
23'Ibid. 
ZDemetrio Delgado de Torres to Clarence E. Pickett, 22 September 1939. Committee on Spain 
1939, Refugees, Spanish Resettlement in Mexico, General (Box 13). 
'Clarence E. Pickett to Daniel Jensen, cable, 13 September 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. 
Correspondence: Mexico (Jensens) from/to (Box 12). 
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perform in this direction, and he turned instead to the problems facing the Spanish 
refugees ' There was little money available for direct relief, and with Republican 
money tied up in Mexico it was difficult to appeal for funds, but assistance with 
resettlement and education-a programme of moral and spiritual, rather than 
physical help-was feasible . 
23' On the basis of the Jensens' expense account of 
around $2,500 for a year, some small assistance might be provided for specific 
projects but Daniel Jensen felt strongly that the growing European concerns of the 
AFSC took precedence in both urgency and levels of need. ' One major need was 
for assistance in reuniting divided families, and there are a number of letters in the 
files requesting assistance with this activity. Success was mixed and whilst contact 
with relatives in Spain could often be established, reuniting people was almost 
impossible'' The work done by the local committee consisted of some direct 
relief, up to a maximum for any one family of $10 per day. but mainly the checking 
and establishing of qualifications and the settling of "employables" into paid work; 
although as many were professionals this was not easy. Many of the skilled 
workmen were employed in a cooperative factory turning out tools, and elsewhere 
Spanish men were settled in agricultural cooperatives, an aspect of the work dear 
to the heart of the Jensens, who ran a cattle ranch. Ironically, the war conditions 
assisted with the resettlement projects as it limited the numbers of Spaniards who 
could leave Europe. The receiving station at Perote had been intended to receive 
up to 2,000 refugees but found itself with rarely more than 300 at a time8 
'See file: Committee on Spain 1939. Correspondence: Mexico (Jensens) from/to (Box 12). 
235Daniel Jensen to John F. Rich, 22 October 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Correspondence: 
Mexico (Jensens) from/to (Box 12). 
236John F. Rich to Daniel Jensen, 27 October 1939 and to Elizabeth Marsh Jensen, 7 November 
1939; the Jensens to John F. Rich, 12 December 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. 
Correspondence: Mexico (Jensens) from/to (Box 12). Daniel Jensen to John F. Rich, 13 
November 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Correspondence: Mexico (Jensens) from/to (Box 
12). 
237Daniel Jensen to John F. Rich, 23 October 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Correspondence: 
Mexico (Jensens) from/to (Box 12). Committee on Spain 1940, Correspondence Mexico, Jensens, 
January-June (Box 17). 
238"Report by Daniel Jensen", 17 October 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Correspondence: 
Mexico (Jensens) from/to (Box 12). 
253 
In November, Clarence Pickett had written to Dr. Frank Tannenbaum that 
with the deterioration in world conditions, it would be best if the majority of the 
150-200,000 refugees in France went back to Spain. Only about 20-50,000 prominent 
people needed to be got to Mexico, thus, in his opinion reducing the problem to 
something more manageable " Unfortunately, unless Mexico could furnish the 
ships, it looked unlikely that even this number could be removed. John Rich 
mourned the problem with Dr. Aydelotte of Swarthmore: 
No one seems to have any money for migration. Transportation is 
difficult to secure and Latin American countries are loath to make 
any commitments regarding acceptance of Spanish refugees 240 
This transportation, however, was dependent upon raising at least an extra $50,000. 
Unless the British Government and a variety of voluntary agencies contributed this 
was unlikely, and on the whole, although the British government agreed to pay half 
the costs of transportation, the Santo Domingo project succeeded only in sending 
sponsored individuals? " Mass migration to Santo Domingo was not really feasible, 
and the conditions there were such-with limited government funds, and an 
economy dependent on agricultural labour, of which the refugees had little 
experience-that many migrants used it as a stepping stone to somewhere else? ' 
The problem for Friends in considering this type of relief work was that it was 
potentially endless? ` 
139Clarence E. Pickett to Dr. Frank Tannenbaum, 20 November and 20 December 1939. 
Committee on Spain, 1939, Refugees, Spanish Resettlement in Mexico, General (Box 13). 
240John Rich to Dr. Frank Aydelotte, 22 December 1939. Committee on Spain, 1939, Refugees, 
Spanish Resettlement in Mexico, General (Box 13). 
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International Commission. (Box 14); Joseph A. Rose, Dominican Republic Settlement 
Association, Inc. to Clarence E. Pickett, 17 April 1940. Committee on Spain 1940. Corns. & Orgs.: 
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By 1940 the prospects of relocating large numbers of Spanish refugees were 
poor. The Mexican government was willing to take almost any number but only on 
condition that they be financially underwritten, and there was no money in sight 
as long as the basic needs of the the refugees in France were to be met. From July, 
similar demands were made of refugees landing in Santo Domingo Z44 The Jensens' 
mission had always been planned as an advisory rather than relief service and 
despite constant appeals from them, there was little hope of any money? 4' In May 
1940 Spaniards were forbidden, at twenty-four hours notice, to leave Spain 246 In 
July, the Vichy government began to clamp down on Spanish refugees and make 
it increasingly difficult for them to leave. By October, the collapse of France had 
affected a number of fund raising bodies, including SERE, the Spanish organisation 
which had sponsored most of the resettlement in Mexico 27 With no money on 
either side, and a lack of cooperation on one, emigration was looking ever less 
feasible. The Spanish Refugee Relief Campaign, still active, reported that the Vichy 
government were refusing to allow refugees to leave even when boats were 
available, in violation of their agreement with Mexico248 The Jensens' work 
resembled far more that of a traditional Quaker centre than it did a relief station. 
Much of what they did was to provide open house, to write letters for people and 
intervene with the authorities, provide textbooks where possible and to provide 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
"Daniel Jensen to John F. Rich, 2 March and 7 July 1940, John F. Rich to Daniel and Elizabeth 
Jensen, 8 April 1940. Committee on Spain 1940, Correspondence Mexico, Jensens, January-June 
(Box 17). 
2''sIbid. 
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"Herman Reissig, SRRC, to John F. Rich, 26 March 1941. France, Relief, Internment Corps, 1940 
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Relief, Internment Corps, 1940 (Box 25). Jack Nicholls, Ministry of Economic Warfare to John 
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hospitality to those passing through 249 Many Spanish colonists had settled down 
and were supporting themselves, schools were running although short of funds, 
and a certain amount of self-assistance was organised., There was some clothing 
distribution but as many of the Spanish had by now scattered in various 
settlements, this was a difficult job, and as the refugees became more settled, and 
began to accept Mexican citizenship, they became increasingly hard to mobilise in 
support of their counterparts still in France'" 
After the war there was a growth in Spanish Republican cultural politics as 
the refugees looked briefly to the victorious allied powers to overthrow the 
Nationalist regime, but the failure of this hope led the majority of the refugees to 
look to Mexico for their future2 In March 1947, Franco announced that 
Republicans might return to Spain unless they were guilty of political crimes. This 
naturally had little effect, but in the 1950s the rapprochement between Mexico and 
Spain was achieved in part by the extension of a more cordial welcome to those 
who wished to return. 
2'9Memorandum, 25 September 1940. Committee on Spain 1940, Correspondence Mexico, 
Jensens, January June (Box 17). 
250Daniel and Elizabeth Jensen to John Rich, 3 December 1940. Committee on Spain 1940, 
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Chapter Seven: 
Ethics and Ideology 
The Friends' insistence on the distinctive nature of their relief work, and its 
intimate connection with their witness to peace and social justice, is not fully 
substantiated by the simple fact of their work. They were not, after all, the only 
relief organisation engaged in Spain. In their letters, however, the relief workers 
maintained that critical to their work was the mode in which they conducted it. In 
this chapter I shall examine the decisions the Friends made at different levels of the 
organisation and attempt to describe the ideologies they brought with them and 
those ideologies which developed on the ground. It is not possible to separate 
ideological considerations from financial concerns and this chapter will consider 
how the relief workers' interpretation of financial ethics led to a number of very 
distinctive attitudes, extending into both their public and private domains, and the 
degree to which their beliefs shaped the ways in which they worked with others. 
This chapter will conclude with an exploration of Howard Kershner's impact on the 
relief workers in Spain, and the extent to which he reoriented the public witness 
and reinterpreted the field workers' values in the light both of changed conditions 
and his own character. 
7.1 The Special Qualities of Quaker Relief 
It has already been established that the Friends decided to focus their relief on 
children. This decision was not dissimilar from that of other organisations and 
although their motives may have been slightly different, with an emphasis on the 
neutrality of the recipients rather than a decision to aid the Spanish Republic, they 
did not stand out in this fashion from other agencies involved in Spain. The SCIU, 
in fact, used similar arguments. However, the Friends held a distinctive witness 
which shaped their ideology. 
Although the most public side of the Friends' testimony in the Spanish Civil 
War was the maintenance of neutrality and the succouring of the victims of war, 
a practice shared with both the SCN and the Red Cross, they themselves felt that 
such a witness would be in itself inadequate. Crucial to the twentieth-century 
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Friends witness-both British and American-was a belief in social 
justice. Unless 
the witness to peace was linked to some attempt to preserve and sponsor social 
justice it had the potential to become a belief in the duty of the Christian to suffer 
tyranny. 
The AFSC and the FSC were themselves products of the acceptance of a 
social gospel which put deeds before words: at the turn of the century they 
had 
firmly rejected theological understandings which saw worldly activity as a 
distraction from the "eternal truths" of Christianity. ' Liberal Quaker theology 
emphasised social justice as a crucial element in the making of peace. This itself was 
perhaps the crux of the matter: in their work in Europe and in Ireland during the 
nineteenth century, the Friends had moved from a belief in the keeping of peace 
through neutrality and non-compliance in the acts of war, to a growing belief that 
it was their duty to make the conditions for peace. How they chose to dispense 
relief was a part of an ideological stance on peacemaking. 
In December 1936 the FSC Spain Committee responded to a request from 
an English woman who wished to evacuate her children, explaining that they had 
declined to take part in any international evacuation from Spain. During the war, 
the Friends in both organisations consistently refused to assist the evacuation of 
children from Spain, making an exception only for children who were taken to 
camps and colonies on either side of the French-Spanish border. The Friends 
declined to become involved in any of the other schemes for helping Spanish 
children, such as the Basque refugee project or the attempts by the National Joint 
Committee, from late 1937, to arrange for the repatriation of children 3 
1H. Kraemer, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World, Edinburgh House Press, 
London, 1938, p. 48; Rufus Jones, The Quaker Peace Position, Peace Association of Friends in 
America, Richmond, Indiana, 1915. 
2Dorothy Thompson, Assistant Secretary, Spain Committee to Alfred Jacob, 2 December 1938. 
London letters -copies, 1938 (General Files 1938, Foreign Service). 
This second possibility, involvement in repatriation, emerged in late 1937. Earl Smith and Dan 
West, Mennonite AFSC representatives to Nationalist Spain, stopped off in London to hold talks 
with the National Joint Committee about the possibilities. The conclusions, however, were less 
than positive. The committee felt that few parents would be found to admit to not wanting their 
children to return and it would place these parents at risk of persecution if some were returned 
and not others. The Mennonites' proposal, that neutral territory should be established from 
which the children might be collected, was dismissed as impracticable. Dan West and Earl 
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The first matter-the support of Basque children in Britain-was 
vehemently opposed by Alfred Jacob because of the excessive cost-which he 
found to be inefficient and unethical-of the potential trauma to the children taken 
away from their own culture, and of the problem of maintaining public interest in, 
and financial support, of the children after the initial enthusiasm had worn off. 
Jacob argued that it was cheaper to bring food to the children than the 
children to the food and argued that it was psychologically healthier for the 
children to remain in Spain. In some instances, Jacob felt called upon to question 
the motives of those who wished to take children abroad. One such individual was 
a Mrs. Adeney who desired to adopt a Spanish child for the experience of bringing 
such a child up with her family; Alfred Jacob asked if she would not rather donate 
such a child's passage-money to feeding a far greater number of children in Spain. 
He felt strongly that the plans which emerged in 1937 to transport considerable 
numbers of Spanish and Basque children to countries offering refuge went against 
the principle that no child should receive "special" treatment and that the money 
spent on train-fares for this relatively small number of children deprived others of 
badly needed food and medical aid. In contrast, the SCIU took no such stance: Dr. 
Pictet arranged with Senor Alcalä to send some 500 children to Switzerland and 
increasing hardship in Barcelona meant that by late January the Catalan Refugee 
Committee was prepared to acquiesce as long as certain conditions were met 5 
Friends' qualms over the wisdom of bringing the children to England were later 
justified to some degree. A number of the older boys had to be returned to Spain 
when their behaviour made them unwelcome in the towns and camps offering 
support. " When money did run out and once the war ended it became difficult for 
Smith, to John Reich and Patrick Malin, 15 September 1937, Committee on Spain, 1937: 
Correspondence, Nationalist Spain, Workers (from and to). 
'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 16 January 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
'In public the FSC Spain Committee supported all efforts made in whatever direction. Alfred 
Jacob to Fred Tritton, 24 January 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
6FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 22 July 1937. 
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sponsors to justify the children's presence. 
' 
The drive to sponsor children's colonies by both the Barcelona and the 
Murcia units, which began in earnest in April 1937, coupled worries over growing 
food shortages with a concern for children's moral and spiritual well-being. 
Although the Friends generally opposed evacuation overseas, evacuation within 
Spain was something they believed to be potentially beneficial to large numbers of 
children, and which offered efficiency gains in terms of feeding substantial 
numbers of children in a central location. Having seen a number of mentally 
damaged children at her feeding centre in Murcia, Esther Farquhar visited a 
number of colonies in June 1937: "the stories of the individual children and of their 
experiences are hard to believe since they now seem such happy normal children... 
We wish that more of the children could be living in these colonies. "8 For many 
children, as I have discussed in Chapter Three, the colonies were a means of 
rehabilitation, and the creation of holiday camps and part-time colonies was one 
means by which Francesca Wilson attempted to fulfil this aim. But children's 
colonies were by no means a new idea; they had become popular in both America 
and Britain in the nineteenth century as a means of housing orphaned and 
homeless children and taking children out of the city slums into the 
countryside-in Britain, Dr. Barnardo's Homes were perhaps the best known of the 
children's colonies or villages. In Spain, a number of children's societies and relief 
organisations quickly took up the idea as a way of getting children out of the cities 
where the privations were likely to be greatest, and also as a means of housing 
refugees. In November 1936, Alfred Jacob visited a number of these colonies, both 
to assess what needs they had, and in order to consider whether this was an 
appropriate method of providing relief. Conditions in these colonies varied widely 
although this did not appear to relate automatically to who ran the colonies. Thus, 
the first colony Jacob visited, run by Ayuda Infantil de Retaguardia, was one of the 
better homes, the children being housed two to a room and one to each bed. Those 
7The older boys followed news of the war closely and tended to be highly politicised. They did 
not easily fit the popular image of "innocents". Legaretta, op. cit., p. 119. 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 20 June 1937, Committee on Spain: Correspondence from Esther 
Farquhar (Box 3). 
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children from better-off families had brought clothing with them; others, some 
from the streets, had brought nothing and there was a general shortage of clothing. 
The Ayuda Infantil was made up of anti-fascist students, although Jacob reported 
that its publicity did not stress this point, and children were helped irrespective of 
their parents' political allegiance. However, the second home, run by the same 
organisation, contained many slum children and conditions were poor. Children 
were in dormitories of ten or twelve, potentially hastening the spread of infection. 
The children greeted their visitors with the raised arm and clenched fist, and a 
picture of Lenin hung in the chapel. This home was much more political, but the 
absence of politics in the first colony suggests that politics was brought by the 
children and their responsables rather than the sponsoring organisation. 
Most of the colonies were settled in large houses abandoned by their owners 
at the start of the war. Ayuda Infantil settled children in colonies of between thirty 
and ninety children, under the care of their teachers and other voluntary help. The 
intention was that through the comradeship of school classes, educational and 
cultural values could be preserved better in this fashion than by billeting refugee 
children with individual families. In 1936, the Ayuda Infantil was taking care of 465 
children, with the help of subscriptions and donations. Government support was 
restricted to the supply of rice, beans, sugar and cooking oil, but this was clearly 
more government support than the children would have received in their own 
homes 9A report from the International Red Aid home in Castellon, suggested that 
a shortage of supervisory personnel made it difficult for children to be monitored 
in individual homes 1° The Friends, although not always comfortable with the overt 
politicisation of these homes, believed that their support for a wide range of groups 
would avert accusations of bias. More important than the colour of their politics, 
was the fact that these organisations were feeding children. Their difficulties in 
Nationalist Spain would centre on whether children were actually being fed. 
The first of the Quaker children's colonies was in Puigcerdä on the French 
border. The settlement at Puigcerda was to develop into more of a village as a 
'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 19 November 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, "International Red Aid: Castellon; visit to War Orphans Home 
at Benicasim", 21 November 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
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number of organisations sponsored different houses. The Quaker representatives 
there were Norma Jacob, who settled there with her two children, Theresa and 
Piers, and Esme Odgers, a representative of the Australian Spanish Relief 
Committee, who chose to work under Quaker aegis. Internal evacuation, to 
colonies and camps, proved to be a suitable subject for publicity photographs and 
were Alfred Jacob's solution to the difficulty in which the FSC found itself when it 
refused to sponsor evacuation, something for which it was relatively easy to raise 
funds. In the FSC Bulletin in late December 1937, members of the Birmingham 
Meetings and other donors were encouraged to send postcards and manufactured 
products from the city of Birmingham to the children of the Birmingham colony at 
Caldas Maravella, a small health resort south of Gerona. In such ways the 
connection between donor and recipient, always an important consideration for 
Friends, could be strengthened. " The Belgian, Swedish and Swiss colonies which 
Alfred Jacob had observed seemed an appropriate means of feeding and caring for 
large numbers of children. Despite the fact that he still believed, in principle, that 
Friends' money should supply food alone, he also believed that the speed with 
which these colonies became established, and therefore capable of distributing the 
food, could be increased if installation costs could be met from abroad. The main 
emphasis was on getting the children out of Madrid and Barcelona as soon as 
possible. With plenty of large houses available, Jacob felt there was scope for 
expansion of the colony system beyond refugee children, and suggested that 
foreign organisations could agree to provide the funds to provision the homes, 12 
whilst individuals could themselves sponsor individual children. 13 
The decision to support the children's colonies took the Friends for the first 
time beyond simply the provision of milk. To keep the colonies going required the 
supply of a wide range of food stuffs including chickpeas, noodles, rice, sugar, fish 
(usually salted cod), tinned meat and lentils, and the shortage of food in the area 
1'FSCSpain Bulletin, no. 16,22/12/37. 
12Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 9 April and 4 May 4 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, undated but sometime before 4 May (date of next letter) and 
stamped received 10 May 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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meant that it was urgent that food be sent in quickly from abroad 
14 Some food 
could be grown locally, but the absence of most of the male workforce meant that 
there was nobody to do the heavy digging. " By July 1937, however, the Friends 
had offers of financial support from Friends in Paris, Birmingham, Denmark and 
Norway16 The Paris and Birmingham colonies were to be in Rubi, a short distance 
from Barcelona, and under the supervision of Asistencia Infantil. Both were to be 
ready for occupation in mid-July, housing a total of ninety-five children17 
However, although it continued to support the Manresa colony for which it was 
already responsible, the Danish committee pulled out of the scheme when the news 
arrived that 500 Basque children were to be received in Denmark, this despite Elise 
Thomsen advising the committee of the views of Alfred Jacob and herself on this 
subject 18 
Once the colonies were materially established, the difficulty was to convince 
parents to send their children. Domingo Ricart and Elise Thomsen began a series 
of visits to Murcia and to Madrid (where conditions were particularly bad) in order 
to persuade the authorities and parents of the advisability of sending children 
away. In general, whilst parents appeared to support the concept, many were 
reluctant to be parted from their children despite the conditions in which they were 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 10/11 June 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
'-With this in mind, Alfred Jacob requested the service of voluntary diggers, a group of students 
under the supervision of Jack Hoyland, a British Quaker. Getting visas for such a workforce, 
however, required some negotiation with the Foreign Office who, presumably, feared the 
young men involved would use it as a way to join the International Brigade. In the event, the 
diggers were allowed in, but rather than digging individual plots for each house, in Jacob's 
absence they were sidelined into other, larger work, including digging drainage ditches, 
clearing bricks in preparation for a stable, cleaning houses in preparation for the children, and 
preparing some of the land for planting crops. Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, addendum dated 
13 July to letter of 7 July 1937, FSC/R/SP/1 /3; Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 11 September 1937, 
FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
16Alfred Jacob to Henry von Ettei, Paris, 2 July 1937; Elise Thomsen to FT, 2 July 1937; Alfred 
Jacob to Mrs. Small, 17 July 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 7 July 1937, Elise Thomsen to Fred Tritton, 30 July 1937, 
FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"Elise Thomsen to FT, 30 July 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
263 
living 19 
The establishment and maintenance of the colonies did not go as smoothly 
as might have been wished. By mid-August 1937, it had become clear that getting 
food through to Spain on a regular basis was not going to be easy. The three 
colonies at Rubi had been running for three weeks and had still not received 
supplies. One solution was to order supplies through the SCIU at Geneva, but this 
required the sort of cooperation which the unit and the SCIU were no longer 
sharing 20 In September, the colonies were still waiting for the supplies to arrive 
from Geneva. 21 
The decision over what food was supplied was, as far as possible, left to the 
Spanish colony administrators who informed Alfred Jacob what food was required. 
This ensured that, within the restrictions imposed by rationing and shortages, as 
far as possible the children received a familiar diet. ' There was a constant need for 
rice, sugar, wheat flour, oatmeal, tinned meat, dried fish and beans, the list 
confirming the Spanish control over the children's diet. Where possible, the food 
was to come in the largest packs available-herring, for example, in barrels rather 
than tins-in order to minimise the cost of transporting packaging. 24 Jacob would 
inform the colonies what was cheapest or most readily available and from this list 
they would work out what they wanted in what quantities. The matter of daily diet 
was left to the warden or the cook of each colony's The main problem with the 
colonies was in keeping them stocked. Supplies were slow to arrive, and by 
October 1937 Alfred Jacob was becoming increasingly unhappy at the failure to 
support them. On average, the food orders were taking between two and three 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, addendum dated 13 July to letter of 7 July 1937, FSC/R/SP/1 /3. 
"Alfred Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, undated, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 11 September 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
The Basque children sent to Britain were faced with unfamiliar food which led to a number 
of difficulties. Legaretta, op. cit., p. 109. 
23Alfred Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 5 October 1937, FSC/R/SP/1 /3. 
2'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 27 October 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
2'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 11 September 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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months to come through. The lack of food at Figueras and at the Birmingham 
colony prompted him to send the remainder of the cocoa and milk intended for 
Barcelona Station canteen which was to be closed down. The Birmingham colony 
had been established in July, but had not yet received any food from the FSC, 
making do on what could be obtained locally, which was very little? ' Coordinating 
the supply of the colonies required that the Friends knew the itemised cost of all 
supplies. One method adopted to stretch relief supplies was to supply only that 
which could not be got in Spain, using some of the supplies to exchange with other 
organisations for goods that could be procured locally 27 However, in addition to 
food, the Friends tried to provide other materials for the colonies. The lack of coal 
was a constant worry, particularly as winter drew in, and despite their concerns 
that the coal might be appropriated to military use, the FSC agreed to provide some 
forty tons of coal to be divided between Hogar Luis Vives (two tons) and the 
colonies, and some to be sold to small agencies for whom it would be uneconomic 
to import small quantities 28 
The moral health of the children was of great concern to Friends and efforts 
were made to create a healthy moral atmosphere, and to this end attempts were 
made to send out materials for lessons and for games. For the girls, Jacob was 
anxious to provide knitting wool and cloth so that they might be both occupied and 
help to make up the shortage of blankets and clothing which many of the colonies 
experienced 29 Dr. Morages, encouraged to take charge of the colonies at Rubi, 
began to run an experimental education system: 
The day is planned so that the children receive schooling from 9: 30 
to 12 and 3: 30 to 6. At 12 there is a talk on some subject of interest 
and at 6a walk. The schooling is given in such a way as to arouse the 
children's curiosity so that they themselves are eager to learn. Bits 
of Greek history for example are learned on the play-ground, the 
'Alfred Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 5 October 1937, FSC/1/3. 
"Norma Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 25 September 1937, FSC/R/SP/ 1/3. 
'Norma Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 12 October 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
29Alfred Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 27 August 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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children themselves forming bands and acting the part of one or 
other nation.. 30 
The children also ran their own council, were given a small amount of 
pocket money and once a week were taken to the cinema, the gift of the cinema 
manager and the workers. The children's well-being was monitored on index cards, 
and Dr. Morages was able to report that those children who were at first restless 
and inclined to run away, had settled down. Those showing most signs of distress 
appeared to have recovered their spirits? ' At Bosque in the Woods, in Murcia, 
Esther Farquhar observed "the happiest and most natural bunch of youngsters that 
I have seen for a long time, " and she wrote approvingly of the practical 
arrangements for the colony with its emphasis on practical and moral training. 
The whole place was very simple, and the children do the work. 
There are some of the mothers there too who do the cooking and 
heavier work, but the girls do the ironing, the sewing and the 
cleaning and were proud to tell us all about it 32 
Concerned not to create a culture of dependency, and to provide children with 
practical skills, the Friends also believed such involvement helped to encourage 
children to have pride in their own colonies. However, at most of the colonies-the 
exception was Rub-the emphasis seems to have been on girls' contribution to 
household management. Less attention appears to have been given to training boys 
in household or other skills. This may have been related to the age of the 
inhabitants. Whilst many teenage girls were evacuated, teenage boys were often 
mobilised into either the army or the factories. 
Two types of purchase were made for Spain, of food and of manufactured 
materials. In each case a different buying policy was adopted. In the case of food, 
the primary problem in Republican Spain was the lack of milk, meat and bread. 
Fresh vegetables, fruit and oil remained in reasonable supply well into the war, 
misleading the casual inspector as to the severity of the hardship. In some cases the 
'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 11 September 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
31 m; a. 
"Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 21 July 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
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difficulties were due to lack of transport for foodstuffs, and later blocked transport 
links, rather than actual absence of food. With the support and recommendation of 
the authorities, therefore, Friends in Barcelona and Murcia used their foreign 
currency to supply those foods which could only be bought outside Spain, but 
which the devaluation of the peseta precluded the authorities from procuring 
Thus, in the first year or so of the relief effort, fruit and vegetables were bought 
only sparingly, and the Friends always concentrated their resources on milk and 
grain 3' In Nationalist Spain, the emphasis remained on clothing until the end of 
1938 and the unifying of the relief operation. 
Although food was in scarce supply in Republican Spain, industrial 
materials were not, so wherever possible Alfred Jacob and Esther Farquhar 
preferred that manufactured materials be bought in Spain for as long as they 
remained available, using the pesetas acquired from the sale of milk supplies to 
institutions and small relief parcels to civilians. Where possible, equipment was 
bought from Spanish factories, and later, when materials became scarce, it became 
the practice to use the condensed milk tins as cups. Material for Francesca Wilson's 
workshops was also, where possible, bought in Spain In this way foreign 
currency could be reserved for essentials no longer available in Spain, such as milk, 
whilst pesetas could be fed back into the local economy without creating 
widespread financial disruption 36 The exception to this was medical equipment: 
with most medical resources directed to the front, it was necessary to import 
medical equipment for civilian use 37 
33Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 21 July 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
"Esther Farquhar to Barbara Wood, undated, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, 
Workers in Spain [internal] (Box 3). 
'Francesca Wilson, In the Margins of Chaos: Recollections of Relief Work in and Between Two 
Wars, John Murray, London, 1944, p. 175. 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 4 May 1937, Committee on Spain, Correspondence from Esther 
Farquhar (Box 3). The soap purchased by the FSC for example, was purchased from Spanish 
factories until supplies could not longer be secured. Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 15 June 1937, 
FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 21 July 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
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The concern to employ money as frugally as possible extended into other 
areas: Alfred Jacob preferred to send mail overland to save money, and whilst 
Esther Farquhar and the other Americans chose to use airmail, they tried, when 
possible, to avoid employing the telegrams which the AFSC in Philadelphia liked 
for the sake of speed. Even the letters which were sent home both to keep the 
committees informed and for the purposes of publicity were affected by this 
concern for economy. Esther Farquhar's earliest letters frequently ran to between 
seven and ten pages. By September 1937, however, they were usually around three, 
both to cut down on mailing costs from Spain to the USA, and also to restrict the 
cost of copy typing and internal postage as Esther's letters were to be sent on to 
others Alfred Jacob used the thinnest of onion skin, presumably to keep down the 
weight of his often lengthy screeds 39 
Travel, too was an area on which to economise. Relief workers were 
conscientious and travelled third dass on trains 4° The AFSC, concerned to maintain 
as high a standard of professional ethics as possible, even issued its field workers 
in Spain with expense forms on which they were required to detail all their 
expenditure in a standard format. Regular reports of shipments and receipts were 
also required 4' Although Alfred Jacob did not fill in forms he did maintain a 
constant flow of information on expenses. 
Apart from relief itself, one of the largest single costs was the purchase of 
labour, and Alfred Jacob rapidly became predisposed to the use of Spanish 
personnel. Some overseas workers were clearly welcome, specifically medical 
personnel such as the Scottish doctor, Richard Ellis, or the medical student Martin 
Hereford, but others annoyed him, in particular the "observer" 42 Horace 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 15 September 1937, Committee on Spain, 1937: Correspondence 
from, Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
39See Spain files at Friends House, London. 
40Esther Farquhar to John Reich, May 4,1937, Committee on Spain, Correspondence from Esther 
Farquhar (Box 3). 
"Louisa Jacob to Esther Farquhar, 8 October and 7 December 1937, Committee on Spain, 1937: 
Correspondence, to Esther Farquhar. 
''Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 10 October 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
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Alexander's visit in December 1936 was welcomed enthusiastically: "a man of 
immense human kindness and wisdom", ' and the needs of fund-raising 
necessitated regular visits by Friends (and others) to the Barcelona Unit, in order 
that they might report back as eye-witnesses, but to Alfred Jacob, concerned to 
maximise the child feeding, this did seem an unconscionable waste of money. 
Unless foreign workers had specific skills or spoke Spanish, Alfred Jacob was 
generally hostile to the concept: 
... everybody wants to send somebody to Spain, and you see those 
dozens of somebodies loafing about the cafes. The thing to send to 
Spain is food... Workers in England is quite a different matter, and 
much more difficult for the person who becomes one-no travel, no 
glory, no holiday, no fame, just work 44 
As he wrote in a letter to Judith Corcoran of the BYPA, there was something rather 
presumptuous about the assumption that foreign expertise was needed, implying 
that Spaniards lacked expertise and/or commitment to their own needs. In 
November 1936 Jacob wrote to Edith Pye stressing the availability of Spanish 
personnel: "I do not yet see any prospect of need for further English helpers here, 
because any milk centres established should become autonomous Spanish ones 
under our supervision. " Jacob saw the Barcelona unit as working with rather than 
for the Spanish people, providing the resources for them to help themselves. When, 
in April 1937, Jacob reported a need for more personnel, despite the possible 
expense, he added that to his knowledge the only people fulfilling his requirements 
of speaking perfect Spanish and caring deeply for Spain, were his wife, Norma, and 
his colleague from the YMCA, Domingo Ricart: as he had requested that a paid post 
might be found for Ricart for some time, this resolved itself satisfactorily and 
Domingo Ricart was retained at £1 per week46 
Taking in Spanish workers inevitably meant accepting the loss of complete 
'Alfred Jacob to Mrs. Small, 12 December 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
"Alfred Jacob to FSC, 8 December 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
'Alfred Jacob to Edith Pye, 26 November 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
46Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, April 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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political neutrality, but Jacob felt that neither Ricart's membership of the 
Socialist 
party, another worker's anarchism, nor another worker's status as the son of a 
marquis was of any great concern. In Jacob's opinion, "to do without party people 
would be to do without voluntary workers entirely. "" The real issue was whether 
those workers were willing to lend themselves to Quaker notions of impartial relief 
and Quaker insistence that they cooperate with those of conflicting allegiances. 
In contrast to the policy operated in Barcelona, the Murcia unit operated 
with an assumption that foreign expertise was required, if only in selected 
professions. In July 1937, Esther Farquhar wrote requesting American volunteers 
with specific skills, particularly a visiting nurse, ".. . oh 
how Spain does need to learn 
something about public hygiene, as well as personal. "48 The tone of her letter 
implied that the need was for foreign expertise rather than qualified locals. 
I have already mentioned the need for a doctor. The methods 
of the Spanish doctors differ from those of England, according to 
one of the English nurses, and I would suppose that were true as 
compared to those of American doctors also. I only know I often 
wish for an American doctor with all of his facilities to do something 
for these babies 49 
Esther Farquhar apparently did not distinguish easily between American scientific 
expertise and American money and equipment. The reluctance to use expensive 
foreign workers came not from the Murcia unit but from the Philadelphia office; 
although a number of American nurses offered their services in 1937, Louisa Jacob 
and John Reich were hesitant to accept as the cost of sending them abroad was 
excessive, added to the risk that they might not fit in with the British nurses already 
employed 50 A particular concern with overseas workers was that they should be 
able to speak Spanish and to stay for a sufficient amount of time as to ensure the 
"Alfred Jacob to FSC, 31 March 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 21 July 1937, Committee on Spain: Correspondence from Esther 
Farquhar (Box 3). 
'9Ibid. 
"Louisa Jacob to Esther Farquhar, 7 December 1937, Committee on Spain, 1937: 
Correspondence, to Esther Farquhar. 
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continuity of their work. One doctor, a member of the 
New York Yearly Meeting, 
was rejected on both these grounds: her proposed two-month stay was not 
sufficient to generate any proficiency in the language 
51 Dan West's inability to 
speak any form of Spanish severely hampered his role in Nationalist 
Spain. On one 
occasion, in order to explain to the charge nurse at the hospital in Bilbao that 
he 
wished to take an inventory of the clothing received, he was forced to rely on the 
inadequate translation of a patient who had some English 52 However, as has 
already been discussed, the AFSC faced major difficulties merely keeping the 
Burgos unit staffed. 
In Barcelona the influx of American funds from the AFSC from 1937 
onwards, and later from the International Commission, allowed the unit to consider 
paying for additional assistance. However, rather than spend more money on 
foreign volunteers, the distribution and mixing of milk was undertaken by local 
women, three to a station, and each paid 50-60 pesetas monthly. These women 
would be chosen by Asistencia Social, the Republican agency, and would spend 
some time working in Barcelona in order that they might "get to know the spirit of 
our work" 53 something which the unit regarded as crucial. In addition to the 
feeding, these workers would be expected to assist the refugees with other 
difficulties and to monitor needs as they developed and had a secondary effect of 
empowering and training sections of the local population. As the unit continued to 
expand, taking on a number of Spanish workers, there was also a growing need for 
office space independent of the YMCA. These Spanish workers were responsible 
for the day to day process of running the relief effort. Senor Pala, a bank manager, 
assisted with the accounts; Rosa Poy "does everything from buying medicines 
asked for by the children's colonies to arbitrating between English and Spanish 
workers at Puigcerdä"; Reuben Ferre looked after the station canteen and did odd 
jobs, and a number of others helped in the garages and drove the trucks. This still 
"Louisa Jacob to Esther Farquhar, 2 July 1937, Committee on Spain, 1937: Correspondence, to 
Esther Farquhar. 
"Dan West to John Reich, 27 October 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence, 
Nationalist Spain (from and to). 
'Norma Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 21 December 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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left Alfred Jacob with the need for another office worker, and he eventually took 
on a young woman called Mercedes (no surname is ever provided), the sister of 
another worker-both later turned out to be supporters of the Nationalist cause, 
which was helpful once the Nationalists took Barcelona. " In contrast the Murcia 
unit, which used the money from the International Commission in part to increase 
the size of their unit, had by November 1938 grown substantially to include fifteen 
American workers? These differences in practice may be explained in a number 
of ways. The larger amount of money which the AFSC had at its disposal allowed 
the Murcia and Burgos units to import more US workers-although this was 
limited by State Department restrictions but it would also have allowed them to 
expand relief using Spanish personnel. The Murcia and Burgos units' decision to 
operate primarily with American workers was a choice for expertise, but it was 
also an alignment with the professional and secular world of the 1930s, a culture 
in which professionals did things for people, rather than with them, in both 
business and social work, although it must be recognised that this preference could 
not always be supplied with adequately trained individuals. In the actuality, the 
AFSC took what people it could get. 
Contrasting the different practices it would be easy to suggest that Alfred 
Jacob and the FSC, with their ideologies of empowerment and facilitation, were 
ahead of their time even allowing for the economic stringencies which shaped their 
practice. In fact, the policies of the FSC were in accord with the standard practice 
of missionaries in the 1930s: the emergent concern amongst missionary societies 
'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 7 August 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3 
-'Working in Murcia were: Clyde E. Roberts, Emily Parker, Alfred H. Cope, Martha Rupel, 
Florence E. Conard, Levi Hartzler, Clarence Fretz, Lester Hershey, Mary Elmes, Irene Callon, 
Sylvia Pitt, Francesca Wilson, Dorothy Morris and Dorothy Litten. The last two were nurses. 
John Reich to Murcia Unit, 25 November 1938 Committee on Spain: Correspondence, Murcia, 
General, October-December (Box 7). 
-"See Alex Bryan, Healing the Wounds, Quaker Home Service, London, 1986; Joan Hewitt, 
Lending a Hand in Holland, 1945-46, William Sessions, York, 1990; Stanley Johnson, Quaker 
WorkForPrisoners of Warin South West France, 1945-1948, William Sessions, York, 1990; Eryl 
Hall Williams, A Page of History in Relief- London, Antwerp, Belson, Brunswick, Quaker Relief 
1944.1946, William Sessions, York, 1993; Roger C. Wilson, Authority, Leadership and Concern, 
Swarthmore Lecture Pamphlet, Friends Home Service Committee, London, 1970. 
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was to encourage indigenous peoples to create and minister to their own church" 
The AFSC units thus appear in tension between two models of practice, that of 
modem business and social work with its emphasis on expertise and that of the 
missionary who hopes to generate enthusiasm and talent in the field. This tension, 
exacerbated by the AFSC's need to avoid accusations of missionary intent, may 
have been resolved in part by the type of person they did despatch. Of the AFSC 
representatives in Spain, Sylvester Jones, Esther Farquhar, Clyde Roberts, Earl 
Smith, Florence Conard, Emily Parker, Alfred Cope and Emmet Gulley all had both 
missionary and either social work or business backgrounds. All of these workers 
show a tendency to switch rapidly between calling for expertise and placing 
emphasis on training and empowerment. 
Concern for ethical relief practices extended into the running of the 
household and the unit's social relations with others. Quite early on, Alfred Jacob 
reported that there was a need to reciprocate Spanish generosity with small gifts 
of milk or sugar to people who hosted him or who worked as volunteers. However, 
he felt strongly that it would not be right to provide these small gifts out of the 
relief stores, and requested instead that the unit be supplied with a box of 
provisions specifically to distribute amongst the voluntary workers as thank 
offerings 58 This desire to keep gifts separate from relief is a small but simple 
illustration of the way in which the difficulties of residence in Barcelona became 
ethical issues. 
When in July 1937 the Barcelona Unit moved into its own house new issues 
emerged, some major others minor but significant. The house provided 
accommodation for the foreign workers (and the Ricarts), a space for large food 
stores, and also a garage for the trucks of the National Joint Committee which had 
become crucial to the distribution of Friends' relief. It was hoped that this would 
cut down on the cost of living expenses, but food for the growing household was 
both a practical and an ethical problem 59 The house had a population which 
"Gordon Hewitt, The Problem of Success: A History of the Church Missionary Society, 1919- 
1942, vol. 1, SCM Press, London, 1971, p. 422. 
'Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 3 March 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, addendum dated 13 July to letter of 7 July 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
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fluctuated around fourteen, with a constant stream of visitors supplementing the 
permanent household. Initially they had only four ration cards and whilst this 
eventually climbed to ten, it left a shortfall which it was felt the FSC should fill. 
From late August, the FSC undertook to send out separate rations for the workers 60 
For day-to-day maintenance all those living in the house needed to pay their way. 
As Sra. Ricart had become de facto house keeper, and Domingo Ricart was 
receiving no payment for his services from either the FSC or SCIU, it was decided 
that all but the Ricarts would pay ten pesetas a day, which the Ricarts would then 
manage to cover the expenses of the household. When the NJC took up office space 
in the house, it was decided that the most equitable arrangement would be for the 
NJC to pay a proportion of the costs in London 6' 
The supply of the household could produce unexpected ethical dilemmas. 
Although there is no testimony against it, most Quakers do not smoke, and Alfred 
Jacob in particular did not approve However, cigarettes were one of the principal 
forms of currency: when a supply of 5,000 cigarettes were donated, Norma Jacob 
expressed a hope that they might be able to keep some as they were a valuable 
medium of exchange and tobacco could also be employed to secure good will, 
Overcoming his dislike of the substance, and his usual determination to act at all 
times within the law, Jacob had tobacco smuggled over the border. In order to 
maintain some contact with his Spanish workers in what was an expanding 
organisation, he made it his own responsibility to hand out a small weekly tobacco 
allowance to truck drivers and other volunteers with whom he had little day-to-day 
contact " Clyde Roberts, who became head of the Murcia unit in 1938 made a 
similar decision, and despite disapproving of the substance, distributed coffee as 
"Alfred Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 27 August 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"Alfred Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 5 October 1937. 
62This usually stems from a combination of two testimonies, the rejection of stimulants and the 
rejection of luxury and waste. 
'Norma Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 25 September 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3; In the event, 3,000 
were sent to Puigcerdä for use in local exchange by the colonies. Norma Jacob to Dorothy 
Thompson, 15 October 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"Interview with Farah Mendlesohn, 15 January 1994. 
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a gift to workers and local officers of the council, recognising its value both in 
improving morale and, in the circumstances, as a stimulant. As Roberts put it, "it 
is good economy to take care of ... 
[the assistants]... properly. "65 
One of the difficult issues for Friends, as food supplies shortened and 
greater restrictions were imposed upon imports and the use of foreign currency, 
was how far to abide by laws which interfered with the provision of relief. The 
testimony to Truth clearly required that Friends operate within the letter of the law, 
but Friends' tradition of refusing to abide by those laws they felt contravened the 
law of God is well known. Smuggling, however, fell short of the latter in being 
rather less than above board. Norma Jacob, in the appendix she contributed to her 
son's autobiography wrote: 
... It amuses me now to recall that this highly respectable Quaker 
drove into Spain with the spare tyre on his car stuffed with foreign 
money. This was our first encounter with Catch-22 which always 
operates in wartime. Money was contraband and might not be 
carried across frontiers, yet it was impossible to do anything without 
it. This was just the beginning of our subsequent career as 
lawbreakers. "67 
Alfred Jacob, in an interview for the AFSC, recalled smuggling in eggs for a sick 
man who had been told by his doctor that he must have an egg a day. The very fact 
that, as Quakers, they were waved across by the customs inspectors, only made it 
worse in that they were trading on the Society's good name. 
And yet, from a higher moral standard, of course it was right, but 
just according to the letter of the law, it was wrong. We were really 
trying to do the best we could ba 
"Clyde E. Roberts to John F. Reich, 18 October 1938, Committee on Spain, 1938: 
Correspondence, General, October-December (Box 7). 
"The refusal to pay tithes has been replaced by some self-employed Friends by a decision to 
deduct that proportion of tax which would be spent on defence. 
67Norma Jacob, "The Spanish Civil War" in Piers Anthony, No of an Ogre, Ace Books, New 
York, 1988, p. 230. 
"Karin Lee interview, "Alfred Jacob... ", op. cit., p. 16. 
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This willingness to do one's best, and to compromise one belief in order to support 
another, demonstrated the flexibility which the Jacobs brought to their work. It is 
unusual for Friends in that it placed a heavier emphasis on ends rather than means 
than perhaps meets the conventions; however, it is more understandable within the 
British tradition of relief work in which individuals were very much responsible 
for their own choices and actions, than that of the AFSC which attempted to 
maintain corporate consistency in action as well as words. 
By October the condition of the Spanish workers was deteriorating and 
Alfred Jacob asked permission to begin providing food for the Spanish workers in 
the house: "We cannot work side by side with people who we suspect have 
starving families while we are well fed". " In response the FSC began to send £10 
to contribute to groceries for the house and another £5 that relief parcels might be 
made up to be dispensed from the house. 7° The visible deterioration in the physical 
health of the citizens of Barcelona also began to alter the Unit's approach to their 
own food. The shortage of food in Barcelona meant that it was no longer a case of 
the Committee supplementing the household food; instead, at least 80% of the 
household's requirements would have to be sent in from abroad if the unit were to 
eat through the winter. What this meant was that the food parcel, ordered much 
earlier in the year, would have to be stripped of its luxuries, such as breakfast 
cereal, both because the money could buy a far greater amount of basic foods 
locally, and also because the unit increasingly felt that the purchase of luxuries 
could not be justified. Norma Jacob wrote: 
The Committee's money must either be used on us or on hungry 
children, and so long as we have enough to go ahead on simple 
standards, I want the children to get everything else. For me £1 is 20 
kilos of milk which is 160 litres of liquid milk which 360 children 
drink71 
After much debate the Committee finally agreed, but suggested that transient 
"Alfred Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 5 October 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"Norma Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 12 October 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
"Norma Jacob to Dorothy Thompson, 3 November 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/3. 
276 
observers and other guests be charged a fixed sum per meal to compensate the 
FSC, 
money which could be put to relief purposes. At the same time it was agreed that 
Lucy Palser, a nutritionist, would be sent to Barcelona to assist Sra. Ricart and 
ensure that the relief workers did not allow themselves to become malnourished! 
' 
Although the same issue did not excite such debate in Murcia, in part because the 
rules were established in Philadelphia and not debated on the ground, the same 
concerns applied. Ruth Cope, sent out as a secretary and housekeeper, wrote in 
November 1938, 
Enclosed are, at long last the expense reports. My chief source 
of thanksgiving [sic]. Our personal expenses aside from the office are 
practically nil, as there is literally nothing to buy... 
I have just discovered that while 16 units of food from the 
warehouse was considered by all concerned as a rock bottom figure, 
our household expenses in terms of warehouse units are roughly 22. 
This cheers me as it indicates that we are not living too 
extravagantly from the local point of view! ' 
In actuality, weekly maintenance varied as each person took the chance to purchase 
large quantities of local produce whenever possible, such as tomatoes or raisins, 
but the principle remained the same: as little as possible was to be spent on food 
for the workers whilst still maintaining them in good health! " 
7.2 Working With the Local People 
The Quaker relief work in Spain did not and could not take place in a vacuum. 
Although the Friends had remarkably little to do with the war itself and there is 
rarely any mention of its progress or its politics in correspondence except 
references to the changing flow of refugees, the Friends did work actively with 
Spanish volunteers, with the Spanish authorities and with other organisations on 
''Dorothy Thompson, Assistant Secretary, Spain Committee to Alfred Jacob, 11 November 1938. 
London letters-copies, 1938 (General Files 1938, Foreign Service). 
"Ruth Cope to John Reich, 24 November 1938 Committee on Spain: Correspondence, Murcia, 
General, October-December (Box 7). 
"Ibid. 
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both sides of the political divide. As was made painfully clear to the SCIU, the 
Friends regarded the manner of cooperation as an ethical issue in its own right. 
Wolf Mendl suggests that one factor which influenced the outlook of 
Friends and shaped their dealings with others was the dominant part in World 
affairs played first by Great Britain and then by the United States 
75 In 1936 the 
British Friends retained a strong sense of responsibility for the world but were 
coming early to the realisation that imperialism had its drawbacks and was not 
truly compatible with their Testimony. In contrast, the American Friends were a 
vibrant part of a growing American internationalism, which unconsciously or 
consciously had begun to see its mission as bringing American values to a turbulent 
Old World; they were part of the newly emerging cultural imperialism which was 
to characterise the American presence in the world throughout the twentieth 
century. Although both agencies worked for what they would have considered to 
be non-imperialist ends, their differences influenced the way the units cooperated 
with their Spanish associates. 
If the Barcelona unit's experience of working with the SCIU had been 
unsatisfactory, cooperation with the Spanish in Barcelona more than compensated. 
The rapid expansion of activity in all spheres brought with it a shortage of 
personnel to mix and serve drinks in Barcelona and its surrounding districts and 
to act as nurses in Murcia and Valencia. Mobilising a local workforce, however, 
required tact and a facility with the language which was not always available. As 
already discussed, local factors also played a part in dictating who was available 
and willing to help with the relief work. In politically mobilised Barcelona, securing 
workers was not particularly difficult. In Murcia, where politics felt less urgent and 
the population was more suspicious of outsiders, there were few people with either 
the motivation or the education to form an obvious corps of volunteers and the 
unit, out of both choice and necessity, relied more heavily on American workers 
and on Spanish professionals. 
By January 1939, the Friends' unit in Barcelona had up to sixty Spanish 
workers, some volunteers, and other paid workers(such as the truck drivers). Most 
"Wolf Mendl, Prophets and Reconcilers: Reflections on the Quaker Peace Testimony, 
Swarthmore Lecture 1974, Friends Home Service Committee, London, 1974, p. 44. 
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of these we know very little about. Fear of incriminating individuals meant that 
once the Nationalists were clearly winning, the Friends disposed of most of their 
records. Only those actually named in the correspondence can be discussed. What 
is clear is that most of the volunteer workers in Barcelona had strong beliefs of their 
own, from Domingo Ricart, a pacifist Spanish Protestant, to Alfred Jacob's 
secretary, a rather reticent woman who turned out to be a Nationalist! ' In response 
to a query from the FSC as to the suitability of these people, whether they accepted 
the peace testimony or were in any way maintaining a witness for peace Alfred 
Jacob answered: 
I never discuss politics with them and it does not interest me in the 
slightest what they choose to think so long as they can carry out the 
particular piece of work they are willing to do for us. In the case of 
the foreign helpers [non-Spanish] I try to make it clear to them that 
they should not do anything which would classify them with a 
particular political group" 
In a 1997 interview he confirmed that he had little awareness of, or concern for, the 
political allegiances of either the workers employed or the authorities with whom 
he cooperated. His principal concern was whether or not they were efficient and 
committed. 78 Earlier concerns that Quaker relief work should be undertaken only 
by the like-minded disintegrated under the pressures of the moment. In addition, 
Alfred Jacob appears to have grasped what the Spain Committee at home had not: 
that these workers, whatever their private opinions, were publicly involved in 
relief that was provided as part of a witness to peace. As such, they and the work 
they performed within that context were automatically expressions of that witness. 
Despite Jacob's great spiritual concern for Spain, he stopped short of 
establishing a silent Meeting for Worship within the unit. This was not for lack of 
encouragement: in addition to Sylvester Jones' desire to see a distinctive Quaker 
witness, Russell Ecroyd, the originator of the mission, pressed for the spiritual 
76This may have been the Mercedes mentioned above, but it is interesting that whenever this 
individual's political allegiance is mentioned her name is not specified. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 3 March 1937, FSC/R/SP/1/2. 
78Alfred Jacob, 13 January 1997, Pendle Hill Quaker Study Center, PA. 
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message of the Friends to be declared through the presence in Spain of a silent 
Meeting'" Alfred Jacob did initially attempt to begin the day with a silent Meeting, 
but he made the mistake of inviting his secretary to join the worship and realised 
from her reaction that this was inappropriate-the Meeting quickly fell into 
abeyance. As he was to realise at the end of the war, many of the Spanish workers 
were Catholics, and of the foreign workers, only Elise Thomsen, Lucy Palser and 
the Jacobs were Quakers! ' This particular type of outreach would not be possible 
for the Friends, although the Mennonite workers in Murcia were much more 
successful with their Spanish Protestant associates. 
Prior to August 1938, the regular Spanish help in both units was essentially 
unpaid, in part to discourage those whose motives were purely pecuniary. 
However, as already discussed, all units moved rapidly to provide relief to their 
collaborators. In Murcia a system of recompense was worked out in early October, 
based on family need and circumstances, rather than the amount of service 
rendered. After the completion of a form and with a personal interview, each 
family was given a ticket for a stated peseta's worth of food at the legal price. Once 
a week they were then permitted to take that amount from the food stocks, 
choosing for themselves what to take. Alfred Cope reported that the system was 
well received although the value of the food given was low 81 Only a very few of 
more than fifty full-time Spanish workers in Murcia were paid in cash. Those who 
worked in the International Commission Canteens were reimbursed to the extent 
of a child's ration per day, with some local municipal authorities adding payment 
on top of that. In the closing days of the relief work gifts of codfish and coffee were 
given to the helpers who it was feared would suffer particularly after the change 
in regime! ' Sometimes, offers of work were themselves relief. One young woman 
whose youngest child was a recipient of the Gota de Leche station was offered a 
"Ester Perez de King to May Jones, 8 November 1936, Committee on Spain: Individuals-Jones, 
May and Sylvester (Box 1). 
'Karin Lee interview, "Alfred Jacob... ", op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
''Report of the Spanish Child Feeding Mission from August 1938-15 May 1939 as seen by Alfred 
H. Cope. Committee on Spain 1939, Reports, Murcia (box 13). 
82Ibid. 
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caretaking post. The woman concerned had four children of her own and the care 
of an orphaned niece. Her husband was in prison and, in search of work, she 
approached Esther Farquhar who offered her cleaning work in the office and 
warehouse. 
... 
but it didn't take me long to realize that she herself needed some 
more nourishing food in order to be able to do all that she was 
undertaking. Their diet has been poorly cooked potatoes, with 
occasionally some rice, and practically nothing else for a long 
time... We have since been giving her milk, beans, bacon, prunes and 
chocolate at regular intervals, for certainly she needs food worse 
[sic] than money, which buys so little food in Murcia 83 
In addition to food this woman was provided with clothing, and two of her 
children continued to dwell in the colony at Espuna. It was very clear to both the 
AFSC and the FSC workers that they could not morally refuse food to those who 
worked feeding others, whilst they themselves were well fed. 
Alfred Jacob's attitude to the Spanish was very relaxed. Although critical of 
Catholicism he felt that the Spanish were eager to modernise, and at least part of 
his motive for his own presence in Spain was a desire to be involved in a truly 
experimental society. Entering into the work with so much zeal, he tended to be 
over-critical of outsiders such as Dr. Pictet who disapproved of Spanish innovation 
and enthusiasm. However, crucial to the relationship of the Murcia unit with the 
Spanish was a rather different assessment of the "Spanish character". The Friends 
in Murcia were not precisely critical: Quaker doctrine prefers to look for that of 
God-in this case the good and useful-in everyone, and there are numerous 
references to the enthusiasm and welcome they received, and to the abundant 
offers of help made. Particular compliments were paid to the efficiency with which 
the local authorities organised the distribution of refugees. Nevertheless, the 
American workers clearly regarded many of those whom they assisted as 
disorganised and backward. However, they saw this as something to be remedied, 
rather than to be condemned. Most of the relief workers believed that the place of 
'Esther Farquhar to john Reich, 15 September 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence 
from Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
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external assistance was to promote development from within. 
Disorganisation was a charge frequently levelled at the refugees whom the 
Friends assisted and one which seems somewhat unfair. Many, if not most, of the 
refugee hostels were overcrowded and few refugees had the resources to allow of 
any serious level of organisation. The refuges in which the Friends worked appear 
to have left much to the individual, despite the inefficiencies which this promoted. 
Dorothy Thompson saw families cooking small rations individually, using small 
bits of wood scavenged for fuel. In Granollers much of the cooking was done on the 
roof, with water brought up from a single tap downstairs. Only the children's meal 
was cooked communally, and this by individuals "trained" by the Friends " When 
children's canteens were begun in these places the relief workers always reported 
back on the chaos which accompanied the first week, but it is noticeable with what 
speed the anarchy settled down, usually when refugee women were recruited to 
assist in the organisation and feeding within the canteens. However, although the 
workers were taking part in a supposedly egalitarian exercise, their unconscious 
prejudices, both with regards to the children's nationality and to their class, 
sometimes surfaced. Friends placed responsibility for much of the chaos they 
witnessed on the type of people who were found in the refuges. Dorothy 
Thompson wrote of the refugee centre at Granollers: 
[It] is one of the most pathetic things in bulk I have ever seen.... In 
Granollers-as far as I could visualise, the people are of a much 
poorer class and therefore more hopeless. They were less desirous 
of making any effort to be clean, and, to give them their due, their 
quarters were much worse... but when the people make no effort it 
is almost impossible and the place becomes littered with every kind 
of rubbish ' 
Falling into similar assumptions, on his visits to some of the poorer of the Ayuda 
Infantil homes, Alfred Jacob wrote that the place was too cold, "but perhaps no 
"Dorothy Thompson to john Reich, 25 April 1938, Committee on Spain, 1938: 
Correspondence-Barcelona (Jacobs), (Box 7). 
"Dorothy Thompson to John Reich, 25 April 1938, Committee on Spain, 1938: 
Correspondence-Barcelona (Jacobs), (Box 7). 
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more than the homes the children came from. "86 
Warm water was a necessity, for 
moral as well as physical reasons: "they will not 
have warm baths this 
winter-which is a pity, just when they are in the care of people who could 
teach 
them to like cleanliness. 1187 
The charge of backwardness which was often levelled at the Spanish is more 
complicated. On the whole, in the hospitals which the American 
Friends ran in 
Almeria, Alicante and Murcia, the efficiency and practice of the Spanish doctors 
was admired by the Americans, as was these doctors' interest in new treatments 
and their desire for reforms. When tension arose between the English nurses and 
the Spanish doctors over treatment methods, it was the nurses who were 
relocated-at no time did the unit actually import American doctors (although the 
British doctor, Audrey Russell, joined the International Commission in 1939). The 
offer of an American pediatrician had been made by the AFSC, but as the woman 
in question did not speak Spanish it was felt that her use would be limited " When 
nursing staff were needed it was, by 1938, either provided from America-Esther 
Farquhar was also convinced that American and British nurses did not mix-or 
supplied by Spanish refugee women who volunteered to train as nurses to fill the 
role previously associated with nuns. Of the refugee assistants, the practicantes, the 
general consensus was that they were "child-like": they could not be left 
unsupervised but were warm-hearted and liked, and were liked by, the children. "' 
They are always referred to as girls and no age is ever mentioned, so it is not clear 
if these women were simply too young, or whether ignorance was being 
mislabelled as stupidity, but their lack of education exacerbated the Americans' 
general impression that this was a backward nation. 
This lack of education at all age levels was of particular concern. Esther 
Farquhar was keen to get schools going in the refugee camps, usually appointing 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 19 November 1936, FSC/SP/R/1/1. 
"Alfred Jacob to Edith Pye, 28 November 1936, FSC/R/SP/1/1. 
"Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 21 July 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
"Impressions of the Children's Hospital at Murcia", Dorothy Litten, 22 November 1938. 
Committee on Spain: Reports, Murcia (Box 9). 
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teachers from within the camps, pointing again to that tendency to rely on local 
human resources which the Friends prized. Other concerns, however, were 
backwardness in educational techniques, play abilities, in child hygiene and 
nutrition. The Friends were determined that America had something to teach the 
Spanish in all of these areas although they were keen to work with the local culture. 
Emily Parker came to Spain as a play worker to teach Spanish children something 
of American play habits, whilst Martha Rupel, a nurse and member of the Church 
of the Brethren, was brought in to act as a visiting nurse taking lessons in hygiene 
and child development into the refuges and canteens 9° 
Friends in both Barcelona and Murcia preferred to work within existing 
structures. There were efficiency gains to be made by employing already active 
systems and individuals, and a greater moral value for the Friends in working with 
people rather than for them. In addition, working within existing systems increased 
the chance that some influence would remain after the Friends departed. 
In Valencia and Murcia, whilst cooperation with the mayors and the local 
municipal authorities was relatively smooth, problems included the rivalry and 
lack of cooperation between the local authorities' committees dealing with refugees 
and, as hardship widened, those committees dealing with the hardship suffered by 
local inhabitants? ' In order for relief work to proceed in the "scientific" manner 
which both Esther Farquhar and her Spanish physician, Don Amalio, wished, some 
form of remuneration would have to be offered, preferably from the coffers of the 
Health Authorities. Contact with the authorities, however, could bring forth offers 
of voluntary assistance from those individuals not mobilised for the war effort. 
Although Barcelona appears to have had a system of mobilisation for relief work, 
Murcia did not. A member of the Asistencia Social, Sr. Aguiler, indicated that his 
wife and her niece would both be willing helpers: Esther Farquhar felt that 
educated women would help to bridge the gap between herself, the Murcian 
90Clyde E. Roberts to John F. Reich, 27 August 1938. Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia (General, January-September). 
"Levi Hartzler to Orrie Miller, Chairman of the Mennonite Relief Committee, Committee on 
Spain 1937: Correspondence-Murcia (Levi Hartzler, from and to) (Box 7). 
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doctors and the refugee women ' Where the issue was milk canteens 
for children, 
the Friends had often to rely on the efforts of local volunteers, but it was a 
continuing concern to Esther Farquhar to find locals "who are not grand of the 
refugees. "" When she did, individuals such as Dr. Montalbän and the 
Mayor of 
Murcia proved invaluable in their co-operation. Others were willing to take on the 
lowly task of mixing milk. In a lovely example of cultural differences one young 
man, Jose, expressed concern that Esther should be mixing the milk, 
... 
for he said women shouldn't do work like that, and he was sure 
that he could do it without my help. I told him that women had been 
preparing milk for babies for a good many generations and in all 
countries, and that I rather enjoyed it, but he still insists that I should 
let him do it 94 
Whilst Esther felt that they would probably get a female helper in to assist with 
cleaning the bottles as the work got heavier, she was prepared to cater to Jose's 
male pride to the extent of leaving him the responsibility for the operation. 
Interestingly, in this same letter, Esther Farquhar mentions Jose's queries about the 
nature of Quakerism, one of the few occasions when a Friend indicated that a 
Spaniard had expressed an interest. From the letter, it seems clear that Esther 
Farquhar did little to encourage this interest, anxious, as was Alfred Jacob, not to 
be labelled a "rice Christian"9s 
Good relations with the local authorities could ease supply problems. 
Because the unit in Burgos undertook limited distributions this was not a major 
issue, but shortages of flour in the Murcia unit in May 1938 were alleviated by a 
loan of five tons of flour from the local government, to be returned when supplies 
'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 21 July 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
"Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 1 July 1937, Committee on Spain: Correspondence from Esther 
Farquhar (Box 3). 
"Ibid. 
15Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 21 July 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
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were adequate, which in the event, was not until September 1938.9' The need to 
maintain good relations with local authorities was illustrated when deliveries went 
astray. In December 1938, fifty tons of condensed milk were unloaded at Cartagena 
instead of Valencia. Apparently unclaimed, the milk was requisitioned by the 
authorities and assigned to Madrid. Only because Emily Parker travelled through 
Cartagena and was informed of the presence of boxes with the Quaker star upon 
them was it possible to track the milk and, following the cooperation of the Civil 
Governor, to recover it 'A continuing concern in Barcelona was the need to pay 
import duties: although the government was willing to pay them on the FSC's 
behalf, this still slowed the process down and frequently led to bureaucratic 
confusion 98 However, the difficulty with relying on the local authorities was that 
it brought the Friends into contact with local politics. In the summer of 1937, the 
dissolution of the local refugee committee in Murcia, due to political in-fighting, 
left a power vacuum; the Asistencia Social could not take over until all the accounts 
were settled. In the meantime the local committee continued to act until Sr. 
Delgado, secretary of the Asistencia Social, took over in mid-August 1937 and 
became Esther Farquhar's principal liaison " When a local Asistencia Social was 
reconstituted there was no place in it for Sr. Montalban, Esther Farquhar's principal 
aide, whose insistent efforts on behalf of the Friends appears to have made him 
unpopular. Despite his offer of voluntary assistance-paid for by his trade 
union-it was made clear by Sr. Delgado that he would not be acceptable as a 
liaison between the Friends and the Committee. Instead, Esther Farquhar, Inez 
MacDonald and Francesca Wilson decided that he could be employed to assist with 
the Red Cross's request that the Friends extend their feeding stations to Almeria. 
Montalbän's assistance proved invaluable: like Domingo Ricart in Barcelona, his 
"Clyde E. Roberts to John Reich, 27 August 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, General, January-September (Box 7). 
"Alfred Cope to Dorothy Thompson, 6 December 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: 
Correspondence, London-Spain (Box 7). 
"Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 23 September 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence 
from Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
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local connections helped the unit to find premises, in this case a warehouse with 
office space, and provided the understanding of the local culture which assisted the 
success of the warehouse. In addition, he proved able at those administrative tasks 
which Esther Farquhar appears to have found irksome. Apparently, retaining an 
individual out of favour with the local committee did not damage the Friends' 
relationship with the authorities 100 
Depending on the local authorities for assistance could be helpful, in that it 
secured credentials, but issues of prioritisation and accreditation often arose. The 
demands on the municipalities were large and often FSC/AFSC business was of 
relatively low importance. Projects such as the Dining Rooms for children, whilst 
desired by the authorities, were often slow to receive attention: planned in August, 
the Murcia canteens were yet to materialise at the beginning of September 10' If 
anything, Esther Farquhar's concerns to do things "properly" may have proved 
slower and less effective than Alfred Jacob's more amateur approach. This 
interpretation is perhaps supported by her decision to by-pass the authorities in 
order to establish a Gota de Leche station in Almeria. Her original intention had 
been to encourage the Ministeno de Sanidad to establish and run the station, whilst 
the AFSC merely provided the milk. Lack of action in this area encouraged Esther 
Farquhar to ignore governmental disapproval and simply go ahead with the plans, 
finally establishing the station in the house of a local supporter of Sir George 
Young, Jose Gonzalez, as the hospital was both overcrowded and currently 
occupying a building previously employed as a Reformatory, a use to which the 
local judge was anxious to reassign it 102 This did not always resolve the issue of 
demarcation. When Levi Hartzler came out to Murcia in late 1937 he reported that 
the local government was anxious that all relief work be in their hands, to the 
extent of taking over any new projects. Hartzler, like Esther Farquhar, was 
reluctant simply to hand over relief supplies until they could be absolutely sure 
"'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 25 August and 7 September 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
Correspondence from Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
"Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 7 September 1937, Committee on Spain: Correspondence from 
Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
"'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 30 November 1937, Committee on Spain, Correspondence 
from Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
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where they were going, and this was best achieved by maintaining control of the 
relief stations 103 However, when it came to setting firm guidelines the Republican 
authorities seemed reasonably willing to accept the units' decisions. Ruth Cope 
argued that the triage rules of the International Commission and the Friends were 
often appreciated by local authorities, as it freed them from making difficult and 
unpopular decisions, and the Barcelona Unit was clearly willing to accept some 
direction from the authorities on the matter of the location of canteens and support 
for colonies l04 
In addition to cooperating with the local authorities the Friends in 
Republican Spain established a number of successful relationships with other 
voluntary agencies. In Barcelona, the FSC were successful in establishing mutually 
beneficial arrangements with the expatriate-organised General Relief Fund and 
with the TUC-sponsored National Joint Committee which provided much of the 
transport for the unit and for which the unit provided graging facilities and an 
administrative base in Barcelona. In fact, this was so successful that it is alluded to 
only in passing. There was little need for Alfred Jacob to discuss on paper what was 
clearly a smooth arrangement. 
In Murcia, the unit's principal partner was Sir George Young, an expatriate 
and philanthropist who ran a number of hospitals. Overall this co-operation was 
successful, but it was not without difficulties due to the clash of ideologies and 
ethos which a close arrangement engendered. Co-operation with Sir George 
Young's hospitals in Almeria, Murcia and Alicante had been on an informal level 
from mid-1936 through most of 1937. This informal arrangement had its difficulties 
however: the Friends, although supplying food and medical equipment to the 
hospitals, had little control over their management. Although Sir George Young 
willingly provided nurses for Francesca Wilson's first feeding station in Murcia, by 
July 1937 he was ready to recall them in order to staff another children's hospital 105 
"Levi Hartzler to John L. Horst (Scottdale, Pa.: Mennonite), 27 December 1937, Committee on 
Spain 1937: Correspondence - Murcia (Levi Hartzler, from and to) (Box 7). 
104Ruth Cope to Family, received 28 November 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938. Individuals: 
Alfred and Ruth Cope (Box 9). 
"Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 1 July and 7 September 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: 
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In response the AFSC offered to take over responsibility 
for the hospitals and 
Esther Farquhar began to visit them in the company of Sir George Young. In 
September 1937 the Friends in Murcia were invited to take over the running of 
three children's hospitals in Murcia, Alicante and Almeria. However, the 
AFSC 
could afford this commitment only if the Mennonites and Brethren continued each 
to guarantee $2,000 a month, and even then the AFSC could guarantee 
funds only 
for three months, an arrangement which Sir George viewed with some alarm 
106 
Consequently he determined to maintain what Levi Hartzler termed a "fatherly 
feeling" for the establishments, which constantly threatened to flower into 
interference should the AFSC not live up to his expectations 107 
Relationships between workers after this take-over were not always easy. 
Already present in Murcia were the British nurses attached to Sir George Young's 
unit. However, there were a number of problems with these women, both in terms 
of their personal commitments and how they related to their Spanish co-workers. 
Francesca Wilson and Esther Farquhar may both have been put off from the 
thought of too many overseas volunteers in part because of the problems these 
women involuntarily caused. A major issue was simply that when overseas 
workers became ill, they almost always went home. As typhoid was becoming a 
problem in 1937, and as overwork left nurses exhausted, the withdrawal of 
overseas workers left gaps only some of which could be filled by Spanish 
auxiliaries 108 Other problems were about conflicts in practice. During her last visit 
to Murcia 1938 Francesca Wilson was informed by one nurse of the Spanish 
practice of injecting children, which the doctors preferred as it ensured that the 
correct dose was received. The nurses were horrified by the fear that this 
engendered, and preferred to administer medicines orally 109 Only the rigid 
hierarchy maintained between these two branches of the medical profession 
1°6Louisa Jacob to Esther Farquhar, 8 October 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence 
to Esther Farquhar. 
"Levi Hartzler to John Reich, 15 November 1937, Committee on Spain 1937: Correspondence - 
Murcia (Levi Hartzler, from and to) (Box 7). 
"'Francesca Wilson, op. cit., p. 184. 
1091bid. 
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appears to have ensured that the nurses continued to support the Spanish doctors' 
practices. Although there were problems with the English nurses, when asked if 
she wished for American replacements or additions, Esther Farquhar replied that 
she felt to add a third national culture into the already strained situation would be 
too much. 
My concern at the moment is the personnel of the American 
staff and the philosophy of relationship with the Spanish people, 
especially with those that have offered us their time and services. 
The Spaniard is... as different from the traditional Puritan American 
as any of the European peoples. Without a rather deep 
understanding of this difference and of Spanish and character, 
foreigners in Spain are very apt to be so impressed by what they see 
as weaknesses and deplorable characteristics that they lose faith in 
them altogether. And so I should say that the first prerequisite for a 
good worker is an understanding and appreciation of the Spanish 
race.... 110 
For example, the reaction of Margaret Hope, one of the senior nurses, was one of 
hostility, both to the Friends directly, and with regard to Friends' relations with the 
Spanish staff, which were more informal than the English and Scottish nurses 
preferred. The AFSC expected high levels of accountability and there was also 
some suggestion that the Almeria staff could not supply the records which the 
American staff expected as a matter of course 111 In the end, the Almeria hospital 
had to be disbanded and the nursing staff either sent home or to other stations'lx 
Dorothy Thompson sent me a copy of Margaret Hope's report... It 
bears out what the Spaniards felt to be true-that the English nurses 
were jealous of the Americans. They were never interested in the 
Gota de Leche [milk station] and were always afraid that they were 
"'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 26 May 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, Esther Farquhar (Box 8). 
"'Esther Farquhar to Dorothy Thompson, 21 February 1938, Committee on Spain, 1938: 
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going to have to work under the American flag... the English, 
especially non-Friends, are very very conscious of their nationality, 
and feel superior to all the rest of the benighted world. But there I 
have made a general statement which doesn't apply to most of the 
English people I know... Francesca Wilson is a grand person and 
very cosmopolitan and so is Barbara Wood 113 
In particular, its seems that the nurses did not understand the Quaker notion of 
collaboration and remained uncomfortable with the egalitarian and non- 
hierarchical atmosphere the Quakers preferred. There is no evidence that the 
nurses saw themselves as part of a wider mission or as anything other than 
employees, unlike the Spanish doctors who were happy to connect their work to 
the wider child-feeding project. 
It must be emphasised that the Friends did not see this as a problem entirely 
external to their unit. Esther Farquhar had a number of difficulties with Levi 
Hartzler, who was unwilling to accept the principles on which the Friends worked 
with the Spanish. 
I saw no point in imposing upon them any made-in-America system 
and have not believed that in so doing I was being false to my 
responsibility to the Committee nor to those who sacrificed to make 
it possible... He [Levi] resents the Spaniards making any criticisms or 
suggestions, or seeming to take any authority upon himself "' 
Levi's attitude caused problems in Esther Farquhar's absence. A Spanish Protestant 
had offered his services and been accepted. With the permission of the unit he 
distributed goods from his own home. When he seemed to be taking a great deal 
of goods, Levi dismissed the woman who had helped him and placed an older 
woman with him as a spy. When this came out, Esther Farquhar was left to soothe 
ruffled feelings. The Spaniard in question had been told that unless he did things 
in the way the unit laid down they could do without him as there were plenty of 
other people who would be glad to take his place. Eventually the problem was 
13Ibid. 
"'Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 26 May 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Correspondence, 
Murcia, Esther Farquhar (Box 8). 
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sorted out, but not without apologies all around, and some members of the unit 
resented the Spanish helpers' evident pleasure in Esther's return 
11S Her final 
comment was that, "Levi thinks he understands more than he does and so gets 
things balled up occasionally, but he continually studies the language" 116 Even 
where the chain of command was relatively clear and the two organisations 
formally tied, differences of culture could cause difficulties. 
The cultural stresses within the hospitals finally led to a reorganisation in 
November 1937. The hospital in Murcia had to be moved anyway as the 
relationship with the reformatory in which it was housed had reached its limits. A 
bout of illness amongst the English nurses created a poor atmosphere for making 
such decisions. Margaret Hope wanted to close the hospital and establish a 
convalescent home in the Villa Maria approximately five kilometres away, with a 
clinic in the Gota de Leche building. The nurses would then be sent to Murcia 
where they were badly needed. None of the nurses, however, were willing either 
to transfer to Murcia or to move to the convalescent home. In the end ten beds were 
provided at the Villa Maria, with what Esther Farquhar referred to as a practicante, 
a Spanish nurse employed to take charge of the children. The nurse was one of the 
few secular Spanish nurses available, secured from a UGT syndicate. The English 
nurses, however, remained unhappy. Relations within the hospital appeared to 
have deteriorated, cultural expectations and prejudices having got in the way of 
close co-operation. Esther Farquhar explained: 
... the doctor... expressed a 
feeling which has been manifest in other 
hospitals also. He said he never felt at home in the English Hospitals. 
They served him tea and said "thank you - thank you - thank 
you", but he never felt that his orders were being obeyed... The 
difficulty has been that the English nurses feel themselves far above 
the Spanish doctors in their knowledge of hygiene at least, and are 
very much opposed to the use of so many injections, and you can 
easily understand that this attitude on their part has made it very 
'15Ibid. 
16Ibid. 
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difficult for the Spanish doctors who are giving their time and 
services to out hospitals 117 
The situation had become so bad in the Murcia hospital that the doctor, Don 
Amalio, had threatened to resign. The nurses were eventually returned home and 
a new administrator, Dorothy Morris, with experience of Spanish doctors at the 
front was engaged, releasing Margaret Hope to take over the workshops in Murcia 
from Francesca Wilson who needed to return to England for the start of the school 
term. Local practicantes were hired in place of nurses and Dorothy Litten, a nurse 
who arrived in September 1938, was able to report that she had nine girls learning 
to be nurses, some refugees and some local girls 118 Those on the domestic staff 
were all refugees. 
Most of the girls are not really enthusiastic about nursing, but like 
to be here because of the safety and the good food-nevertheless we 
hope that some of the elementary health instruction that we give 
them will make them more sensible wives and mothers later on. 
They are good natured girls and kind to the children but very 
irresponsible and needing endless supervision 119 
What was clearly required both in the hospitals and other areas of relief work was 
an attitude that there was more than one right way of doing things and a belief in 
the essential unity of the mission'0 Hiring local, untrained girls smoothed the path 
to co-operation: they learned the American and the Spanish methods which kept 
the peace and, from the American point of view, were being trained in modern 
methods and in addition helped to reinforce the spiritual connection between giver 
and receiver which the Friends were anxious to emphasise. The loss of the English 
nurses allowed for a shift in operational procedure in a direction more in accord 
117Esther Farquhar to John Reich, 30 November 1937, Committee on Spain, 1937: 
Correspondence from Esther Farquhar (Box 3). 
"'-Impressions of the Children's Hospital at Murcia", Dorothy Litten, 22 November 1938. 
Committee on Spain: Reports, Murcia (Box 9). 
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with Quaker ideologies of self-help and empowerment. Furthermore, the incident 
provided clear evidence that over a period of time Esther Farquhar had learned to 
value the experience and judgement of her Spanish medical staff. 
7.3 Howard Kershner and the Difficult Adjustment 
The Friends' Mission in Republican Spain until 1939 had been marked by their 
willingness to adapt to the needs of their Republican colleagues and their operation 
as collaborators rather than directors. Consequently, it was further distinguished 
by the extent to which the Friends in Murcia and Barcelona succeeded in 
integrating their priorities and ideology into the prevailing mood. The failure of 
this approach from 1939 was a direct consequence of the Nationalist victory, but the 
speed with which it took place and the lack of corporate resistance to Nationalist 
demands can be traced to the actions and beliefs of Howard Kershner, appointed 
director of the AFSC and International Commission relief effort in Spain at the end 
of 1938. Kershner's very different witness and the relief workers' response 
illuminates very effectively some of the underlying beliefs which most of the relief 
workers shared at the same time as illustrating the degree to which circumstances 
might shape the manifestation of the Quaker witness. 
Throughout 1939 the relief work was unified under the directorate of 
Howard Kershner and the International Commission. In Spain, the International 
Commission was to all intents and purposes Howard Kershner, and his personality 
guided the mission, shaped its relationship with the Auxilio Social and in the end 
alienated many of the workers. One way to interpret the rapid departure of the 
relief workers from Spain, and the failure of the principle relief workers to transfer 
to France in 1939, is as a reaction to their dislike of the arrangements, compromises 
and attitudes which Kershner imposed in this year. 
Kershner's principal work was intended to be in Republican, or Government 
Spain. John Reich wrote to Alfred Jacob, "... while no definite plans have been laid, 
it is reasonable that he will have headquarters in Barcelona to be in touch with the 
Government there. " It was hoped that Kershner's appointment would provide both 
unity and professional management skills for an increasingly large operation. 
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However, Kershner acted upon his own initiative when he chose visit insurgent 
Spain first, a habit which was to lead to a troubled relationship with both his 
colleagues and the AFSC, although in the event, with the Nationalist victory 
imminent by February 1939, it was hoped that Howard Kershner's contacts with 
Nationalist Spanish officials would assist the AFSC's and FSC's adjustment 121 
We hope Howard Kershner will be a great help to everyone trying 
to do this tremendous task of feeding Spain's millions. He is an 
outstanding business man and a good executive who should be able 
to co-ordinate private and governmental efforts. Give him all the 
help you can. He comes to the job entirely unacquainted with Spain, 
but with a sound business judgement and with a deep devotion to 
the spiritual implications of our work 12' 
However, in appointing someone who knew nothing of Spain to oversee the relief 
mission, the AFSC were ignoring all previous requirements for relief workers, and 
in particular ignoring Alfred Jacob's criterion that his workers should feel attached 
to the people with whom they were working. 
Kershner's position vis-a-vis the AFSC was complicated. He was initially 
employed by the AFSC to take over as director of their relief work in Spain but, at 
the last moment, he was asked also to direct the International Commission relief 
work. He was therefore both employee and colleague of the AFSC. However, the 
AFSC was only one of a number of organisations whose work was supplemented 
by International Commission rations and the relationship between the two was 
complex. 
Howard Kershner was to maintain his own accounting system and banking 
facilities for expenditures in connection with the administration of relief supplies 
furnished by the American Red Cross, but AFSC workers in Southern and 
Nationalist Spain were to be accounted for through the AFSC offices in 
'John F. Reich to Murcia Center, 6 February 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Correspondence: 
Murcia, General (Box 12). 
122John Reich to Alfred Jacob, 30 December 1938, Committee on Spain 1938: Correspondence- 
Barcelona (Jacobs) (Box 7). 
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Philadelphia P Indications emerged early on that Kershner's own perception of his 
role differed from that of the AFSC, and that his own personality drove many of the 
decisions that the International Commission made in the field. In February 1939 he 
proposed that all accounting be centralised through him and that he should 
have 
control of his workers' salaries. Charles Ewald who regarded Kershner as 
"something of a reactionary in Economics" did not approve of either Kershner's 
appointment or his actions. 
... 
he seems quite lacking in appreciation of the spirit that must 
pervade this service. When he argues that to have the loyalty of the 
people who are doing this relief work in Spain, he should control 
their salaries, I am frankly shocked. I refused a salary of $1500 a year 
offered me by one of the leading merchant banking corporations in 
South America years ago because my life was not for sale. I was 
doing the thing I was doing because I wanted to do it and because 
I had a certain attitude towards my fellow men, and so it is with 
people in Spain. They are not there for salaries, and money does not 
determine their loyalties... Howard Kershner impressed me as 
opinionated, with rather bookish ideas of efficiency and almost hard 
boiled. To my surprise Hallingworth Hood, without knowing 
anything about what was in my mind, spoke of him as something of 
a mystery man and "opinionated". "' 
Kershner's plans were rejected by both the AFSC and the FSC, but it was already 
clear that Howard Kershner entered Spain with very different notions of Quaker 
work to those of the closely knit and essentially egalitarian relief units, and a very 
different understanding of who he was working for. " Ewald's assessment of his 
character was to be substantiated by subsequent events. 
The relationship between the AFSC and the International Commission was 
John Reich to Bernard Lawson, 3 January 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Corns. and Orgs.: 
Friends Service Council correspondence, from/to (Box 10). 
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296 
always awkward. The FSC needed the funds of the International Commission 
enough to be willing to subsume its structure within that of the Commission. The 
AFSC, with a more formal relationship and greater financial independence was not 
and a number of significant decisions assisted in exacerbating the potential for 
tension. The International Commission decided to appoint Kershner as a vice- 
President without waiting for the AFSC response to the initial suggestion, which 
they in fact opposed 126 Kershner replied in July that after some discussion there 
had been unanimous agreement from all but the Friends that he should be 
appointed. He wrote, "I do not hold this against you, as I understand your view 
point", but his concern was somewhat undermined by his revelation that he had 
been elected prior to the receipt of the AFSC's views upon the matter 117 Kershner's 
tendency to centralise administration led to the Philadelphia office feeling 
uninformed and in August 1939 John Reich had to request that copies of all AFSC 
relief workers' reports that revealed the state of affairs in either France or Spain 
should be forwarded to both London and Philadelphia. This had previously been 
the normal practice for any field director. 128 Clearly Kershner did not view the 
AFSC as his primary responsibility, although it had been his first from which all 
else flowed. 
Practical arrangements with the International Commission were often better. 
In March 1939 the AFSC decided to accept the proposal that all AFSC personnel be 
maintained by the International Commission and that AFSC money go to the 
purchase of American wheat, but problems still emerged over the amount of 
influence which the Friends were to wield in International Commission decision 
making. The British Friends in particular had been essential to the formation of the 
126The International Commission later made the decision to appoint the American George 
MacDonald to the same post despite AFSC protestations of his ineffectuality on the Presidential 
Commission supposedly raising funds for Spain. John F. Reich to Howard Kershner, 23 
February 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: Intl Commission for Relief of Child 
Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
127Howard Kershner to Clarence Pickett, 11 July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: 
Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
128John F. Reich to Howard Kershner, 16 August 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: 
Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
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International Commission, and the presence of the British Friend Edith Pye on the 
committee ensured Quaker input. But Kershner could be rather defensive, quite 
properly, about undue over-emphasis on Friends' influence; however the way in 
which he phrased it was troubling. 
One point that I think has not been appreciated in 
Philadelphia is that the greater part of the resources of this 
Commission have come from Europe. We are responsible to twenty- 
four Governments of which America is only one. Is it right for us to 
allow our course to be unduly influenced out of consideration for 
conditions in America, when after all America is comparatively a 
small factor in the work of this Commission? Are we not rather in 
duty bound to look to the situation in Europe and be governed 
largely by what appears to be advantageous from this standpoint lz9 
The uncomfortable implication, which was to echo in much of Kershner's work, 
was that his loyalty was to the governments and to international politics. As the 
governments were the major donors, this appeared superficially to accord with 
Quaker concern for financial responsibility towards donors, but traditionally, the 
Friends' primary responsibility had been to the recipients of relief. Although some 
earmarked gifts were distributed they were only ever solicited for the colonies and 
the practice was not one which either the AFSC or FSC encouraged. More usually, 
Friends operated on the assumption that those who gave money to Quaker 
agencies understood the factors which shaped Quaker relief practices. Howard 
Kershner had turned this around, allowing the donors the right to influence the 
direction of relief, and although ostensibly Quakerly this emphasis on the 
"European situation" effectively opened the door to a relief policy which would 
accommodate Nationalist political demands. If the donors did not object, why 
should the recipients? 
The effectiveness of the International Commission can best be judged by its 
ability to mobilise cross-governmental support. The British, Swedish, Finnish, 
129Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 16 August 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns, and Orgs.: 
Int'l Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
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Belgian, Norwegian and Danish governments were the largest givers. In February 
1939 the Swedish Government donated £75,000, whilst the British Government 
donated £20,000.130 America preferred not to give aid directly and the International 
Commission had to be satisfied with purchasing cheap surplus wheat-an offer 
whose generosity varied with the discount that the Federal Surplus Commodities 
Corporation was willing to offer131-and the donations raised by the President's 
Committee. 132 One gets the sense that both the AFSC and Howard Kershner were 
slightly ashamed by the parsimonious attitude of the US government 
1' The USA's 
President's Committee, by 23 March had raised only $5,000 and donations were 
slow to come in 134 In April John Reich reported that they came in at only $200 per 
day. Income in Philadelphia was slightly less and largely earmarked and what was 
left was pooled to buy wheat and pay off the deficit owed to the Red Cross as a 
result of their underwriting the shipping costs. The Catholic Church had not 
proved as helpful as hoped; apart from $5,000 from one Catholic committee there 
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had been no large-scale support. The remaining anti-Franco 
feeling in America 
ensured that many donations came in earmarked 
for the refugees in France 1 
Fundraising in America was hampered by the American Red Cross and the 
International Red Cross being reluctant to take overtly political money; in February 
1939 they refused to accept funding from the Medical Bureau of North America 
because of its Communist taint. Howard Kershner felt that a more pragmatic 
approach was needed and said that it should be accepted for grinding wheat 
l' 
Consequently it was necessary to persuade the Spanish governments to contribute 
transportation costs for the wheat, not always an easy task 1' 
Because of the difficulties in the field, one area of work that was not 
explored was peacemaking. Kershner had hoped to assist in peace negotiations but 
was warned off first by the State Department and later by the AFSC who felt that 
it would jeopardise both the work and the safety of the personnel l J. Passmore 
Elkington of the Spain Committee (AFSC) wrote of the fear that the Nationalists 
would hear the AFSC as pleading for their Communist "partners". Furthermore, 
the AFSC had no way to enforce any agreement the Nationalists might ask them 
to broker with the remnants of the Loyalist and wished to have no association with 
unreliable promises. Despite this, however, Elkington assured Kershner that the 
peace witness remained at the heart of the mission, "... we cherish peace-making 
always... Besides, your alms bearing, it is a joy to know that the influence of your 
spirit reflecting constantly Divine Love, 'will condition', as moderns say, the 
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temper of many an otherwise bitter spiriti139 The difficulty was that Kershner's 
own understanding and expression of pacifism were extremely simplistic. In 
his 
autobiography he wrote: 
I sometimes speculate about what might have happened if the 
Republican Government had not resisted Franco's attempt to take 
over... If Republican Spain had held fast to an attitude of non- 
violence, allowing Franco to assume the responsibility of governing, 
a change might have taken places without bloodshed and without 
the inevitability of inaugurating a Fascist government. It seems not 
unlikely that after a time the Franco government would have been 
overthrown by the will of the people peaceably expressed, and the 
Republican Government restored 1'0 
Although his comments were a version of the classic statement of acceptance and 
compliance which we see in both the 1660 Peace Testimony and in later Quaker 
actions such as the acceptance of the American Revolutionary Government, 
Kershner appeared oblivious to other parallel developments in Quaker 
thought-refusal of military service, refusal of oaths and of the payment of 
tithes-which did not equate peaceableness with compliance. Pacifist the Friends 
might be, but they had maintained a consistent reputation as an obstinate and 
uncompliant people. 
Kershner's claim to the moral high ground and his expressions of goodwill 
were also tainted by anti-Republican prejudice and ignorance. His efforts to 
substantiate his neutrality only served to display his partisanship. In the same 
passage he wrote: "The insurgents did not observe constitutional procedure; they 
resorted to violence. It is also true that there was violence and bloodshed on the 
part of the Loyalists" 14 The equating of the two, whilst firmly within a Quaker 
tradition that all violence is wrong, lacked any acknowledgement of the political 
'1. Passmore Elkington, Chairman of the Spain Committee, to Howard Kershner, 28 February 
1939. Committee on Spain. Coms. and Orgs. Int'l Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in 
Spain-Correspondence, from/ to Howard Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
1401-Toward E. Kershner, Quaker Service in Modem War, Prentice-Hall Inc., New York, pp. 102-3. 
"'Ibid. 
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history of the war and made no distinction between the legitimate and the 
illegitimate government-a distinction which Quakers in earlier wars, whilst 
maintaining their neutrality, had observed. 
Kershner was also wary of offering direct help to political refugees: a 
decision taken with the advice of the AFSC, but again his public statements went 
beyond simple refusal and embraced the vocabulary of judgment and 
condemnation. Approached by a member of the Defence Council of Republican 
Spain at the end of March to assist with the evacuation of up to 10,000 intellectuals, 
he expressed his regret but was obliged to say that his government did not wish 
him to become involved in such matters. "He made no claims for the criminal or 
lawless element but spoke only of getting the high grade, honestly convinced 
Republicans out", but decided privately that he would be willing to make a 
personal plea in Burgos for the safety of the "high grade", a distinction that most 
workers would have decided was irrelevant and unnecessary in an atmosphere in 
which criminality was decided by a person's political allegiance 142 
Initially, as I have already indicated, Kershner felt that it was not in keeping 
with the wishes of the donors that goods should simply be turned over to Auxilio 
Social 1' Although prior to 1939 some gifts had been made to government agencies 
it was not standard practice. However, in late February 1939 he came to an 
agreement with Senor Bedoya, chief of the Auxilio Social, that David Blickenstaff 
should have an office at the headquarters of Auxilio Social in Valladolid, and from 
"'Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 27 March 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: 
Int'l Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). A particular problem was that the International Commission's 
money was earmarked and there were no funds to assist with migration. The International 
Commission (actually Dermod O'Donovan acting on Kershner's behalf while he was in Spain) 
refused to assist 120 Lincoln Brigaders trapped at Le Havre and in danger of imprisonment. 
O'Donovan felt that the Americans were far better off than other refugees, either military or 
civilian and that International Commission resources could be better applied: "The position of 
about 6,000 Central European ex-International Brigaders In the camps... is quite desperate. They 
cannot return to their own country. [And] Mexico will accept only Spaniards. " Dermod 
O'Donovan to John Reich, 21 April 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs : Int'l 
Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
... Howard Kershner to General Franco, 13 February 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns, and 
Orgs.: Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to 
Howard Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
302 
there take charge of allocation and distribution of all supplies sent 
in to Nationalist 
Spain. This had certain advantages, it brought with it customs waivers and 
protection for personnel, but it was also a tacit surrender to the principle 
that goods 
would be handed over to the Spanish agency and the tendency was 
for Auxilio 
Social to assume more authority that the Friends thought they had granted 
14 The 
rapid assumption of authority by Auxilio Social was received 
badly by the relief 
workers, in particular because Kershner's belief in centralised administration meant 
that they had been allowed no part in any negotiations. Consequently, only a few 
days after the above letter John Reich wrote to Kershner with the news that the 
entire Quaker unit in Barcelona-with the exception only of Alfred and Norma 
Jacob-would be leaving as they had been deprived of all authority and 
responsibility. '' 
Although they were still listed as representatives of the International 
Commission the Jacobs had lost control of direct relief work: the Commission's gifts 
went straight to the Auxilio Social. The Jacobs received reports as to the location of 
deliveries, endeavoured to monitor these and also attempted to keep in touch with 
local needs and to pass on this information to the Commission. Their official work 
was increasingly limited in scope, consisting mainly in tracing missing members 
of families and providing small food parcels for particularly hard hit families. One 
or two study groups were being attempted although this was hedged around with 
restrictions, and it was possible for the Friends to loan cars and lorries to 
organisations and to young people in order that outings might be made 
146 
Even when, as happens only too often, the problem is outside 
our power to solve, we do our best to give sympathy and encourage 
"Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 21 February 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs 
Int'l Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
"John F. Reich to Howard Kershner, 23 February 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs» 
Int'l Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
146"News from Barcelona" by Alfred Jacob, 31 October 1939.1939 Committee on Spain 1939, 
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Alfred Jacob, Barcelona, 6 September, 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Reports, Barcelona (Box 
13). 
303 
people to keep on looking for ways out of their difficulties instead 
of giving way to despair. For what has been achieved in this way we 
have principally to thank our invaluable Spanish secretary, a 
staunch Catholic who has during these difficult months given us an 
object lesson in what Quakerism in practice should really mean 
14 
In August Auxilio Social reported that they had delivered over 17,000 kg of milk 
to 32,224 children 148 However, in the small number of sites that the Friends were 
able to visit, Alfred Jacob reported that a smaller number of children was being fed 
than the Barcelona Unit's experiences had led them to feel were in need 149 In 
Igualada, the centre of the tanning industry, unemployment had wreaked havoc. 
Auxilio Social was feeding sixty-eight babies, 288 children aged 3-13 and 441 older 
people. In October, however, the representative received instructions to strike off 
the register all families where the income was as much as one peseta per head per 
day. 150 Similar situations existed in most towns, with conditions depending largely 
on what factories were operating. In April 1939 Auxilio Social claimed to be feeding 
21 million children and 11 million adults 151 In July, Harvey Ernest Bennet (a 
Mennonite), Irene Callon, Alfred Cope (but not Ruth who was in France), Jean 
Cottle, Maria Ecroyd, Mary Elmes, Rachel Marshal, Emily Parker and Sylvia Pitt 
arrived in London. Emmet Gulley left Valencia at the same time for the USA on the 
way to take up a position in Cuba in a retraining centre for German refugees. 
Clearly, the AFSC workers were not comfortable with Auxilio Social and 
this discomfort was passed on to the Philadelphia office. In April 1939 Clarence 
Pickett (Executive Secretary of the AFSC) made his feelings clear in a letter to 
Eleanor Roosevelt: "It is a purely political and partisan organization, with which 
it has been extremely difficult for us to work. .. our Organization found that the 
147Report from Alfred Jacob, Barcelona, 6 September, 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Reports, 
Barcelona (Box 13). 
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"'Howard Kershner, report: "Three Weeks in Spain", April 1939, Committee on Spain, 1939. 
Corns. and Orgs.: Int'l Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain (Box 11). 
304 
Loyalist Government had a more intelligent and more dedicated relief set-up than 
the Auxilio Social. The latter is pretty much politics at its worse. "" Lillian Traugott 
felt that the situation, based on the June reports of Alfred Cope, Emmet Gulley and 
Emily Parker, was such that Quaker feeding should draw to a close 1 However, 
belying this point of view, Howard Kershner wrote: 
The official attitude of the military and civil authorities is very 
cordial. Our twelve workers will carry credentials from Sr. Bedoya 
and will have permission to go about wherever our food is being 
used, observing, inspecting and recommending. The food will be 
distributed from our warehouses upon the joint recommendation of 
our representatives and the delegates of Auxilio Social' 
Kershner's experience of civility and reasonableness from the Nationalist 
authorities was at some remove from that of his workers, and negated his own 
criticisms about the waste of manpower in endless parades and celebrations" In 
particular, it is important to recognise that it was at variance with the pre-victory 
reports of both David Blickenstaff and Earl Smith. '-56 However, as has already been 
indicated, the fundamentals of the situation extended beyond a simple belief on the 
part of Kershner that the Nationalists were doing a good job. The dissonance 
between the ideology and expectations of Howard Kershner and those of his relief 
workers finally blew up in June 1939, threatening to damage the public face of the 
Friends, putting their workers in danger and exposing the differences in values and 
experience between those Friends who had served in the Republican zone and 
Howard Kershner. 
On 8 June Alfred Cope arrived back in New York. Upon landing he was met 
by John Reich's secretary and told that Clarence Pickett was willing for him to be 
'52Clarence E. Pickett to Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, 20 April 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. 
Corns. and Orgs.: Auxilio Social (Box 10). 
'Lillian Traugott to John F. Reich, 14 and 20 June 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. 
Correspondence: John Reich from/to-in Spain (Box 12). 
"Howard Kershner to AFSC, undated, Committee on Spain, 1939, Personnel, General (Box 13). 
15'Kershner, Quaker Service..., op. cit., pp. 97-98. 
1-'See Chapter Six, fn. 47 and 53. 
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interviewed. He was presented with a list of appointments including the New York 
Times and the New York Tribune. Based on these originals, Time also ran a story. 
In the latter Alfred Cope, based on what he had been told by Nationalist Officials 
and what he had seen himself, was quoted as estimating that there might still be 
around 70,000 Italian troops in Spain, and spoke of the Nationalist confiscations of 
food in Murcia and other districts. 57 On 9 June the New York Times printed an 
article based on this interview with the newly returned Alfred Cope. The AFSC had 
not merely given permission for this interview, they had encouraged it, but had 
monitored neither the interview nor the subsequent article. 
General Franco today stands accused by Alfred Cope of the 
American Friends Service Committee, with having taken food and 
milk supplies intended for 100,000 half-starved Spanish babies and 
of having diverted them to other purposes because their mothers 
were not politically acceptable to the Spanish Dictator. Mr. Cope, 
who directed the non-political and impartial distribution of relief for 
the American Quaker organization, declared... that the Friends had 
lost 6 or 7 shiploads of food destined for destitute children, but 
which, he said, "so far as we can find out was eaten by Franco's 
army.... "' Despite the well-known aversion of the Quakers to mix in 
politics or to comment upon political situations, Mr. Cope said the 
Loyalists had been herded into concentration camps everywhere 
under unbelievable conditions, and that executions by General 
Franco were apparently going on continually. 
The only point made which was definitely untrue was that Alfred Cope was never 
the director of the operation but served first under Clyde E. Roberts and later under 
Emmet Gulley. 
The partiality which this article advertised might have passed quickly from 
public view had not Howard Kershner, without consultation with the AFSC, 
released a repudiation to the Paris Press and the New York Times. When Howard 
Kershner had entered Spain he had made the decision to visit the Nationalist side 
'Alfred Cope to Dorothy Thompson, 17 June 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Correspondence: 
Murcia, Copes (Box 12). 
306 
first, against the advice of the AFSC. In the event, there was no Republic by the 
time he had finished. One effect was that he only received one side of the story. 
First-hand reports of "Red" brutality and torture were counteracted only by 
rumours of Nationalist executions 158 For example, Kershner wrote without 
comment: 
When the Francoists "liberated" Valencia they emptied the gaols of 
29,000 prisoners. I asked the official who told me this how many 
they placed in gaol, and he said with great gusto: "Fifty thousand! " 
I was told that of this 50,000 maybe one or two thousand might be 
shot and that the rest would be put to work. ""' 
He added no discussion which would indicate whether he realised that this would 
be forced labour, and, as he made clear in a later comment, was willing to regard 
the large number of arrests and executions as a "restoration of discipline and... the 
execution of what it [the new government] considers justice-. '60 
On 27 June Howard Kershner wrote to Clarence Pickett, simultaneously 
sending a copy to the New York Times, arguing that because only one lot of the 
350 tons taken by the army was from America, the matter was one which chiefly 
concerned the Commission and the governments and institutions who contributed 
to its resources. In addition he offered reassurances from Auxilio Social that all the 
missing goods were accounted for and would be returned 161 However, in a later 
letter and in reply to Clarence Pickett's request for a copy of the agreement made 
with the Nationalists in March, Kershner admitted that no written confirmation of 
the agreement had ever been received. He had been advised by the British 
representative in Burgos that it would be undiplomatic to insist on a written 
agreement, but insisted that with the exception of the missing shipments all 
"'Howard Kershner, report: "Three Weeks in Spain", April 1939, Committee on Spain, 1939. 
Corns. and Orgs,: Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain (Box 11). 
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160Statement to the AFSC, 29 June 1939. Controversy: Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
"Howard Kershner to Clarence Pickett, 27 June 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: 
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agreements had been kept 
162 Neither Florence Conard, who was refused 
involvement in the canteens, the workers in Murcia, where three hospitals had 
been 
closed, nor the Jacobs, who lost all control over distribution, would 
have agreed 
with this statement. 
Howard Kershner did make genuine efforts to secure the return of the food, 
writing directly to both General Franco and to General Antonio Aranda 
163 
However, the matter was complicated by his inability to fix on the number of 
shipments which had gone missing. In his letter to General Franco it was seven 
shipments; in a statement to the American Friends Service Committee, it was five 
or six shipments. 1 His statement to the AFSC also contained comments which 
were almost designed to be inflammatory. Kershner insisted that of the thirty-one 
workers in Spain none had been forced to leave. "Those who left did so from 
personal inclination and because they felt their usefulness had come to an end. " 
Apart from Dorothy Morris, who was advised to leave because of former service 
as a nurse with the International Brigade, 115 there is evidence from both Alfred 
Cope, Emmet Gulley and Florence Conard that they left because, whilst not 
physically compelled, they felt their presence to be unwelcome. Sylvia Pitt and 
Rachel Marshall were not actually thrown out but were forced out of their jobs and 
residence. In fact, they had to get Kershner's support to be able to leave. 166 Kershner 
wrote with astounding complacency: 
It ordinarily requires two to three months to get permission to leave 
Spain, but in view of the splendid work which these people had 
"Ibid. 
"Howard Kershner to General Franco, 28 April 1939; Howard Kershner to General Antoni 
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done, permission was granted immediately 167 
Kershner's comments implied that these workers had abandoned their posts. In an 
attempt to discredit the evidence of Alfred Cope he asserted that far from hanging 
on as he had said, Cope had been anxious to leave despite the offer of work under 
Auxilio Social in Alicante. However, Cope's arrival in America in June rather than 
March suggests that he did not leave in great haste 1" Kershner complained: 
It is unfair for Alfred Cope to say our representative was 
forced to leave Albacete. It is true that he was told to get out or he 
would be put in gaol. This statement was made during the change 
by an uninformed official, but David Luscombe or any other of our 
workers could go back to Albacete armed with a salvo-conducto to 
go anywhere in Spain and a letter of credentials from the National 
Delegate of Auxilio Social, both of which our workers now carry 169 
Florence Conard, in her letters from Madrid, was explicit that her work was being 
hindered and increasingly constrained. As was discussed in Chapter Six, it was the 
personal connections between donors and recipients which Friends regarded as so 
important which most offended Auxilio Social. To Howard Kershner, however, 
preserving good relationships with officials in order to facilitate the distribution of 
relief, took priority over contact between the Friends and the recipients. This was 
a valid point of view which recognised the simple importance of material aid, but 
it marked an important departure from the Friends' previous insistence that their 
work must offer a spiritual dimension. 
Florence Conard and Alfred Cope were also convinced that the relief work 
was increasingly partial. The accusation that Auxilio Social was discriminating 
against the children of "Reds" was one that Kershner vociferously denied, but 
Alfred Cope, Emmet Gulley and Emily Parker all gave personal testimony to 
117Howard Kershner, "Report of Mission of the Director to Spain, 13 April to 5 May 1939), 
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discrimination in feeding, and had reiterated their worries in a number of letters 1'0 
Furthermore, evidence existed in Earl Smith's reports that the Auxilio Social had 
never accepted the principle of impartial relief'71 
Perhaps most unfortunately, the statement which Kershner sent to the 
AFSC, he also released to the press. Furthermore, Kershner did not restrict himself 
to a simple repudiation of Cope's own statement. In his final paragraph Kershner 
explicitly exposed his own prejudices: 
That many people have been imprisoned by the Nationalists 
is well known. Personally, I think the number is excessive and quite 
unjustifiable. Nevertheless, when one reckons with the violence and 
lawlessness of the opposition and the equal if not greater degree of 
murdering and robbing that was conducted by the opposition, the 
present situation is quite understandable. At least the present 
Government has restored discipline and is proceeding in an orderly 
manner to the execution of what it considers to be justice. One may 
differ from this conception of justice, but at least it is not mob 
violence or lawlessness, and there is much in the present regime to 
commend it to those who believe in public order and discipline. l'2 
Kershner's view of Spain was entirely constructed through Nationalist eyes and, 
although he made clear his opposition to totalitarianism, his own instincts and 
organisational practices were autocratic and centralist. It is thus unsurprising that 
he felt able to express warmth and sympathy to the representatives of centralisation 
and "order". 
I consider a totalitarian government the greatest misfortune that 
could come to any people.. . [However] I have great sympathy for it 
on account of the difficulties which it faces and the highest 
admiration for the sincerity of many military, civil and Auxilio 
Social officials with whom I am personally acquainted. That they are 
170Clarence Pickett to Howard Kershner, 30 June 1939. Controversy: Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
17"Earl Smith's report", June 1938. Committee on Spain, 1938: Reports, General (box 9). 
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trying very hard to restore justice, good government and prosperity 
to Spain is beyond question 1'3 
Kershner was willing to ignore the fact that after three years in Republican Spain, 
the Barcelona unit had reported very little lawlessness or violence. Edith Pye had 
tried to edit it this statement, prior to its submission, but to no avail. 
I think it gives an equally wrong impression of the state of things in 
Spain. Perhaps not so much of the actual state of things, but it seems 
to me a reflection upon the state of things in the Spain we knew and 
loved and worked for under the Republic va 
Some Friends were outraged. One AFSC worker whose signature, unfortunately, 
is illegible, wrote: "Little did we think that we would come to having a Friend 
posing as an apologist of the Franco regime". " There was concern that a Director 
could repudiate the word of his field workers who had spent a great deal more 
time in Spain. Kershner's commendation of the Nationalists' "justice" brought 
particular outrage 176 Another Friend felt that it was not in the spirit of the 
testimony of the Society to indulge in a public discussion of the merits of one form 
of government over another, a stance which Kershner, for all his vehemence, 
claimed to support. In his own eyes, he was the public advocate for neutrality, 
whilst Cope was the advocate of partisanship 17 
Kershner was considerably hurt by the response which his letters received. 
His initial hope that the effect of the Cope statement would blow over in Spain was 
undermined as knowledge of its contents spread. As far as he was concerned Cope 
had the disadvantage of having seen the war only from one side; he refused to 
admit that he himself was at the same disadvantage. He also argued strongly that 
1'3Ibid. 
"'Edith Pye to Clarence Pickett, 29 June 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: Cope. 
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Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
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Cope's estimates of the number of Italian soldiers in Spain were a wild guess and 
already out of date. However some of his arguments were disingenuous. Declaring 
that only one of the missing shipments was in fact Quaker food did not invalidate 
Quaker concern for the return of the other shipments. He agreed that Auxilio Social 
had refused milk to babies; he had witnessed it but claimed that it was due to lack 
of supplies. He did not answer the challenge that Auxilio Social had been giving 
milk to healthy adults 178 In self defence he argued that the key to Quaker work in 
Spain was not to feed the hungry-a statement made often by other Friends-"any 
decent philanthropically minded person might have done that and did", 
but to have stayed through the change and shown forth an attitude 
of patience, understanding and love when the Nationalists came, 
was the greatest opportunity for demonstrating the Quaker way of 
life that I have ever seen. I am very sorry to say that with a few 
exceptions, this opportunity was not realised and that most of our 
representatives did not rise to the occasion. 79 
This rather unpleasant dig at Alfred Cope ignored the fact that Kershner himself 
had not served under two administrations and did not have to make a transition. 
Emily Parker, in one of her last letters, had been very clear about her willingness 
to serve under the new regime 180 In his autobiography, a book not printed by any 
of the Quaker presses, Kershner wrote rather insultingly, 
The experience of those who were unable to make the adjustment 
had been entirely in the Republican zone. They had not had the 
benefit of associating with any of the fine people on the Nationalist 
side. They seemed to feel that there was nothing to be said on behalf 
of the Nationalists or any of their works 181 
Although the workers in the Republican zone had either begun with or had 
'Howard Kershner to Clarence Pickett, 29 June 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: 
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developed sympathies with Republican aims, particularly in the areas of child- 
welfare and literacy, this ignored the evidence that both the Barcelona and Murcia 
units had served successfully with Spanish workers who had turned out to have 
Nationalist sympathies. Furthermore, the units had had their offers of co-operation 
spurned and their projects forcibly closed. In addition, Kershner was not in Spain 
in May when Alfred Cope left and did not return arrive until 24 June 182 He was 
also absent from the field during the two other major crises, the fall of the Republic 
and the fall of France. 
Despite Kershner's protestations, at the end of June the Board was 
convinced that the information provided by Emmet Gulley's report substantiated 
that of Alfred Cope and despite Kershner's assertions that neither could be 
considered impartial, both were probably accurate 13 Because Cope himself had 
never claimed to be wholly impartial his account was more plausible. Writing to 
his family (a letter which passed through the AFSC) he stated: 
Internally, Spain was never meant for Fascism, or Communism or 
Anarchism. Its development into a republic may be deferred, but not 
stopped by a Franco victory. Thus, while I admit my sympathies are 
with the people on the side I am working, it seems that the 
secondary results of our feeding on a large scale will not be for the 
bad and may diminish the total evil somewhat 1M 
Writing to Henry Cadbury, one of the founders of the AFSC, Cope had also argued 
that, "Our realization of what basic Quaker concepts of religious freedom, and 
attendant democracy, should lead us to the right course to followi1O Although 
Florence Conard expressed herself disturbed at Cope's statements, her own letters 
182 [bid. 
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to Emmet Gulley had supported much of what Cope had said'' Clarence Pickett 
believed that as it was Emmet Gulley who had had the boat-loads of food removed 
from his care and had seen other food stocks taken away and sold, he was probably 
correct in his facts. 87 Emmet Gulley, who had by July 1939 returned to the USA, 
generally supported Alfred Cope's statements although both men felt that there 
had been some distortion of Cope's original comments. Clarence Pickett was 
inclined to believe Alfred Cope but felt that it did not help relations with Spain. "' 
An extra problem, however, was that John Reich was in Paris at the time of both 
releases, accompanying Howard Kershner on his duties. Although Reich had been 
extremely supportive to his field workers, this was his first visit to Spain and he 
was dependent upon Howard Kershner for chaperonage and guidance. Inevitably 
he viewed circumstances through Kershner's eyes and met only the people with 
whom Kershner dealt 189 Reich, still on tour with Kershner, wrote in support of 
Kershner's stance, and indicated that substantial amounts of food had been 
returned 190 In fact no acceptable restitution was made until November and this still 
fell short of the total food which had been taken, despite Kershner's rather dubious 
assertion that a settlement based on food prices within Spain for goods bought 
abroad (resulting in less food returned than taken) was fair"' A particular 
problem was that Cope, Gulley and Parker felt that the feeding should draw to an 
end, as they were reluctant for the AFSC to become associated with partisan 
feeding; Kershner felt this would only convince the Nationalist that the Quakers 
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Orgs.: Friends Service Council Correspondence, from/ to (Box 10). 
190John Reich to Clarence Pickett, cable, 6 July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: 
Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
19'Kershner, Quaker Service..., op. cit., p. 97; Howard Kershner to Clarence Pickett, 30 
November 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
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were indeed "Reds". He was probably right; however his mode of expression was 
again an apologia for the Nationalists' actions, condemning the Friends for using 
the Bishop's palace to house a children's dining room and a church as a food 
warehouse. 92 Kershner was adamant that he was not pro-Franco, and that he had 
"remonstrated with them" over some of their policies, but his tone was always anti- 
Republican 193 He made a rather revealing comment to John Reich in April 1939, 
which was in marked contrast to the experience of the AFSC and FSC workers in 
Barcelona and Murcia: 
We are liked and greatly appreciated at the top but it is difficult in 
some instances to get this attitude filtered down to the local people 
that one must deal with. It can be done and is being done but only 
with infinite patience and persistence 19a 
Kershner's sympathies were very much with the hierarchical structure the new 
regime embodied; his very choice of colleagues may have shaped his perception 
of events. Stanley Payne asserts that representatives of the Spanish fascist party, the 
Falange, were generally excluded from the upper echelons of government during 
the war and it was these upper echelons, predominantly military and often Carlist, 
with whom Kershner dealt most often. Members of the Falange instead "filled in 
the framework of local government"" at just the levels at which most of the relief 
workers were operating and as it was these levels which appear to have directed 
so much hostility to the overseas relied organisations. Relief workers in Murcia, 
Barcelona and in Burgos prior to the victory had relied greatly on local support. Its 
absence reinforces the impression that it was no longer possible to maintain an 
ideology of collaboration and co-operation. 
Kershner felt it outrageous that the Board should accept Cope and Gulley's 
"Howard Kershner to Clarence Pickett, 11 July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: 
Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
193[b1d. 
"'Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 22 April 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs : Intl 
Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
'"Stanley Payne, Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism, Stanford University Press, Stanford 
CA, 1979, pp. 202. 
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word without reference to the report of the Secretary of the Spain Committee on a 
fact finding tour 1% However, Kershner's hostility towards Gulley is problematic; 
until this incident he appears to have had the highest regard for Emmet Gulley 
whom he appointed to Valencia to replace Clyde Roberts. In March he had written: 
"We are particularly fortunate in having secured the services of Emmet Gulley. He 
has already won the affection and co-operation of the entire force in Central and 
Southern Spain .... I cannot speak too 
highly of the quality of the service he is 
rendering. i197 His protestations that Gulley was unreliable, consequently ring 
rather hollow. 
Kershner's relationship to the AFSC was a difficult one. He seems to have 
regarded their reaction to the controversy as a personal betrayal and ignored his 
own contribution to the situation. With regard to Kershner's independent press 
release, Picket commented that he had not thought of contacting him when the 
news broke about the contents of Cope's (authorised) press release because: "I 
never before have known anyone abroad who was representing the Service 
Committee to give a release without consulting the office here" 198 Kershner's belief 
that he did have the right to speak independently for the International Commission 
caused problems in that he was inextricably identified with the AFSC and anything 
he said would be identified with them, '" In September John F. Reich cautioned 
Walter Woodward of The American Friend not to publish Kershner's revised 
statement on Spain. "He is not correct in assuming that the International 
Commission is an independent organization. It must, at all times, be correlated to 
the Society of Friends if Friends are to maintain any responsibility in the Spanish 
''Howard Kershner to Clarence Pickett, 11 July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: 
Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
'"'Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 7 March 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: Intl 
Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, Jan-July (Box 11). 
'"Clarence Pickett to Howard Kershner, 20 July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: 
Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
'"Ibid 
316 
relief field. "200 Walter Woodward subsequently forwarded letters from Kershner 
to himself in which Kershner complained that the most important part of his 
statement, that on what he thought to be the proper Quakerly attitude had been 
cut. Like many, including the AFSC, he sought an end to this matter, but felt that 
if Clarence Pickett thought it appropriate to continue the debate then he would 201 
In July 1939 it was decided that despite the problems, and taking into 
account promised restitution for the missing food, the International Commission 
would continue feeding beyond August202 A statement was made to this effect to 
the press, attempting, where possible, to smooth over any difficulties caused by the 
controversial nature of Cope's and Kershner's comments? 03 However, it was not 
felt that the AFSC could continue to raise funds for Spain. The most they could do 
was to continue to support the remaining workers, including the Kershners, and 
to begin moral support of those refugees arriving in Mexico, important because the 
International Commission had decided that its remit did not run to Mexico? 04 
Despite the pledges of support which Kershner received from the AFSC he 
refused to let the matter drop, perhaps because they reiterated their faith in Cope's 
and Gulley's reports. Kershner complained that he had been personally betrayed, 
having given his pledge that all the workers were "fair and impartial, and the type 
of people who would not concern themselves with politics", something which he 
200John F. Reich to Walter Woodward, 7 September 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. 
Controversy: Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
201Walter Woodward to Clarence Pickett, 9 September 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. 
Controversy: Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
202Although the Nationalist authorities were clearly not overly concerned to preserve the 
inviolability of foreign agencies' food supplies from their own expropriations, they did not 
encourage pilfering and were willing to act against generalised looting. In 1942, Jose Perez de 
Cabo was executed for selling Auxilio Social flour on the black market. Payne op. cit., pp 215- 
216. 
203Statement to the New York Times, 20 July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: 
Cope-Kershner, re-Franco; Clarence Pickett to Howard Kershner, 20 July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
204 Clarence Pickett to Howard Kershner, 20 July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: 
Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
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had no right to do as Friends do not operate on group pledges205 In August Alfred 
Cope received a cautionary letter from John Reich which contained the following 
extract of a letter from Howard Kershner: 
... More serious 
[than food shortages] from our point of view is that 
the fact that the Cope release has been translated and more or less 
circulated in Spain. One of Cope's former drivers received a letter 
from Alfred Cope a short while ago and was promptly put in gaol... 
the very fact of having received a communication from Cope was 
sufficient to incriminate this man. Cope should be warned 
immediately not to write to anyone in Spain. 
... Burgos replied that in 
his judgement and in the judgement 
of the officials of Spain, Cope will always be regarded as a spy... I 
think our contacts have been friendly enough and solid enough so 
that we will have no difficulty in retaining them, but for a long time 
there will be a big question mark in the minds of nationalist Spanish 
authorities in regard to us and our workers? " 
In August Alfred Cope, who had kept relatively silent on the matter, wrote a 
lengthy letter to Howard Kershner on the advice of an acquaintance who worked 
in international law. In this he stated that he considered his own account to be 
"more in accordance with the facts" and based on better evidence207 He felt 
strongly that he had to make some statement so that his acquiescence did not pass 
into the record. 
There are many who hope that you can effectively obtain de 
facto restoration of the remaining goods involved, regain control of 
the food outlets in Spain, and do something realistic to investigate 
and alleviate the difficulties some of our former workers suffer 
20'Howard Kershner to John Reich, 21 July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: Cope- 
Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
'Howard Kershner to John Reich, 22 August 1939; John Reich to Alfred Cope, 25 August 1939. 
Committee on Spain 1939, Corns. and Orgs : Friends Service Council Correspondence, from/ to 
(Box 10). 
207Alfred Cope to Howard Kershner, 23 August 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: 
Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
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through jail or restrictions before glowing reports of progress are 
issued. The greatest hope is that in these matters the name of the 
AFSC as administrator may be kept in good order. This does not 
mean alone the winning of the good graces of Franco, other 
governments, or gaining international prizes much as these may be 
hoped for; I refer also to certain traditional values which may only 
be discovered by reading Quaker history rather carefully, and 
reexamining our spiritual condition. 
I must reject as untimely recent statements to the effect that 
staying in Spain is good pacifism as true but aside from the issue. 
We should be good pacifists, but I also believe that one should not 
hide difficulties in administration by saying that what has been done 
had been effected for the sake of pacifism. It is possible to be good 
pacifists and good administrators 208 
Understandably Howard Kershner did not take the accusation of venality lightly, 
nor the accusation that he did not understand Quaker pacifism, and in a letter he 
again attacked Cope's initial statement point by point, and took issue with this last 
point in particular209 Kershner seems to have been determined to destroy Cope's 
credibility. In Chapter Twelve of his autobiography, "A Difficult Adjustment", he 
went to great lengths to present his view of events whilst avoiding all mention of 
Alfred Cope's name or the decision of the AFSC to accept Cope's version of events. 
The acceptance of this book as one of the established records of Quaker activity in 
Spain has done a great disservice to all the Friends who served in Republican Spain 
and should be read only with the understanding that it is deeply partial and 
unreliable. Whilst it is clear that Cope's original statement was ill-advised, in that 
it made life difficult for those still in Spain, there is no evidence that he was 
deliberately attempting to mislead. 
By late July, only one-third of the total amount of missing foodstuffs had 
zosp0id. 
209Howard Kershner to Alfred Cope, 14 September 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. 
Controversy: Cope-Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12), 
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been returned? " In reply to Alfred Cope's continuing concern on this matter, Reich 
had written that Kershner continued to emphasise his confidence that full 
restitution would be made and that short of "camping on official doorsteps" 
nothing more could be done 211 Kershner's promises that all would be returned, 
when made earlier in the year, had been received with some incredulity by Lillian 
Traugott. In June the food had been promised for three months and in September 
restitution had still not been made? " Although much of the food was eventually 
returned by the army, it was not, as had originally been intended, returned to the 
International Commission. Instead a compromise was reached whereby it was 
returned in Spanish rather than American estimates of value, and to the Auxilio 
Social who by August were the only public face of relief permitted? " The food was 
finally all returned to some satisfaction in October 1939 and as an 
acknowledgement, the remaining $100,000 of foodstuffs which the International 
Commission had earmarked for Spain was sent in? " In October Howard Kershner 
reported the winding up of the work in Spain. It had been decided to spend the 
remaining $100,000 allocated to Spain rather than transfer it to the refugee account. 
$25,000 was to be used for powdered or condensed milk, and for an invalid food 
made of 70% flour and 15% each milk and sugar, and $15,000 for medical 
equipment? "' However, the bitterness which the controversy with Alfred Cope had 
left is testified to by Kershner's refusal to accept Emily Parker's offer to work in 
n°Howard Kershner to John Reich, 21 July 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. Controversy: Cope- 
Kershner, re-Franco (Box 12). 
21John Reich to Alfred Cope, 5 September 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Cams. and Orgs-- 
Friends Service Council Correspondence, from/to (Box 10). 
212Lillian Traugott to John F. Reich, memo, 20 June 1939. Committee on Spain 1939. 
Correspondence: John Reich from/to-in Spain (Box 12). 
21Howard Kershner to John F. Reich, 11 August 1939. Committee on Spain. Cams. and Orgs 
Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, August-December (Box 11). 
214Howard Kershner to Clarence Pickett, 19 October 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs.: Intl Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain-Correspondence, from/to 
Howard Kershner, August-December (Box 11). 
25Report of Conference of Workers, Howard Kershner, 16 October 1939. Committee on Spain, 
Reports, General (Box 13). 
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France 216 Howard Kershner left the Society of Friends in the 1950s. 
Howard Kershner's directorship of the Quaker mission in Spain left 
uncomfortable and unpleasant memories in the minds of the relief workers. 
Kershner changed both the direction of the relief-acquiescing rapidly to the 
Nationalist demands that all work should be channelled through their partisan 
agencies-and its ethos. The Friends' units on both sides of the war had seen their 
work as separate from the war and its outcome, although many, particularly the 
Jacobs and Emily Parker, clearly hoped for a Republican victory. Crucially, 
however, prior to 1939 they had expressed their work through the strong 
relationships they maintained with the people around them and with little 
reference to the authorities and governments under whom they ostensibly served. 
Howard Kershner brought with him a new ideology which permeates his letters; 
his autobiography illuminates a man concerned to work with and through 
governments and who saw himself responsible to official authorities rather than 
directly to the recipients of the relief he dispensed. Crucially, he seems to have seen 
Spain and the Nationalist authorities as the recipients of relief, rather than the 
people. This sense continues throughout his work in France, where again there is 
rarely any mention in his letters of the people on the receiving end of the mission. 
Howard Kershner worked for Spain and for the refugees as an abstract; for the 
Jacobs, the Copes, for Esther Farquhar, Emily Parker, and the others it was 
intensely personal. 
26John F. Rich to Howard Kershner, 7 December 1939. Committee on Spain. Corns. and Orgs 
Int'l Commission for Relief of Child Refugees in Spain--Correspondence, from/to Howard 
Kershner, August-December (Box 11). 
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Conclusion 
The Friends' presence in Spain was motivated by very different impulses than 
those which operated in other organisations and this had consequences for Quaker 
practice: the Friends were not in Spain to support a political cause and 
consequently, they did not leave when the cause collapsed. Equally, despite their 
prioritisation of children's needs (the arguments for which were discussed in 
Chapters One and Two), they were not, unlike the Save the Children Union, in 
Spain specifically for the children. When adults became the majority of refugees in 
1939, the Quakers did their best to redirect their provision. Rather the Friends were 
in Spain to demonstrate their belief in the positive powers of peaceful cooperation 
and to witness to the presence of the Divine Light in all people. 
Perhaps the most crucial question to ask in this conclusion is to what extent 
the work in Spain was a successful witness to pacifism. It is clear from the early 
actions of Alfred Jacob and the letters of Sylvester Jones that when the work in 
Spain was first considered, it was this Testimony which was of primary 
importance; without the Peace Testimony there might be nothing to distinguish the 
Friends' work from the "merely" humanitarian. 
The FSC and AFSC were adamant that they were neutral participants in the 
war. However, by demanding this status they argued forcefully that neutrality 
could and should be an active and not passive position. The Friends publicly 
declared the principle of international responsibility and asserted that neutrality 
did not have to mean waiting for natural events to take their course. For the 
Friends, starvation was as final a cause of death as warfare; to permit the former 
was to engage in war no matter what declarations of neutrality were made. In this 
the Friends made a substantial contribution to long-term developments in 
international politics. Although blockades still take place, it is unusual for 
blockades of foodstuffs to be deemed acceptable. 
Publicly, the FSC and the AFSC maintained their corporate witness by 
serving on both sides of the lines. Although Friends had in the past made a point 
of assisting both the victors and the vanquished in the aftermath of war, this was 
the first time they had successfully served as an outside agency on both sides of an 
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ongoing war. However, until the fall of the Republic it is an uncomfortable fact that 
the AFSC rarely had Quaker workers based with the Burgos unit. Until the arrival 
of Howard Kershner, who may have been selected precisely for the right-wing 
orientation which so offended many of his field workers, the Burgos unit relied 
almost entirely on Brethren and Methodists. Without personnel files, which do not 
seem to exist, it is impossible to assert whether this was deliberate or coincidental, 
nor is it clear whether this issue is significant. Did the failure of the AFSC to 
establish a Quaker presence in Nationalist Spain indicate a left-wing bias on the 
part of the Committee? It seems unlikely: the AFSC was anxious to operate in 
Nationalist Spain but it relied heavily on securing willing workers. This in turn, 
however, leads one to question the individual neutrality of the Quaker workers in 
the Republic. 
Although all relief workers volunteered knowing that they could be sent to 
either zone, it seems clear that many of the relief workers in the Republican zone, 
whilst somewhat suspicious of communist and socialist rhetoric, identified strongly 
with many of the social ideals of the Republic. In particular they welcomed the 
opportunity-which the Republic seemed to offer-to introduce mass education 
to Spain, and supported the general faith in an emerging order of social justice. It 
was inevitable, therefore, that the relief workers in Murcia and Barcelona, whilst 
not regarding themselves as Republican supporters, would direct their sympathies 
to that government, and be somewhat dismayed by the policies of the Nationalist 
regime. Their personal beliefs were subsequently often rather less than neutral, but 
it is important to recognise-before faulting these people for failing to live up to 
their own ideals-that they were prepared to attempt relief work under the 
Nationalists and that for the most part they consistently maintained an outward 
neutrality in their everyday actions. Their reasons for leaving varied but for Emily 
Parker and Alfred Cope, the actions of Howard Kershner were as significant as 
those of the new authorities. Their assignments to Republican Spain mayhave been 
a simple recognition by the AFSC of where these individuals would be most 
effective. 
It is worth reiterating how apparently unaware most of the Friends were, 
prior to 1939, of the allegiances of their Spanish colleagues or of the political in. 
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fighting which surrounded them. The allegiances of the relief workers were very 
much to the Spanish people rather than to the authorities, and the Friends appear 
to have been mostly indifferent to the turmoil which was apparently taking place 
around them. This aspect of their behaviour and experience is significant in another 
way. The history of this war has typically been written by those with strong 
political allegiances or who were themselves involved in the political changes 
which were occurring. That the Friends in Barcelona could be oblivious to many of 
the local political disputes suggests that historians may need to re-examine in the 
future just how significant such events were to the average inhabitant of the city. 
The importance of the Friends' witness to peace and to neutrality was 
displayed best by the decision to remain in Spain after the fall of the Republic when 
many other agencies began to withdraw. It is also in this area that we can see the 
importance of the corporate testimony over and above that of the witnesses of 
individuals. Although the majority of the relief workers who served during the 
Republic did leave within months of the Nationalist regime taking hold, the 
despatch of new workers to replace those who departed ensured the continuity of 
the corporate Quaker witness. 
If neutrality was one of the hallmarks of the Quaker witness as publicly 
displayed to the outside world, amongst Quakers and the Quaker relief workers 
there was an additional concern to distinguish the work from the "merely" 
humanitarian. To modern ears, this sounds odd. What was it about humanitarian 
work which the Friends regarded as inadequate? The answer to this can be seen in 
a brief comparison of Quaker work in the Republic and the non-Quaker AFSC 
work in the Nationalist zone. The Burgos Unit was involved very much in 
distributing humanitarian war relief: a short term expression of sympathy to the 
"innocent" victims of war. One of their major concerns was that they did not 
become involved in alleviating more long-term poverty. Whilst Quaker relief in 
Murcia and Barcelona might have been selective, it was motivated not by 
humanitarian sympathy but by a pacifist witness which refused to acknowledge 
any distinction between the "innocence" of combatants and non-combatants, or 
between the Spanish recipients of relief and their "neutral" donors. A request from 
the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom in 1936 for example, 
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"asking that we appeal to the chief Spanish leaders to show especial mercy to 
women and children, hostages etc., " drew forth the comment: "Considerable 
discussion reveals insufficient unity for us rightly to go forward in this matter. ", 
The difficulty lay with the implied legitimation of the killing of combatants and 
male civilians contained within the request. Thus the Quakers did not believe that 
some were less due sympathy than others and further, they were usually reluctant 
to acknowledge any fundamental distinctions between war-time or peace-time 
poverty or to accept that the poor might deserve their poverty. The incident with 
the Fifth Quarter (the vice district) in Barcelona (Chapter Two) was unusual. The 
only issue which mattered was that each individual had that of the Divine Light 
within him or her, and this entitled all to long-term social justice, not to pity or the 
transient sympathy expressed in humanitarian relief. 
This insistence on social justice and the distinctiveness of Friends' relief was 
further emphasised by the Quaker insistence that means mattered as much, if not 
more, than ends. This emphasis-despite the Jacobs' occasional lapse into 
smuggling-distinguished the mission from 1936-39 from both the SCIU and the 
later policies of Howard Kershner. This privileging of means over ends also 
distinguished them, in the final analysis, from both the secular professionals whom 
the AFSC workers often seemed anxious to emulate, and the religious missionaries 
within whose paradigm the FSC unit appeared to operate. In contrast to 
professional social workers of the period, the Friends emphasised that their role 
was to facilitate and empower, to work with people not for them-an approach 
with spiritual benefits for both Spanish and foreign personnel. Furthermore, the 
Friends emphasised the importance of leaving communities able to sustain and 
expand upon the work initiated. Whilst the Friends admired professionalism and 
where possible sent out professionals they did not want to create a culture of 
dependency. In addition, whilst the American Friends often adopted the rhetoric 
of professionalism it needs to be recognised that this rhetoric was tempered by the 
difficulty of finding spiritually suitable and professionally trained personnel. 
The belief in creating indigenous expertise was a growing trend amongst 
missionary societies of the period, anxious, like the Friends, to expand operations 
'FSC: Draft Minutes of the Peace Committee, #100, Thursday, 1 October, 1936, p. 104. 
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as cheaply as possible and increasingly aware that an indigenous organisation had 
a better chance of survival. However, for all that the Friends were anxious to put 
down roots, and despite the previous missionary experience of a number of the 
American workers, they fiercely rejected religious (although not always scientific) 
proselytising and were very cautious what message they left behind. Although 
keen to contribute to the future spiritual and intellectual development of Spain, the 
Quaker relief workers did not wish to be the source of cultural conflict. The 
Friends' belief that children should not be sent abroad was both a rejection of a 
very expensive means of relief, and a rejection of one aspect of the result, that of 
separating children from their families and culture. Although the Quakers never 
totally abandoned the hope that a Quaker mission might be possible after the war, 
they regarded as immoral the use of colonies or evacuation proposals to influence 
Spanish children. Quite prepared to teach hygiene and domestic skills in the 
colonies, the Quakers nevertheless comprehensively rejected the idea of interfering 
in the transmission of indigenous culture, placing emphasis on the use of Spanish 
responsables wherever possible. Because of the importance of this belief that the 
mode of operation mattered as much as material achievements, the Friends existed 
in an uneasy but productive tension between the modern science and 
professionalism they admired, the missionary ideologies which a number of the 
workers brought with them and the weight of Quaker principles. 
In her desire to assert the modernity of Friends' ideology and practice in 
Ireland, Helen Hatton quickly loses sight of the role of the Inner Light in the relief 
practices of the Friends. A similar issue exists in relation to the work in Spain. 
Because the Friends, AFSC workers in particular, were anxious to assert their 
modernity and their rejection of active proselytisation it is easy to lose sight of the 
important part which faith and their witness to peace played; most of the field 
workers talk little of their faith in their letters home. However, for modern, liberal 
Friends, the theological emphasis is on silent witnessing for Christ and public 
emphasis on good works: as was the case for many missionaries in other fields, 
'Helen E. Hatton, The Largest Amount of Good. " QuakerReliefin Ireland 1654-1921, McGill- 
Queen's University Press, Kingston and Montreal, 1993. 
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"the sacred and the secular were mutually sustaining"? Faith mattered enormously 
to these workers: it motivated their actions beyond any belief in humanitarianism 
and it helped to maintain the organisations in the field when others had retired 
from the cause or turned their attention to more immediately fashionable disasters. 
However, it is not clear all the relief workers continued to believe that their work 
was an adequate witness to peace in the face of war. Alfred Jacob rejected his 
qualms: 
We are almost tempted to feel that all our work has gone for nothing 
... [but]... we 
hope and believe that for some of our most valuable 
fellow-workers contact with the ideas of Quakerism has opened up 
new possibilities of service.. . we have learned 
how fine human 
nature can be even in the midst of cruelty and destruction, and how 
imperishable are the things for which men think it worth while to 
die 4 
But Jacob clearly came to believe that whilst fighting might be wrong, not all causes 
were unworthy. However, in part perhaps because of their sympathies for the 
Republic and because the workers in the Republican zone experienced the 
hardships of blockade and bombardment to an extent not shared by their 
colleagues in Burgos or the later AFSC workers in Marseilles, a number of AFSC 
and FSC workers came to doubt their own commitment to pacifism and the 
adequacy of relief work as a witness. Emily Parker, as we saw in Chapter Three, 
came to reject what she felt to be the "stock answers" of pacifists and went home 
with more questions than she had answers. ' Norma Jacob, who went on to be a 
regular employee of the AFSC, recalled in later life: 
I went into that war as a pacifist, and I've never been as good a 
'Kristine Swenson, "Ministering to Bodies and Souls: British Medical Missions and Women 
Doctors in the 1880s and 1890s" in Nineteenth Century Religion and the Fragmentation of 
Culture in Europe and America, Conference Papers: Stream li, Women's Interventions in 
Religious Traditions, Lancaster 1997, p. 13. 
4FSC Bulletin no. 33,4 July 1939, Committee on Spain 1939. Corns. and Orgs: Friends Service 
Council-Friends Service in Spain, Bulletin (Box 10). 
5Emily Parker to Grace Rhoads, 24 February 1939. Committee on Spain 1939, Individuals: 
Parker, Emily (Box 13). 
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pacifist since because Barcelona was heavily bombed, usually on 
Sunday mornings... You'd go up on the roof and you'd watch the 
bombers coming in and the defending fighters going out to get them. 
It's not possible to wish, you know, that they would miss... I'm not 
as good a pacifist, since then, as I had been 6 
In contrast, Dorothy Bonnell, who served in Marseilles in the early 1940s, could 
write, "In time of bitterness, hatred and energetic pursuit of cruelty, we try to 
demonstrate another way of life... we try to show that some men can still try to 
behave like Christians. "' Clearly, to be part of a war had a very different effect on 
the Friends' Peace Testimony than did clearing up in the aftermath. The doubt 
which some workers expressed, however, should not be seen as a sign of 
failure-Emily Parker and Norma Jacob, for example, both went on to do further 
relief work whilst Alfred Jacob, the most committed, perhaps, to Spain settled 
down to organic farming-instead, it should be seen as a process of struggle with 
a difficult and complex witness which has continually to be shaped to the 
circumstances in which it is practised. Quaker willingness to continually reinvent 
and adapt the Peace Testimony may be a factor in its longevity. 
From 1936 to 1942 British and American Quaker relief workers were active 
in feeding and clothing over 150,000 children of Republican and Nationalist Spain. 
From their initial beginning as a Quaker mission centre in Barcelona the Friends 
developed their work along the east coast of Republican Spain and in the villages 
around Burgos: in order to remain active they had to recognise the often 
secularised or hostile context in which they worked and during this period came 
to sublimate their religious witness within an apparently wholly practical project. 
Yet within this context the Friends actively witnessed to the testimonies to peace 
and social justice which lie at the heart of Quaker belief: for the Friends in Spain, 
feeding the children was a sacred, not a secular activity. 
6Karin Lee, op. cit., p. 5. 
7"Inter-Office Letter" forwarded to Europe Committee, by Dorothy Bonne11, AFSC worker in 
Marseilles, 22 may 1941. Letters from AFSC (Box 24). 
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APPENDIX A: 
Receipts and Expenditure 
1. International Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees, London, 1940, p. 42. 
SUMMARY O-F'' ,R E-C E-T-F TS 
APRIL 1,1940 
Gifts in kind L 251,447 
Governmental grants in cash 182,657 
Public subscriptions 19,649 
Private subscriptions 30,606 
Total £ 484,359 
Unexpended balance, fully allocated 
for continuing-the most urgent of 
our services 20,000 
Amount required monthly. to carry 
on the work £ - 9,000 
For French relief work, contributions dbould be, sent to 
The Committee of Mercy, 
254 Fourth Avenue, New York city. 
or 
The American Friends Service Canmiuee, 
20 South Twelfth Street, Philadelphia. 
Contributions for Spanish ielief work should be sent to 
The American Friends : 
_` ,. 
_, 
":, .ý: 20 South Twelfth Street, P ilJd« Via, 
- 42 -- ' 
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2. FSC, Quaker Service in Spain, 1936-1940, Friends Service Council, London, 1940, 
pp. 21-23. 
GIFTS IN KIND 
We record our grateful thanks to all those who have so kindly 
donated gifts in kind for the furtherance of the Spanish work, 
including bedding, clothing, educational materials, foodstuffs, 
household equipment, lorries and cars, medicines and vaccines, 
soap, etc., making a total value of C8,4z3 os. od. 
The following list will give contributors some idea of the variety of such 
sasst & Dossom, LTD. Barley sugar. 
BIIauNGRAm FazErms' SPANISH CHIWRENs 
R=mF Fu ND .... .... 
Clothing, Soap, Milk. etc. 
BmuiNGH" FarF s .. Standard Nine Car. Boum vmu WosSEU' Associ&rioN .. Tinned vegetables, ae. Isuc Burrxw. ura & Som .... 
Soap. 
Boanoucus Wrs & Co. .... Medicinal 
Supplies. 
C. wsux: -Fir, Lrn. .... .. 
Cocoa and Milk powder 
Chocolate. 
Gsamca GRouP (per Miss E. W tv- 
cHOaN) .... .... .. 
Malt and Cod-liver oil, 
Calcium Tablets, Marmite, 
Vitamin capsules. 
CLARKS NIcKou. s & COOAMBs, LTD. .. 
Various confectionery. 
DR. D. 1. COLLIER 
. And-dipbtheritic serum. t 
DANISH FRIENDS .... .... 
Milk, Codfish, Shipbread, 
Tinned meat, Soap. Uoth- 
B. FrNcarx & Co., LTD.. .... 
iagt etc. 
Coffee, " Force " 
FRaNDS' MEETINGS AND SCHOOLS .. Condensed and Dried Milk, Soap, Educational material. 
W. R. JACOB & Co., LTD. .... Biscuits. 
. EVER l os ci IN 
sT ý .... .... LISTEIL nes, Serum. High Vac 
potency bulbs. 
Sm HAROLD MACKINTOSH .. " Toffee, Caramels. SPANISH NATIONAL JOINT Con srrrEE FOR 
RELIEF 
.. 3 ton 
Bedford truck. 
" Nsws CHRONICLE" AND " TIRE AND 
Ting ° .... .... Paper (reel ends). Noawet: IA. v FRIEND .... .. 
Clothing, Kippered Herrings 
, Soaý Oil ,. etc THE MISSES PILYINGTON 
.... .. 3 toll Bedford t ruck, 
R. H. PILrENGToN, Esq. '.. .... 3 ton Bedford truck. QUAKER OATS, LTD. .... .. Quaker Oats. SIR RICHARD REES, BART. .... Ford car and Scales. 
SHUTrt ewoRTH & Co., LTD. .... Chocolate. SWEDISH FRIENDS 
.... .... 
Qothingý 
Li F d Mess OLGA TuRNF. a .... .. ver oo s and Medical Supplies. 
Rossar WHEEIXR .... .... 3 ton Bedford truck, Half ton van,, Aluminium cooking 
utensils, Typewriter. 
In addition. 6, ooo tons of wheat aas sent direct to Catalonia per the American Friends' Service Committee. 
11 
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APPENDIX B: 
Domingo Ricart and his Impact 
Domingo Ricart is the only one of the Spanish assistants who attains a clear and 
delineated personality in the letters which the Friends sent home. Although he 
rarely spoke directly to the FSC, he maintained a continuous presence throughout 
the mission in Barcelona, from 1936 to 1940. His aid was particularly important as, 
although Jacob spoke Castilian, he did not speak Catalan, and Ricart took on the 
role of translator, mediator and, as Norma Jacob came to spend much of her time 
with the children's colonies at Puigcerdä, second-in-command. ' Ricart left very 
little personal writing (his historical works, held in Haverford library, are 
extensive), but the weight of his presence is embedded in his relationship with 
Alfred Jacob. 
Domingo Ricart was raised a Catholic, in common with most of his 
contemporaries. However, he had begun to question the church's teachings whilst 
still at school in Barcelona: "We read some text about Luther, about how depraved 
and terrible he was. But the same page had a quotation from Luther that made 
more sense than what the text told about him. "' He went on to study in Paris and 
by 1936 was working in Barcelona and on the board of the YMCA. He was by this 
time a committed pacifist, but was not aligned with any one church. In a talk he 
gave in 1940 during a year spent at Woodbrooke, the Quaker centre in 
Birmingham, Ricart recalled that having "solved a long, deep and anguished" 
religious crisis by leaving the Catholic Church he had found the satisfaction of his 
most immediate spiritual needs in the Calvinist Swiss Reformed Church. In 
particular, he relished the "uncompromising recognition of the absolute and direct 
Sovereignty of God without human intermediaries"? When Alfred Jacob arrived 
in Barcelona, Domingo Ricart welcomed him as the first pacifist he had met. 
A few days after our first contact with Alfred Jacob, we took him to 
our home, and then began the most complete and deep friendship 
that I have ever made. Two and a half years of life and work in 
common, sharing anxieties and dangers, joys and difficulties, bind 
people together for ever 4 
The spiritual connection between the two was strong and Domingo Ricart offered 
Alfred Jacob both office space at the YMCA and lodgings with him and his wife, 
Margarita de las Barreras. When the unit eventually moved to a house, Hogar Luis 
'FSC: Minutes of the Spain Committee, 22 December 1936. 
'Nancy Dawson. "Domingo Ricart: A life of Seeking and Serving", in Fri ends Journal, February 
1988, p. 6. 
'Domingo Ricart, "The Society of Friends and Spain", address given to Monthly Meeting, 
Birmingham, 9 November, 1940. 
'Domingo Ricart, "The Society of Friends and Spain", op. cit., p. 1. 
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Vives, Domingo Ricart and his wife moved as part of the unit, he as the second 
administrator and Margarita as the housekeeper 5 
However, unlike Alfred Jacob, Domingo Ricart did not view Quakerism as 
a spiritual form suitable to the Spanish soul and, despite discussion and study with 
Jacob, it was the work of Friends which initially made the greater impact. By 1940 
Ricart saw the Society of Friends on a path which he would like to follow. During 
a year spent at Woodbrooke he became convinced that the Spanish mystical 
tradition, embodied by Juan de Valdes, was "amazingly coincident" with the 
thoughts and writings of George Fox. 
In common with Alfred Jacob, Ricart, although an intellectual, was a 
believer in practial Christianity and was most impresed by Quakers in action rather 
than with Quaker doctrine. His ideas for post-war missionary activity included 
experiments in practical Christianity and "The application of Christian principles 
of social justice". ' However, his notions of social justice were channelled by his 
opinion of the morality of the recipients. Thus it was Ricart who persuaded Alfred 
Jacob, early in the war to reject the authority's request for a canteen in one of the 
vice districts of Barcelona. " The significance of this should not be exaggerated: 
moral and spiritual care was a major concern for Friends, as will be examined in 
chapter four, and neither Esther Farquhar nor Francesca Wilson were averse to 
selecting recipients n the grounds of moral worth, but this case was unusual in 
forming a reason for exclusion from care rather than inclusion. 
APPENDIX C 
The following notes from a Miss Girsberger, a missionary in Shanghai, were 
reported in an article in The Evanglical Friend in 1938. 
We are still quite busy in the camps. Christian work is being 
done in eight camps, and we inspect seven of these, besides, for the 
Red Cross. The latter consists in checking up on the food, sanitation 
and everything that has to do with the welfare of the refugees .... In 
some camps we have regular preaching services. Group meetings 
and children's meetings are held where it is possible; and in two 
camps we have Bible classes for the Christians and those who are 
specially interested in the Gospel.. . We have found a goodly number 
of Christians in the camps. Our deep desire is to bring them all to 
Christ... 
"Missionary", Walter R. Williams, The Evangelical Friend, June 1938, p. 7. 
'Nancy Dawson, op. cit, pp. 6-7. 
'Domingo Ricart, "The Society of Friends and Spain", op. cit, p. 2. 
7lbid. 
"Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 16 January 1937, FSC/R/SP? 1/1. 
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APPENDIX D: 
FSC's Canteens and Colonies, 1938 
CANTEENS IN BARCELONA 
Sans ...................................... supported 
by F. S. C. 
Carmen ....................................................... 
F. S. C. 
S. Andres ..................................................... 
Norway 
Luis Companys refuge .............................. FS. C 
CANTEENS I N CATALONIA 
Sabadell .......... .................... supported 
by A. FS. C Puericultura 
Direct distribution 
Tarrasa ............ ........................................... A. FS. C. 
Refugee Canteen 
Manresa .......... ........................................... 
A. FS. C. Refugee Canteen 
Vich ................. ........................................... 
A. FS. C. Refugee Canteen 
Granollers .................................................. 
A. FS. C Refugee Canteen 
Igualda ........... ........................................... A. 
FS. C. Puericultura 
Direct Distribution 
Gerona ........................................................ 
A. FS. C. 
Caldas Malvella ............................................ 
FS. C. 
CHILDREN 
3 500 
30 
350 
325 
400 
800 
400 
225 
250 
300 
110 
N. B. Puericultura means that the infants are fed in a welfare centre under the auspices of a 
doctor. 
COLONIES 
Rubi ....................................... supported 
by Birmingham 50 
St. Helens 25 
Asistencia Infantil 95 
Paris 20 
Caldas de Malvella ........................................ 
Birmingham Asistencia Infantil 85 
La Noguera Manresa ........ Denmark Pro-infancia Obrera 85 
Solerbotey ....................................................... FS. C. Ayuda Infantil 100 
OTHER RELIEF WORK (Food and Milk for Refugees. 
Manresa, Igualada y Reus (Cantina Swiss 300) 
N. B. In certain places there are transient refugees who recieve food and milk so that the 
numbers vary from week to week. 
CHILDRENS' COLONIES 
[names of organisations supported] 
Ayuda Infantil 
Asistencia Infantil 
Pro Infancia Obrera 
Auton6mas 
AID IN GOODS Ayuntamiento Barcelona (Town Council Social service) 3.0009 
'Dorothy Thompson to john Reich, 25 April 1938, Committee on Spain, 1938: Correspondence-Barcelona (Jacobs) (Box 7). 
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APPENDIX E: 
Personnel 
FSC Workers in Spain. 10 
William Bremner 
Kanty Cooper*f 
Arthur Egerton 
Signe Fredholm (Swedish) 
Lydia Gee 
Anthony Gilpin 
Donald M. Groom 
Dr. Martin Herford 
Alfred B. Jacob* 
Norma Jacob* 
Bronwen Lloyd Williams 
Angus McCowen 
Muriel McDiarmid 
Dermod O'Donovan (Irish)*f 
Lucy M. Palser*f 
Janet Perry 
Richard Rees (volunteer )*f 
Domingo Ricart (Spanish)* 
Joyce Richards 
Dr. Audrey Russell*f 
Elise Thomsen (Danish)* 
Dorothy Thompson 
Robert Wheeler (volunteer) 
Francesca Wilson* 
J. Cuthbert Wigham 
Barbara Wood. * 
* served in Spain for more than a few months. 
f also served in France. 
In addition to the above, the following workers were appointed by the Friends 
Service Council on behalf of the American Friends' Service Committee for their 
hospital work in South-Eastern Spain. 
G. Irene Callon 
Jean Lyall Cottle 
Margaret de Culpeper 
Marie E. J. Elmes 
Ann Hathaway 
Bessie Hobson 
Margaret Hope 
Marjorie Kent 
Dorothy Litten 
Rachel D. Marshall 
Dorothy Morrisf 
Norah Morris 
Sylvia Pitt 
Doris Shaw 
f also served in France. 
AFSC Workers in Republican Spain: 
Florence Conard 
Alfred Cope 
Sylvester Jones 
D. Park Lantz (Mennonite 
Central Committee) 
Ruth Cope Emily Parker 
Esther Farquhar Clyde Roberts 
Levi Hertzler (Mennonite Central Committee) Martha Rupel 
Eleanor Imbelli (originally of the Swiss Committee) 
10QuakerService in Spain, 1936-1940, Friends Service Council, London, 1940, p. 20. 
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AFSC Workers in Nationalist Spain: 
David Blickenstaff 
Paul Bowman 
Howard Kershnerf 
Emmet Gulley 
Wilfred Jones 
Earl Smith 
Dan West 
also served in France. 
AFSC Workers in France included: 
William Brebner 
Donald R. Darling 
Margaret Frawley 
Helga Holbeck 
Gertrude T. Kershner 
David T. Luscombe 
Patrick Murphy Malin 
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